IOTL, the U.S.S. Yorktown was very nearly sunk in the Battle of the Coral Sea.
What if she actually had sunk?
What if she actually had sunk?
[I]Yorktown[/I] is sunk in the Coral Sea
- Thread starter Alternate History Geek
- Start date
in OTL not nearly sunk, ready for battle in just a few days of repair.
but just one torpedo or extra bomb probably means she is not ready for Midway.
So I imagine the Battle of Midway without Yorktown unfolds like something this. Enterprise and Hornet are at sea, but will await events well east of Midway. Loitering about at a position that within a half hour of steaming they could launch a strike in support of defenders on the island.
Japanese air raid Midway as OTL but there is not American carrier strike so Japanese raid again, while the air field is out of action, American defences are very strong still. Japanese land at dawn the next day, but the invasion is a complete disaster for the Japanese, several thousand US marines in base defence mode, with artillery, tanks and even PT boats in the lagoon, there is a reef around the island so the Japanese are forced to wade in shallow water from some distance away. Its all over very early.
An American carrier strike rolls in about noon from the east, but there is very little targets left, so with their anti personnel bombs loaded they go after some of the Japanese transport shipping loitering around the area.
The Japanese know there are american carriers in the area but before they can be located, the Americans land their strike and move back east out of range.
In a couple of days, Saratoga joins Enterprise and Hornet but by then the Japanese have given up and gone home.
Japanese atill all have their fleet carriers still intact so likely Guadacanal counter attack does not happen. Allies just reinforce Port Moresby-Buna campaign instead and move slowy under the cover of land based air until the Essex class carriers are ready..
but just one torpedo or extra bomb probably means she is not ready for Midway.
So I imagine the Battle of Midway without Yorktown unfolds like something this. Enterprise and Hornet are at sea, but will await events well east of Midway. Loitering about at a position that within a half hour of steaming they could launch a strike in support of defenders on the island.
Japanese air raid Midway as OTL but there is not American carrier strike so Japanese raid again, while the air field is out of action, American defences are very strong still. Japanese land at dawn the next day, but the invasion is a complete disaster for the Japanese, several thousand US marines in base defence mode, with artillery, tanks and even PT boats in the lagoon, there is a reef around the island so the Japanese are forced to wade in shallow water from some distance away. Its all over very early.
An American carrier strike rolls in about noon from the east, but there is very little targets left, so with their anti personnel bombs loaded they go after some of the Japanese transport shipping loitering around the area.
The Japanese know there are american carriers in the area but before they can be located, the Americans land their strike and move back east out of range.
In a couple of days, Saratoga joins Enterprise and Hornet but by then the Japanese have given up and gone home.
Japanese atill all have their fleet carriers still intact so likely Guadacanal counter attack does not happen. Allies just reinforce Port Moresby-Buna campaign instead and move slowy under the cover of land based air until the Essex class carriers are ready..
If Midway was so well garrisoned that any Japanese attack would fail, why was repairing the Yorktown lickedy-split and sending the fleet out to fight the Japanese so big a deal?
Looking at this from the perspective of fighting and winning the war, not from the perspective of civilian morale or the like.
Looking at this from the perspective of fighting and winning the war, not from the perspective of civilian morale or the like.
Perception is not reality. The perceived weakness of the US Fleet that meant that the Yorktown was rushed back into operations was not matched by the reality that Japan lacked the necessary forces to successfully take Midway.
Maybe it's just me as a decided amateur, but the idea that the the Axis achieving victories anywhere they lost OTL was impossible reeks of the kind of attitude that if the commanders at the time had it, would have lead to a much worse war for the Allies.
Why rush Yorktown back into functional shape for a battle against a stronger fleet if you can just wait for two months and be in a better position while Midway remains safe?
Mindless impulsiveness is not a quality usually ascribed to King in my limited reading.
There was a perceived weakness with the fleet. A weaknesss that OTL bore out with the aircraft strike from one of the three carriers (Hornet?) completely missing the enemy.
This doesn't change the fact that the garrison at Midway was way too strong for the forces that the Japanese bought along. So without Yorktown it is indeed possible for things to go as Catspoke has suggested.
This doesn't change the fact that the garrison at Midway was way too strong for the forces that the Japanese bought along. So without Yorktown it is indeed possible for things to go as Catspoke has suggested.
Okay, I'm not following.
It was "a perceived weakness' borne out by OTL, but that doesn't mean it was an actual weakness.
And I'd love to see something detailing the strength of the garrison vs. what the Japanese brought with them. Not something written by "some guy on the internet" but something documented.
Is there a carrier in the Atlantic that could transit the canal and be in play within the month after Coral Sea?
Saratoga arrived 2 days after the battle, IIRC - could any time have been shaved off that if she had not stopped at San Diego but instead headed straight for Pearl, and done the loading of food, munitions, an air group, etc., in Hawaii?
