Historical European neutrals become belligerents in WW II

Dave Shoup

Banned
Historically exactly those 'benefits' were on offer and ended up doing nothing to budge neutrality. Neither did the stick which both the British and American governments used often enough. The thing you have to understand is that the War of Independence ended in 1921. That is not even two full decades before the start of the Second World War. It had also ended in partition, an issue the Americans never even tried to engage with and the British had an understandably complicated relationship with. There is also the blunt fact that many saw neutrality as in itself a necessary act of independence rather than being an appendage of the UK.

Fair enough .... hence the suggestion in the OP that any such decision would have to come after the tide had turned. 1943 seems the most reasonable, given whatever POD it takes to move Irish government opinion. Obviously, it is all speculative, but I agree, it certainly would not have happened in 1939-42. Maybe in 1943 or afterwards?

Trying to avoid the easy out of "specific individual slips walking down the stairs" and miraculously policy changes, obviously. Was there nothing that would have persuaded De Valera? Other than a German invasion? The Irish Merchant Marine lost a fair number of ships to Axis attack, and that was - with the promise of L-L - enough for Brazil, Mexico, and Cuba, for example...
 
1) Well, it's pretty clear UN membership in 1945 was an element of what drove the "11th hour" declarations by Argentina, Chile, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, etc. As far NI goes, presumably the US would be more willing to engage with an Eire that was a WW II ally than was not, otherwise. And if Dublin did join in, certainly gives De Valera and anyone who follows an angle to criticize Stormont?

The US is not going to care about Ireland's view compared to the UK's position, and I don't think Ireland being involved or not would change the relationships between Ireland and the UK materially in regards to NI.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
I'd have to go digging but I wouldn't be surprised that those forces were more on paper than full strength units, I mean start of 1940 the force strength was about 15K including the Coastal Service

Irish Defense force itself says 40,000 on active duty, in two divisions and two separate brigades (which would suggest the division each consisted of at least two brigades, otherwise why form divisions?) so that a total of (at least) six for home service ... getting one for overseas service would seem possible.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
The US is not going to care about Ireland's view compared to the UK's position, and I don't think Ireland being involved or not would change the relationships between Ireland and the UK materially in regards to NI.

In 1942-45? Probably not.

In 1946 onwards? Maybe...
 
Fair enough .... hence the suggestion in the OP that any such decision would have to come after the tide had turned. 1943 seems the most reasonable, given whatever POD it takes to move Irish government opinion. Obviously, it is all speculative, but I agree, it certainly would not have happened in 1939-42. Maybe in 1943 or afterwards?

Trying to avoid the easy out of "specific individual slips walking down the stairs" and miraculously policy changes, obviously. Was there nothing that would have persuaded De Valera? Other than a German invasion? The Irish Merchant Marine lost a fair number of ships to Axis attack, and that was - with the promise of L-L - enough for Brazil, Mexico, and Cuba, for example...

No to be blunt, I mean it's not just Dev you'd have to change, as pointed out by RossN it was something that had widespread support even with the impact to supplies when the UK refused supplies. It's more than just replacing him, though certainly his relationship with Churchill wouldn't have helped anything. You'd have to overcome public perceptions, Departmental resistance (both from the DOD and DOF)...
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
Both Spain and Turkey seem quite easy to get involved.

1) Spain all you need is Hitler to be convinced that them joining would be better.

2) Turkey, have the referendum in Syria delayed and the allies denounce them for the treatment of the kurds. Or have Stalin invade them instead of or in addition to Finland.

