IJN Soryu's and USS Wasp's Durability and Usefulness

[TxAggie]

I think the Japanese used Soryu correctly, by only running it as part of big carrier fleets. With armor that could be punched through by a 500lb bomb or a 5" destroyer gun, it was always going to need a large escort to head into battle. But it only carried 3/4ths the planes of a larger carrier like Akagi or Kaga, so it wasn't really suited to be the centerpiece of a task force either.

Being the 3rd or 4th carrier in a large battle group suited it. It could add a big punch to an existing fleet, while receiving enough of a screen and safety-in-numbers to remain alive. Think of it more as a side dish than the main course. The milkshake you order once you already have the burger and fries. For a 15,000 ton ship, that's good enough.

 

[McPherson]

You do know that the Allied Submarine Ace of Aces was British right?
David Wanklyn sank a greater tonnage than Richard O'Kane.

USS TANG. You might want to read her history.
5 Patrols ~93,722 tonnes (JANAC). 23-24 kills. Richard O' Kane., HE is the Allied ace of aces. USS Tang was killed by a circular run. Tang was fighting in an area just between Taiwan and then Rikyuku Islands. Tanker alley. Japanese air patrols and escorts thick as fleas. I might point out O'Kane was fighting during the "torpedo crisis".

Murphy knows what he would have done with torpedoes that worked?

David Wancklyn Depending on sources; sank 16-18 vessels of about 92,000-115,000 tonnes over 25 patrols and was killed by RMS Pergaso in a depth charge attack most likely off Tripoli while he tried to work in shallow.

Of course neither of them was even close to Otto Kretschmer.
Also your own source points out that "...the U-Boat arm faced the most efficient anti-submarine force operating in WW2, namely the Royal Navy." The most successful Anti-Submarine commander of WW2 was Captain Johnnie Walker RN.

Not until 1943. The Royal Navy should not be too ecstatic over their results between 1939 and 1943.

You also seem to be missing that the British Sank 2.4 Million tons of Axis Shipping in the Mediterranean, Submarines are not the whole story, and did cut the Italian SLOC. By 2nd El Alamein the tonnage of supplies delivered had dropped to a thirteenth of its peak. (I suggest Alamein by Stephen Bungay for a succinct analysis) And that was heavily dependant on Air-Supply. Italy lost 72% of its entire merchant tonnage in the campaign.

The Royal Navy sank 1.6 million tonnes of merchant shipping total. That is for all theaters of war. They might have sunk 400,000 tonnes of warships, But I doubt it. I suggest 330,000 tonnes is more likely.

 

[McPherson]

USS Wasp CV-7 had not a very good AA as this was just the eight 5 inch/38 guns mounted in pairs in the four courners, with no realistic backing of reliable medium and light AA, as the four quad 1.1 inch mountings were a nightmare to operate and prone to jamming and the mix of a few 20mm and .50 cal MG's was inaddequate. Wasp needed escorting warships to mount a realistic FLAK against enemy aircraft in the Guadalcanal timeframe.

BTW, Soryu had a heavier but slower rate of fire main heavy AA outfit, but as all IJN CV's and warships in general lacked the backup of medium and light AA with a capability to do damage against large numbers of enemy aircraft. the 25mm weapon used was not the best weapon in general.

That is not her Mediterranean record. USS Wasp did well.

 

[edgeworthy]

USS TANG. You might want to read her history.
5 Patrols ~93,722 tonnes (JANAC). 23-24 kills. Richard O' Kane., HE is the Allied ace of aces. USS Tang was killed by a circular run. Tang was fighting in an area just between Taiwan and then Rikyuku Islands. Tanker alley. Japanese air patrols and escorts thick as fleas. I might point out O'Kane was fighting during the "torpedo crisis".

Murphy knows what he would have done with torpedoes that worked?

David Wancklyn Depending on sources; sank 16-18 vessels of about 92,000-115,000 tonnes over 25 patrols and was killed by RMS Pergaso in a depth charge attack most likely off Tripoli while he tried to work in shallow.

Not until 1943. The Royal Navy should not be too ecstatic over their results between 1939 and 1943.

The Royal Navy sank 1.6 million tonnes of merchant shipping total. That is for all theaters of war. They might have sunk 400,000 tonnes of warships, But I doubt it. I suggest 330,000 tonnes is more likely.

Wanklyn took HMS Upholder on 27 Patrols, she was lost on the 28th, not counting the six he made as the Captain of HMS H31.
And according to sources sank 128,353 tons of enemy shipping, including 6 warships, 3 of them submarines.

 

[McPherson]

Wanklyn took HMS Upholder on 27 Patrols, she was lost on the 28th, not counting the six he made as the Captain of HMS H31.
And according to sources sank 128,353 tons of enemy shipping, including 6 warships, 3 of them submarines.

Kane did more with less and that against some tough circumstances. YMMV, but the American by objective metric did better.

In her five patrols, Tang is credited with sinking 31 ships, totaling 227,800 tons and damaging two for 4,100 tons. This record is unexcelled among American submarines. In her first patrol, spending February 1944 west of Truk and Saipan, she sank three freighters, a large tanker and a submarine tender. Tang's second patrol was in the area west of Palau, east of Davao and at Truk. She made no ship contacts worthy of attack, but at the latter island she rescued twenty-two Navy airmen during a carrier based strike at Truk on 30 April-1 May 1944. This vessel's third patrol was in the East China and Yellow Seas. Here she sank six freighters, a tanker, and a large aircraft transport. She covered the waters along the southern coast of Honshu in August 1944. She sank a freighter, a large transport, a tanker and two patrol craft, while she damaged another freighter and small craft.

