Historical European neutrals become belligerents in WW II

Dave Shoup

Banned
Historically, there were six major European nations that maintained neutrality for much or all of the Second World War. The politics for all six were varied, but generally came down to the realities that they were not attacked by a larger neighbor, and their neutrality was otherwise more valuable to one or both sides than belligerency would have been ... that being said, the political and strategic realities of the conflict, from 1939-45, were such that multiple nations that had maintained neutrality throughout the Great War and would have been content to stay out became active combatants (Norway, the Netherlands, etc.), and others that began the war as active members of one alliance switched and continued to fight (Finland, Italy) as a member - de facto if not de jure - of another.

To bring a potential point of departure into focus, consider the reality that by the end of 1942, the Axis declarations of war had brought the US into the war in a huge way, as demonstrated by TORCH, which came in roughly the same period as the German defeat at Stalingrad. These events, coupled with the US and Allied counteroffensives in the Pacific, made clear the tide was turning.

So with a nod toward the geopolitical historical realities by early 1943, what could have brought the neutrals to consider entering the conflict, and - realistically - what they might have brought to the fray?

It seems unlikely that Franco's Spain, which guarded its neutrality quite strongly, would have ever officially gone to war. Same for Inönü's Turkey, certainly not any earlier than historically, in Turkey's case, to qualify joining the UN. Sweden was surrounded by Axis territory, so absent JUPITER or something like it, hard to see the Swedes entering the war. Switzerland after mid-1944 would have had a supply line to the Allies, but still would have been vulnerable to Germany from north, south, and east...

So this leads to the two remaining European neutrals with Atlantic coastlines, Eire and Portugal. Both were very careful about neutrality during WW II, but, historically, both nations were also friendly toward the Allies.

Tens of thousands of Irish citizens volunteered to fight in the British armed forces between 1939 and 1945 (a common estimate is 50,000, including as many as 5,000 men who left the Irish military for the British armed forces) and hundreds of thousands of Irish citizens worked in Britain's war economy (a common estimate is as many as 200,000). The politics in Ireland would have been very challenging, but with American encouragement, it's not beyond the realm of possibility - presumably any actual "Irish" contingent (beyond the volunteers mentioned above) - would have served under US command, equipped and sustained as an Allied formation within the 12th or 6th army groups, not unlike the French and Belgian forces that did so historically.

To step from the political to the military, the Irish forces during the Emergency increased to 40,000 on active service and another 100,000 in the reserves; so if 10 percent were willing to volunteer for active service overseas, that's 4,000 men; along with the estimate of 5,000 in British service, call it 9,000 total - presume a 100 percent replacement pool, cut that in half, so 4,500, which is the equivalent (roughly) of a US Army infantry regimental combat team or a British/Commonwealth brigade group.

Portugal maintained its neutrality throughout the war, but Portuguese personnel "unofficially" resisted the Japanese in Timor in 1942 and in August, 1943, Portugal opened the Azores to the Allies, which had a significant effect on the Atlantic campaign. Given that, if - and its a large if, but still - the Portuguese enter the war as an active belligerent, Portugal brings some resources into play.

The Portuguese had, after all, committed a force of two infantry divisions to serve under British command on the Western Front in 1917-18, as well as a separate artillery unit under French command. By 1943, the Portuguese had deployed a roughly 35,000-strong force to the Azores, mostly Army along with air and naval elements. The Portuguese Navy, for that matter, was a reasonably-sized force, with five modern destroyers, six modern sloops, and three modern submarines, all built in Britain or Portugal to British interwar designs in the 1930s, plus various older vessels and extemporized patrol and mine warfare vessels.

So, although two divisions is probably a stretch, perhaps an infantry brigade group and an aviation squadron, both for service under British command in northwestern Europe, along with a dozen or so escorts with the RN?

So an Irish infantry RCT in the 12th Army Group, and a Portuguese infantry brigade group in the 21st Army Group in 1944-45?

Thoughts?
 
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I think you are overlooking how poor Irish-American relations were during this period, in many ways the absolute nadir of relations between the two countries. Some of this is down to David Gray the American representative in Dublin who was probably the worst person possible for the job but I think relations between any plausible Irish government and FDR would be frosty.
 
and a Portuguese infantry brigade group in the 21st Army Group in 1944-45?

I assume that attaching them to the Brazilians (on the basis of language) would have been interesting.

Alternatively given their African and Indian colonies, providing garrisons in the Indian Ocean?
 
