Fear, Loathing and Gumbo on the Campaign Trail '72
- Thread starter Drew
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This started out as an alternate outcome for the 1972 Presidential election and sort of grew from there. I wouldn't mind taking it to 2012, although it may take me until 2012 do do that.
As I've mentioned I won't have much time to work on it between May and July, so I'm trying to get it to the beginning of 1974 by the end of next week or so, and later work from there.
Part of it could be a short story, though at this point it is becoming a series just in terms of length and complexity.
Good luck with your TL. It would be interesting to see more Agnew based TLs.
This sort of invites this kind of debate; and Constitutional scholars ITTL will be debating this one until the end of time, I imagine. Lots of books will be written about the Constitutional legalities of the Agnew and Gavin Presidencies and the debate will never be completely finalized.
Yep, Herbert Hoover broke the "so help me God" tradition and look what happened to him. No one wants to emulate him.
pnyckqx
Banned
Sorry I wasn't more specific. My time line will have a POD just after Nixon and Agnew have left. It will proceed into the 1990's. Jerry Ford will still be the President when it begins.This started out as an alternate outcome for the 1972 Presidential election and sort of grew from there. I wouldn't mind taking it to 2012, although it may take me until 2012 do do that.
As I've mentioned I won't have much time to work on it between May and July, so I'm trying to get it to the beginning of 1974 by the end of next week or so, and later work from there.
Part of it could be a short story, though at this point it is becoming a series just in terms of length and complexity.
Good luck with your TL. It would be interesting to see more Agnew based TLs.
I do rather admire the way that you've read each character's politics in a manner consistent with his actual political views. Yes, I must concede that with Agnew, there's just not much written material there. It is far better than some of the stuff I've seen where the writer's own politics are read into the character.
You've done an excellent job with Agnew given the limited resources at your disposal.
Let us just say that in respect to my proposed time line, you'll see "Gunfighter" Emerson again.
Your TL should be interesting; not a lot of alternate history has been done on that post-Watergate period between Nixon and Reagan.
Thanks for the good review.
Some writers are better off just doing it with fictional characters, which can be written so that they are identifiable as a historical personage, but as fictional stand-ins you can make what you want of the them and their politics. John Ehrlicman did that with The Company and George Bernau did it with Promises to Keep and each did a good job with it.
Writing with real people it becomes important to know what makes them tick, so you get some authenticity into the portrayal. With Agnew, the best was to take a psychological profile and extrapolate what he might do in the job, based on how he behaved IOTL. I think I captured the essence. He actually wrote an autobiography which didn't sell very well and is out-of-print. I understand that it was a denial festival (The title was Go Quietly or Else). In fact OTL Agnew denied he did anything wrong for the rest of his life (even though he pleaded out the charges rather than go to trial and he paid the fines), which says much about his psychology. It might be admirable if he really had been innocent - or there had been some doubt - but he continued to do it in the face of overwhelming proof to the contrary.
Even with James Gavin, where there's much more material to get handle on the person, once I place him into the Presidency I've got him where IOTL he never was, facing crises the OTL man didn't, so you still have to make some judgments about how he will react. Gavin was a proactive, take charge sort of guy, so his Presidency will reflect that. He was also an outside the box thinker throughout his military and business career, so that'll figure in how he approaches the Presidency too. However, the demands of the Presidency will push back against those personality traits too, forcing him to adapt. (Jimmy Carter is actually an excellent OTL example of a pro-active, take charge guy whose personal approach to work helped pull his Presidency under because he was resistant to changing or adapting to the realities of the job until it was too late to fully adjust).
Another thing many AH writers seemed to miss is that people of ordinary intelligence tend to evolve with the experiences in their life. Almost every President was a slightly different, more wizened man when he left office than when he entered (provided he left alive), so if you take someone who wasn't President - like say Barry Goldwater - and you put him into the challenges of the Presidency in a TL then the man will experience some changes of attitude and understanding as a result. It won't suddenly make Goldwater a liberal for instance (that would be fiction), but to have credibility it has to track some nuance in the evolution of his world view. (Unless, as with Agnew, you have a personality totally resistant to learning and change, but those sorts are relatively rare).