And unlike the British captain, Kane survived.

 

[Kantai Kessen]

I think the Japanese used Soryu correctly, by only running it as part of big carrier fleets. With armor that could be punched through by a 500lb bomb or a 5" destroyer gun, it was always going to need a large escort to head into battle. But it only carried 3/4ths the planes of a larger carrier like Akagi or Kaga, so it wasn't really suited to be the centerpiece of a task force either.

Being the 3rd or 4th carrier in a large battle group suited it. It could add a big punch to an existing fleet, while receiving enough of a screen and safety-in-numbers to remain alive. Think of it more as a side dish than the main course. The milkshake you order once you already have the burger and fries. For a 15,000 ton ship, that's good enough.

Good point and analysis. I think she'd work well with the Cranes and Kongos then in a post-alt-Midway setting.

If Soryu is a side-dish, I guess making her a pure fighter carrier is a bad idea - if she is lost, which is likely, the entire force loses much-needed cover. I think this aircraft composition might work then, in a late 1942 setting?

• Shokaku (flagship CarDiv1): 27 A6M Zeroes, 18 D3A Vals, 27 B5N Kates
• Zuikaku: 27 A6M Zeroes, 18 D3A Vals, 27 B5N Kates
• Soryu: 36 A6M Zeroes, 18 D3A Vals, 9 D4Y1-C Judys (this is the reconnaissance variant, which was in service in late 1942 and was even present at Midway).

This allows the carrier force to launch two 81-plane strikes, each of the form:

• Shokaku/Zuikaku: 6 Zeroes, 18 Vals
• Zuikaku/Shokaku: 9 Zeroes, 27 Kates
• Soryu: 12 Zeroes, 9 Vals, 2 Judys (to guide the strike to the target, which was done IOTL)

In total, 27 Zeroes, 27 Vals and 27 Kates apiece. Pretty good ratio and strength IMO. Each carrier will retain 12 Zeroes for CAP (3 in the air at any time and a chutai's worth in reserve), while Soryu's remaining 5 Judys can be used to augment the search capabilities of the carrier force alongside the two Tone-class cruisers. This gives 4+4+5 = 13 recon planes, which, along with other cruiser-based floatplanes, should allow for a pretty comprehensive combat search (NB: Tone and Chikuma never carried more than four operational planes).

Problem is, all of the aforementioned carriers are very fast, at 33-34 knots, and so will only really work with the Kongos. Hiyo and Junyo are just 25 knots, Ryuho is just 26 knots and Zuiho, Chitose and Chiyoda are 28 knots though - this will make fleet operations more complicated and mean that a significant part of the carrier force will have to be left behind in some situations. Perhaps the Falcons and Ryuho will be held back to work with Nagato and Mutsu, which is of a similar speed. This might allow those 16.1-inch-gunned BBs to get into more combat situations in 1942, filling in for the giant fuel binger that is Yamato - who is being saved for the most important situations.

 

[Kantai Kessen]

That is not her Mediterranean record. USS Wasp did well.

Wasp did a good job in the Med, yes. Unfortunately that was against the Luftwaffe who were not the best at RIKKO. Put her against the much-more-competent-at-killing-ships IJNAS (it was what they were literally made to do) and she will suffer.

I can also find no evidence that Wasp received AA augmentations before she went to the Pacific. That means that, worst-case scenario, she will be trying to fend off waves of Vals and Kates with just her eight 5" guns and the crappy 1.1-inch autocannons, with maybe some .50 cals to provide morale support. I don't she is going to last long in that scenario unless her escorts are exceptionally well-endowed with AA - which, in 1942, they are not yet unless they happen to be USS North Carolina. Admittedly Washington had been assigned to serve with her in the Home Fleet so perhaps she can escort her into the Pacific as well. Nevertheless, since Wasp has not been bulged, she remains horrifyingly vulnerable to torpedoes, and her deck armour is weak as well.

It's also worth noting that, in 1942, despite the heaviness of AA in all four of the carrier battles, Japanese attack planes consistently got through and landed hits. I think it likely that in any engagement, barring the intervention of God, Wasp WILL take damage - and she is screwed then.

 

[CV12Hornet]

Problem is, all of the aforementioned carriers are very fast, at 33-34 knots, and so will only really work with the Kongos. Hiyo and Junyo are just 25 knots, Ryuho is just 26 knots and Zuiho, Chitose and Chiyoda are 28 knots though - this will make fleet operations more complicated and mean that a significant part of the carrier force will have to be left behind in some situations. Perhaps the Falcons and Ryuho will be held back to work with Nagato and Mutsu, which is of a similar speed. This might allow those 16.1-inch-gunned BBs to get into more combat situations in 1942, filling in for the giant fuel binger that is Yamato - who is being saved for the most important situations.

Hiyo, Junyo, and the light carriers were organized into essentially separate task groups from the fleet carriers post-Midway - and at both Philippine Sea and Santa Cruz the battleships, Kongos included, were supporting the smaller, slower carriers, not the fast fleet carriers. This was due to their penchant for posting the battleships, along with heavy cruisers, in an Advance Force deployed ahead of the fleet carriers that could soak up attacks and potentially engage in surface actions - that sort of setup would have likely forced Spruance to retire at Midway, for example, rather than stick around and keep bombing things.

