If Japan had occupied Hawaii in 1941

How would the war have gone if Japan, after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, they had brought troop ships. If they had taken a large number of their troops occupying China and landed them in Hawaii to occupy the base and the Island.

Could they have won and claimed the Island as part of their empire?
If they have, how would that had affected the war then.

I See that if they had been able to do that that it would have a massive affect. All of those damaged ships would have had not been able to be repaired. The rest of the fleet being able to fuel and prepare to fight japan from Hawaii now would have to go to California and start from there.
 
It would have been a logistical nightmare for them to supply occupied Hawaii because US submarines would be on the prowl all along the sea lanes between Japan and Hawaii. Those are some long sea lanes. Afterwards, after the US Navy inevitably regains the initiative they'll cut off the Japanese garrison. After that I see the US invading Hawaii and they'll be pissed off when it turns out the population has brutalized by the Japanese (the Americans aren't going to get better treatment than European or Chinese prisoners got, see the Bataan Death March for example). In the short term, the US Navy will have to withdraw to San Diego and that will lengthen the Pacific War, but not change its outcome.
 
How would the war have gone if Japan, after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, they had brought troop ships. If they had taken a large number of their troops occupying China and landed them in Hawaii to occupy the base and the Island.

Could they have won and claimed the Island as part of their empire?
If they have, how would that had affected the war then.

I See that if they had been able to do that that it would have a massive affect. All of those damaged ships would have had not been able to be repaired. The rest of the fleet being able to fuel and prepare to fight japan from Hawaii now would have to go to California and start from there.

(CALBEAR INTENSIFIES)

The Japanese war effort in the Pacific and South-East Asia would die instantly. The amount of sealift needed to take Hawaii would be such that the invasion of the Philippines, the invasion of Siam, the invasion of Malaya and the invasion of the Dutch East India would all be so enfeebled that they wouldn't succeed - or might not even happen at all.
 
Perhaps we could have a POD before the war in which Japan decides to forgo the Yamato class battleships and uses their materials to build the necessary shipping.
 
Didnt think about that at all.

(CALBEAR INTENSIFIES)

The Japanese war effort in the Pacific and South-East Asia would die instantly. The amount of sealift needed to take Hawaii would be such that the invasion of the Philippines, the invasion of Siam, the invasion of Malaya and the invasion of the Dutch East India would all be so enfeebled that they wouldn't succeed - or might not even happen at all.

My problem and what got me thinking was this fact. The Japanese destroyed many ships that day. Then they just left the US to repair the ships and eventually fight them. Hawaii became a staging area for their eventual doom.

So what if the Japanese took that and all of the ships that would have came back to fight them.

I guess this all means no matter what, they were doomed and there was no way they could have a victory in the war.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Historically, the IJN demonstrated the ability to operate

How would the war have gone if Japan, after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, they had brought troop ships. If they had taken a large number of their troops occupying China and landed them in Hawaii to occupy the base and the Island. Could they have won and claimed the Island as part of their empire? If they have, how would that had affected the war then. I See that if they had been able to do that that it would have a massive affect. All of those damaged ships would have had not been able to be repaired. The rest of the fleet being able to fuel and prepare to fight japan from Hawaii now would have to go to California and start from there.

Historically, the IJN demonstrated the ability to operate east of the Dateline twice during WW II, in each case for about a week.

They had very limited underway replenishment capabilities for bunker fuel, and almost none for avgas, other POL, soft stores, and, of course, ammunition.

ALL the Japanese offensives across the Pacific at the beginning of the war, combined, amounted to the equivalent of about four infantry divisions and two separate brigades afloat and combat-loaded (nearly-)simultaneously, plus the escorts to cover them and the follow-up supply convoys. That's it, for Thailand/Malaya, Borneo, the Philippines, Guam/Rabaul, Wake, etc. - and almost all of these operations, other than Wake, relied on land-based air; not exactly something that's going to work in the Hawaiian islands.

