[I]Yorktown[/I] is sunk in the Coral Sea

With USS Yorktown missing at Midway would mean that the Japanese aircraft carrier Soryu would not be taken out in the fatal divebomber attack on the Kido Butai. Therefore the IJN could have retalliated with both carriers in full force of Carrier Divission 2 (Soryu and Hiryu), meaning twice the number of aircraft will be able to be launched at TF-17 (as TF-16 is now missing) Hopefully the airstrike that missed the target from USS Hornet would have returned in time to aid the sole remaining carrier USS Enterprise.

The further consequenses are possibly that the Japanese would still fail in landing troops at Midway, although that always had been a secondary objective. The goal had been to blow the USN from the sea in the Pacific, which was a serious possibility, with one less USN carrier in the region, as only USS Enterprise was an effective unit, since USS Hornet seemed to be a quite unlucky ship from the start on, as her aircraft did not play a major role in the battle. (VB-8 and VSB-8 completely missed their target by poor navigation adn only returned to the ship, after the battle, while VT-8 was completely destroyed and VF-8 was unlucky in loosing fighters due to running out of fuel.)
 
I think Fearless Leader's point has merit. Nimitz's staff was already having grave doubts as to whether they should confront IJN as is. Everyone knew there were dozens of carriers in the pipeline and they will be deployed within months.

In the event Yorktown is sunk, maybe he caves in to the pressure and refuses the battle. Ain't no shame in running away to fight another day.
 
Shaby said:
In the event Yorktown is sunk, maybe he caves in to the pressure and refuses the battle. Ain't no shame in running away to fight another day.
Not going to happen. Nimitz knows he has forces coming, & can afford to lose them. What he can't do is afford to give way to IJN. Ever. If he caves, his men, already suffering low morale from having their asses kicked across the Pacific, might never recover. Not to mention King is liable to bust him back to Ensign & assign him to counting paperclips in Kiska.:eek:

Yes, it might mean Nimitz will have to change his approach after he loses two, or (unlikely) even three, CVs at Midway. He might have to adopt mining.:cool::cool: (He opposed it, for reasons IDK.) He might have had to stop relying on subs for close surveillance of IJN bases (which is pretty stupid anyhow:rolleyes:). He might have had to place more emphasis on subs.:cool::cool:

More attention & emphasis on subs is likely to mean the Mk 6/Mk 14 problems get solved sooner.:cool::cool::cool: It's likely to mean there's an earlier change in targeting priorities, putting tankers & DDs higher. Both of these are bad for Japan.:eek::eek:

Do you see a pattern?

It's really, really hard to make the Pacific War go better for Japan....:eek::eek:
 
It's really, really hard to make the Pacific War go better for Japan....:eek::eek:

No doubt. It already went about the best it could possibly have for them. Rare are the occasions in a war where your plans work almost to the letter.

Your other points make perfect sense. Moral factor is a wild card that US cannot ignore. Refusing to give battle, regardless of the rationale, would be a large stinker for all involved.
 
Shaby said:
No doubt. It already went about the best it could possibly have for them.
Word. And not because Japan did anything remarkable, except achieve massive surprise & keep the Brits (Commonwealth) & Americans on the run while it lasted.
Shaby said:
Your other points make perfect sense.
:):) I love being right.:p
Shaby said:
Moral factor is a wild card that US cannot ignore. Refusing to give battle, regardless of the rationale, would be a large stinker for all involved.
I should also have said, refusing battle doesn't strike me as Nimitz's style. He didn't bluster like Halsey, & he was nicer than King, but he was about as tough as they come. You don't get to be CinCPac being a pansy.;)
 
Okay, I'm not following.

It was "a perceived weakness' borne out by OTL, but that doesn't mean it was an actual weakness.

And I'd love to see something detailing the strength of the garrison vs. what the Japanese brought with them. Not something written by "some guy on the internet" but something documented.

Okay I am only "some guy on the internet"...but I got all of my information from published sources including Jane's for the ranges of guns and the US Navy historical documents loaded on their web site.

So...while I think I have posted this before, I can't find the link.