Also, knowing how the Japanese - and in fact literally everyone else - organized their light carrier air wings it's highly unlikely that Soryu would go with all dive bombers for her strike complement. They will want to fit torpedo planes, especially since the Japanese preferred to land torpedo planes when they reorganized the carrier air wings to fit more fighters, probably because dive bombers were more useful for attacking aircraft carriers. I'd expect Shokaku and Zuikaku to keep their 27/27/18 ratio, while Soryu's would probably look more like 33 Zeroes, 9 Judys, and 18 Kates, if the goal is to fit more fighters and put up the strike numbers you cited.

 

[HMS Warspite]

That is not her Mediterranean record. USS Wasp did well.

According to this document it was not that well:

 

[McPherson]

According to this document it was not that well:
View attachment 629686

What has a description of build got to do with how her crew used her and how she functioned? As an example, the USS Nevada was a piece of crap as a built ship, yet she turned in a good service record. And if one compares the USS Wasp to HIJMS Soryu (title subject of this thread),. even as a build, it turns out the USS Wasp was still a better built, designed and used ship than that piece of floating junk.

Discussion.

Look here taken from that thread...

THAT is the constrictor one found in a Japanese aircraft carrier about mid hanger deck.

Now compare...

USS WASP CV7 (Note no hanger constriction by funnel uptakes as built?)

http://www.navsource.org/archives/02/020748.jpg

Discussion.

Article (USS Ranger)

Article>

Now I have to say that funnel trunking for an aircraft carrier...

HMS Queen Elizabeth back in home port as ‘fully trained
continues to be a problem for aircraft carrier designers who do not know what they are doing,..

File:USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67) bow view in 1991.JPEG ...

 

[McPherson]

Wasp did a good job in the Med, yes. Unfortunately that was against the Luftwaffe who were not the best at RIKKO. Put her against the much-more-competent-at-killing-ships IJNAS (it was what they were literally made to do) and she will suffer.

I can also find no evidence that Wasp received AA augmentations before she went to the Pacific. That means that, worst-case scenario, she will be trying to fend off waves of Vals and Kates with just her eight 5" guns and the crappy 1.1-inch autocannons, with maybe some .50 cals to provide morale support. I don't she is going to last long in that scenario unless her escorts are exceptionally well-endowed with AA - which, in 1942, they are not yet unless they happen to be USS North Carolina. Admittedly Washington had been assigned to serve with her in the Home Fleet so perhaps she can escort her into the Pacific as well. Nevertheless, since Wasp has not been bulged, she remains horrifyingly vulnerable to torpedoes, and her deck armour is weak as well.

It's also worth noting that, in 1942, despite the heaviness of AA in all four of the carrier battles, Japanese attack planes consistently got through and landed hits. I think it likely that in any engagement, barring the intervention of God, Wasp WILL take damage - and she is screwed then.

USS Wasp was sunk by I-16.

 

[McPherson]

USN CARRIER EVOLUTION VII: EARLY JAPANESE CARRIERS
(Seventh article in a series by Scot MacDonald. Reprinted with permission: Naval Aviation News, October 1962 pp. 39-42.)

This is fascinating insofar as it describes what the IJN thought it was doing with HIJMS Soryu.

“In the last analysis, the success or failure of our entire strategy in the Pacific will be determined by whether or not we succeed in destroying the U.S. Fleet, more particularly, its carrier task forces.” ADML Isoroku Yamamoto, IJN, 1942.

“I think our principal teacher in respect to the necessity of emphasising aircraft carriers was the American Navy. We had no teachers to speak of besides the United States in respect to the aircraft themselves and to the method of their employment … We were doing our utmost all the time to catch up with the United States.” FADM Osami Nagano, IJN, 1945.

I find those two quotes, particularly the last one, "ironic:" as it was the USN desperately trying to catch up with IJNAS and IJN aircraft carrier operational concepts throughout the war. If the Japanese gave chase to the Americans in the realm of naval aviation operational art, it was the deaf who led the blind.

But, on to HIJMS Soryu.

PORT-SIDE ISLANDS​

But the startling innovation was the introduction of small islands on the port side of the carriers Akagi and Hiryu. The remaining carriers had islands on the starboard (standard) side—of those that had them at all. Strategists planned to use these carriers in a formation that was unique. The lead carriers in the basic formation were to be the port-islanded Hiryu and Akagi, followed by the Soryu and Kaga. This would supposedly allow for a more compact formation with nonconflicting aircraft traffic patterns. This formation was used in the Battle of Midway.

(Ed. note: This explanation remains valid only if the carriers turned together to a flying course of about 90 degrees port. See the caption to the Hiryu photo above for a better explanation.)

Japan’s next venture into aircraft carrier construction was the Shokuku (Flying Crane) and Zuikaku (Lucky Crane). These carriers were kept fairly well under wraps, insofar as specifications are concerned. They were authorised under the very ambitious Fleet Replenishment Program of 1937, the same program under which the famed super battleships Yamato and Musashi were built.

