Come to think of it, it's right. It has been Phillips fans and anti-fans who have been arguing and someone who didn't know who he was.It depends of the buttleflies...
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Come to think of it, it's right. It has been Phillips fans and anti-fans who have been arguing and someone who didn't know who he was.It depends of the buttleflies...
Hmm... So what's the conclusion?
I was thinking the same thing!Very interesting this thread...
ok lets get started by ships that could have been part of Force Z. If HMS Indomitable didn't get damage near Jamaica, yes she could have join Prince of Wales and escort at Capetown. Her Naval air squadrons would be: 880 Naval air squadron (12 sea Hurricanes), 800 Naval air squadron (12 Fulmer), 827 Naval air squadron (12 Albacore), and 830 Naval air squadron (12 Albacore). Now here is where the buttleflies could happen. On the thread someone said HMS Kenya (Colony Cruiser class), HMS Bedouin (Tribal class destroyer), and HMS Intrepid (I class dedtroyer) could be her escort but this can't be since these ships are part of the Artic convoy protection. Unless there is a cruiser lying around doing nothing, Kenya won't join. Bedouin has very good ASW on her so she won't join either. Intrepid could join her but what destroyer could replace her? Again here is when buttleflies happen. HMS Hurricane was damage severely in May 1941 by bombs while in dock. If she didn't get severely damaged and only minor damage, she would have been ready by October with her refit for ASW and radar. She could replace Intrepid in the Artic convoy escort. (more information on HMS Hurricane: https://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono-10DD-33Brazil-HMS_Hurricane.htm). Now here is the good part, HMS Indomitable needs cruisers protection so what cruisers could be provided? Here again is where buttleflies could happen. HMS Dido was damage at the end of May 1941. Left Alexandria in June toward Durban where temporal repairs were done. By the middle of the month. If she left to New York during that time, she would have arrived in July and started repairs on her injury probably by July 20 and not in August. She would be ready by the beginning of September and sail toward UK by the 15. Here she gets her Radar probably finishing the refit by October 10. Start her trials that by the end of October she would be ready. So a cruiser is available now to escort HMS Indomitable. (more information on HMS Dido: https://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono-06CL-Dido.htm). Now we got a Anti-Aircraft cruiser and one destroyer. Well three more destroyers could join the escort to Singapore. HMS Duncan station at Gibraltar as well Dutch destroyer HNLMS Isaac Sweers (more information on Isaac Sweers: https://www.netherlandsnavy.nl/Sweers_his.htm). HMS Duncan was going to get a refit in November but seeing that the carrier needs escort well the refit had to wait. (more information on HMS Duncan: https://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono-10DD-18D-HMS_Duncan.htm). HMS Arrow would also join, increasing now Indomitable to one cruiser and three destroyers.I was thinking the same thing!
I started reading this with some apprehension given the controversial nature of the topic and I've been pleasantly suprised by the civil discussion that has been going on.
The old trope of "Admiral Phillips was an arrogant fool who believed capital ships were unsinkable by airpower and led his ships to their unavoidable doom, this event alone ending the area of battleships and proving the incontestable superiority of air power" remains the dominant rhetoric in the media when talking about the Force Z affair, event though it is starting to change.
I'm glad people here have pretty clearly debunked that theory.
In real time we all know that but if buttleflies had happened and she got hit not in the bow but a lot back near the bridge, then things would have been different. Now about her Radar, if things went like I said before and you read on HMS Liverpool https://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono-06CL-Liverpool.htm then you will understand why she could have arrived by September and have her Radar, refit and trials finish by either the 10 -14 and she would be assigned to escort either Prince of Wales or Indomitable.Liverpool did not complete repairs at Mare Island until October
ok lets get started by ships that could have been part of Force Z.