3) Alternatively Switzerland, Turkey, Sweden and micronations were all potential invasion targets and Hitler could easily decide to invade them. Goebbels stopped the Swedish invasion. Portugal and Ireland are the hardest ones

1) Yes, but if Hitler could not persuade Franco in real life - to the point Hitler himself recognized he'd met an immovable object - than I have a hard time seeing a POD.
2) The interwar (meaning between WW I and WW II) conflicts between the Turkish Republic and the Kurds reached their high point, from what I can tell, in 1937-38. Recent history, but seems unlikely to have prompted Turkish adherence to the Axis, given how carefully Inonu and company were in 1941-45.
3) True, but all three had geography against them. Ireland and Portugal are open to the Atlantic, and so, Allied support against any move by the Axis.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
No to be blunt, I mean it's not just Dev you'd have to change, as pointed out by RossN it was something that had widespread support even with the impact to supplies when the UK refused supplies. It's more than just replacing him, though certainly his relationship with Churchill wouldn't have helped anything. You'd have to overcome public perceptions, Departmental resistance (both from the DOD and DOF)...

Okay, fair enough. No policy change possible for Ireland as late as 1943-45.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
Historically, no, no they didn't.

That's a shame. The US - historically, and when led by a senior veteran of the ETO - told the French and British to stand down in Egypt in 1956. Seems like something similar might have been in the realm of the possible otherwise for Eire, between DDE and JFK's potential obvious interests...
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
Well, think it through which is more important to the US, the UK or Ireland?

Egypt was over the UK and France in 1956. Vietnam was over France in 1954. In both cases, based almost entirely on US strategic interests.

One can also make the point there were not too many Egyptian-American or Vietnamese-American voters in those years, either.
 
Fair enough .... hence the suggestion in the OP that any such decision would have to come after the tide had turned. 1943 seems the most reasonable, given whatever POD it takes to move Irish government opinion. Obviously, it is all speculative, but I agree, it certainly would not have happened in 1939-42. Maybe in 1943 or afterwards?

Trying to avoid the easy out of "specific individual slips walking down the stairs" and miraculously policy changes, obviously. Was there nothing that would have persuaded De Valera? Other than a German invasion? The Irish Merchant Marine lost a fair number of ships to Axis attack, and that was - with the promise of L-L - enough for Brazil, Mexico, and Cuba, for example...

Honestly no, I don't think so. As sparky42 notes neutrality was not some baroque policy pushed by Dev alone. It had solid public support at every stage of the war.

A big part of the problem - and there are many other parts - is that the American government and to a large extent the American population neither understood nor cared about the internal difficulties Ireland would have about joining the war. If anything based on the newspaper editorials I have read there seems to have been a pretty widespread sense of entitlement that American political pressure had won Irish independence and therefore this was a debt owed.
 
Egypt was in 1956. Vietnam was in 1954.

Well yeah but think about it, even in that period Ireland's capability is zero compared to the UK, I mean Dev tried to engage with the US for a joint defence partnership instead of joining NATO but there was no interest in that.
 
That's a shame. The US - historically, and when led by a senior veteran of the ETO - told the French and British to stand down in Egypt in 1956. Seems like something similar might have been in the realm of the possible otherwise for Eire, between DDE and JFK's potential obvious interests...

Even when JFK visited there was a fairly clear line that the North was an internal UK matter when Dublin tried to get him to engage on the matter. Moreover what would you expect them to have actually done in regards to the dispute between Ireland and the UK over the constitutional position of NI at the time?
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
Honestly no, I don't think so. As sparky42 notes neutrality was not some baroque policy pushed by Dev alone. It had solid public support at every stage of the war. A big part of the problem - and there are many other parts - is that the American government and to a large extent the American population neither understood nor cared about the internal difficulties Ireland would have about joining the war. If anything based on the newspaper editorials I have read there seems to have been a pretty widespread sense of entitlement that American political pressure had won Irish independence and therefore this was a debt owed.

Well yeah but think about it, even in that period Ireland's capability is zero compared to the UK, I mean Dev tried to engage with the US for a joint defence partnership instead of joining NATO but there was no interest in that.

Okay, fair enough. Just interesting to compare the paths of the various powers. Portugal is an interesting one, given its neutrality in 1939-45 and enthusiasm for NATO postwar.