Shokaku was laid down December 12, 1937 at the Yokosuka Navy Yard, while Zuikaku was started at Kawasaki Dockyard May 25, 1938. Basically, the ships had similar specifications. They displaced 25,675 tons standard, had a designed speed of 34.2 knots, carried 16 five-inch guns in twin mounts, and could carry up to 84 aircraft, although a normal complement was 73. There were no major differences between the ships. Zuikaku, however, was fitted with a bulbous bow, the first Japanese warship so designed. Shokuku was launched June 1, 1939, and completed August 8, 1941; Zuikaku was launched November 27, 1939, and completed September 25, 1941.

While HIJMS Soryu was built with the starboard island and down-drafted funnel arrangement (More on this space wasting feature in a moment.), the real significance is that from the very beginning... from the time of HIJMS Kaga and HIJMS Akagi, (1933) the IJN intended to mass their aircraft carriers in a single body.

HIJMS AKAGI

How do we know this to be true?

Early service

At this time, the IJN's carrier doctrine was still in its early stages. Akagi and the IJN's other carriers were initially given roles as tactical force multipliers supporting the fleet's battleships in the IJN's "decisive battle" doctrine. In this role, Akagi's aircraft were to attack enemy battleships with bombs and torpedoes. Aerial strikes against enemy carriers were later (beginning around 1932–1933) deemed of equal importance, with the goal of establishing air superiority during the initial stages of battle. The essential component in this strategy was that the Japanese carrier aircraft must be able to strike first with a massed, preemptive aerial attack. In fleet training exercises, the carriers began to operate together in front of or with the main battle line.

Reconstruction (HIJMS Akagi in 1935)

The modernization added an island superstructure on the port side of the ship, which was an unusual arrangement; the only other carrier to share this feature was a contemporary, the Hiryū.

See diagram for the tactical lunacy at work.

The theory was that the portsider islanded aircraft carriers (on the formation right and the lead two ships in the formation diamond) would lead the formation and their landing circuits would clockwise to the formation right. The starboardsider islanded flattops would be formation left and in trail and their landing circuits would be to their left and anti-clockwise. This was to tighten ship intervals and to keep the formation compact for ASW and AA defense. How did this work for the IJN in battle? NTG. The same landing loop confusion the Americans encountered when they first began to mass their own aircraft carriers in 1943 plagued the IJN from 1937 forward. Add to the confusion, the IJN doctrinal answer to dive bombers and torpedo plane attack of independent ship maneuver in S curves to throw enemy plane pilots' aims off, and any logic of mechanical solutions to multi-aircraft carrier land-on operations disappeared.

How did the Americans solve it?

Wagon wheel formation and they accepted stacking up the returnees and wait your turn in the stacked landing loops. All anti-clockwise and around the compass points of the wagon wheel, lead aircraft carrier goes first and lands on then the aircraft carrier to the right and so forth around the formation circle. When the trail flattop landed on her birds, then the land-ons were the next aircraft forward of her in formation and to the left of her until the circuit completed on the lead flattop. Then repeat as needed.

 

[Kantai Kessen]

USS Wasp was sunk by I-16.

I-19, actually. And that was not my point. I'm talking about a hypothetical carrier battle.

 

[McPherson]

I-19, actually. And that was not my point. I'm talking about a hypothetical carrier battle.

It was mine. The USS Wasp and her bodyguards was well drilled in air defense. It was anti-submarine warfare that was the problem.

15 September 1942:
At 0950, while running submerged, the soundman reports a contact with many heavy screws at 12-18S, 164-15E. LtCdr Kinashi orders I-19 to periscope depth. He makes a sweep with his 'scope but no ships are in sight.

250 miles SE of Guadalcanal. Captain (later Admiral) Forrest P. Sherman's USS WASP and Captain Charles P. Mason's (later Rear Admiral) HORNET (CV-8) are escorting a reinforcement convoy of six transports carrying the 7th Marine Regiment from Espiritu Santo to reinforce Guadalcanal. The carriers are steaming in sight of each other about 8 miles apart. Each carrier forms the nucleus of a task force. Captain George H. Fort's (later Rear Admiral) battleship USS NORTH CAROLINA (BB-55) is with the HORNET task force to the NE of the WASP force.

At 1050, Kinashi raises his periscope again. This time he sees a carrier, a heavy cruiser and several destroyers (Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes' Task Force 18) bearing 045T at 9 miles. Kinashi estimates the task force's course at 330 and begins a slow approach. The Americans, zigzagging at 16 knots, change course to WNW. Then at 1120, the target group again changes course -this time to SSE. WASP makes a slow left turn into the wind to launch and recover her aircraft - and heads toward the I-19.

LtCdr Kinashi estimates that his target is on course 130 degrees making 12 knots. At 1145, from 50 degrees starboard, he fires a spread of six Type 95 oxygen-propelled torpedoes at the enemy carrier from 985 yards. Two or possibly three hit the WASP and start an uncontrollable fire.

HORNET force continues a right turn to a 280 degree base course. Suddenly, an alarm is heard the tactical radio speakers from USS LANSDOWNE (DD-486) in the WASP's screen "... torpedo headed for formation, course 080!"