Found butterfly, forward gasoline store does not causes secondary explosion, which OTL, wrecks A turret, 1st and 2nd deck back to B barbette , also found Mare Island source that says Liverpool received 9 I stead of 6 x 20mm AAIn real time we all know that but if buttleflies had happened and she got hit not in the bow but a lot back near the bridge, then things would have been different. Now about her Radar, if things went like I said before and you read on HMS Liverpool https://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono-06CL-Liverpool.htm then you will understand why she could have arrived by September and have her Radar, refit and trials finish by either the 10 -14 and she would be assigned to escort either Prince of Wales or Indomitable.
Remember this can happen if buttleflies happen...
Please reread my posting more carefully.On the thread someone said HMS Kenya (Colony Cruiser class), HMS Bedouin (Tribal class destroyer), and HMS Intrepid (I class dedtroyer) could be her escort but this can't be since these ships are part of the Artic convoy protection. Unless there is a cruiser lying around doing nothing, Kenya won't join. Bedouin has very good ASW on her so she won't join either. Intrepid could join her but what destroyer could replace her?
All three ships were idle in Scapa Flow when (in my ATL post), HMS Indomitable sails for South Africa. They are available because HMS Kenya is "lying around doing nothing". On 31 October, all three were sent to Iceland, not on ASW duties, but to search for German ships which may aid a possible breakout of KMS Tirpitz. They found nothing. My argument is that escorting HMS Indomitable would be a higher priority mission than Iceland. I do not dispute the ASW capability of HMS Bedouin. However in this timeframe in the OTL she was not used for that purpose.The most likely escort are light cruiser HMS Kenya and destroyers HMS Bedouin and Intrepid. From 10-31 October these three ships were at Scapa Flow, then departed for Iceland to search for suspected German weather and replenishment ships. Given the likelihood of success in Icelandic weather compared to the value of a capital ship, these three ships are assigned HMS Indomitable.
If HMS Dido left at the end of October, she is 1) unavailable to escort IMS Indomitable; and 2) leaving eight days later. Assuming similar transit times, it is difficult to see her arriving before 10 December. Her choice also requires an infusion of considerable hindsight. While HMS Kenya accompanying the carrier is logical, HMS Dido sailing alone to catch up with her is less so.Start her trials that by the end of October she would be ready.
So HMS Duncan has to go in for refit on arrival as did HMS Jupiter and Encounter. I do not see the gain here. The delay in HMS Nubian, Ilex and Isis was in part due to prevailing weather patterns in the Western Indian Ocean which their seaworthiness was not considered adequate. I could go on.HMS Duncan was going to get a refit in November but seeing that the carrier needs escort well the refit had to wait.
Moving a torpedo hit on a ship in December 1940 is a bit too far of a stretch for me. Likewise, HMS Glasgow was not fully repaired when her refit at Singapore ended in September 1941, and her speed was limited until full repairs in 1942. Hence she remained on convoy duty until then (See McCart "Town Class Cruisers" for additional details.) HMS Mauritius arrived at Singapore on 6 November - there is simply not enough time to repair her boilers.The first group would have been Cruisers that could have join. HMS Liverpool which is being repair at Mare Island USA. Now if the hit of the torpedoe was much behind where she got hit, yes her repairs would have been done by August. She would have sailed to UK and by October have completed her refitted with radar and her trials. She would have either join Prince of Wales group or Indomitable group. (more information on HMS Liverpool: https://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono-06CL-Liverpool.htm). HMS Glasgow and HMS Mauritius were two cruisers that needed repairs in Singapore but could not provide it since labour work and experience were taken from Singapore to help out in Alexandria, Suez, Aden, Bombay, Mombasa, and Durban. Now if the buttleflies would have happen and no labour workers were sent to Mombasa or Suez, these two cruiser would have been part of Force Z.
