The part about American observations of Japanese armor units in China came directly from Robert Cameron’s book. I’m not doubting you, but could you provide a bit more details.More properly, imperialist Italy under the Moose and the Spiritualist faction of the IJA.
1. WWI Esercito was a rifleman and artillery based force that developed after an incredibly steep learning curve the tools and techniques of mountain warfare. They had considerable French and British help. At the time they were frankly considered an Entente liability by 1917.
2. Interwar the Italians lacked the economic strength to modernize their army to the degree that they modernized their navy and air force. Benny the Moose did not help matters with his politicization of the otherwise professional Italian military from 1927 onward.
3. The Italian mid-grades and junior officers were very conscious of their men's problems, but there was not a whole lot they could do about it with Commando Supremo and the top field slots filled by political appointees and incompetents and with so little budget for equipment, training and troop factors.
4. Pfui on Rommel. He abused the Italians worse than any German I've researched. What the Italians accomplished after they got their act together in North Africa was in spite of Rommel, not because of him.
5. Italian performance when they were out from under Bagladaccio and Grazziani was "fair to good". Artillery was excellent. Mountain troops and paratroopers probably as good or better than their German counterparts. Blackshirt units were garbage. Italians fought HARD when they chose to fight, and that is the difference. When they understood they were being misused, like the French or ANY sensible soldiers, they would defend up to a point, but not attack. And they refused to fight for a corrupt regime unlike the Germans or the Japanese.
1. The Japanese have a group consensus tradition. You are not going to see a lot of rugged individualists like ADM "King Kong" Hara or GEN Yamashita. Once the group has a theory and a consensus it will take a huge effort to change minds.
2. Death or glory attacks (banzai charges) were last gasp efforts to inflict maximum damage before the Americans inevitably massacred them. The Pacific War was a racist war on both sides with no quarter asked or given. This colored fighting attitudes by BOTH militaries. No prisoners except for intelligence purposes was the norm until the Japanese finally broke. It took a LOT of effort to break them. Refer to 1. .
3. If Italian field grades were concerned about their men, the IJA field grades were concerned about their NATION. They were thoroughly indoctrinated in the necessity to think about the Japanese polity as being surrounded and threatened by Western Imperialism. The example they had was CHINA next door. As such the Japanese mid-grades were highly self-politicized and had a two competing theories that drove their radical politics. One was China must be rationalized and added to Japan to strengthen East Asia so that the foreign barbarians could be thrown out. Asia for Asians so to speak. The other political problem/solution/fight was how to bring China into the firm in spite of the West. In military terms this was a fight between the "materialists" and the "spiritualists" or more properly, "the human factors" and "the mechanistic factors" factions. One IJA group wanted to train the soldier and use him attritionally to overcome equipment deficiencies in main force against the West. The other group wanted to use equipment as well as training and NIBBLE the China problem one small bite at a time and try to sneak up on the solution. The political assassinations and coups the majors and colonels staged were the policy disputes inside the IJA spilling over into whichever IJA faction put their man into the national government as war minister. Tojo was a spiritualist and he was the train-wreck.
4. Both military organizations had learned the Isonzo and Mukden lessons. Machine guns and artillery = lots of dead for the attackers. Both militaries would LOVE to find ways around this problem. The IJA thought they found it in infiltration and small unit maneuver tactics through difficult terrain. They were right. Right until the end of the war, as long as the Japanese could find a gap, seam or flank they were dangerous attackers, who outfought and outthought their allied opponents. The only way to make sure of them was to continuous front them and keep the pressure on by constant recon patrols and small unit brawling at the line of contact.
5. By contrast the Esercito was far more conventional (very Austro Hungarian) in tactics and doctrine, relying on massed leg infantry and artillery in the attack and trenched camps and infantry boxes in the defense. Against a motorized enemy this fighting scheme is going to fail.
6. Oh, hello, no. Yamashita and Homma understood tank warfare quite well. They handed Perceival and MacArthur respectively their asses with armored operations not too dissimilar to France 1940 only on a smaller scale. Similarly at Khalkin Gol, the Japanese found it was lack of numbers and the quality of gear that failed them against the Russians who out-died them and defeated them through numbers, better bulk logistics and Zhukov who pulled a surprise flank assault on them when they overextended.