At 1152, a torpedo from I-19's salvo hits NORTH CAROLINA in her port bow abreast of her forward main battery turret. The blast holes the side protection below the armor belt and NORTH CAROLINA takes on a thousand tons of water. She takes on a five-degree list but counter flooding quickly levels her and she makes 25 knots. [4]

At 1154, a torpedo hits destroyer O'BRIEN's (DD-415) port quarter and another just misses HORNET. [5]

I-19 dives to 265 feet under the carrier's wake. The first depth charge explodes six minutes after the last torpedo hit. Soon the depth charges were exploding all around. American destroyers try to surround I-19 to attack together and finish her off. They rain down 30 depth charges.

At noon, WASP's avgas tanks explode. At 1515, two cruisers and destroyers abandon WASP and withdraw to the south. At 1520, Captain Sherman orders "Abandon Ship". The carrier is scuttled by five torpedoes from LANSDOWNE and sinks by the bow at about 2100. WASP suffers 193 killed and 367 wounded.

USS Radford presumably killed the I-19 just 75 km west of Makin on 25 November 1943.

RADM Noyes should have been court martialed.

 

[Kantai Kessen]

It was mine. The USS Wasp and her bodyguards was well drilled in air defense. It was anti-submarine warfare that was the problem.



USS Radford presumably killed the I-19 just 75 km west of Makin on 25 November 1943.

RADM Noyes should have been court martialed.

I wholeheartedly agree.

 

[HMS Warspite]

I-19, actually. And that was not my point. I'm talking about a hypothetical carrier battle.

In a hypothetical battle Soryu vs USS Wasp it will come to who will score the first hits and in this case USS Wasp lacked an experienced airgroup, which basically had no, or at best minor combat experience, versus a veteran airgroup on Soryu, with much more experience in especially anti shipping tactics. Equally USS Wasp did have a slight advantage in a slightly thicker belt and more concentrated deckprotection on her engine and boiler rooms, though it left larger parts completely unprotected as a result due to weight saving measures. One of her biggest flaws was her absence of any reliable form of underwater protection, also due to weight restrictions.

Basically Soryu, with her more experienced aviators will most likely get the upper hand in the fight, if she was able to strike first, something seriously possible as her aircraft outranged the ones on US Wasp. Coupled with USS Wasp not having the desired AA on her own, she either had to rely on her own fighters to protect her mainly, as well as other escorting warships, which in august 1942 was still not as good as it would be a few years later. (although significantly better than the AA on their opponents still.) USN aircraft control, especially fightercontrol was still in its infancy and basically not existing in this time, with the result the fighters did not provide the sort of defense they could have given later on, when more discipline was forced in the heads of the fighter pilots. Japanese pilots at this time were very disciplined and could operate with more primitive means more effectively than their contemporary USN aviators. So the air battle goes to the Japanese most likely.

As spoken US Wasp was not well protected against underwater damage, so she might survive some bomb hits, but not torpedoes put in her hull, unless very fortunate in a part of the hull outside the sections in the center of her hull, such as the tip of her bow, or extreme stern. Soryu was not much better off either, being equally leightweight in construction with just some splinterprotection basically on her vitals, defective internal fuelsystems and the famously inefficient damagecontrolparties. So Soryu could perhaps survive a few bombs on the ends of the ship, but would suffer major, or even catastrophic damage when hit in the center. (By bombs especially as the USN torpedoes were still horribly bad and more often failed to function, then doing their supposed job.)

So the theoretical fight (escorts and other factors excluded as a force on their own):
Soryu gets her search advantage due to her longer ranging aircraft (even the floatplanes on cruisers had a longer range then the USN CV borne aircraft at this time.) USS Wasp detects the enemy scout and prepares for the fight, not knowing yet where her enemy is. CAP is launched, ship prepared for damage and fuelsystems filled with CO2 gas. In the meantime her own scouts are searching for the enemy still, which is out of range still. Soryu strikes with a well coordinated compact strikegroups of around half her full airwing with equal numbers in fighters, divebombers and torpedobombers. (a grouping of 12 + 12 + 12 is a possibility) The CAP of the USS Wasp engages, but the constant chatter and screaming of exited pilots prevents normal communication and the F4F's go for individual targets, mostly the enemy fighters with challenge the USN fighters into dogfights. So the fightercover is not doing its job as expected. The strikplanes get on the USN taskgroup mostly unmolested and start their coordinated two anvil attack on the Wasp, ignoring the escorts completely. The weak AA at this time manages to shoot down several attackers, but more get through and attack the CV. Wasp gets two bomb hits and takes two torpedoes, with the first doing only moderate damage due to proper damage preventive measures taken before, but the two torpedoes do mortal damage as they knock out the power of the ship completely, leaving it dead and with a severe list in the water. (as happened to her larger halfsister USS Yorktown at Midway)

In the meantime the scouts of Wasp detect the Japanese at the extreme edge of their searchpattern and radio in the contact, but Wasp is in no shape to strike anymore with no power left to get aircraft in the air, as she cannot move into the wind anymore, being a motionless ship now. The severe list is not helping either. The Soryu strike returns to the mothership, about half of the planes lost, or shot up in some way. Before this the second strike, smaller than the first wave is flown off, but can get on the target unopposed as the CAP is gone already, either out of fuel, out of ammunition, or both. Finding an inmobile USS Wasp, some of the strike diverts to other targets, but fail to do much doing so. The rest of the attack, 4 torpedoplanes and 5 divebombers attack the Wasp again, scoring two more bomb- and two more torpedo hits sending the CV to the bottom, after a huge explosion. (Perhaps an internal fire created earlier, or by this attack toughed off a bomb magazine, of less likely a fuelbunker exploded???) The AA barrage of the escorting warships downs two planes, but it is over as Wasp is gone and Soryu is not.