If Stanhope Ring just follows Waldron (in company with Hornet's F4Fs), knowing that there will be plenty of Japanese carriers to go around, would Yorktown's air group be missed?
Saratoga arrived 2 days after the battle, IIRC - could any time have been shaved off that if she had not stopped at San Diego but instead headed straight for Pearl, and done the loading of food, munitions, an air group, etc., in Hawaii?
If Stanhope Ring just follows Waldron (in company with Hornet's F4Fs), knowing that there will be plenty of Japanese carriers to go around, would Yorktown's air group be missed?
Midway Island
Col. Harold D. Shannon (CO), Maj. William W. Benson† (CO Eastern Is.)
Seacoast Artillery Group LtCol. Lewis A. Hohn
Battery A: 2×5"(127 mm)/51 Mark 15 Maj. Loren S. Fraser
Battery B: 2×5"(127 mm)/51 Mark 15 Capt. Rodney M. Handley
Battery C: 2×5"(127 mm)/51 Mark 15 Capt. Donal N. Otis
7" Battery: 2×7"(178 mm)/45 Mark 2 Capt. Ralph A. Collins, Jr.
7" Battery: 2×7"(178 mm)/45 Mark 2 Capt. Harold R. Warner, Jr.
3" Battery: 2×3"(76 mm)/50 Mark 10 Capt. Jay H. Augustin
3" Battery: 2×3"(76 mm)/50 Mark 10 Capt. William R. Dorr, Jr.
3" Antiaircraft Group Maj. Charles T. Tingle
Battery D: 4×3" (76 mm) M3 Capt. Jean H. Buckner
Battery E: 4×3" (76 mm) M3 Maj. Hoyt McMilan
Battery F: 4×3" (76 mm) M3 Capt. David W. Silvey
Battery G: 12×60" Sperry Searchlights Capt. Alfred L. Booth
Special Weapons Group Capt. Robert E. Hommel
Battery H: 24×.50" (12.7 mm) M2 AA HMG Maj. William E. Boles
Battery I : 24×.30" (7.62 mm) M1917A1 HMG Capt. Edwin A. Law
3rd Marine Defense Battalion, detach. Maj. Chandler W. Johnson
Battery D: 4×3" (76 mm) M3 Maj. William S. McCormick
Battery E: 4×3" (76 mm) M3 Maj. James S. O'Halloran
Battery F: 4×3" (76 mm) M3 1stLt. Arnold D. Swartz
Battery K: 8×37 mm (1.45") M1 Capt. Ronald K. Miller
Battery L: 18×2×20 mm/70 (0.79") Mark 20 Capt. Charles J. Seibert
Seacoast Defense Group
22nd Provisional Marine Rifle Company 1stLt. Thomas E. Clarke
23rd Provisional Marine Rifle Company Capt. Boyd O. Whitney
Mobile Reserve Group
2nd Marine Raider Bn., Rifle Company C Capt. Donald H. Hastic
2nd Marine Raider Bn., Rifle Company D 1stLt. John Apergis
Light Tank Platoon: 5 M3 Stuart
Japanese Invasion Force
Combined Landing Force
2nd Combined SNLF* 1,250 men Capt. Ōta Minoru
28th Regiment's detach. 1,200 men Col. Ichiki Kiyonao
11th Construction Btn. 1,250 men ???
12th Construction Btn. 1,250 men ???
http://midway1942.org/order.shtml
So the Japanese proposed to land with fewer than 3000 combat troops vs a quite vast Midway defense force with a bucketload of coastal artillery and tanks.
One would think that the Japanese - as un-averse to casualties as they were, even - would do something slightly more likely to succeed than "drop off the infantry and hope for the best.
And I hate to sound contrary, but that doesn't sound like a very big bucketload of artillery to me compared to Japanese fleet - assuming of course said fleet tries to do anything about it.
And I hate to sound contrary, but that doesn't sound like a very big bucketload of artillery to me compared to Japanese fleet - assuming of course said fleet tries to do anything about it.
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What though? Their earlier airstrikes weren't particularly effective. They had a limited amount of time to make a landing anyway and it's a very small island with a lot of artillery and MG's on it. Either they weren't aware of just how well it was protected or they thought that the Yamato spirit would triumph...
A limited amount of time before . . . what?
Assuming they - not an impossible feat - defeat the US naval forces, or said forces are slow steaming to Midway, what's the time crunch?
Yes, it has been a while since I've read up on this, so my apologies if I'm asking a stupid question.
Fuel - the eternal Japanese anchor around their necks. The KB will have to retire and when it does, there will be no air support or naval gunfire support.
Oh sure, but how long before it has to retire if what the ships are doing is just - exaggerating a tad - sitting and blasting Midway?
That's not as fuel-intensive as the voyage there, I would think.
Definite limit on the ability to do anything if the first (just throwing this out there as the outward limit) week(?) doesn't amount to much, as bringing up reinforcements is a waste.
Midway is useful, but not that useful unless you actually can use it against the Americans, and I think that one has been covered as "Um, not going to work."