Midway invasion compare
US Forces on Midway.
Sand Island
12 5-Inch Guns.
4 7-inch Guns
6 3-inch Guns
3 Searchlights
18 3-inch AA Guns
8 .50-Caliber HMG
8 .30 Caliber MMG
4 37mm AA Guns
6 20mm AA Guns
800 infantry, with integral heavy weapons (Another 12 HMG, 12 MMG, 24 LMG, plus 12 mortars)
800 marine support troops with light weapons.
8 Light Tanks.

Eastern Island
6 5-inch Guns
4 7-inch guns
6 3-inch guns
3 Searchlights
18 3-inch AA Guns
8 .50-Caliber HMG
8 .30 Caliber MMG
4 37mm AA Guns
6 20mm AA Guns
400 infantry with integral heavy weapons (Another 6 HMG, 6 MMG, 12 LMG, plus 6 mortars)
400 marine support troops with light weapons.

There was also a squadron of 10 PT boats at Midway tasked to attack landing craft if they got inside the reef.


The Japanese plan was to have the “Close Support Group” actually cover the landing while the “Covering Group” stood off and protected them from a distance.

So the forces that Midway itself would have to deal with for the landing would be
the 4 Cruisers of CR Div 7 Depending on how the rest of the battle goes two of them may or may not be there, for arguments sake say they are.
Suzuya, Kumano, Mogami, Mikuma 10x20cm main battery which sounds good except... after research “This class is seen by naval architects as trying to fit a quart into a pint pot” basically they fast heavily armed but fragile the wrong kind of ship to get in a duel with shore batteries. Their 8 inch guns have very similar max range but a shorter effective range than the 7-inch guns on Midway but the US has better fire control and a stable platform to fire from.

2 destroyers in Destroyer Division 8
Asashio, Arashio 6x 127mm main battery these are fairly typical Japanese DDs with heaver armament than the US DDs of the same time period. Also to remember they have a total range of 5700 NM at optimum cruising speed (10 knots) they have used over 2400 of that so they are going to have to watch the high speed dashes or need to refuel on the way home. (The range at 34 knots is only 960NM).



The Transport Group had 12 transports and freighters.
I can not find how many landing craft the Japanese had with them but I will give them the benefit of the doubt and assume the have enough to land their planned 2550 troops in a single wave. Which would be a minimum of 26 Toku Daihatsu Type landing craft, give them 30. They had the capability to carry 100 men or 16 tons of Cargo at 11 knots for 30MN They draw 3.3 feet of water and have either 1 HMG, 2 LMG or 3 Light AA guns. Figure a mix for this operation.

The Japanese planned to land with 1250 men on Sand island and 1200 on Eastern Island. The remaining 2500 men in the landing force were construction and follow on survey groups

The Old DD Shimakaze with 4 120 MM guns.
The Old DD Nadakaze with 2x 120 mm guns
The Old DD Suzuki (I can’t find this ship but from the above I can’t believe it has more than 4x120 mm guns...)

They also have a Screen of a Light Cruiser and 10 more Destroyers which I will ignore for now because their plan is that the Screen is not going to attack Midway at all but is to protect the rest of the ships from subs and aircraft so for our purposes for now these ships are just burning fuel keeping the US subs from sinking the Japanese fleet.

The Japanese have the preponderance of heavy weapons but the Americans are dug in deep and there is only one entry to the Atoll that the Landing craft can use except at high tide, even then there are places in the lagoon that are under a meter in depth especially north of Eastern Island if they are not careful how they Eastern the landing craft could get hung up on a sand bar. The second problem for the Japanese is they have no idea how many troops and guns are actually on Midway, as far as I can tell their operational intelligence was non existent they truly expected that the only troops were ground crews for the aircraft, AA gunners and construction crews building the airfield. I don’t have any reports of if this changed after the reports of the attacking pilots or the destroyers that shelled Midway during the battle but by then it’s too late to change the plan. So unless someone on the Japanese side has the initiative to change the plan at the last minute (and the WWII Japanese were not noted for changing the plan, riding the plan down to oblivion yes, changing the plan no.) They are going to send only the close support group in, leave the Screening group out screening the transports, the Close support group plan was to close to within 5K yards and start shelling the airfield, air defenses and any beach defenses that were visible.

