German Invasion of Russia Before France?
- Thread starter kio
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I assume OP is talking about 1940 here and to put it simple, the Germans are in no position to be invading Soviet Russia with their western flank being exposed to French attacks.
Yup, its been discussed here & elsewhere a few times. I have also gamed it a few times. While the German army has some tactical or operational advantages, on the game board strategic gains are elusive. If the Allies act in the defense or apply modest pressure then the German economy collapses sometime in 24-36 months. If the Allies are able to get a substantial offensive underway, then the German army is stuck in a two from war, & far less ready than in 144 or even 1942 of OTL. The end of the nazi regime & Germany occupied by mid 1943 at the latest.
Barbarossa as it was was only barely possible to carry out by June '41, and that was with French plunder and an extra year of Soviet resource deliveries, industrial production and even battle experience. Add to the fact that while the Red Army in 6/40 would be smaller than 6/41, it won't be attempting a massive expansion either that left units disorganised and poorly equipped in the first days of the war.
Even ignoring France in the rear, Germany's going to get beaten pretty hard.
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Even ignoring France in the rear, Germany's going to get beaten pretty hard.
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Would the French and British even attack at all in 1940? Or just sit tight until 1941, letting the two dictators slaughter each while building up their forces?
Limited attacks. Designed to methodically dismantle the fortifications between the Rhine & Luxemborg.
If Russia or Germany were in danger of falling the French and British would have to act.
A German assault in 1940 would be constricted to the region of land between the Baltic States and Hungary instead of everywhere between the Baltic and Black Seas, lack the combat forces and logistical support of the OTL force while the Soviets haven't pushed the bulk of their deployments forward from the Stalin line or dismantled it's fortifications. It probably grinds to a halt somewhere between the Stalin line and the D'niepr river. That leaves the Soviets with almost all of the industrial and manpower resources they lost OTL while the Germans are denied both the resources they received from the Soviets in 1939-1941 and the loot from Western Europe when they conquered it, crippling their war economy from 1941 on.
Hence the longer-term prognosis for this is that the Anglo-Brits sit tight until 1941, when they'll be ready to launch limited attacks, and then go onto a full offensive in 1942. By then, the Soviet's will also probably have entered a war-footing, built up, processed their combat experience, and overwhelmed most of the German forces in the East. As per OTL, their prize will be Eastern Europe and probably a swathe of Eastern Germany... although obviously there's the question of precisely where in Eastern Germany they might meet up with the Anglo-French.
Hence the longer-term prognosis for this is that the Anglo-Brits sit tight until 1941, when they'll be ready to launch limited attacks, and then go onto a full offensive in 1942. By then, the Soviet's will also probably have entered a war-footing, built up, processed their combat experience, and overwhelmed most of the German forces in the East. As per OTL, their prize will be Eastern Europe and probably a swathe of Eastern Germany... although obviously there's the question of precisely where in Eastern Germany they might meet up with the Anglo-French.
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I've been translating Merekovs account of the mobilization of the Red Army & he describes a fairly hefty expansion from mid 1939 through 1940. The original record seems a bit muddied by the existence of multiple directives for expansion, and overlapping plans, and possibly out right Maskrikova or deception. It appears the Red Army expanded from approximate 100 organized divisions mid 1939 to approximately 180 divisions during 1940. This did not spread the existing trains cadres as thinly as the 300+ designated division HQ of June 1941 but it did water down the command and staff quality. Problems were aggravated by two reorganizations of the armored or mechanized forces, and a misguided neglect of artillery training. After the Polish campaign there was a decision, made at the top, that only tank and airfares mattered & infantry or artillery obsolete and high levels of training for those arms not urgent. At this point in the summer of 1940 the skill level of the commanders and staff were not so diluted or out of synch as a year later, but there was still some decline.
The record for the frontier fortifications is a bit less clear. Some accounts I've seen suggest that pressure from above, to move the fortified zone forward, resulted in the weapons, communications, and other infrastructure in the old zone being dismantled in haste & the weapons ect... transported forward long before construction of the new positions started. If this is true, then at least parts of the old defense zone may have already been rendered impotent.
