Henry Clay wins 1844
- Thread starter Mattrock
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Hi there Mattrock, and welcome to AH.com!
TBH, I know this is a somewhat unpopular viewpoint, but I'm not necessarily convinced that a Clay victory in 1844 would have avoided the Mexican-American war, or perhaps even delayed it all that much.
It may be true that Clay was opposed to annexing Texas, and war with Mexico to a lesser degree, but mainly because he felt, at that time, that the South might use both as an excuse to expand slavery(which, by the way, never came to pass outside of Texas). There are ways to avoid this, though-for one, slavery never had a real chance in California; many of the Anglos who settled there were either anti-slavery, or at least on the fence....and most of the latter probably would have sided with the former in the event of a conflict like "Bleeding Kansas", or something along those lines. If someone could find a way to show Clay what was really going in California, that would have a good chance of greatly lessening his anxieties in that regard.
With that said, however, Texas's annexation probably *does* get delayed for a bit under Clay; maybe 5 years?
As for Oregon-Polk wanted to go all the way to 54'40, but that may not happen here; more than likely, under Clay, we'll get the border we ended up with IOTL; the 49th parallel from mountains to coast.
You might be interested in Gary J. Kornblith, "Rethinking the Coming of the Civil War: A Counterfactual Exercise", Journal of American History 90 (June 2003): 76-105 http://www.oah.org/site/assets/documents/02_JAH_2003_kornblith.pdf
While believing that Clay would have opposed Texas annexation and the war with Mexico that ensued, Kornblith does acknowledge that "the long-term survival of the second party system after a Clay presidency would not have been a sure thing. The expansionist wing of the Democratic party would have pressed for American acquisition of new territory, and had it succeeded, the question of slavery's status in that territory would have stimulated sectional conflict and threatened the second party system." But he also thinks that "a triumph by the Democrats' expansionist wing was far from assured."
On California, Kornblith writes:
"The destiny of California under a Clay presidency is harder to project with confidence. Even without the advent of war with the United States, Mexico would have sustained its claims to sovereignty only with difficulty. In early 1844 the beleaguered governor of California, Manuel Micheltorena, recommended to his superiors in Mexico City that they consider handing the province over to British creditors rather than let it fall into the hands of American immigrants and californios (Californians of Hispanic descent). 'In August 1844,' wrote David J. Weber, 'a group of californios met secretly with British vice consul James Forbes in Monterey and told him they were ready to drive Micheltorena out of California, declare independence, and ask for British protection.' Without instructions from London, Forbes was stymied, but the rebels nonetheless succeeded in ousting Micheltorena in early 1845. They stopped short of declaring independence, however, and soon divided among themselves. Meanwhile, Americans in California prepared to take matters into their own hands, and in June 1846 they staged the Bear Flag Revolt. 'Even if [the Mexican-American War] had not occurred,' Weber asserted, 'Americans in California had become numerous enough to think they could play the 'Texas game' and win.'
"Whether the discovery of gold in 1848 would have prompted President Clay to show more enthusiasm for annexing California than he did for annexing Texas is hard to know. Fellow Whig (but political rival) Daniel Webster had long hoped to acquire San Francisco and the surrounding area for the United States. Yet Clay was more sensitive than Webster to sectional tensions and to the explosive consequences of adding new territory to the federal domain. As with Texas, Clay might well have preferred strong commercial ties with California to the national and international controversies sparked by annexation. For this reason, he would probably have encouraged California to remain independent so long as it avoided an open alliance with Great Britain or another foreign power. Certainly, the possibility that California could have flourished as a separate nation deserves serious consideration. The historical geographer D.W. Meinig has written, 'Was there ever a region better designed by Nature for separate geopolitical existence than Alta California--a land so distinctive and attractive, set apart by the great unbroken wall of the Sierra Nevada backed by desert wastelands, fronting on the world's greatest ocean, focused on one of the world's most magnificent harbors?'
"Alternatively, under pressure from Democratic expansionists in Congress, a President Clay might have proposed pairing the annexation of Texas and California--a reprise of the Missouri Compromise with its coupling of Missouri and Maine. But that scenario seems less probable than the establishment of an independent California because it presupposes Mexico's peaceful acquiescence, a most unlikely development. In keeping with past policy, Britain would have supported Mexican objections to American annexation (as distinct from Texan or Californian independence), and Clay would have backed away from a war for territorial expansion. His commitment to diplomacy, rather than force of arms, would almost surely have curtailed the country's westward growth for the duration of his presidency..."