Here is where things get interesting. The US has an Effective Range of 18K yards with the 5-inch guns 15K yards with the 3-inch guns and 29K yards with the 7-inch guns. How close do they let the Japanese get? On one hand if they let them get to within 15K then all the guns can hit them, on the other hand if the 7-inch start hitting at 29K yards all of the Japanese ships are out of effective range (The Japanese Cruisers had max range of 27K but effective range of about 22K yards) so there is some chance that the US manages to knock out some of the Cruisers before they take any hits at all. My take is that the US would start firing as soon as possible in the hopes of Knocking one or more Cruisers out of the battle.

So, now the question is what the Japanese do? My opinion is they speed up and close to their effective range to and turn to clear broadsides. So they are going to take about 15-20 minutes to get from 29K yards to 22K yards and turn broadside. That gives the US time for around 30-40 aimed rounds per gun (stated ROF for the 7-inch is 3 rounds per minute but I am reducing it some). This is on the order of 250+ 7 inch shells hitting around 4 historically fragile Cruisers. I would be surprised if more than one of them make it to their effective range, and very unlikely that any of them survive long enough to knock out any of the US 7-inch mounts. Basically this is the result when Cruiser class ships dual with shore batteries without Battleship or Monitor support. The Destroyers have a better chance to close because they are more maneuverable so they can change course and speed unexpectedly and avoid the volleys from the larger guns but once they close to within 18K yards they have to deal with the US 5-inch batteries which have a ROF of 15 rounds per minute and during the war proved to be very accurate. This kind of battle is not playing to the Japanese Destroyers strengths which is quick slashing attacks with torpedoes not slugging matches with shore batteries.

If the remaining Japanese commander of the Close Support group is smart he pulled out before he lost all of his Cruisers. And called for help from the Covering Group which includes 4 more heavy cruisers and two Battleships. Here I am unsure what the Japanese would do, because to this point in the war have not used their Battleships as shore bombardment weapons, however in OTL we are less than 6 months from them doing so at Guadalcanal. So I will assume that the commander of the covering force moves forward with his force to give support.

This gives the Japanese the following additional force (I will ignore DDs for now except for how many since like the Screening group they are mostly to protect the heavies from subs and aircraft).
4 Cruisers Atago, Chokai, Myoko, Haguro
2 Battleships
Kongo 4 14-inch guns, 16 6 inch guns 8 3 inch guns. Max effective gun range 29K yards
Hiei 8 14-inch guns 15 6inch guns 8 3 inch guns. Max effective gun range 29K yards

NOTE: The listed Max range for the 14 inch gun is 38K yards however after doing additional research the gun as installed in these two had a shorter effective range due to fire control, max elevation of the mounts and the mounting of the guns in the turret mechanism. which is why I am listing the range at 29K yards which was the longest shot I could find documented for either of these two ships, most of the shots for these two were at 24K or under.

I was a bit surprised about the range limits on these two Battleships I was expecting that when the Battleships got involved they could sit at max range and pound the crap out of the Island w/o answer from the Americans. It does not look that way. OTOH it does not look like the American guns will do much good as they don’t have the penetration to get through the Battleship armor.

Now I am going to make another assumption, the First Mobile Force is busy sparing with the Americans during all of this. The POD I pick is that the US did not get luck and knock out the Japanese carriers on June fourth. The two carrier forces maneuver away to the north west of Midway with the Japanese eventually sinking the American carriers on June 8t. However by this time all of the Cruisers and Destroyers are running on fumes and the Japanese carriers are down to just a few operational aircraft each so they refuel their escorts and turn for home leaving the Midway invasion group to handle the Island by its self. This fits with the pattern of OTL behavior so I feel I am on safe ground with this one. If the First Mobile force finishes off the American carriers sooner and chooses to return to help the Midway Occupation force it will be harder for the Midway defenders but not impossible - read the last possible invasion scenario below for why.