Of course, in publishing this or a variation thereof, I have to consider that Rumsfeld, Cheney, Bork, George Bush sr. and junior and Henry Kissinger are still alive and may not appreciate what I've done with them. That's where the whole fictionalization may have to come into it.
I actually have in mind to write another TL in which Agnew is not removed and he remains President until 1977, but I'm only going to work on one at a time.
One Step Forward; One Step into the Abyss
Note: Blue portions of Henry Kissinger’s memoirs are words actually written by Henry Kissinger in Years of Upheaval 1982, Little, Brown and Company pp. 23-25 (I: A Visit to Hanoi) and pp. 644 (XXIII: First Middle East Breakthrough). (Some passages edited for economy of space).
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(From Colin Powell My American Journey)
I can't say that the attacks known collectively as the Third Battle of Dong Hoi came as a surprise to anyone; we had been planning for the contingency. What came as a surprise was the ferocity of the final NVA assault on the city (which by November 18 was in ruins) which was, if anything, a human wave suicide attack. Much has been written about the heavy casualties (over 30,000 estimated for the NVA) and that many of the NVA soldiers who attacked were adolescents, which was said to indicate that our enemy was becoming increasingly desperate. My own personal interpretation, based on the evidence which we accumulated after the battle, was that while desperate, Hanoi wasn't down for the count either. Many of those NVA kids everyone talks about were armed with new and relatively well maintained Kalashnikov and PK assault weapons, indicating that supplies were still getting into Hanoi from the Soviet Bloc.
At the time I gave General Emerson an estimate that while the enemy had tried for a knock-out blow at Dong Hoi, they were still holding their best troops back, meaning that we would have to attack North in strength - and expect heavy resistance - if indeed we did go further North. (Our objective for November - December had been to take Nghe An Province from North Vietnam and cut off their supply lines in to Laos, but the coup and supply factors - together with the discipline and morale problems in the ARVN resulting from the coup [not to mention our own political problems back in the States] - had forced us to hold off on an offensive into North Vietnam.) My finding was controversial and not much appreciated back in Washington, but "Gunfighter" stood-up for it.
Our casualties at Dong Hoi III were severe, 2,112 Americans killed, 4,081 seriously injured, over 8,000 casualties among the ARVN who, despite their political problems, had fought well when push came to shove. At Dong Hoi we faced massed enemy charges and rather primitive armoured thrusts that reminded us of what we had studied about trench warfare during the First World War. It was clear their strategy was to overwhelm us, and we had to hold our ground and stop them through attrition. That made the battle a mess and destroyed the city. Our air power, support from Naval guns, and a Marine landing in their rear made the difference, but it was still closely run throughout.
Our strength was tested in the days before the battle when units of the NVA and the Viet Cong staged diversionary attacks at Tchepone, and throughout the Laos and Cambodia border areas. We could hold them off, but with our added responsibilities in controlling the country as "caretakers" of the South Vietnamese government, we were stretched to thin for any but the most concentrated offensive action. We did receive word that President Gavin was committed to sending more troops to reinforce our position, but that did not address the immediate situation.
General Emerson had resented the order from Washington to take control of the South Vietnamese government; he didn't believe it was our role to be ruling the country. However, after some volatile arguments with Ambassador Whitehouse, he carried out his orders. We captured General Minh and General Phu and put them in jail, where the Vietnamese judicial authorities could take care of them. Marshall Ky had sensed something in the wind though, and he slipped past us and made it out into the countryside where, I presume, he had followers. Within months he organized a guerrilla band of his own, adding to our problems as the Vietcong now had a better equipped junior partner.