While believing that Clay would have opposed Texas annexation and the war with Mexico that ensued, Kornblith does acknowledge that "the long-term survival of the second party system after a Clay presidency would not have been a sure thing. The expansionist wing of the Democratic party would have pressed for American acquisition of new territory, and had it succeeded, the question of slavery's status in that territory would have stimulated sectional conflict and threatened the second party system." But he also thinks that "a triumph by the Democrats' expansionist wing was far from assured."
On California, Kornblith writes:
"The destiny of California under a Clay presidency is harder to project with confidence. Even without the advent of war with the United States, Mexico would have sustained its claims to sovereignty only with difficulty. In early 1844 the beleaguered governor of California, Manuel Micheltorena, recommended to his superiors in Mexico City that they consider handing the province over to British creditors rather than let it fall into the hands of American immigrants and californios (Californians of Hispanic descent). 'In August 1844,' wrote David J. Weber, 'a group of californios met secretly with British vice consul James Forbes in Monterey and told him they were ready to drive Micheltorena out of California, declare independence, and ask for British protection.' Without instructions from London, Forbes was stymied, but the rebels nonetheless succeeded in ousting Micheltorena in early 1845. They stopped short of declaring independence, however, and soon divided among themselves. Meanwhile, Americans in California prepared to take matters into their own hands, and in June 1846 they staged the Bear Flag Revolt. 'Even if [the Mexican-American War] had not occurred,' Weber asserted, 'Americans in California had become numerous enough to think they could play the 'Texas game' and win.'
"Whether the discovery of gold in 1848 would have prompted President Clay to show more enthusiasm for annexing California than he did for annexing Texas is hard to know. Fellow Whig (but political rival) Daniel Webster had long hoped to acquire San Francisco and the surrounding area for the United States. Yet Clay was more sensitive than Webster to sectional tensions and to the explosive consequences of adding new territory to the federal domain. As with Texas, Clay might well have preferred strong commercial ties with California to the national and international controversies sparked by annexation. For this reason, he would probably have encouraged California to remain independent so long as it avoided an open alliance with Great Britain or another foreign power. Certainly, the possibility that California could have flourished as a separate nation deserves serious consideration. The historical geographer D.W. Meinig has written, 'Was there ever a region better designed by Nature for separate geopolitical existence than Alta California--a land so distinctive and attractive, set apart by the great unbroken wall of the Sierra Nevada backed by desert wastelands, fronting on the world's greatest ocean, focused on one of the world's most magnificent harbors?'
"Alternatively, under pressure from Democratic expansionists in Congress, a President Clay might have proposed pairing the annexation of Texas and California--a reprise of the Missouri Compromise with its coupling of Missouri and Maine. But that scenario seems less probable than the establishment of an independent California because it presupposes Mexico's peaceful acquiescence, a most unlikely development. In keeping with past policy, Britain would have supported Mexican objections to American annexation (as distinct from Texan or Californian independence), and Clay would have backed away from a war for territorial expansion. His commitment to diplomacy, rather than force of arms, would almost surely have curtailed the country's westward growth for the duration of his presidency..."
I think the Mexican War is avoided. Texas will remain independent for several more years at least, and perhaps indefinitely. California will probably break away from Mexico, protected by Britain and the U.S.
The wild card, for me, as far as the West is concerned, is Deseret/Utah. If the Mormons settle there as OTL, I don't see what Mexico can possibly do about it, and I don't see what the U.S. or the Republic of California would or could do, either.
The Mormons thus might be granted a substantial period to establish their sovereign state. Due to their religion and the practice of polygamy, they would have trouble gaining recognition from the U.S. (or any other established nation). And at some point, there would be pressure in the U.S. for a campaign to occupy Utah and suppress the Mormon heresy.
It's hard to think of any move that absolutely everyone would oppose so much. First, the whole idea of annexing territory outside the Western Hemisphere was problematic enough--even Hawaiian annexation failed. But territory inhabited by free blacks? That was a nightmare for the South, while anti-slavery northerners would denounce it as a betrayal and even a plot to re-enslave the freedmen who lived there...
I've read that article, though it's behind an academic wall for me now. Actually, though, Matt Yglesias wrote about it a couple of years ago. The article (and Yglesias' piece) included a map which was actually from yet another article:
Less clear why he (or the original creator of the map) assumes that the US wouldn't have gotten the Oregon Territory up to the 38th parallel, but still an interesting look.