I'm kind of impressed that Ireland of the time is considered a "major" nation given it's size/capabilities. As RossN has pointed out the relations between Ireland and the US were crap at the official level through much of this time. As for equipping and fielding a force, I'm presuming that the equipment would have to come from UK sources, otherwise it would take even longer to standardise on US hardware (we only bought a small amount of US equipment mainly rifles at this period), moreover there would need to be an increase in time to bring any force up to speed given how relatively limited the equipment would be.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
I think you are overlooking how poor Irish-American relations were during this period, in many ways the absolute nadir of relations between the two countries. Some of this is down to David Gray the American representative in Dublin who was probably the worst person possible for the job but I think relations between any plausible Irish government and FDR would be frosty.

Strategic realities can overcome personalities, even historically (as witness the Finnish about-face); presumably even de Valera could have recognized that ... if you don't like Gray, then we can posit that someone else (Bill Donovan? John Prout?) is named the US envoy to Dublin.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
I assume that attaching them to the Brazilians (on the basis of language) would have been interesting. Alternatively given their African and Indian colonies, providing garrisons in the Indian Ocean?

My presumption is the Portuguese colonial forces would have remained where they were, but the size of the metropolitan garrison that was built up, historically, in the Azores by 1943 gives at least a benchmark. Given Portugal's 1917-18 experience, if such a force was available, I'd expect it would served alongside the British, be equipped as such, and find itself in the 21st AG. Serving attached to the Brazilians would require additional time to train and equip such a force to US standards, much less open the door to trying to figure out Portuguese-Brazilian-US command relationships.

A "extra" infantry brigade group in 21st AG would certainly have been useful, given the decisions the British and Canadians made historically to try and keep their commands at strength.

The Portuguese Navy and Merchant Marine would certainly have been a useful addition to the Battle of the Atlantic. A dozen modern (1930s) ships would have yielded at least one additional full escort group (6-9 ships) in action, plus three more submarines for ASW training and potentially offensive missions.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
I'm kind of impressed that Ireland of the time is considered a "major" nation given it's size/capabilities. As RossN has pointed out the relations between Ireland and the US were crap at the official level through much of this time. As for equipping and fielding a force, I'm presuming that the equipment would have to come from UK sources, otherwise it would take even longer to standardise on US hardware (we only bought a small amount of US equipment mainly rifles at this period), moreover there would need to be an increase in time to bring any force up to speed given how relatively limited the equipment would be.

Major in comparison to the other even smaller neutrals (Andorra, etc.), although 40-50,000 men on active service (Irish armed forces and volunteers for the British), plus another 100,000 for home service, is a significant force, all in all.

My presumption is putting an Eire army formation under British command would be a bridge too far in terms of Irish and British domestic politics, even in a WW II where the Dublin government sees active involvement in the conflict as a political positive. If such an formation/unit is available, seems equipping it to US standard and deploying it as an element of the 6th or 12th Army groups makes relative sense, and then were a few men with experience in both armies available for liaison duties. The alternative would be to serve with the French, and as historically romantic as that could have been, I'd guess the politics would be even more open to question.

As far as equipment goes, given the US had raised and sustained a force of 96+ US divisions, eight French divisions after the ANFA agreement, a Brazilian divisions, and a fair-sized Chinese force in Indian/Burma from 1943 onwards, doesn't seem like equipping an Irish infantry RCT through Lend-Lease would have been especially challenging.
 
Strategic realities can overcome personalities, even historically (as witness the Finnish about-face); presumably even de Valera could have recognized that ... if you don't like Gray, then we can posit that someone else (Bill Donovan? John Prout?) is named the US envoy to Dublin.

While Gray was bad I don't think a better diplomat could have achieved more - except perhaps in the field of keeping the poor relationship between Washington DC and Dublin out of the newspapers. The American and Irish governments simply weren't on the same page on, well, anything.

I also think blaming Dev is a mistake. As much as his persona was chalk and cheese with FDR and Churchill any even vaguely plausible alternate Irish leader would have dug their heels in over neutrality. WT Costello and Richard Mulcahy also backed neutrality and the only significant politician who didn't (James Dillon) ended up leaving his party over his isolation.
 
While Gray was bad I don't think a better diplomat could have achieved more - except perhaps in the field of keeping the poor relationship between Washington DC and Dublin out of the newspapers. The American and Irish governments simply weren't on the same page on, well, anything.

I also think blaming Dev is a mistake. As much as his persona was chalk and cheese with FDR and Churchill any even vaguely plausible alternate Irish leader would have dug their heels in over neutrality. WT Costello and Richard Mulcahy also backed neutrality and the only significant politician who didn't (James Dillon) ended up leaving his party over his isolation.

Also there's the fact that Dev was very much against war, even back to WW1, I don't think even if you changed the Diplomats you still have that. As we've said before you'd pretty much have to change the domestic affairs from '22 to '39.
 
Major in comparison to the other even smaller neutrals (Andorra, etc.), although 40-50,000 men on active service (Irish armed forces and volunteers for the British), plus another 100,000 for home service, is a significant force, all in all.