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7. Uhm, no. The island defense was an IJA/IJN misread of how airpower works as a denier of use. They thought RIKKOs would be like a wall instead of as an attrition sponge that makes the enemy bleed but does not keep him from slicing into an island airfield system defense. Also the IJA/IJN did not realize as the Americans did, that the Pacific Ocean is a supply desert. Everything has to be shipped forward including fresh water.
8. China is HORRIBLE tank country as the Americans found out when they tried to armor up the nationalist Chinese. Armored trains and motorized and pack mule supported infantry is the norm. Infantry is a premium and artillery beyond the railroads and supply heads almost impossible to supply cross country. The IJA had the trucks and the railroad logistics advantage right to the end of the China war.
10. The Chi He was by 1940 world definition a MEDIUM tank. It was the main battle tank of the IJA. There were just never enough of them.
11. Tell that to Littorio or Ariete who had to pull Rommel's carcass out of the fire on numerous occasions. Might remark that Italian tanks of the 1940 and 1941 period were competitive with British cruisers. Just never enough of them. Semoventes (Stugs Italian style.) were DEADLY with Italian infantry support.
12. Might add that 90% of the Axis logistics effort in North Africa was ITALIAN. DAK logistics? What is logistics? The Germans were the clown club, not the Italians.
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13. IJA/IJN staff work was generally outstanding.
14. American observers in China came to exactly the opposite conclusions. Japanese armor operations were restricted by logistics handicaps and the small size of forces available. When used the IJA armor was well used.
15. The IJNAS provided fully half of the IJA CAS and recon support, especially in the southern resources area and the coastal regions of China.
16. Generally accurate except the field grades seem to know what they did. Add that Italian artillery and engineers and quartermaster units were good to excellent. Logistics was often lacking in supply items available, but what was there got to the front intact and not missing parts or training manuals or such as sabotage as one finds with the British.
17. Fair with the caveats I noted.
Good sources. Mine are Hyperwar, and the USAWC studies series on the Pacific war. Generally in agreement, with the caveats I specified.
Imperial Japanese Army vs Royal Italian Army
- Thread starter Marius Mazzini
- Start date
The part about American observations of Japanese armor units in China came directly from Robert Cameron’s book. I’m not doubting you, but could you provide a bit more details.
Good source. And I think it IS accurate, but contains some misunderstandings about how logistics hobbled armor operations in China in the 1930s and 1940s.
https://www.amazon.com/World-Japanese-Tank-Tactics-Elite/dp/1846032342
Good primer with recent scholarship. Then there is Hyperwar for the American campaigns where the Japanese used tanks in the Philippine Islands
McP.
The artillery regiment of a Japanese division varied based on the division in question. Generally there were 8 classifications as of 7 December 1941: A1, A2, A3, A1 (mountain), A2 (mountain), B, B (mountain), and "S." Their composition was as follows:
A1: 2 battalions with 75mm guns, 2 battalions with 105mm howitzers (24 x 75mm, 24 x 105mm)
A2: 1 battalion with 75mm guns, 2 battalions with 105mm howitzers, and 1 battalion with 150mm howitzers (12 x 75mm, 24 x 105mm, 12 x 150 mm)
A3: 3 battalions with 75mm guns, 1 battalion with 150mm howtizers, (36 x 75mm, 12 x 150mm)
A1 (mtn): 3 battalions with 75mm mountain guns (36 x 75mm)
A2 (mth): 2 battalions with 75mm mountain guns, 1 battalion with 105mm mountain howitzers (24 x 75mm, 12 x 105mm)
B: 2 battalions with 75mm guns, 1 battalion with 105mm howtizers (24 x 75mm, 12 x 105mm)
B (mtn): 3 battalions with 75mm guns (36 x 75mm)
"S:" To my knowledge, "S" signified a "special wartime" regiment and was generally similar to Type B in its composition. However, there could also be a hodgepodge of guns that didn't resemble any particular template. Additionally, a common arrangement later in the war was for a two-battalion mountain artillery regiment of only twenty-four 75mm guns; these came about after the two-battalion Independent Mountain Artillery Regiments were absorbed into divisions.