Similar problems were emerging with the air forces and support echelon. That is between expansion and displacement forward into Poland a not trivial degree of degradation of capability had occurred by June 1940. While not as catastrophic a loss of ability as in 1941 there was still a decline in tactical and operational ability.
More important than where the German army halts are its losses relative to 1941. Consider:
Germans.......vs West...vs USSR
Divisions.........122.........134..........91%
Casualties.......155k.......213k........67.1%
Div, avg loss....1270......1590........79.6%
Enemy Div.......140.......183..........76.5% (Note the 183 Div represent the number deployed vs the Germans 22 June to 7 August. Not the total in the Red Army)
Casualties per..1107.....1160.........95.4%
Enemy Div
The table is from Randal Reeds analysis of the 1940 campaign.
Without nitpicking Reeds 47 year old text... The point I am taking from this is, in 1940 a somewhat less diluted Red Army may very well inflict larger losses on the attacker. That is the total casualties may be higher, and spread across fewer divisions. That can bring the losses in infantry closer to the crippling or effective level sooner than OTL. ie: 213,000/122 = 1745 casualties avg per div. The equivalent of two entire battalions per div lost, and then some. Since the highest portion of German infantry losses were among the NCOs & company grade officers this level of losses starts to cripple the small unit leadership & can badly degrade combat power beyond the raw numbers.
While the much lower number of Red Army units avail be against the Germans in 1940 is lower it must be understood the attacking mobile forces are half those of OTL 1941. Ten Armored and five motorized divisions, if none are left in the west to counter the French. Vs the 20 armored divisions actually deployed in 1941. Thus even against a smaller Red Army the ability to execute three or four massive mechanized thrusts does not exist in this ATL. At best there is the wherewithal for two weaker mobile axis of attack. This means encircling or killing 700,000+ soldiers in six weeks will not occur. Quite possibly not even half that.
Deleted member 1487
There is something to be said about quantity having a quality all its own. Having a less diluted force also means having less forces and fewer targets for the Axis forces, especially their air force, to concentrate on.
There is something that should be noted here: in terms of Panzer divisions to get ready for Barbarossa the 10 existing panzer divisions were cut in half to create twice as many panzer divisions. That had the benefit of having much more infantry and truck support per tank, but the 1940 panzer divisions had double the number of tanks and were thus much more durable in terms of what losses they could take as well as inflict in open maneuver warfare. Of course that comes with the caveat that they'd have less infantry and truck support per tank...so balance that as you will. The other issue is that the Luftwaffe was stronger in 1940 than in 1941 in terms of those committed to the decisive campaign due to losses they had taken throughout 1940-41 leading up to Barbarossa, plus the many more commitments they had to disperse what aircraft they had available.
That's what the implications of a further westward halt are: the Germans have less resources and take heavier losses, so they have to come to a halt much further west. Continuing Soviet deficiencies will of course render them unable to mount a counter-offensive that drives the Germans all the way out in 1940, but they have far more resources then the OTL's second year of war, have moved to a war footing earlier, and not having to outright replace the Red Army three times over will leave them with far more experienced soldiers to reform and build up around much faster then OTL.
That would be a bigger factor if the air forces is as capable as it was in 1941. But, its lacking a second campaigns worth of experience. There is also a assumption here the enemy soldiers were be huddled more densely around fewer flag poles.
Conversely there was a higher portion of the fragile MkI training tanks used in the 1940, & the MkII type used as substitutes for theMkIII & MkIV that had not been built yet. Both operational and combat losses were substantial in 1940, in part from the very limited experience of the Polish campaign, and in part because the support services for the armored divisions were not yet up to the task of repairing casualties fast enough. ie: Rommels 7th Pz div reached the coast with 24 of its starting strength of 225. The balance were either destroyed or strung out along the route being repaired or racing to catch up. This was typical of the short & long term losses for the ten divisions in the 1940 campaign. Also typical was the overall tank strength was below 60%, at 50% by some counts, when the second phase of the campaign started. Lacking the second campaign experience and another year of improvement/preparation the larger numbers per div are not going to mean as much.
A better staffed/led Red Army & a less experienced German army are not as favorable conditions as existed in 1941.