My presumption is putting an Eire army formation under British command would be a bridge too far in terms of Irish and British domestic politics, even in a WW II where the Dublin government sees active involvement in the conflict as a political positive. If such an formation/unit is available, seems equipping it to US standard and deploying it as an element of the 6th or 12th Army groups makes relative sense, and then were a few men with experience in both armies available for liaison duties. The alternative would be to serve with the French, and as historically romantic as that could have been, I'd guess the politics would be even more open to question.

As far as equipment goes, given the US had raised and sustained a force of 96+ US divisions, eight French divisions after the ANFA agreement, a Brazilian divisions, and a fair-sized Chinese force in Indian/Burma from 1943 onwards, doesn't seem like equipping an Irish infantry RCT through Lend-Lease would have been especially challenging.

My issue would be more moving from Commonwealth equipment to US, that adds in time to make them of any use. Also modernising the forces given how limited the DF were. Also if Ireland is moving from Neutral to Active forces, then you get into questions about whether the AC and the not Navy would need to be built up at the expense of the Army strength.

You're right about the issues with serving under the command of British forces particularly if there were situations where there were large losses in service.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
While Gray was bad I don't think a better diplomat could have achieved more - except perhaps in the field of keeping the poor relationship between Washington DC and Dublin out of the newspapers. The American and Irish governments simply weren't on the same page on, well, anything. I also think blaming Dev is a mistake. As much as his persona was chalk and cheese with FDR and Churchill any even vaguely plausible alternate Irish leader would have dug their heels in over neutrality. WT Costello and Richard Mulcahy also backed neutrality and the only significant politician who didn't (James Dillon) ended up leaving his party over his isolation.

Understand the point of view, but in spite of De Valera's public statements, the historical reality is Irish government policy was certainly stretched far more towards supporting the Allies then away (much less supporting the Axis), and Allied support - however limited - was there; the sales/transfer of merchant shipping to Ireland, the agreements to (if nothing else) look the other way when it came to Irish citizens volunteering for the Allied (British) forces or the British war economy, intelligence sharing, etc.

Give that, if De Valera's government understands the benefits on the table (protection of Irish trade, Lend-Lease for Ireland, joining the UN as a founding member, etc.), much less the goodwill that active Irish belligerency would have towards a resolution of Northern Ireland's status in Eire's favor, is it out of the question they would make the same decision - and with, arguably, even more cause, in terms of Axis military actions against Ireland and Irish interests - than as (for example) Brazil and Mexico?
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
Also there's the fact that Dev was very much against war, even back to WW1, I don't think even if you changed the Diplomats you still have that. As we've said before you'd pretty much have to change the domestic affairs from '22 to '39.

And yet he took up arms for Irish self-determination.

Not unlike, for example, his contemporaries Lázaro Cárdenas and Manuel Ávila Camacho... who both saw the benefits to their country of joining the Allies.
 
I dont know how true it is I just read once in a Turkish source years ago, but according to that article sometime in 1944 Turkey wanted to attack Germans in Bulgaria but WAllies did not let because Bulgaria would be in Soviet sphere.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
My issue would be more moving from Commonwealth equipment to US, that adds in time to make them of any use. Also modernising the forces given how limited the DF were. Also if Ireland is moving from Neutral to Active forces, then you get into questions about whether the AC and the not Navy would need to be built up at the expense of the Army strength. You're right about the issues with serving under the command of British forces particularly if there were situations where there were large losses in service.

Fair points, but the Free/Fighting French 1st Division made the same transition with minimal problems between 1942 and 1943. The thing about an Irish army contingent is the basic skills and organization for an RCT/brigade group were in place; the Irish ground forces' order of battle during the emergency amounted to two divisions and two separate brigades, so (presumably) an infantry brigade group/RCT equivalent organized and able to go into action alongside Allied forces could have been raised more expeditiously than an air squadron or anything similar.

https://www.military.ie/en/public-i.../history-of-the-army/history-of-the-army.html
 
Understand the point of view, but in spite of De Valera's public statements, the historical reality is Irish government policy was certainly stretched far more towards supporting the Allies then away (much less supporting the Axis), and Allied support - however limited - was there; the sales/transfer of merchant shipping to Ireland, the agreements to (if nothing else) look the other way when it came to Irish citizens volunteering for the Allied (British) forces or the British war economy, intelligence sharing, etc.

Give that, if De Valera's government understands the benefits on the table (protection of Irish trade, Lend-Lease for Ireland, joining the UN as a founding member, etc.), much less the goodwill that active Irish belligerency would have towards a resolution of Northern Ireland's status in Eire's favor, is it out of the question they would make the same decision - and with, arguably, even more cause, in terms of Axis military actions against Ireland and Irish interests - than as (for example) Brazil and Mexico?