Conclusion:
USS Wasp on its own is not a good option in any circumstance in any CV vs CV fight. In any logical operation USS Wasp at any time needed a second CV to operate with, primarily to lessen the weaknesses of the ship itself, as well as to add something else to shoot at for the enemy, as Wasp was not well build to take serious damage.

 

[Kantai Kessen]

USN CARRIER EVOLUTION VII: EARLY JAPANESE CARRIERS
(Seventh article in a series by Scot MacDonald. Reprinted with permission: Naval Aviation News, October 1962 pp. 39-42.)

This is fascinating insofar as it describes what the IJN thought it was doing with HIJMS Soryu.



I find those two quotes, particularly the last one, "ironic:" as it was the USN desperately trying to catch up with IJNAS and IJN aircraft carrier operational concepts throughout the war. If the Japanese gave chase to the Americans in the realm of naval aviation operational art, it was the deaf who led the blind.

But, on to HIJMS Soryu.


While HIJMS Soryu was built with the starboard island and down-drafted funnel arrangement (More on this space wasting feature in a moment.), the real significance is that from the very beginning... from the time of HIJMS Kaga and HIJMS Akagi, (1933) the IJN intended to mass their aircraft carriers in a single body.

HIJMS AKAGI

How do we know this to be true?

Early service

Reconstruction (HIJMS Akagi in 1935)

See diagram for the tactical lunacy at work.

The theory was that the portsider islanded aircraft carriers (on the formation right and the lead two ships in the formation diamond) would lead the formation and their landing circuits would clockwise to the formation right. The starboardsider islanded flattops would be formation left and in trail and their landing circuits would be to their left and anti-clockwise. This was to tighten ship intervals and to keep the formation compact for ASW and AA defense. How did this work for the IJN in battle? NTG. The same landing loop confusion the Americans encountered when they first began to mass their own aircraft carriers in 1943 plagued the IJN from 1937 forward. Add to the confusion, the IJN doctrinal answer to dive bombers and torpedo plane attack of independent ship maneuver in S curves to throw enemy plane pilots' aims off, and any logic of mechanical solutions to multi-aircraft carrier land-on operations disappeared.

How did the Americans solve it?

Wagon wheel formation and they accepted stacking up the returnees and wait your turn in the stacked landing loops. All anti-clockwise and around the compass points of the wagon wheel, lead aircraft carrier goes first and lands on then the aircraft carrier to the right and so forth around the formation circle. When the trail flattop landed on her birds, then the land-ons were the next aircraft forward of her in formation and to the left of her until the circuit completed on the lead flattop. Then repeat as needed.

Never seen this before. Very interesting.

 

[McPherson]

Let us look at this?

In a hypothetical battle Soryu vs USS Wasp it will come to who will score the first hits and in this case USS Wasp lacked an experienced air group, which basically had no, or at best minor combat experience, versus a veteran air group on Soryu, with much more experience in especially anti shipping tactics. Equally USS Wasp did have a slight advantage in a slightly thicker belt and more concentrated deck protection on her engine and boiler rooms, though it left larger parts completely unprotected as a result due to weight saving measures. One of her biggest flaws was her absence of any reliable form of underwater protection, also due to weight restrictions.

Most of these statements are true. There are caveats.

1. HIJMS Soryu had been in as many aircraft carrier duels as USS Wasp before she was SUNK. Exactly 0.
2. Her air group had carried out 3 harbor raids. Pearl Harbor, Darwin and Colombo. Her air group had supported IJA operations in China and Indochina.
3. USS Wasp's history was dissimilar, but as can be attested, the USS Wasp had her own war experienced air wing.
4. Compartmentation is a coin toss. I think the Wasp was the tougher ship, but then HIJMS Soryu was a three torpedo (1 of the three missed) scuttle after she burned down and was ruined. It took SIX torpedoes, three Japanese and three American fish to scuttle the USS Wasp.

Basically Soryu, with her more experienced aviators will most likely get the upper hand in the fight, if she was able to strike first, something seriously possible as her aircraft outranged the ones on US Wasp. Coupled with USS Wasp not having the desired AA on her own, she either had to rely on her own fighters to protect her mainly, as well as other escorting warships, which in august 1942 was still not as good as it would be a few years later. (although significantly better than the AA on their opponents still.) USN aircraft control, especially fighter control was still in its infancy and basically not existing in this time, with the result the fighters did not provide the sort of defense they could have given later on, when more discipline was forced in the heads of the fighter pilots. Japanese pilots at this time were very disciplined and could operate with more primitive means more effectively than their contemporary USN aviators. So the air battle goes to the Japanese most likely.

These statements are very debatable. We do not know how Soryu's air wing would have fared in direct battle with the USNAS. Her fliers never got the chance. We have some idea how USS Wasp's pilots would have fared in their operations against Japanese aviation in the operations leading up to her loss. Good.

Japanese AAA aboard HIJMS Soryu was lousy. From Wiki.