Here is the breakdown by arty regiment type for all Japanese divisions active on 7 December 1941:
A1: 20th, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 2nd, Guards, 5th (7 total)
A2: 12th, 1st, 14th, 24th, 8th, 10th, 16th (7 total)
A3: 23rd
A1 (mtn): 7th, 19th, 9th, 11th, 25th (5 total)
A2 (mtn): 28th
B: 53rd, 54th, 57th, 51st (4 total)
B (mtn): 52nd, 48th
"S" (field): 32nd, 26th, 35th, 110th, 34th, 39th, 15th, 17th, 116th, 104th, 56th (11 total)
"S" (mtn): 29th, 36th, 37th, 41st, 27th, 13th, 40th, 22nd, 38th, 33rd, 55th, 18th, 21st (13 total)
Aggregate: 51 divisions
(Source: Leland Ness, "Rikugun: Guide to Japanese Ground Forces 1937-1945). Note that these are only templates and the reality did not necessarily correspond 100% to the above.
Japanese infantry divisions also had mountain guns as regimental artillery, typically 12 per division. These had a maximum range of over 7,000 meters and could also be used in an AT role. There were additionally various non-divisional artillery units that appeared at the corps-level and up.
In the Kwantung Army, there existed for a period of time an army called the "Kikogun," or 'Mechanized Army.' It comprised 2 tank divisions and some smaller units. According to General Shinichi Tanaka there were about 900 tanks in the Kwantung Army during the summer of 1943. In addition to this, the First General Army on Honshu had what was called the "Kido Dageki Butai," or "Mobile Shock Force." This consisted of two tank divisions and seven armored brigades and was intended to be used during the planned counterattack against the anticipated American beachhead.
More generally, the Kwantung Army as a whole and the Southern Army during the initial offensive in 1941-42 tended to be well-motorized by Japanese standards. In particular, the 5th, 48th, and Guards divisions were designated "motor-type" divisions and had no horses or carts except in medical units. The artillery regiments in these divisions were re-configured as follows: 2 battalions with 2 batteries of 75mm guns and 1 battery of 105mm howitzers, plus 1 battalion with 12 75mm mountain guns. Based on this, there were 16 75mm guns, 8 105mm howitzers, and 12 75mm mountain guns per division. Of the 'motor-type' divisions, the 5th and Guards initially fought in Malaya while the 48th fought in the Philippines; all three ended the war in the Dutch East Indies and saw no combat after mid-1942. (Ness pp. 95-96) During its operations in Malaya, the Japanese 25th Army under General Yamashita used about 3,000 trucks while the 16th Army in the Dutch East Indies was allocated 5,898 motor vehicles when combined with airfield units.
On the whole, however, the number of trucks in the entire Japanese military never surpassed 100,000: according to the USSBS the peak was 83,000 at the end of 1942.
Even so, I don't believe the Italians ever fought to annihilation Iwo Jima style. Depends on the circumstances I suppose.
The Italians likewise had mountain guns at the regimental level and additional corps and army level artillery units. So the regular A divisions seem like they'd be superior to varying degrees. Regular B is about equal. S sounds like they'd generally be significantly worse off than the Italians.
Ok, so Japan fielded two mechanized corps level formations. Italy fielded three, the XX Motorized Corps (two armoured divisions and a motorized one), the Truck Borne Corps (one armoured division, one motorized, two semi-motorized), and the Rome Army Corps (two armoured divisions, a motorized division, and a regular infantry division*).
Mhm.
3,000 trucks for the 70,000 troops of the Malayan campaign means one truck for every 23 soldiers.
5,898 trucks for the 107,800 troops of the Dutch East Indies campaign means one truck for every 18 soldiers.
The 8th Italian Army operating in the Don basin in mid 1942 had 18,000 trucks in service to its 229,000 troops, meaning one truck for every 13 soldiers. And the 8th army wasn't a heavily motorized force, having only two semi-motorized divisions amongst its ten divisions.
The Folgore Division was seemingly poised to do just that until Rommel approved their withdrawal. With reinforcements they were able to get back to battalion strength.
As tends to be the case in these theoretical vs battles.
Sorry for long response time; I was working on a post, but it was eaten 
The Italians didn't have battalion guns. I had a long list of differences, but again lost them. Suffice it to say the Italian divisions would have been badly outgunned in middle distances (3000-7000 meters) as well as long and short. "S" division artillery regiments were usually the same as B, but as I said there were always exceptions.
Based on what I saw of Niehorster's tables, Italian "metropolitan" divisions appear to be extremely weak compared to IJA divisions in terms of TO&E; only the N. Africa types look impressive.