This is the biggest question what are we looking at and how early does the POD start, really does HMS Indomitable send scouts out pre war to join the Hudson & Catalina of OTL and do they find something interesting before the 9/10th and report it back unlike OTL?At midnight 9/10 December 1941, Force Z is further to the east than in the OTL by perhaps 50-60 miles or so. In the OTL Phillips did not give much credence to his Chief of Staff’s report of landings at Kuantan sent at 2335 hrs
Very well done. But a second wave was being prepared but was called off when they received confirmation that both Repulse & POW were sinking. So, another attack would've come in the afternoon. Two other points, if the Japanese have an additional 30-45 minutes of fuel the attacks would be better coordinated. Knowing that a carrier is present the Japanese would make use of the 20 Zero's that were availed. The landings in upper Malaya were secure so the priority would be escorting the attack on Force Z.(Note: I do not consider the times listed below as likely. The IJNAF attacks will likely be 30-45 minutes earlier. I use the OTL time to allow the reader to easily compare the OTL sequence of events with my ATL estimate.)
Conditions were not idyllic over Force Z when first sighted at 1015, but the professional skill of IJNAF pilots overcame strong winds. The extra anti-aircraft guns aboard HMS Kenya did little, the poor quality of the RN High Angle Control System directors made them unsuitable for aircraft that flew twice as fast as the RN’s own aircraft – this had long ago been proven in the Mediterranean. More valuable was HMNLS Jacob Van Heemskerk, whose centerline 4-inch guns had better magazine arrangements, and therefore higher sustained rate of fire, where the two paired amidships had the same ammunition difficulties as did HMS Kenya because of the distance from her amidship magazines. Of use was the smoke screens laid by HMS Kenya and the additional escorting destroyers. Although the wet weather conditions hamper its effects, the larger scale than OTL does play a role in IJNAF pilots’ vision and resulting actions. Luck, both good and bad, would play itself out over Force Z.
The RN Combat Air Patrol (CAP) cycle will be based upon flights of three. Beginning at 0600, there Fulmar and three Sea Hurricane are launched. Two Sea Hurricane patrol astern, one Sea Hurricane and one Fulmar to the east, and two Fulmar to the west to cover in order the most likely approach routes of IJNAF aircraft. Although the Fulmar can remain aloft almost twice as long, duration of patrol is based on the lesser range of the Sea Hurricane. A second patrol is launched at 0800, and the first recovered no later than 0815; the third patrol at 1000, with recovery by 1015; by which time the first patrol is refueled and on standby. CAP was focused on defeating a torpedo attack; high level bombing would be left to a ship’s maneuverability and anti-aircraft (AA) crews. Fighter control and skill in interpreting radar fixes had not evolved sufficiently to do both.
Force Z is steaming in line, with HMAS Vampire in the lead, followed by HMS Indomitable with HMNLS Jacob Van Heemskerk to port and HMS Intrepid to starboard. HMS Repulse is next in line with HMS Bedouin to port and HMS Electra to the west. HMS Kenya, HMS Prince of Wales and Express trail. Once within range, a squadron of Albacores armed with bombs is sent in response to the report of landings at Kuantan. They find nothing. As they are returning, Force Z will be under attack and they will land at Kuantan.
It was not the 4/Genzan Air Corps which spotted Force Z, but rather a sister squadron. HMS Tenedos was spotted at 0943, but both 55Kg bombs missed and the aircraft continued to trail the destroyer. She was detached at 0800 hours low on fuel to proceed without zigzagging to Singapore. The first attack, at 1015 was by 3/Genzan Air Corps coming in from the south and also encountering HMS Tenedos. Repeating the colossal error in ship recognition, all nine bombs dropped by the IJNAF aviators failed to strike this nimble, if geriatric and unworthy veteran. En-route home, the bombers passed over Force Z. The position of Force Z was then widely broadcast; and because Phillips is further north than the OTL, E-13A float planes from 7th Cruiser Sqn are also able to join tracking it. In turn, at 1020, 1025 and 1030 warnings from HMS Tenedos were received by Force Z. The standby CAP was launched beginning at 1040.