And that's at significantly shorter distances (French Indochina to Malaya, for example, or Taiwan to Leyte) than those necesary for any troop lift and subsequent amphibious assault east of the Dateline.

Now that's an impressive total for 1941 (the Allies didn't manage anything similar until North Africa a year later) but still, considering the size of the prewar US garrison on Oahu (2 Army infantry divisions, with a total of five brigade equivalents, plus the fleet, the air forces, coast defense, AA, and engineers, Marines, Naval shore personnel, the Territorial forces, etc.) even everything they used historically would not be enough, especially considering the distances involved.

The historical carrier raid was hanging out on the ragged edge of logistical sustainability, as it was.

Best,
 
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I guess this all means no matter what, they were doomed and there was no way they could have a victory in the war.

Got it in one. Given the situation as it existed in December 1941, barring ASB intervention, the Japanese were toast. Even if they had sunk every ship in Pearl Harbor with a magazine hit rendering it unsalvagable, it would not have mattered. It might have delayed the outcome by a few months, but the US fleet under construction was still larger than the IJN and all of its construction. The force disparity meant the only way the US could lose was if it decided to quit, and the nature of the Pearl Harbor attack meant the US would not quit period.

See http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm for a longer description of just how badly Japan was screwed.
 
To have invaded Hawai'i in 1941 would have meant sacrificing the operation in the South, effectively giving up Japan's primary war aims. It was theoretically possible but a non-starter of the first order.
 
So what if the Japanese took that and all of the ships that would have came back to fight them.

I guess this all means no matter what, they were doomed and there was no way they could have a victory in the war.
The problem is that the USN has another fleet in Atlantic and a another even bigger one building on US slips.

None of the US battleships damaged at PH really did anything decisive for the rest of the war, bombardment is helpful but the new CVs, Fast Battleships and Subs will win the war anyway....
 
Honestly, if I remember Calbear's accounting correctly, even keeping the Kido Butai in the area for that long would be an unacceptable risk, given how many planes Pearl Harbor could throw at them.
 

CalBear

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(CALBEAR INTENSIFIES)

The Japanese war effort in the Pacific and South-East Asia would die instantly. The amount of sealift needed to take Hawaii would be such that the invasion of the Philippines, the invasion of Siam, the invasion of Malaya and the invasion of the Dutch East India would all be so enfeebled that they wouldn't succeed - or might not even happen at all.

I think I am already about as intense on this as I can get without going incandescent. :p

To the OP: Japan can't do it. Quite literally impossible.

1. Politically there is no combination of circumstances that would persuade the IJA to move sufficient forces out of China to even attempt an invasion Oahu. The effort would require at least 100,000 men (even then the numerical advantage would only be 2:1, not counting U.S. non infantry personnel), enormous amounts of shipping (it is an open question if the Japanese could assemble sufficient lift to even mount the operation) and would, in the perspective of the IJA be a sideshow. The IJA diverted an extremely small force to the Southern Strategy, with units being double assigned (as an example the same formation, the South Seas Force, was used to invade Guam in the Marianas and then used, six WEEKS later, to invade Rabaul in New Britain).

The IJA only agreed to the Southern Strategy because it was forced to do so by oil supply issues. Hawaii would add nothing to that goal, would vastly increase the size of the defensive perimeter that would require defense, and, worst of all, would damage the effort in China.

It is critical to keep in mind that the Japanese government could be brought down by either the Army or the Navy, at a whim. It was one of the most poisonous elements of the Japanese system and the IJA wielded it like a sword.

2. The Kido Butai could not remain on station to cover an invasion effort. The strike force had been forced to DECK LOAD fuel, including onto the Akagi to keep their escorts fueled. The carrier force remains on station another two days and it either has to abandon its destroyers or tow them home behind the capital ships (sort of an interesting mental picture if you think about it) leaving the entire fleet unimaginably vulnerable to submarine attack. Pearl Harbor was a RAID, not an invasion effort. Logistically it would be impossible.