I celebrated Christmas with the staff in Saigon; all of us were homesick in the way most soldiers are at that time of the year when far from home. But, as 1973 became 1974, there was among us an unspoken apprehension about what we were doing here, and a real sense of foreboding that we (by which I mean the US military collectively, and not us as individuals in particular) would be fighting in this place for a long time to come; all because of political arrogance and poor planning. On reflection, this was the point when I began to appreciate the true meaning of the term “mission creep,” and why it was not a good thing.
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November 11 – 18. 1973
The Third Battle of Dong Hoi
November 14, 1973
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko arrives in Washington for meetings with President Gavin, Secretary of State George Bush, Dr. Henry Kissinger and General Scowcroft. This is the first high-level meeting between American and Soviet officials since President Nixon left office.
In the United Kingdom, Princess Anne marries a commoner, Captain Mark Phillips, in Westminster Abbey.
The Government of Saudi Arabia acquires a 25% stake in ARAMCO (Arabian American Oil Company). ARAMCO (a wholly owned U.S. company up to this point) was forced to sell the shares to the Saudi Royal Trust after King Faisal threatened to nationalize all ARAMCO holdings in his country as a punitive action in retaliation for the U.S. support of Israel in the Yom Kippur War.
November 16, 1973
The United States and the Soviet Union sign an interim agreement on the cease-fire in the Middle East, acknowledging a cease-fire in place along the Suez front, and calling for a phased Israeli withdrawal from Southern Syria to positions along the Golan Heights. Jordanian forces are then to move into Southern Syria and secure the area on behalf of the Syrian National Government. Future talks are to be held to conclude a permanent cease-fire and to settle the border disputes between Israel and Syria and Israel and Egypt. Both superpowers agree not to introduce troops into the area, except under the auspices of a larger United Nations peacekeeping force which is to supervise the truce lines.
This communiqué marks the official end to the October (Yom Kippur/Ramadan) War (October 6 – November 16, 1973).
NASA launches Skylab 4 (Gerald Carr, William Pogue, Edward Gibson) from Cape Canaveral, Florida on an 84-day mission.
President James Gavin signs the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act into law, authorizing the construction of the Alaska Pipeline.
November 17, 1973
Greek troops with a tank crash through the iron gates of the Athens Polytechnic University to help police dislodge around 2,000 students who have seized the campus in a protest against the dictatorship of George Papadopoulos.
The United States Military Assistance Command in Vietnam takes direct control of the executive authority of the Government of the Republic of (South) Vietnam. The U.S. military arrests coup leaders Duong Van Minh and General Phu, however Marshall Ky escapes. MACV then imposes a provisional American Military Government in place of the national executive authority. The mission of the TAMGOV-SV (Temporary American Government – South Vietnam) is to stabilize South Vietnam and supervise elections for a new President.
General Earle Wheeler (USAF Ret.), a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is named as the interim Administrator of South Vietnam.
North Vietnam and the North Vietnamese backed Provisional Liberation Government both protest the U.S. action. The People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union also protest this move by the United States.
President Gavin appears on American television to defend his approach to the Vietnam problem. He also orders an increase in troop strength to 225,000 U.S. personnel. During his speech he pledges to end U.S. involvement by the end of his term in office.
November 19, 1973
Papadopoulos has imposed martial law. In Athens since the night of the 17th, there have been clashes in scattered areas between the police and demonstrators, the police firing their handguns into the air and using tear gas to disperse hostile crowds.
The United States House of Representatives passes the War Powers Bill (1973) by a vote of 297 – 138. The title of the War Powers Bill states in part:
“It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgement of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicate by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.”
As a good will gesture the United States announces that it will release the Soviet MIG-25 pilot, Gennady R. Filitov, captured in South Vietnam on September 1, and return him to Soviet authorities. The Gavin Administration uses the occasion to warn the Soviet Union against direct involvement in Vietnam, and to urge the Soviets to put pressure on the North Vietnamese government to reach an early settlement with the United States.
November 21, 1973
President Gavin announces the nomination of former Governor William Scranton (R-PA) to the office of Vice President. The nomination of Scranton, a moderate Republican, was well received by the Congressional leadership during the President’s consultations with them.