Approaching from the south 40 minutes later, 1/Mihoro Air Group quickly identified the massive control top of HMS Repulse as symbolic of a capital ship, and lined up in tight three aircraft “V” formations. LT Shirai Yoshimi made the decision to attack the battlecruiser because he believed the deck armour of HMS Prince of Wales to be too thick for his 250Kg bombs to be effective. He was then advised by another plane crew of an aircraft carrier to the west, and decided to switch targets. The anti-aircraft fire was thick; five planes were hit, four seriously of which two did not make it back to Saigon. All made two bomb runs, dropping one each time. For all the care in aiming, only one bomb hit HMS Indomitable, on the starboard side about five feet outside the armoured hanger box, and about ten feet inside the hull. Exploding just aft of the island, it ruptured a fuel tank and started a fire that was quickly extinguished. Her ability to operate aircraft was not impaired. (Note: I based the location of this hit based on the position of the OTL hit on HMS Repulse, and the damage from the accidental explosion aboard HMS Indomitable in February 1953; although this bomb hit is about 10-15 feet further aft than the OTL explosion. That as far as my expertise goes.)
The next squadron, the 1/Genzan Air Corps arrived at 1138 (43 minutes later) from the northeast and was real trouble; forever demolishing the myth of battleship invulnerability so cherished by naval traditionalists (HMS Prince of Wales was undamaged, free to maneuver, and had unimpeded AA fire). CAP engaged as planned, and losses were heavy, two G3M shot down; and two more damaged and prematurely launched their torpedoes before the AA Zone was reached. One more G3M was shot down and one damaged severely, but both launched their weapons. CAPT Leach was able to dodge four of five torpedoes. The deadly 150 Kg warhead exploded on the port side aft, breaking through the armour belt and flooding B Engine Room. The shaft was bent at an odd angle and continued to spin for a few seconds more, gouging the thin bottom plating and permitted Y Engine Room to slowly flood; while at the other end the loosened shaft mountings allowed water into B Boiler Room. Shock damage shut down the diesel dynamos, leaving X Engine and Y Boiler Rooms in the dark. A Boiler and A Engine Rooms were shut down as an unnecessary precaution. Without power, her rudder went limp. She wallowed aimlessly, and was effectively hors de combat.
2/Genzan Air Corps flew past their retiring sister squadron to attack HMS Repulse from the east at 1150. Only eight aircraft were present, one having aborted with mechanical difficulties during launch. With CAP drawn towards the north, only one fighter engaged without success, due to CAPT Tennant’s skill. The old girl hiked up her 25-year-old skirts and reached 27.5 knots; and he was now nearly ten miles ahead of the flagship. All eight torpedoes missed, and four attackers were damaged by AA fire, none seriously. HMS Repulse then returned to normal station ahead of the flagship.
Only five minutes later, 4/Mihoro Air Group approached from the southeast, and sighted HMS Indomitable. She had recovered her third fighter patrol launched at 1000, and just completed launching her second fighter patrol from her catapult (which were still in her vicinity). Two Nells were shot down by CAP, and two damaged. In accordance with IJNAF doctrine, torpedoes were dropped as soon as engaged to avoid being lost if its aircraft went down. One more was shot down by HMNLS Jacob Van Heemskerk. None of the torpedoes hit (the OTL effect against HMS Repulse).
VA Phillips at last broke radio silence requesting destroyers from the Singapore local Flotilla and powerful tugs, and reporting his position. There was a lull in attacks of 50 minutes during which HMS Kenya was of most value. Shifting from port to starboard side, she comes alongside a now stationary flagship. This allows HMS Kenya to pass slave cables to supply power to the dynamo room, with 25 minutes of light allows the diesel generators to restart. The risk of stationary ships being sunk by submarines was gladly accepted. As power was restored, the flooding of B and Y Boiler Rooms was staunched and control regained over the rudders. A Boiler and A Engine Rooms were restarted, and then X Boiler and X Engine Rooms. By 1215, HMS Prince of Wales was able to get under way at 14 knots, and redundant power cables were laid out. Gradually compartments were pumped out and resealed.