To change the subject slightly there is also the question of the Red Army suffering the devastating conditions of tactical and operational surprise that existed in June 1941. We cannot assume Stalin will cripple the defense by prohibiting a alert to the attack and deployment to battle positions. A few weeks of actual combat preparations by the frontier armies, or even a few days, guarantees higher losses for the attackers in the opening days of of the war.
Germany equipped with early versions of the Pz III and IV is going to bog down in Russia a lot quicker than OTL.
The Western Allies are very quickly going to finish mobilization and then begin reducing the Westwall. Once they can, they’ll launch a full offensive into the industrial heartland of Germany and then it’s all over but the crying.
Call it WAllies and Soviet troops meet up somewhere in Eastern Germany by 1943.
Good news is the Holocaust should be significantly less severe.
They'd have to intervene at some point if it looks like either power would be about to fall. The Nazis managing to control everything between the Rhine and the Urals doesn't end well, and the Bolshevik Hordes on the Rhine is another nightmare scenario for the Allies.
Deleted member 1487
As a preface before I respond further I think a German invasion of Russia in 1940 without dealing with the Wallies first is nuts and would not go well as a result of having to fight a two front war.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mecha...e-war_development_of_Soviet_mechanised_forces
I don't recall there being any significantly greater capabilities IOTL in 1941 vs 1940; if anything the air force used in 1940 was better than that used in 1941 because of the heavy attrition of pre-war trained/experienced in 1940-41 before Barbarossa.
Not more densely, just fewer men around fewer flag poles. Therefore with more aircraft (assuming the west is hollowed out to maximize the invasion force) with fewer targets that allows for more dense concentrations for bombing targets.
Indeed, but there are no KV-1s or T-34s and fewer AT guns on the Soviet side. Rommel's division IIRC had so many AFVs taken out of circulation to do deferred maintenance given that they'd been in constant motion for well over a week. It took a day or two to triple or quadruple runners. That said I agree that the panzer divisions of 1940 were inferior to those of 1941 in TOE even if nominally more powerful. On balance though the Soviets had broken their armored units up into penny packets and had not yet formed the Mechanized Corps as of summer 1940, so effectively had no answer to the Panzer division if encountered, while support for Soviet armor would be even worse than IOTL.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mecha...e-war_development_of_Soviet_mechanised_forces
The Luftwaffe was incapable of mobile support in 1940.
"The [Luftwaffe system] was best at supporting the Heer when it assaulted well-defined enemy defensive lines. It was not effective at supplying close air support once panzer units were in the open and moving with the rapidity that caused such surprise and consternation among other European armies." -Murray Williamson, The Luftwaffe Experience 1939-1941.
It could be used against fixed positions in a pre-planned manner to support breakthroughs, such as Sedan, effectively enough but running CAS for exploitation tended to result in more friendly fire then effective air support.
"Thus, the reporter of Panzerregiment 5 (3rd Panzer Division) noted laconically when asked about the experience of ground support. 'No experience, but only losses due to air raids by own air forces'." -Pohlmann Markus, Der Panzer und die Mechanisierung des Kriegus (Translated MHV)
"More distressing was the fact that throughout the campaign 10th Panzer Division's units were constantly machinegunned and bombed from the air by German aircraft." -Murray Williamson, The Luftwaffe Experience 1939-1941.
Mobile support was something the Luftwaffe had to learn during the course of the Battle of France and only applied in 1941. The effect of having somewhat more level bombers (CAS and Fighter strengths were back to pre-BoB levels by the time of Barbarossa) is rather offset by the fact that by the time the Germans hit the Soviet main force, the Luftwaffe will have to displace to inadequate airfields, with much weaker logistical support over worse terrain, and cover a front about 200 kilometers wider.
"Still in command of the VII Air Corps, von Richtofen in 1941 placed experienced stuka pilots in Mark III Panzer equipped with air-ground radios, to serve as mobile forward air controllers. For the first time, Luftwaffe CAS units could coordinate ground attacks right from the frontlines... The result was considerable increase in the Luftwaffe's ability to coordinate air strikes with the army in a mobile environment. Provided the signal detachments and the Flivos [Forward Air Controllers] were up front, the Luftwaffe could now talk to the lead elements of the army's advance on the ground." -Murray Williamson, The Luftwaffe Experience 1939-1941.