Pearl Harbor was another 1300 nautical miles further east and the Pearl Harbour strike force had only just enough fuel to get there, attack and then leave. Pulling numbers out of my bum, but I'd guess 2 or 3 days max before having to leave even if the US carriers never even show up.
Submaines if nothing else make it impossible to just lower anchor and sit there waiting.
Submaines if nothing else make it impossible to just lower anchor and sit there waiting.
Yeah. Even with unreliable (to put it charitably) torpedoes, you do not want to risk it.
Still, I would not want to sit under a couple days of full out assault by the big bombs/guns as one of those Marines.
The fort might hold, but that doesn't mean many of us will live to see the Japanese give up.
Fearless Leader
Donor
One possible option is that Nimitz decides that without the Yorktown that confronting the IJN at Midway is a fruitless endeavor. Instead he decides to pounce on the Aleutian Island force/covering force and try to annihilate it in the hopes of reducing the IJN to manageable chunks. As a consolation prize he beefs up the Midway garrison and sends as many subs as he can spare to the region.
Regarding the Battle of Midway, I think a lack of USN support is going to make the Midway garrison a hell of a lot more desperate. They're going to see themselves as Wake Island mk.2. I could see them launching desperate raids on the IJN perhaps achieving some results. Furthermore it should be noted that the Japanese never developed a good naval gunfire support system thus rendering Japanese naval support of the landings negligible.
I think a good parallel here would be Tarawa. In OTL the US pounded Tarawa with little to no effect and the Japanese garrison on Tarawa wasn't as heavily entrenched or as heavily armed as the Americans on Midway. Without similar numbers of troops the Japanese don't have a snowball's chance in hell of taking that island. It also bears keeping in mind Japanese infantry doctrine that emphasized elan and infiltration. When faced with a situation like Midway, I don't see these things tilting the balance to their favor.
As for the hypothetical battle of the Aleutians/North Pacific. Assuming the US manages to engage both the Aleutian Island force and the Covering force they stand a chance of eliminating/heavily damaging not only 2 valuable (albeit small) carriers, but a number of irreplaceable battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and merchant vessels.
Finally, their failure to take Midway is going to set up a second Japanese offensive IMO. Only this time the USN is going to be ready...
Regarding the Battle of Midway, I think a lack of USN support is going to make the Midway garrison a hell of a lot more desperate. They're going to see themselves as Wake Island mk.2. I could see them launching desperate raids on the IJN perhaps achieving some results. Furthermore it should be noted that the Japanese never developed a good naval gunfire support system thus rendering Japanese naval support of the landings negligible.
I think a good parallel here would be Tarawa. In OTL the US pounded Tarawa with little to no effect and the Japanese garrison on Tarawa wasn't as heavily entrenched or as heavily armed as the Americans on Midway. Without similar numbers of troops the Japanese don't have a snowball's chance in hell of taking that island. It also bears keeping in mind Japanese infantry doctrine that emphasized elan and infiltration. When faced with a situation like Midway, I don't see these things tilting the balance to their favor.
As for the hypothetical battle of the Aleutians/North Pacific. Assuming the US manages to engage both the Aleutian Island force and the Covering force they stand a chance of eliminating/heavily damaging not only 2 valuable (albeit small) carriers, but a number of irreplaceable battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and merchant vessels.
Finally, their failure to take Midway is going to set up a second Japanese offensive IMO. Only this time the USN is going to be ready...
Just one might've been enough to sink her entire.Catspoke said:
Don't forget, OTL there were two TFs: Fletcher's & Spruance's. With this POD, is Fletcher still SOPA? Is he beached? Is he given what would be Spruance's command, after Halsey is hospitalized? If he is, the rest of your scenario seems probable. If Spruance is SOPA, I forsee only small changes to the OTL outcome, since Nagumo's success depended on him sinking the U.S. carriers before they launched at all.Catspoke said:
That's an obvious contradiction.Catspoke said:
Improbable. The timing may differ slightly. It seems more likely Wasp will be replaced on Malta AVG duty by Ranger.Catspoke said:
Don't forget, Guadalcanal wasn't MacArthur's show, it was Nimitz's. If there's a later move, it might be Tarawa--which actually could go better than OTL, if it's precluded by no Makin Raid by the Carlson's boys (which OTL led to reinforcement of the islandsCatspoke said:
).With the benefit of hindsight, it's obvious to us that the Japanese landing forces could not carry Midway -- but this was not obvious to the American leadership at the time. All they knew was that an operation in strength was underway against Midway; thanks to code-breaking they also had the Japanese order of battle, which was formidable. This is the IJN which had not yet suffered any major defeats in the war. Remember too that the USN didn't merely want to defend Midway, because of the code-breaking they knew when and where the IJN would be and they wanted to strike at them. They wanted to be aggressive and hit the Japanese carriers, inflict damage, cripple the IJN. For that to happen, they needed all the decks they could muster, including the Yorktown.