(Historical note: I know of no incident in which slave cables saved an RN battleship. HMS Sheffield and Edinburgh used them to save HMS Belfast in November 1939. HMS Gloucester sent her own damage control parties, and unsuccessfully attempted to use them in January 1941 to save HMS Southampton, but fires prevented it. The technique was practiced prewar, and equipment generally carried by RN ships. The open question is whether HMS Prince of Wales’ crew is sufficiently trained. I assume that luck cuts both ways, but if not, then HMS Kenya’ damage control parties can help. I also assume the sea conditions are similar to those where she was hit in the OTL. I also assume the OTL level of flooding, about 2400 tons.)
The next three attacks are the most difficult to calculate. The Kanoya Air Corps was ordered to fly the furthest to the south, and when returning north missed Force Z in the weather. It then flew towards Kota Bharu before the mistake was realized. Consequently two squadrons approached from the northwest, the third from the north, and in close sequence. I see nothing in this ATL to change that. It is also quite likely that only one CAP flight is aloft, the other two having almost certainly exhausted their ammunition. The primary effect of CAP is to offset the lack of AA fire from the starboard guns of HMS Prince of Wales – unable to depress because of her list. Without AA fire, I/Kanoya Air Corps was able to close to 550 yards before launching torpedoes. Fighters will force some of them to launch much earlier. The attacks began at 1220, and lasted ten minutes.
2/Kanoya Air Corps chose to attack HMS Repulse on her starboard side, but CAPT Tennant’s luck still held, he dodged all eight. In so maneuvering, he fully exposed his port side to I/Kanoya Air Corps, and three pilots switched to her. One hit punctured a hole beneath the bulge and flooded X Boiler Room. The other six G4M Betty bombers continued on toward HMS Prince of Wales, with one falling to CAP, and one severely damaged. Four dropped their fish, and two hits were scored. The first was in the extreme bow, blowing a hole clean through to the port side, but was not a fatal wound. The second struck even with the after quadruple turret, causing flooding but failing to cause a catastrophic explosion. A third G4M was damaged by AA fire as she passed the ports side of the stricken battleship.
3/Kanoya Air Corps was commanded by LT Iki Hiroshi, who had the fuel to hold back and observe the first five minutes of his squadron mates’ attacks. He will consider three options. Under IJN Doctrine, his primary mission is to damage capital ships so that the main battle squadrons can overtake and sink them. HMS Repulse appears undamaged to him, and allowing an undamaged capital ship to escape will be considered a critical error. (LT Iki is completely unaware that VA Kondo Nabutake’s battleships are too far away to be employed according to doctrine.) Within the IJNAF itself, the prevailing sentiment is that HMS Prince of Wales must not survive so as to prove, once and for all, the supremacy of airpower. That purity of airpower idea will tempt Iki to hunt for HMS Indomitable.
LT Iki will choose, as in the OTL, to attack HMS Repulse. He details six aircraft to attack from the starboard side, as did 2/Kanoya Air Corps. This keeps CAPT Tennant in the same pattern of steaming and allows the three remaining planes to aim at his port side. All three torpedoes hit, abreast “B” turret, directly on the bulge near “B” Engine Room, and one damaging her rudder aft. His two mates' aircraft disintegrated before Ito's eyes due to AA fire, and his own plane was damaged. Belatedly, a torpedo launched far off then hit E Boiler Room on the starboard side, and the battlecruiser is doomed.
(I am actually somewhat agnostic on whether LT Iki goes after HMS Repulse or HMS Prince of Wales. It is impossible to say whether emotions, or doctrinal discipline will win out.)
The last two squadrons went after HMS Prince of Wales. LT Ohira commanding 3/Mihoro Air Group, arrived at 1233, but dropped his bomb well short, and all other bombardiers followed their leader’s example; leaving 3/Mihoro Air Group scoreless. LT Ohira was assigned to the night mission that attacked HMIJS Chokai, and I suspect this OTL error was due to fatigue. 2/Mihoro Air Group was the last to attack at 1241, and scored a single 500 Kg hit on the port side of the catapult deck, and hamaged and caused casualties to X Boiler Room below.