However because of this the Japanese Midway occupation force is dealing with Midway with the air cover of a single light Carrier with 12 Zeros and 11 Vals embarked. While the US still has 6 F2A-3 Buffalo and 5 F4F-3s remaining along with 19 B17, 2 B26, 4 TBF Torpedo bombers, 4 SB2U-3 dive bombers, 10 SBD-2 dive bombers and 30 PBY patrol bombers. So the US has more planes but fewer worse fighters while the Japanese have better fighters but the Zeros have a hard time shooting down the PBYs, and B17s, have trouble catching the B26s, TBFs and SBDs but can shoot down the SB2U’s and F2As at will. The F4Fs have a chance but the pilots are fairly demoralized because they just lost 2/3s of their squadron to the Japanese carrier strike. So my feeling is that the Americans are going to keep trying to bomb the Japanese Midway Occupation force mostly failing because they are going about it wrong. The one group that has a chance is the PBY group, if they can get a dawn or dusk strike they can do some real damage and my opinion is that would be exactly what the commander of the patrol wing would try to do. They have a day while the Covering Group moves into position from their covering position after the Close support group fails to bombard the Atoll. The Americans are going to have patrol aircraft up watching the Close Support group retreat and will be trying strikes which will fail completely because they will be high level strikes by the B17’s. There is a chance that the Dive bombers would do damage but my expectation is that the commanders would hold them in reserve for any sign of the Japanese heavy ships and not spend them on DDs. If they spot the transports it might be a different story but I will not give that to the Americans because that ends it right there - basically if an American sub, Patrol Bomber or Dive Bomber spots the transports and reports in its “Good Night Gracie” every Bomber and sub that can is going to head that way.

So that would be one way it ends.

Another way is that the PBY’s launch a dawn attack and damage or sink one or both of the battleships, since actually taking Midway is about the third or fourth priority and it is obvious the Americans have many Patrol Aircraft left on the island the Midway Invasion force pulls back.

Another way is that the Battleships through pull up just outside the range of the 7-inch guns pound them to pulp, pound the Airfields to pulp, fight off all the USAF and USMC attacks - maybe taking some damage maybe not. The Japanese move their transports to within 25K Yards of shore to reduce the turn around time for the landing craft. Unload the landing craft, load troops into the landing craft and head for shore with 14-inch rounds rumbling overhead pounding the rubble - this will be easy, they had two battleships covering them, nobody could survive that bombardment! They chug toward shore at a blazing 11 knots when out of the center of the Atoll came 10 US PT boats flying over the water at over 35 knots they dodged fire from the Destroyers escorting the Transports and bored in on the slow clumsy landing craft all 10 PT boats opened up with their 2 twin-.50-Caliber HMG mounts and their 20mm Cannon ripping the clumsy landing craft to shreds for a loss of 3 PT boats. The PT Boats then turned toward the Battleships weaving and dodging in an attempt to get the prize all PT Boat crews dream of, but it was not to be, in order to reach attack range for their Torpedoes the PTs need to close to within 12K yards which is well within secondary armament range of the Battleships, plus every escort is targeting them now. Two reach attack range but none manage to fire their torpedoes before being blasted out of the water.

Third way is the Battleships not only shoot up the 7-inch guns, the Airfield and fight off the aircraft but also spot and shoot up the PT Boats (which they didn't have intelligence were there). So again...The Japanese move their transports to within 10 miles of shore (25K Yards or so) to reduce the turn around time for the landing craft. Unload the landing craft, load troops into the landing craft and head for shore with 14-inch rounds rumbling overhead pounding the rubble - this will be easy, they had two battleships covering them, nobody could survive that bombardment! The landing craft move to the single entrance to the lagoon and suddenly the Americans open up with their guns and HMG. So how many are left, based on OTL experience with shore bombardments expect that over 75% of the guns and 90% of the MGs would survive so figure - 12 5-inch guns, 8 3 inch guns, and 30+ .50-caliber HMGs open up and rip the boats to shreds. Even giving the Japanese as good a results as the late war American bombardment they are in unarmored landing craft. If they manage to get across the lagoon in the face of this fire, they will then have to face 30+ MMGs plus 3+ companies of Infantry on each Island. In addition these are (for landing craft) deep draft craft, having a draft of 1 meter, over 40% of the lagoon has a depth of less than 1m at high tide and is above water at low tide. With the volume of fire going on it will not be obvious where the low spots are. Especially for the Eastern Island landing group the obvious course is dead wrong and will end up with the landing craft beached half a mile from the actual beaches with 5 meter water between the beached landing craft and Eastern Island.