Armament:

6 × twin 12.7 cm (5 in) dual-purpose guns 14 × twin 25 mm (1 in) AA guns

USS Wasp also from Wiki

Armament:

8 × 5 in (127 mm) guns 16 × 1.1 in (28 mm) AA guns 24 × 0.50 in (12.7 mm) machine guns

Also, based on the copious research John Lundstrom (The First Team ) did on Pacific War naval aviation operations from 7 December 1941 to 12 June 1942, I am convinced that USN fighter pilots flying decidedly inferior fighter aircraft to the Japanese IJNAS provided better fleet defense than either the Japanese fighter pilots or the British Fleet Air Arm could have in that same period.

Inexperienced FDOs are present, it is true, but I see nothing in the literature that indicates the British would or could do better than the PACFLT. Actually, documentation from British air operations during that period indicates to me, that the British would have done worse and did do worse against the attacking Japanese than the Americans did. Proof? Indian Ocean Raid vs Coral Sea and Midway.

As spoken US Wasp was not well protected against underwater damage, so she might survive some bomb hits, but not torpedoes put in her hull, unless very fortunate in a part of the hull outside the sections in the center of her hull, such as the tip of her bow, or extreme stern. Soryu was not much better off either, being equally lightweight in construction with just some splinter protection basically on her vitals, defective internal fuel systems and the famously inefficient damage control parties. So Soryu could perhaps survive a few bombs on the ends of the ship, but would suffer major, or even catastrophic damage when hit in the center. (By bombs especially as the USN torpedoes were still horribly bad and more often failed to function, then doing their supposed job.)

Extremely interesting read: Krishima damage analysis ...

Note center hit, especially to machinery spaces. Also note the hits fore and aft?

So the theoretical fight (escorts and other factors excluded as a force on their own):

One cannot exclude bodyguard ships in an aircraft carrier fight; unless one is D'orly Hughes, i.e. a card carrying clown club member of the "we don't need no stinking CAP, or need to know how aircraft carriers work fraternity." Sort of a co-member with Leigh Noyes.

Soryu gets her search advantage due to her longer ranging aircraft (even the floatplanes on cruisers had a longer range then the USN CV borne aircraft at this time.) USS Wasp detects the enemy scout and prepares for the fight, not knowing yet where her enemy is. CAP is launched, ship prepared for damage and fuel systems filled with CO2 gas. In the meantime her own scouts are searching for the enemy still, which is out of range still. Soryu strikes with a well coordinated compact strike groups of around half her full airwing with equal numbers in fighters, dive bombers and torpedo bombers. (a grouping of 12 + 12 + 12 is a possibility) The CAP of the USS Wasp engages, but the constant chatter and screaming of exited pilots prevents normal communication and the F4F's go for individual targets, mostly the enemy fighters with challenge the USN fighters into dogfights.

Not the way the USNAS fought at all. They, in fleet defense, tended to orbit in CAPS, fighters on top to handle dive and level bombers and scout bombers at low altitude to deal with enemy torpedo planes until FDOs radio vectored them onto radar contacts. Noise discipline was maintained and flight sections were ground control intercept directed by four flights and COLOR CODES so who knew where to go and what to do when they got there. As for scouting, the VBs were not outranged at all. The Japanese did not use their carrier aviation to search. That was their cruiser float planes and those were shorter ranged functionally than the VBs.

So the fighter cover is not doing its job as expected. The strike planes get on the USN task group mostly unmolested and start their coordinated two anvil attack on the Wasp, ignoring the escorts completely. The weak AA at this time manages to shoot down several attackers, but more get through and attack the CV. Wasp gets two bomb hits and takes two torpedoes, with the first doing only moderate damage due to proper damage preventive measures taken before, but the two torpedoes do mortal damage as they knock out the power of the ship completely, leaving it dead and with a severe list in the water. (as happened to her larger half sister USS Yorktown at Midway)

This of course is not what happened either at Coral Sea, Midway or Eastern Solomons. Now the Enterprise FDO did screw up at Santa Cruz.

The idea that Wasp takes two and two out of 36 planes is sheer nonsense. 39 planes only scored 2 torpedoes and a bomb on USS Lexington and that humongous garbage scow of a ship turned like a PIG. USS Wasp was far more agile and had to be torpedoed from less than 700 meters to get hits.

BTW the USS Yorktown took a lot to kill. NINE torpedoes, four of them American to scuttle.

In the meantime the scouts of Wasp detect the Japanese at the extreme edge of their search pattern and radio in the contact, but Wasp is in no shape to strike anymore with no power left to get aircraft in the air, as she cannot move into the wind anymore, being a motionless ship now. The severe list is not helping either. The Soryu strike returns to the mothership, about half of the planes lost, or shot up in some way. Before this the second strike, smaller than the first wave is flown off, but can get on the target unopposed as the CAP is gone already, either out of fuel, out of ammunition, or both. Finding an inmobile USS Wasp, some of the strike diverts to other targets, but fail to do much doing so. The rest of the attack, 4 torpedo planes and 5 dive bombers attack the Wasp again, scoring two more bomb- and two more torpedo hits sending the CV to the bottom, after a huge explosion. (Perhaps an internal fire created earlier, or by this attack toughed off a bomb magazine, of less likely a fuel bunker exploded???) The AA barrage of the escorting warships downs two planes, but it is over as Wasp is gone and Soryu is not.

The Soryo doesn't have that many planes. This scenario is mathematically not realistic.

Conclusion:
USS Wasp on its own is not a good option in any circumstance in any CV vs CV fight. In any logical operation USS Wasp at any time needed a second CV to operate with, primarily to lessen the weaknesses of the ship itself, as well as to add something else to shoot at for the enemy, as Wasp was not well build to take serious damage.