3. Oahu is not a simple invasion target. Around half of the island, including the famous North Shore is both incredibly rugged, isolated, and subject to some of the most epic surf conditions on Earth (great if you are paddling out on a short board, less so if you are in an landing boat). Look at a map and you will see the North and East Coasts are ribbons of beach with serious mountains running almost to the water.

The U.S. Army had two FULL infantry divisions on the island, the 24th and 25th. These divisions were fully equipped and consisted of 2/3 regulars the remaining forces being local National Guard. There were two USMC defense battalions, and part of a third located on Oahu. The island was defended by a robust coastal defense battery design, including disappearing mount 14" & 12" guns, 12" mortars, 8" guns, 155mm dedicated coastal batteries, and access to parts of the EIGHT 105mm towed 105 and one towed 155mm BATTALIONS assign to the Hawaiian Department. There were also the ground echelon of the substantial Army aviation assets on the island (all of whom had at least basic infantry training)

The two USMC defense battalions had 16 155mm guns, 24 90mm AAA/DP guns, numerous 40mm guns, and 70 (!) 50 cal machine guns. In addition to these force there were also the FMF detachments from the cruisers and battleships.

Lastly there were the tens of thousands of USN personnel, all of whom could be formed into provisional infantry units (similar units served with distinction in the Philippines during the futile defense of Bataan).

4. Japan didn't WANT to fight an extended war against the U.S. The idea was to gat a flash know down, secure the Southern Resource Area, and come to a peace agreement (Stupid? You betcha, still it is a fact) behind a defensible perimeter. Capturing Hawaii, assuming it could be done, would assure that the U.S. would not be willing to make peace. The Japanese knew that they could not survive a long war against the dominant industrial power on Earth.
 

tenthring

Banned
4. Japan didn't WANT to fight an extended war against the U.S. The idea was to gat a flash know down, secure the Southern Resource Area, and come to a peace agreement (Stupid? You betcha, still it is a fact) behind a defensible perimeter. Capturing Hawaii, assuming it could be done, would assure that the U.S. would not be willing to make peace. The Japanese knew that they could not survive a long war against the dominant industrial power on Earth.

This is key. The Japanese were under the notion that this would be some semi-friendly colonial war. Not total war. We beat your fleet and you cede some colonies halfway around the world. Like what happened with the Russians. That was their thinking.

Occupying Hawaii goes totally against that.
 
Perhaps we could have a POD before the war in which Japan decides to forgo the Yamato class battleships and uses their materials to build the necessary shipping.

If the numbers Ellis provided in 'Brute Force' are remotely accurate the shortfall in Japanese cargo shipping was five to six million tons. That is in 1940 some 11 million tons of cargo ships serviced Japans ports. Six million tons was in Japanese flagged or controlled ships, the balance was foreign flagged ships, which all ceased to service Japan when the embargos were started in mid 1941.

I dont know what cargo capacity canceling the Yamamoto & Musashi in 1938 translates to, tho it requires knowing China will hold out three more years and Japan will be involved in a global war of attrition.
 
2. The Kido Butai could not remain on station to cover an invasion effort. The strike force had been forced to DECK LOAD fuel, including onto the Akagi to keep their escorts fueled. The carrier force remains on station another two days and it either has to abandon its destroyers or tow them home behind the capital ships (sort of an interesting mental picture if you think about it) leaving the entire fleet unimaginably vulnerable to submarine attack. Pearl Harbor was a RAID, not an invasion effort. Logistically it would be impossible.

Well hey, look at the bright side, it's not like the American torpedoes will work anyways! :D
 

CalBear

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Well hey, look at the bright side, it's not like the American torpedoes will work anyways! :D

True. Of course the IJN couldn't know that.

They also did work a certain percentage of the time, just a REALLY lousy percentage.
 
True. Of course the IJN couldn't know that.

They also did work a certain percentage of the time, just a REALLY lousy percentage.

If they didn't work at all, the problem would have been found out faster. There were enough ships sunk by the un-fixed Mk-14s to allow BuOrd and the NTF to argue that the failures were due to operator errors for way too long.
 
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