Now if the Japanese loose this landing group their nearest replacement group is either at Turk or Guam. Take your pick. But either way they have to pull back and get them, plus to make matters worse they are now (assuming this has taken 3 days) at the point where they have to pull back and refuel their Destroyers and other short ranged ships before continuing with anything they do. If in fact they had to run their DDs at faster than 19 knots they will have to pull back at 10 knots to keep from running them dry or fuel within range of any aircraft left on Midway.

This is why I think it is unlikely the Japanese can take Midway in June 1942.
 

sharlin

Banned
One would think that the Japanese - as un-averse to casualties as they were, even - would do something slightly more likely to succeed than "drop off the infantry and hope for the best.


Thats basically what their tactic was going to have to be though, they had no landing ships, they could only dream of LVTs, no ship to shore radios, no experience in gunfire support for troops ashore. Due to the reefs the Japanese infantry would have had to slog about 200 yards through water up to their waist if not necks under an absolute hail of gunfire. The results would have been a massacre. And thats not counting the effects of gunfire on what ever they would carry the men to get that close in.
 
phx1138: I think you overestimate the odds against Japan doing better (for a while, certainly not winning) a bit, but the only things I can think of that would actually solve that are twofold:

1) Considerably better Japanese leadership. And I mean in regards to the decisions on focusing maniacally on pilot quality and so on, not tactics or even war strategy.

2) "And King, Nimitz, and Spruance all get killed in the same car crash." level destruction of the American leadership.

Overwhelming force might win in the long run, but it would be a considerably uglier war for the Allies (A-bombs a'coming or no A-bombs) to slog across the Pacific without the good leadership of the men who the US Navy had OTL.

CINCUS should have dropped the last letter.

:D

Fair points for all others on the morale issues of not fighting and the specifics of Midway/the Japanese (lack of) tactics.

Sheesh. Why is it that Japan is so riddled with the kind of delusions that ONLY a power with superior resources can afford but a power where trained manpower is precious has to purge at all costs?

That, IMO, is more fatal to its odds of victory than the industrial weight of the US. The US was fighting a war that demanded all the resources of being a truly massive power, given Germany, so Japan doesn't have to face all of that at once .. .

But it's only possibility of facing that is extremely, in a word, efficient use of limited assets. No underdog has ever won by playing brave-but-stupid.
 

GarethC

Donor
With USS Yorktown missing at Midway would mean that the Japanese aircraft carrier Soryu would not be taken out in the fatal divebomber attack on the Kido Butai. Therefore the IJN could have retalliated with both carriers in full force of Carrier Divission 2 (Soryu and Hiryu), meaning twice the number of aircraft will be able to be launched at TF-17 (as TF-16 is now missing) Hopefully the airstrike that missed the target from USS Hornet would have returned in time to aid the sole remaining carrier USS Enterprise.

The further consequenses are possibly that the Japanese would still fail in landing troops at Midway, although that always had been a secondary objective. The goal had been to blow the USN from the sea in the Pacific, which was a serious possibility, with one less USN carrier in the region, as only USS Enterprise was an effective unit, since USS Hornet seemed to be a quite unlucky ship from the start on, as her aircraft did not play a major role in the battle. (VB-8 and VSB-8 completely missed their target by poor navigation adn only returned to the ship, after the battle, while VT-8 was completely destroyed and VF-8 was unlucky in loosing fighters due to running out of fuel.)
This is what I was getting at upthread. AIUI, Mitscher and Ring took a double-or-nothing gamble on where a second carrier division of the Kido Butai was, anticipating that Enterprise and Yorktown would manage to sink the carriers actually spotted by the Midway PBYs. So although Hornet's air group launched together, the fighters and dive bombers headed off west while the TBDs went pretty much straight to the IJN carriers and their doom.

If no Yorktown, then there's no reason for Ring to go wandering off in the wrong direction - Hornet's strike is needed against the known contacts anyway.

So instead of Waldron and VT-8 getting wiped out without fighter cover, actually the Hornet air group would deliver a coordinated attack exactly as doctrine intended. The aerial torpedoes would still be rubbish, of course, but hell, one of them might work, and in any event, the presence of a fighter escort should mean that Kaga is wrecked by VB-8, and her smoke might guide McClusky to the carriers more effectively than following Arashi did.
 