Case not proven.

 

[Kantai Kessen]

Let us look at this?

Most of these statements are true. There are caveats.

1. HIJMS Soryu had been in as many aircraft carrier duels as USS Wasp before she was SUNK. Exactly 0.
2. Her air group had carried out 3 harbor raids. Pearl Harbor, Darwin and Colombo. Her air group had supported IJA operations in China and Indochina.
3. USS Wasp's history was dissimilar, but as can be attested, the USS Wasp had her own war experienced air wing.
4. Compartmentation is a coin toss. I think the Wasp was the tougher ship, but then HIJMS Soryu was a three torpedo (1 of the three missed) scuttle after she burned down and was ruined. It took SIX torpedoes, three Japanese and three American fish to scuttle the USS Wasp.


These statements are very debatable. We do not know how Soryu's air wing would have fared in direct battle with the USNAS. Her fliers never got the chance. We have some idea how USS Wasp's pilots would have fared in their operations against Japanese aviation in the operations leading up to her loss. Good.

Japanese AAA aboard HIJMS Soryu was lousy. From Wiki.

Armament:

6 × twin 12.7 cm (5 in) dual-purpose guns 14 × twin 25 mm (1 in) AA guns

USS Wasp also from Wiki

Armament:

8 × 5 in (127 mm) guns 16 × 1.1 in (28 mm) AA guns 24 × 0.50 in (12.7 mm) machine guns

Also, based on the copious research John Lundstrom (The First Team ) did on Pacific War naval aviation operations from 7 December 1941 to 12 June 1942, I am convinced that USN fighter pilots flying decidedly inferior fighter aircraft to the Japanese IJNAS provided better fleet defense than either the Japanese fighter pilots or the British Fleet Air Arm could have in that same period.

Inexperienced FDOs are present, it is true, but I see nothing in the literature that indicates the British would or could do better than the PACFLT. Actually, documentation from British air operations during that period indicates to me, that the British would have done worse and did do worse against the attacking Japanese than the Americans did. Proof? Indian Ocean Raid vs Coral Sea and Midway.

Extremely interesting read: Krishima damage analysis ...

Note center hit, especially to machinery spaces. Also note the hits fore and aft?

One cannot exclude bodyguard ships in an aircraft carrier fight; unless one is D'orly Hughes, i.e. a card carrying clown club member of the "we don't need no stinking CAP, or need to know how aircraft carriers work fraternity." Sort of a co-member with Leigh Noyes.

Not the way the USNAS fought at all. They, in fleet defense, tended to orbit in CAPS, fighters on top to handle dive and level bombers and scout bombers at low altitude to deal with enemy torpedo planes until FDOs radio vectored them onto radar contacts. Noise discipline was maintained and flight sections were ground control intercept directed by four flights and COLOR CODES so who knew where to go and what to do when they got there. As for scouting, the VBs were not outranged at all. The Japanese did not use their carrier aviation to search. That was their cruiser float planes and those were shorter ranged functionally than the VBs.

This of course is not what happened either at Coral Sea, Midway or Eastern Solomons. Now the Enterprise FDO did screw up at Santa Cruz.

The idea that Wasp takes two and two out of 36 planes is sheer nonsense. 39 planes only scored 2 torpedoes and a bomb on USS Lexington and that humongous garbage scow of a ship turned like a PIG. USS Wasp was far more agile and had to be torpedoed from less than 700 meters to get hits.

BTW the USS Yorktown took a lot to kill. NINE torpedoes, four of them American to scuttle.

The Soryo doesn't have that many planes. This scenario is mathematically not realistic.

Case not proven.

Great analysis and I have to agree.

Bearing in mind, though, that as @HMS Warspite has said it is unlikely for Wasp to be found alone, and as Soryu would almost certainly be part of a larger carrier group, we'd probably have a larger fight IRL. Probably the Cranes on the IJN's side and a couple of Lexingtons or Yorktowns on the USN's side in late 1942, for a 3 v 3 or thereabouts. Then what? The IJN was better at massed carrier ops at this stage, 100%.

Also, Leigh Noyes vs Chuichi Hara? Noyes is going down.

 

[McPherson]

Great analysis and I have to agree.

Thank you.

Bearing in mind, though, that as @HMS Warspite has said it is unlikely for Wasp to be found alone, and as Soryu would almost certainly be part of a larger carrier group, we'd probably have a larger fight IRL. Probably the Cranes on the IJN's side and a couple of Lexingtons or Yorktowns on the USN's side in late 1942, for a 3 v 3 or thereabouts. Then what? The IJN was better at massed carrier ops at this stage, 100%.

Midway. Or Eastern Solomons.

Also, Leigh Noyes vs Chuichi Hara? Noyes is going down.

Since Hara did not play well with others and Noyes was too junior and also did not play well with others, this is kind of a political problem within the respective high commands. I would have to be convinced as to how this matchup would be arranged in the overall matrix. If it could be arranged, then it is likely a Kincaid vs. Nagumo type situation with a Halsey vs Kondo topper over that. I would expect indecision and confusion at the top, confusion at the bottom and angry frustration in the middle.

Outcome would depend on how much Hara could get Kondo to listen and whether or not Noyes could be overruled by George Murray. My money would be on Murray.