As far as I'm aware, "Kido Dageki Butai" wasn't an official formation but rather a designation for certain mobile forces that would have taken part in the planned counterattack on Honshu. With regard to that, the 'main striking force' of the 12th Area Army around Tokyo was the 36th Army, which included two standard divisions, four mobile divisions, two tank divisions, an amphibious brigade, and two independent artillery regiments. In addition to these another 5-8 divisions would arrive as reinforcements. On Kyushu the equivalent force was 4 divisions and 3 tank brigades plus 2-4 more divisions arriving as reinforcements.
Well, I can't say anything here. Though, the availability of trucks in Europe through the Germans and various conquered countries was much higher than in Asia.
Folgore Division numbered only around 4,500 men and took something like 1,100 killed and wounded at Alamein. Without diminishing the hardship they went though, Japanese forces routinely saw 90-95+% death rates in the Pacific.
Furthermore, what major defeats did the Italians inflict on the Allies? Naval, aerial, or on land? Japan handed the US and Britain the worst military disasters in their entire histories and fought a savage campaign that ended only when they were hit with atomic bombs. The Japanese were surely more dangerous than Mussolini's regime.
The Italians didn't have battalion guns. I had a long list of differences, but again lost them. Suffice it to say the Italian divisions would have been badly outgunned in middle distances (3000-7000 meters) as well as long and short. "S" division artillery regiments were usually the same as B, but as I said there were always exceptions.
Based on what I saw of Niehorster's tables, Italian "metropolitan" divisions appear to be extremely weak compared to IJA divisions in terms of TO&E; only the N. Africa types look impressive.
As far as I'm aware, "Kido Dageki Butai" wasn't an official formation but rather a designation for certain mobile forces that would have taken part in the planned counterattack on Honshu. With regard to that, the 'main striking force' of the 12th Area Army around Tokyo was the 36th Army, which included two standard divisions, four mobile divisions, two tank divisions, an amphibious brigade, and two independent artillery regiments. In addition to these another 5-8 divisions would arrive as reinforcements. On Kyushu the equivalent force was 4 divisions and 3 tank brigades plus 2-4 more divisions arriving as reinforcements.
Well, I can't say anything here. Though, the availability of trucks in Europe through the Germans and various conquered countries was much higher than in Asia.
Folgore Division numbered only around 4,500 men and took something like 1,100 killed and wounded at Alamein. Without diminishing the hardship they went though, Japanese forces routinely saw 90-95+% death rates in the Pacific.
Furthermore, what major defeats did the Italians inflict on the Allies? Naval, aerial, or on land? Japan handed the US and Britain the worst military disasters in their entire histories and fought a savage campaign that ended only when they were hit with atomic bombs. The Japanese were surely more dangerous than Mussolini's regime.
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No worries, sorry to hear that you lost your work.Sorry for long response time; I was working on a post, but it was eaten
Not all of them did, but at least in motorized and armoured divisions the infantry battalions had been reorganized to include 47mm gun platoons in 1941.
Navally, their biggest blow was probably delivered with the Alexandria Raid which retook initiative and numeric superiority in the eastern Mediterranean at essentially no cost.
In the air... Yeah I got nothing lol the RA was the most misused and over politicized arm of the Italian Military. I guess keeping Malta's naval facilities out of action was their biggest achievement, but the fact that they never put Malta's airbases out of action undercut pretty much all strategic value that may have had.
On land, well I assume you won't count anything involving Rommel (even though Italians made up most of those under his command, his entire logistical system, and his immediate superior was Italian) so I can't point to the capture of Tobruk (the second biggest British capitulation of WWII). I guess I also can't cite the Battle of Garfagnana which halted the allied advance for three months, as it also had German involvement (though the majority of the troops were Italian, and the operational commander was an Italian General). So I'll say securing the Dnieper crossing at Petrikowka (because Messe was a chad and didn't need no Germans bossing him around).
Definitely. But I still don't think the difference was such that a Japanese division would reliably beat an Italian corps.
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Trust me as someone (me) who has to use spell checker and a dictionary constantly, that IS both funny and very, also, very true. The Japanese, especially their navy (Savo Island) often failed to finish the schwerpunkt (objective or the whole point of the mission laid on.); when they executed an operation.