November 22, 1973
The chief of the Greek armed forces outlaws 28 student organizations, while demonstrations continue.
President Gavin attends a memorial service in Washington to mark the tenth anniversary of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.
November 23, 1973
Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) says that he will oppose the nomination of Gov. Scranton to the Vice Presidency because, under the law, James Gavin is an acting President and as such cannot – according to Helms’ interpretation of the 25th amendment and the Presidential Succession Act – appoint a Vice President as he does not have the authority.
Robert Bork, now working on Helms’ staff, files a petition with the DC District Court seeking an injunction to block acting President Gavin from nominating Governor Scranton. The petition also asks the court to enjoin Gavin from being referred to as the 39th President of the United States.
The Arab summit conference adopts open and secret resolutions on the use of the oil weapon. Embargo extended to Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa.
November 24, 1973
In Greece, demonstrating students are joined by young construction workers.
November 25, 1973
Greek dictator Papadopoulos is ousted in a military coup lead by Lieutenant General Phaidon Gizikis.
November 26, 1973
Rep. John Ashbrook (R-OH) attempts to introduce an article to impeach President Gavin on the grounds that he has overstepped his constitutional authority in trying to nominate Gov. Scranton for the Vice Presidency. Ashbrook is booed by other members as he speaks, and the House declines to vote on his motion.
President Gavin orders an end to the bombing of North Vietnamese targets, except in direct support of U.S. ground troops. After a meeting with British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home he encourages Henry Kissinger to meet with Le Douc Tho at the earliest opportunity to see if the Paris peace process can be revived. He orders the NSC and the Pentagon to develop a plan for the withdrawal of U.S. ground troops from Vietnam: this to be a phased withdrawal once the South Vietnamese Army is built back-up under new elected political leadership. In essence Gavin is asking for a new program of Vietnamization.
The Gavin Administration calls on the Greek Junta to restore democratic government in that country and hints that it will seek unspecified measures (most likely economic sanctions) unless the Junta follows through with a democratic program.
November 27, 1973
President Gavin signs the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act authorizing price, production, allocation and marketing controls. He also calls on Congress to join with him in developing a domestic oil and energy conservation program which will limit America’s dependence on foreign oil.
The new Greek leadership, moving to generate public support, begins releasing students and others jailed in the demonstrations and riots against Papadopoulos.
The North Vietnamese Court convicts the six POW’s currently on trail:
Lt. George W. Bush USAF (held since Jan. 1973)
Maj. Leo Thorness USAF (held since April 1967)
Cmdr. Jeremiah Denton USN (held since July 1965)
Ernest C. Brace (CIA-officially an Air America employee) (held since May 21, 1965)
Cmdr. Everett Alvarez USN (held since Aug. 5, 1964)
Capt. Floyd James Thompson USA (held since Mar. 26, 1964)
Each is sentenced to death for their alleged crimes. At no time were the defendants allowed to present a defense during the show trial as the court had ruled at the outset that their crimes were “so evident and so heinous as to be indefensible under human law.” The United States formally protests the trials, the verdicts and the lack of opportunity for the defendants to defend themselves.
The dates of execution are not set by the court or the North Vietnamese government.
November 28, 1973
The new military rulers of Greece move to consolidate their power by purging from the armed forces high-ranking officers who supported George Papadopoulos.
The Senate passes the War Powers Bill (1973) by a vote of 54 – 45.
November 29, 1973
President Gavin vetoes the War Powers Bill.
December 1, 1973
Papua New Guinea gains self-government from Australia.
President Gavin announces a blue ribbon panel (The Fowler-Kennedy Commission) composed of Former Treasury Secretaries Henry Fowler, David M. Kennedy and John Connally, along with former Governors Pat Brown (D-CA) and John H. Reed (R-ME) will investigate policy initiatives for managing the economy and leading it out of its current downturn.
December 3, 1973
NLF (Vietcong) forces destroy 18 million gallons of fuel stored near Saigon.