Given that the Luftwaffe was vital in salvaging German advances that almost collapsed by breaking up Soviet flanking attacks on a repeated basis, this inability to provide effective close air support would be lethal in a 1940 Soviet campaign for the German army.
"Thus, the reporter of Panzerregiment 5 (3rd Panzer Division) noted laconically when asked about the experience of ground support. 'No experience, but only losses due to air raids by own air forces'." -Pohlmann Markus, Der Panzer und die Mechanisierung des Kriegus (Translated MHV)
"More distressing was the fact that throughout the campaign 10th Panzer Division's units were constantly machinegunned and bombed from the air by German aircraft." -Murray Williamson, The Luftwaffe Experience 1939-1941.
Mobile support was something the Luftwaffe had to learn during the course of the Battle of France and only applied in 1941. The effect of having somewhat more level bombers (CAS and Fighter strengths were back to pre-BoB levels by the time of Barbarossa) is rather offset by the fact that by the time the Germans hit the Soviet main force, the Luftwaffe will have to displace to inadequate airfields, with much weaker logistical support over worse terrain, and cover a front about 200 kilometers wider.
"Still in command of the VII Air Corps, von Richtofen in 1941 placed experienced stuka pilots in Mark III Panzer equipped with air-ground radios, to serve as mobile forward air controllers. For the first time, Luftwaffe CAS units could coordinate ground attacks right from the frontlines... The result was considerable increase in the Luftwaffe's ability to coordinate air strikes with the army in a mobile environment. Provided the signal detachments and the Flivos [Forward Air Controllers] were up front, the Luftwaffe could now talk to the lead elements of the army's advance on the ground." -Murray Williamson, The Luftwaffe Experience 1939-1941.
Given that the Luftwaffe was vital in salvaging German advances that almost collapsed by breaking up Soviet flanking attacks on a repeated basis, this inability to provide effective close air support would be lethal in a 1940 Soviet campaign for the German army.
The marginal tactical/operational impact of being is vastly outweighed by the operational-strategic capacity of the Soviets to concentrate their defenses-in-depth plus the Germans having to dislocate their logistics (including the airfields) before reaching the Soviets MLR along the Stalin line, whereas the Soviets are operating in a much greater proximity to their rear-area services. Not to mention the Germans having far fewer resources overall.
Lack of T-34s (there are some KV-1s by this point) are offset by a greater lack of modern German tanks. BT-7s/T-26s vs Pz-1s/2s are a much more even fight then BT-7s/T-26s vs Pz-3/4s. The claim of fewer AT guns is unsupported. The fact that Rommel had maintenance issues contradicts your earlier claims about panzer sustainability and actually indicates the opposite: that the number of tanks in the Panzer Divisions were too large to be supported by the support elements, resulting in a decline in sustainability. Indeed, this was the situation in 1940: panzer divisions that were able to operate for two months in 1941 without rest and refit had to be brought down after two weeks in France. Combine this with the fact the Germans are going to have to move forward with a vastly weaker logistical support over far worse terrain then that enjoyed in France and one will be seeing a serious crippling of German combat power by the time they are making contact with the Soviet MLR.
As for the Soviets, the motorized divisions established by summer of 1940 were if anything much better answer to the Panzer divisions then the mechanized corps of 1941, at least when on the defensive, being better balanced in terms of the various arms and supporting elements. True, it isn't much set up for deep offensive action but since the Soviets focus in 1940 will be on stopping the German attack first, it doesn't have to be. The claim about them being worse supported is also not supportable: being located further back means they'd be much better supported then OTL as they would be closer to their supply sources and within the reach of supporting rear services.
Is it even possible the Germans could come up with a plan like Barbarossa was if they attacked in 1940? I mean they have very little time to make a plan and they would lack the experience(and overconfidence) of the battle of France. Would they implement a different plan like Marcks Plan? Also, would they make it a campaign of "extermination" as Hitler put it or less ambitious?
My question is then, could they have come up with a plan that could have worked?
My question is then, could they have come up with a plan that could have worked?