It was over. I suspect with additional attention from destroyers, the casualty list for HMS Repulse will be lower than the OTL 24 officers and 486 ratings. The IJNAF could not attack again, its aircrews cannot rest and aircraft rearmed before dark. The weather on 11 and 12 December did not cooperate with further air operations. I also doubt any losses to submarines will be incurred.
Is there a prospect of the land based air arriving in time to do something useful? OTL they were in time to watch the ships sinking, but ITTL their presence could either deter further attacks - possible if the damage is overestimated or if the attacks took longer, or results in a last gasp attempt to get them before they can escape.Very well done. But a second wave was being prepared but was called off when they received confirmation that both Repulse & POW were sinking. So, another attack would've come in the afternoon. Two other points, if the Japanese have an additional 30-45 minutes of fuel the attacks would be better coordinated. Knowing that a carrier is present the Japanese would make use of the 20 Zero's that were availed. The landings in upper Malaya were secure so the priority would be escorting the attack on Force Z.
Sorry, that's not likely. The problem with land-based air cover is it's sporadic. Especially if the battle takes place 60 miles further east, the Buffaloes don't know when to be above Force Z, because they can only stay on station for a short period of time. They don't know when the second wave will show up. It might be 3 hours, or 4, or maybe 5. The Japanese know every operation is a risk, and the possible presence of a handful of piss poor fighters aren't going to frighten them away.Is there a prospect of the land based air arriving in time to do something useful? OTL they were in time to watch the ships sinking, but ITTL their presence could either deter further attacks - possible if the damage is overestimated or if the attacks took longer, or results in a last gasp attempt to get them before they can escape.
Both could be influenced by quality of Japanese intel on aircraft numbers - if they are reasonably sure the buffaloes are all there is they are more likely to try to finish the job. If, however, they are expecting more, they may be more inclined to accept that there's enough damage to effectively cripple the UK presence for months on end, especially as even if they don't sink, they'll be lost when Singapore is captured.
Point noted, but I believe the A6M will be used as they were in the OTL. They flew air cover over the transport force. On 7 December, two recce planes (one RAAF Hudson, one RAF Catalina) were shot down. The Hudson by an IJAAF Ki-97 Nate, off the coast of Cambodia, but the Catalina almost certainly well out to sea by a Zero. On 10 December, not all IJN transports have completely cleared the Gulf of Siam, and their value to follow-on operations is very high. It's not like the fighters were idle on 10 December.Knowing that a carrier is present the Japanese would make use of the 20 Zero's that were availed.
As for the second strike, from my sources I am not aware of it. As for the additional fuel resulting in better coordination, at the last minute RA Matsunaga removed one squadron from the reconnaissance force and another rearmed with bombs rather than torpedoes. This is why 1/Mihoro Air Group and 2/Mihoro Air Group took off so late. The reconnaissance gaps were filled by increasing the distance between the remaining squadrons. I believe the extra fuel benefits Kanoya Air Corps the most- but that group executed the most perfectly coordinated attack in the OTL. A close second is 1/Genzan Air Corps and 2/Genzan Air Corps, but after careful thought I still believe they would attack separate targets, and extra fuel did not negate the skill of CAPT Tennant in maneuvering his ship. I felt the fuel factor had to be taken into consideration, but did not necessarily change the results.But a second wave was being prepared but was called off when they received confirmation that both Repulse & POW were sinking. So, another attack would've come in the afternoon. Two other points, if the Japanese have an additional 30-45 minutes of fuel the attacks would be better coordinated.
Thats the main issue with this thread are we discussing, what would happen with HMS Indomitable sent to far east or her in exactly the same place as OTL force Z under OTL final air attack that might well never happen simply due to RN not being in the same place as having a CV gives massively more range and options to them.How will HMS Indomitable be used? As a fast transport to bring 50 Hurricane IIA/B fighters from Port Sudan?