Maryland State Attorney-General Francis (“Bill”) Burch, a Democrat, announces that he will open a State investigation into former Governor Spiro Agnew’s corrupt activities. Asked if he can do this, since Agnew pardoned himself, AG Burch says that the Federal pardon, which addressed Federal crimes then under investigation, does not apply to the State charges which – if any are brought – will be under the Maryland penal code.
Spiro Agnew’s lawyer’s immediately try to block Burch’s investigation through court action.
Pioneer 10 sends back the first close-up images of Jupiter.
December 4, 1973
The Federal District Court for the District of Columbia rules in the case Helms v. Gavin that President Gavin “in his discharge of the duties of the office of the President, even as an acting President, and with no reasonable challenge to his position as acting President by another Constitutionally qualified candidate foreseeable through the end of the present Presidential term, this Court finds no merit in the plaintiff’s challenge and no legal of Constitutional ground why the acting President cannot exercise the authority of his office in nominating a candidate for the office of Vice President of the United States, in accordance to his Constitutional duty as prescribed by the twenty-fifth amendment of the Constitution of the United States.”
Sen. Helms immediately announces that he will appeal this ruling to the DC Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.
December 4 -7, 1973
Secretary of State George Bush and Ambassador Henry Kissinger have a summit in Cairo with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.
(from Henry Kissinger The October War and The Pursuit of Peace in the Middle East)
Our preliminary negotiations with Sadat met with an early success in part because the Egyptian leader had a broad sense of the policy goals which he was seeking to achieve. His was a depth and subtlety of vision which few other world leaders I met in my career possessed in such unlimited quantities as he did. To begin with for him to break with the past and engage with us in seeking a broader Middle East settlement was not only a sea-change in national policy, but also personally dangerous for Sadat as well.
Sadat showed no nervousness about the dangers of the course to which he had committed himself. Like a surgeon coldly considering the best course of action, he invited Bush and I to suggest a specific proposal: he averred that I knew better than he what Israel would accept. It was another exhibition of daring, psychological insight and guile. It also showed a commitment to the peace process since he was, by this statement, allowing us to lead him to a cease-fire agreement with Israel, rather than setting pre-conditions. It was dangerous for him, but ultimately productive for us.
During those three days – and later during the first Presidential summit in Morocco – we laid down the changing of a relationship between the United States and Egypt which fostered hope for an evolution of our position throughout the Middle East. By winning Sadat over (or rather him allowing us to win him over) we affected a consequential change in the whole dynamic of the US-Arab relationship, and to some extent in the Arab-Israeli dynamic as well, though this would be a process which would take many years and undergo many tests.
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December 6, 1973
The House of Representatives votes to override President Gavin’s veto of the War Powers Bill (1973) by a vote of 295 – 139 (1 absent).
The House Judiciary Committee votes 28 – 11 to begin hearings for the nomination of former Governor Scranton for the office of Vice President.
December 7, 1973
Former President Nixon’s lawyers cannot explain an 18 ½-minute gap in one of the subpoenaed Oval Office tapes. Special Prosecutor Cox considers indicting Nixon for tampering with evidence and obstruction of justice over the issue.
Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho begin preliminary negotiations in Paris aimed at arranging a cease-fire in the Vietnam conflict. Kissinger demands a North Vietnamese withdrawal from South Vietnam and the border areas in Cambodia and Laos. He also insists on the end of the trials of American POWs in Vietnam, and the suspension of the death sentences imposed on the six POWs recently convicted in the Hanoi show trials.
Le in return insists on an American withdrawal from occupied areas in Laos and North Vietnam, reparations for the destruction of Dong Hoi and an end to the U.S. “occupational government” in Saigon before North Vietnam will consider substantive talks.
Kissinger informs Le that his list of pre-conditions are excessive and will stall the talks. As did the Nixon Administration, the Gavin Administration is willing to discuss post-war development aid and technical assistance to North Vietnam, but it will not pay these as “reparations,” rather they will be part of a package to be included in an overall settlement.