Hyperion

Banned
Okay, I'm not following.

It was "a perceived weakness' borne out by OTL, but that doesn't mean it was an actual weakness.

And I'd love to see something detailing the strength of the garrison vs. what the Japanese brought with them. Not something written by "some guy on the internet" but something documented.

Midway, in OTL, had well over 2,000 troops, and in the month leading up to the invasion, Nimitz, in OTL, sent as much supplies, equipment, weapons, and additional personnel to the island that he realistically could.

The Japanese, despite a far larger fleet than the US, only had a little over 5,000 ground troops assigned to actually land on the atoll, and they where mostly light infantry troops, no tanks or other heavy equipment.

Here are some orders of battle information.

Give me a couple of hours, and I will send you a PM with the names of several books that you can find at the library, or that you might be able to purchase at Amazon.com or somewhere.

http://www.navweaps.com/index_oob/OOB_WWII_Pacific/OOB_WWII_Midway.htm

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_midway#Allied_code-breaking

I'll have that PM with those books in a few hours.
 
Sending as much as he could doesn't necessarily mean enough - or at least, enough if the Japanese had prepared properly.

And thanks. I've read Miracle at Midway, but that's the only one specifically on it, and it's apparently far from the latest research.

So any good recommendations would be greatly appreciated.
 

Hyperion

Banned
Is there a carrier in the Atlantic that could transit the canal and be in play within the month after Coral Sea?

Saratoga arrived 2 days after the battle, IIRC - could any time have been shaved off that if she had not stopped at San Diego but instead headed straight for Pearl, and done the loading of food, munitions, an air group, etc., in Hawaii?

If Stanhope Ring just follows Waldron (in company with Hornet's F4Fs), knowing that there will be plenty of Japanese carriers to go around, would Yorktown's air group be missed?

The USS Wasp arrived in the latter part of June 1942, along with several cruisers and destroyers, and the battleship USS North Carolina, one of few battleships that could actually operate with the US carriers and had the firepower to do anything worthwile.
 
A couple of things to consider. Doctrine has that you want to outnumber an opponent by at least 4:1 when attacking a defended position. I don't remember off the top of my head how many Marines were on Midway but the attacking Japanese forces weren't close to this achieving this level, in fact their combat troops may have been outnumbered by the Marines. When the Japanese attacked Wake Island the second time (Dec 23, 1941), they had approximately 1500 troops invading against 400-500 Marines and civilians and it was a very close battle. Amphibious operations against defended beaches were not a Japanese specialty; their successful landings were normally unopposed or against lightly defended landing sites. Look at Tawara for example. The Japanese had approximately 2,600 combat troops on the island out of a force of about 4,000. The Marines landed the 2nd Marine Division, a force of about 18,000 against them and remember how difficult a fight that was. The Marines at Tawara had Amtraks to get over the reef at Tawara; the Japanese plan was to wade in from the reefs at Midway. Looking back, the chances of the Japanese success at invading Midway were very slim.

Woud have Nimitz deployed the fleet without Yorktown, most likely yes.
Looking at Nimitz's other actions, he was seeking the opportunity to inflict damage on the IJN and slow down their advance. He was trying to use his superior intelligence assets to surprise his opponent and catch him off balance. He would have still sent Enterprise and Hornet to support Midway, to be prepared to engage if events proved favorable. His orders to the task force commanders were based on the concept of calculated risk, "Avoid exposure to superior enemy forces unless the opportunity to impose serious or greater damage to the enemy is possible." He also provided additional guidance to avoid losing any carriers if at all possible and abandon Midway if necessary. Midway was not itended from Nimitz' perspective to be the defining battle of the war but just another opportunity to inflict damage if possible and slow the Japanese advance while waiting for the superior US industrial capacity to provide additional ships and aircraft.

You might want to look at Shattered Swords by Parshall and Tully. It provides excellent coverage of the battle and the events leading up to it. Some may disagree with their conclusions on the causes for the Japanese defeat but their case is compelling and thought-provoking.
 
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This is what I was getting at upthread. AIUI, Mitscher and Ring took a double-or-nothing gamble on where a second carrier division of the Kido Butai was, anticipating that Enterprise and Yorktown would manage to sink the carriers actually spotted by the Midway PBYs. So although Hornet's air group launched together, the fighters and dive bombers headed off west while the TBDs went pretty much straight to the IJN carriers and their doom.