The Irish position was pretty much whatever worked however without question there were plenty of areas where Dublin and London were far apart. Also I'm not sure about your point regarding the UN membership, had Russia made it clear that it would prevent nations joining up without being part of the war effort by that stage? Also not sure about your point in regards to NI, I mean the UK offer in 1940 wasn't enough to alter the Irish position (no doubt as there was little trust it would actually happen), certainly I doubt Dublin would have overly cared whether or not Belfast would have been influenced by Ireland joining the war, not when leading figures of the Unionists were calling for an invasion of Ireland at the time.

And yet he took up arms for Irish self-determination.

Not unlike, for example, his contemporaries Lázaro Cárdenas and Manuel Ávila Camacho... who both saw the benefits to their country of joining the Allies.

Well Dev's actual combat record is more limited than others.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
I dont know how true it is I just read once in a Turkish source years ago, but according to that article sometime in 1944 Turkey wanted to attack Germans in Bulgaria but WAllies did not let because Bulgaria would be in Soviet sphere.

I'd guess they'd have to fight the Soviets and the Bulgarians to get at the Germans, who were withdrawing north from (Greek) Macedonia pretty quickly...
 
Understand the point of view, but in spite of De Valera's public statements, the historical reality is Irish government policy was certainly stretched far more towards supporting the Allies then away (much less supporting the Axis), and Allied support - however limited - was there; the sales/transfer of merchant shipping to Ireland, the agreements to (if nothing else) look the other way when it came to Irish citizens volunteering for the Allied (British) forces or the British war economy, intelligence sharing, etc.

Give that, if De Valera's government understands the benefits on the table (protection of Irish trade, Lend-Lease for Ireland, joining the UN as a founding member, etc.), much less the goodwill that active Irish belligerency would have towards a resolution of Northern Ireland's status in Eire's favor, is it out of the question they would make the same decision - and with, arguably, even more cause, in terms of Axis military actions against Ireland and Irish interests - than as (for example) Brazil and Mexico?

Historically exactly those 'benefits' were on offer and ended up doing nothing to budge neutrality. Neither did the stick which both the British and American governments used often enough.

The thing you have to understand is that the War of Independence ended in 1921. That is not even two full decades before the start of the Second World War. It had also ended in partition, an issue the Americans never even tried to engage with and the British had an understandably complicated relationship with.

There is also the blunt fact that many saw neutrality as in itself a necessary act of independence rather than being an appendage of the UK.
 
Both Spain and Turkey seem quite easy to get involved.

Spain all you need is Hitler to be convinced that them joining would be better.

Turkey, have the referendum in Syria delayed and the allies denounce them for the treatment of the kurds. Or have Stalin invade them instead of or in addition to Finland.

Alternatively Switzerland, Turkey, Sweden and micronations were all potential invasion targets and Hitler could easily decide to invade them. Goebbels stopped the Swedish invasion.

Portugal and Ireland are the hardest ones
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
1) The Irish position was pretty much whatever worked however without question there were plenty of areas where Dublin and London were far apart. Also I'm not sure about your point regarding the UN membership, had Russia made it clear that it would prevent nations joining up without being part of the war effort by that stage? Also not sure about your point in regards to NI, I mean the UK offer in 1940 wasn't enough to alter the Irish position (no doubt as there was little trust it would actually happen), certainly I doubt Dublin would have overly cared whether or not Belfast would have been influenced by Ireland joining the war, not when leading figures of the Unionists were calling for an invasion of Ireland at the time.

2) Well Dev's actual combat record is more limited than others.

1) Well, it's pretty clear UN membership in 1945 was an element of what drove the "11th hour" declarations by Argentina, Chile, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, etc. As far NI goes, presumably the US would be more willing to engage with an Eire that was a WW II ally than was not, otherwise. And if Dublin did join in, certainly gives De Valera and anyone who follows an angle to criticize Stormont?

2) True. ;)
 
Fair points, but the Free/Fighting French 1st Division made the same transition with minimal problems between 1942 and 1943. The thing about an Irish army contingent is the basic skills and organization for an RCT/brigade group were in place; the Irish ground forces' order of battle during the emergency amounted to two divisions and two separate brigades, so (presumably) an infantry brigade group/RCT equivalent organized and able to go into action alongside Allied forces could have been raised more expeditiously than an air squadron or anything similar.

https://www.military.ie/en/public-i.../history-of-the-army/history-of-the-army.html

I'd have to go digging but I wouldn't be surprised that those forces were more on paper than full strength units, I mean start of 1940 the force strength was about 15K including the Coastal Service
 
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