Less clear why he (or the original creator of the map) assumes that the US wouldn't have gotten the Oregon Territory up to the 38th parallel, but still an interesting look.
Bytor
Monthly Donor
Alternate Boundary between the Columbia District and Oregon Territory
While I'm not sure what you mean the by 38th parallel (typo?), perhaps he was thinking along the same lines that I am in making my AH:
Henry Clay in specific and the Whigs in general were for the idea of internal interventions by the government, such as infrastructure projects, in order to keep the American growing, rather than the alternative of territorial expansion offered by the Manifest destiny ideology.
MD was a divisive issue back then, much more than most of us realize 100-150 years later because we're in the timeline where MD won.
If for whatever reason Clay had won, I think that both his foreign-policy initiatives that Andrew Jackson worked so hard to defeat in the 1820s and his feeling that territorial expansion came with too many problems are indicative that he would have accepted a boundary south of the 49th parallel.
In OTL 1845, Buchanan's proposal was rejected by British Envoy Richard Pakenham who once again proposed HBC Governor John Pelly's desired border of the Columbia and Snake Rivers. The British Foreign Secretary, the Earl of Aberdeen, later agreed to the 49th parallel.
So if we assume that Clay's Secretary of State also would have made a similar offer, to be rejected by Pakenham, followed by Pelly's offer, I think Clay would have been inclined to accept it to avoid conflict with Britain but would have felt that the Snake River came too close to the 42nd parallel. Hypothetically he may have proposed the Salmon River as the boundary instead, to ensure that the Oregon Trail was mostly in American territory, plus navigation rights. This is something that Pelly, Pakenham and Aberdeen would all have probably agreed to.
Timeline Δ - Maps of an Alternate History of the World
Less clear why he (or the original creator of the map) assumes that the US wouldn't have gotten the Oregon Territory up to the 38th parallel, but still an interesting look.
While I'm not sure what you mean the by 38th parallel (typo?), perhaps he was thinking along the same lines that I am in making my AH:
Henry Clay in specific and the Whigs in general were for the idea of internal interventions by the government, such as infrastructure projects, in order to keep the American growing, rather than the alternative of territorial expansion offered by the Manifest destiny ideology.
MD was a divisive issue back then, much more than most of us realize 100-150 years later because we're in the timeline where MD won.
If for whatever reason Clay had won, I think that both his foreign-policy initiatives that Andrew Jackson worked so hard to defeat in the 1820s and his feeling that territorial expansion came with too many problems are indicative that he would have accepted a boundary south of the 49th parallel.
In OTL 1845, Buchanan's proposal was rejected by British Envoy Richard Pakenham who once again proposed HBC Governor John Pelly's desired border of the Columbia and Snake Rivers. The British Foreign Secretary, the Earl of Aberdeen, later agreed to the 49th parallel.
So if we assume that Clay's Secretary of State also would have made a similar offer, to be rejected by Pakenham, followed by Pelly's offer, I think Clay would have been inclined to accept it to avoid conflict with Britain but would have felt that the Snake River came too close to the 42nd parallel. Hypothetically he may have proposed the Salmon River as the boundary instead, to ensure that the Oregon Trail was mostly in American territory, plus navigation rights. This is something that Pelly, Pakenham and Aberdeen would all have probably agreed to.
Timeline Δ - Maps of an Alternate History of the World
Kornbluth had a fairly fascinating idea here, TBH, although I wouldn't have given Texas that weird looking strip up to the Arkansas, however.
Sounds good to me, although I'd tweak it so that there's a line at about 45'36* or so connecting the Salmon and Snake Rivers, as well as aligning the watersheds of both the Snake and the Missouri Rivers; in other words, a border with was would have been OTL's state of Montana.
Also, I'd be interested to see a TL in which Britain gets Oregon north of the Columbia and Snake Rivers, and Mexico keeps at least OTL Arizona and southern New Mexico, as well as many those parts of what would be Texas not solidly held by the Republic of Texas(so no El Paso, *Amarillo, or *Lubbock), but which the U.S. still receives the rest of Oregon and California, as well as associated leftovers, such as what would've been Nevada, as well as other areas north of the Colorado River, and even northern New Mexico south of it.
Well, okay-with that in mind, I guess I can now see why it might actually make sense from at least a geopolitical standpoint; it would indeed be harder for the Comanche tribes to keep their alliance together, thus making them less powerful.