Thanks for the thoughtful responses from both of you.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
Even when JFK visited there was a fairly clear line that the North was an internal UK matter when Dublin tried to get him to engage on the matter. Moreover what would you expect them to have actually done in regards to the dispute between Ireland and the UK over the constitutional position of NI at the time?

I don't know; my point is simply that in 1943, neither would have anyone else. However, the shift in international political and economic power from the UK and the European powers to the US was undeniable. An effort by Eire to secure a state to state relationship with the US in 1943-45 is, in the scheme of things, a pretty safe bet.

As per the calculations made evident by statesman in smaller European countries from one side of the Continent to another, most of Ireland's peers saw the world in that way in the 1940s. Ireland did not, obviously, which is interesting. Memories are long, undoubtedly, but even the French and Germans could overcome them in the postwar era...
 
Okay, fair enough. Just interesting to compare the paths of the various powers. Portugal is an interesting one, given its neutrality in 1939-45 and enthusiasm for NATO postwar.

Thanks for the thoughtful responses from both of you.

Well I might wonder was being a member of NATO in part to deflect considering the regime of the time? There's also of course the difference it had with the other members compared to the Anglo-Irish relationship of the time (remember the UK wouldn't even recognise the state for decades due to the Constitutional claim on NI).

The opportunities to shift Ireland's position regarding military are fairly slim and really would require fundamentally different circumstances/people/events to change it imo.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
Well I might wonder was being a member of NATO in part to deflect considering the regime of the time? There's also of course the difference it had with the other members compared to the Anglo-Irish relationship of the time (remember the UK wouldn't even recognise the state for decades due to the Constitutional claim on NI). The opportunities to shift Ireland's position regarding military are fairly slim and really would require fundamentally different circumstances/people/events to change it imo.

Undoubtedly; Portugal's strategic an economic position in the 1950s and 1960s was also somewhat more challenging than Eire's, with no obvious friends in their neck of the woods. Presumably a good US-Portugal relationship was valued for a variety of reasons beyond mutual defense. But having said that, the Portuguese maintained what amounted to a fairly well-equipped infantry division-air group expeditionary force in waiting, and a fairly significant naval force that would have been useful in the event of another Atlantic campaign with the Soviets for most of the postwar era.
 
Undoubtedly; Portugal's strategic an economic position in the 1950s and 1960s was also somewhat more challenging than Eire's, with no obvious friends in their neck of the woods. Presumably a good US-Portugal relationship was valued for a variety of reasons beyond mutual defense. But having said that, the Portuguese maintained what amounted to a fairly well-equipped infantry division-air group expeditionary force in waiting, and a fairly significant naval force that would have been useful in the event of another Atlantic campaign with the Soviets for most of the postwar era.
I'm not sure how Portugal could have been in a worse shape economically than Ireland, the Irish economy was pretty much a closed economy with very limited capability in the period (one of the reasons why Finance was more than happy to ensure as little as possible was ever spent on Defence), and Portugal was about 2 and a half times larger in population giving it plenty more capacity (I mean if you look at it in 1950 even Norway has a larger population than Ireland). Along with that Portugal also had what was left of it's territories and the wars that it faced as well which would also have played into military support at the time.

As I said in 1949 when Ireland was offered membership of NATO, it was refused over the issue of NI, and the attempt by Dublin to interest the US on a bilateral deal died as well, after that it's hard to see any potential change up until joining the EEC in 73.
 
Depending on how far back you'll allow, a Spain that has a Republican government win the civil war and enacts some leftist policies could be a potential replacement for the Balkan campaign before Barbarossa, particularly if the coup in Yugoslavia is butterflied away.

With the Wehrmacht in Spain, Portugal might have to either join the Axis or request British aid now that. There might be an Iberian campaign in addition to the North African one.

Turkey would be a fair bit harder. They are on the periphery of Europe and didn't harbor overt revaunchist goals on their neighbors. You'd have to have a more authoritarian and revenge-minded government in control. Perhaps a less successful independence war where Turkey isn't Sevres-ed, but still loses territory to Armenia and a new Kurdistan
 
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