If no Yorktown, then there's no reason for Ring to go wandering off in the wrong direction - Hornet's strike is needed against the known contacts anyway.

So instead of Waldron and VT-8 getting wiped out without fighter cover, actually the Hornet air group would deliver a coordinated attack exactly as doctrine intended. The aerial torpedoes would still be rubbish, of course, but hell, one of them might work, and in any event, the presence of a fighter escort should mean that Kaga is wrecked by VB-8, and her smoke might guide McClusky to the carriers more effectively than following Arashi did.


Not completely true, as USN doctrine in halfway 1942 still was that every squadron was to operate independently from other allied airgroups. At Midway, both USS Enterprise and USS Hornet operated only together as ships, not as airgroups, which both lacked the needed training to cooperate together in airoperations. Only after Guadalcanal (after the battle of Santa Cruz) did USN doctrine change in favour of more coordinated strikes.
 
Gunner:

Would, in 1942, sending Enterprise and Hornet in something like this be "calculated risk"? That's considerably dicier with one more carrier down even if the Essex class will be available in the long run.

I'd note, incidentally, that OTL was a beautiful - from what I know/remember - example of how to take those sorts of instructions. Enough damage to be worth it, and only Yorktown lost to show for it.

Not ideal (as in, Yorktown might have been savable if memory serves), but a well played hand.
 

Hyperion

Banned
Sending as much as he could doesn't necessarily mean enough - or at least, enough if the Japanese had prepared properly.

And thanks. I've read Miracle at Midway, but that's the only one specifically on it, and it's apparently far from the latest research.

So any good recommendations would be greatly appreciated.

And the Japanese didn't prepare properly.

Yes they had an overwhelming advantage over the US in terms of ships, if you discount the fact that most of the major groups of Japanese ships where not operating together, some operating hundreds of miles further back from Midway, in no position to effect the battle.

And even if they could bomb and blast Midway, the fact remains that they didn't have the manpower or ground combat equipment to effectively take the atoll, at least not without the landing force being slaughtered in the process.
 
Sending as much as he could doesn't necessarily mean enough - or at least, enough if the Japanese had prepared properly.

And thanks. I've read Miracle at Midway, but that's the only one specifically on it, and it's apparently far from the latest research.

So any good recommendations would be greatly appreciated.

You might want to look at Shattered Swords by Parshall and Tully. It provides excellent coverage of the battle and the events leading up to it. Some may disagree with their conclusions on the causes for the Japanese defeat but their case is compelling and thought-provoking.

I second the recommendation of Shattered Sword. Excellent coverage, and very well written.
 
And the Japanese didn't prepare properly.

Yes they had an overwhelming advantage over the US in terms of ships, if you discount the fact that most of the major groups of Japanese ships where not operating together, some operating hundreds of miles further back from Midway, in no position to effect the battle.

And even if they could bomb and blast Midway, the fact remains that they didn't have the manpower or ground combat equipment to effectively take the atoll, at least not without the landing force being slaughtered in the process.

That second one seems to be a particularly bad waste of fuel. What's the point of sailing out with a vast fleet if much of it won't actually be concentrated?

I mean, given the Japanese objective of sinking American ships, those battleships were - as used, even - just there for the ride.

A battle of Midway where the battleships are used, as well as the carriers, might end particularly nastily for the Americans (I'm sure there are ways the US would respond, my point is, that would add problems to face).

Carriers unable to reply effectively to big guns do not do well at all.

Also, if they effectively bomb and blast Midway, how much are the Americans there going to be able to do to respond to the landing troops?

Bolded because to me, "effectively bombed and blasted" implies at least moderately significant damage - otherwise it wasn't very effective.

Thanks for the recommendation on Shattered Sword, guys.
 
Pearl Harbor was another 1300 nautical miles further east and the Pearl Harbour strike force had only just enough fuel to get there, attack and then leave.
And they only made it by deck-loading barrels of fuel. Practically, Midway was about at the limit of their normal range.

I wonder, could the US have given the islands a bit more firepower by grounding destroyers there?
 
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