Israel, Egypt and Jordan sign a formal cease-fire accord.
December 9 - 13, 1973
The Tenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party removes Chou Enlai from all his Party and Governmental positions. Chairman Mao Tse Tung is eased into retirement as a “senior leader” and “wise teacher of the Party.” The Gang of Four (Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen.) and Mao’s nephew, Mao Yuanxin (“The Lesser Mao”) exert direct control of the Chinese Communist Party and the government of the People’s Republic of China.
The Tenth Party Congress announces the program of “Purification of the Revolution” and “the Three Strengths” as the new polices of the PRC government.
At the close of the Tenth Party Congress the government of China announces that it will withdraw all of its diplomatic personnel overseas and that all Foreign Embassies and Legations in Peking are to be closed. The PRC announces that it will maintain a liaison complex office in a “Special Zone” on the mainland side of the border with the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong. Any foreigners wishing to contact the PRC government will have to go t that liaison compound in order to communicate with the PRC government.
One of the casualties of the “Purification” is the archaeological excavation of a large Song Dynasty trade ship of c. 1277 A.D. that was being dredged up from the waters near the southern coast of China. Under orders from the Politburo the wreckage is returned to the ocean and declared to be off limits.
Arab oil ministers announce a further production cut of 5 percent for January for non-friendly countries.
December 12 - 19, 1973
Pursuant to the ceasefire agreement, and in accord with the Faisal plan, Israeli forces begin their withdrawal from Southern Syria into a “secure defense area” around the Golan Heights (in what had been Syrian territory).
Jordanian forces move into secure Southern Syria, but are forced to fight with guerrilla forces from the Muslim Brotherhood and Iraqi armed forces. The Iraqis, in violation of the Faisal plan, are seeking to extend their grip on Syrian territory.
December 14, 1973
Hua Houfang, the PRC Ambassador to the United Nations, defects to American authorities in New York.
In his first public appearance since his removal from office, removed-President Spiro Agnew, speaking to a gathering of conservatives in Richmond, Virginia, denounces the Senate for removing him attacks them for what he calls an illegal act. Agnew is applauded by many of those in attendance.
The United States launches a formal protest with the government of the People’s Republic of China restating its demand that the PRC government return the five B-52 crew members currently being held by the Chinese (their bomber strayed into Chinese territory near the PRC-North Vietnam border before crashing in late 1972). The PRC government does not respond to this demand.
December 15, 1973
The American Psychiatric Association removes homosexuality from its list of mental disorders.
December 16, 1973
O.J. Simpson of the Buffalo Bills became the first running back to rush for 2,000 yards in a pro football season.
Footage of an interview of Lt. George Bush jr. conducted by the East German state broadcaster Fernsehen der DDR is shown on U.S. television. Many who watch Bush believe that his responses are affected by drugs and possible torture. In the interview Bush, in slow and slurred speech, denounces U.S. involvement in Vietnam (notably his answers are slow and seem forced) and applauds the justice of the North Vietnamese courts and claims that he and the other defendants deserve the death sentences they have been handed, and he even says – in a very halting manner – that he looks forward to his “just execution.”
December 18, 1973
Islamic Development Bank created as a specialized agency of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) (effective 12 August 1974).
The Bush family denounces the broadcast of the FdD interview of George Bush jr. and claim that he was tortured and drugged by the North Vietnamese and the East Germans.
December 19, 1973
President Gavin orders NASA to proceed with the Space Shuttle program. Spending on the project will help to stimulate the economy.
Alabama State Police shoot dead three members of the Black Liberation Army who attempted to shoot their way into the Alabama Governor’s Mansion with the intent of assassinating (or kidnapping) Governor George Wallace. One Alabama state trooper is killed and three are wounded. Governor Wallace is unhurt but uses the incident to denounce lawlessness in the country.
The Faisal Plan suffers a set back when Jordanian and Iraqi forces clash over their zone of control in Southern Syria. Moreover, the Syrian government in Aleppo reneges on an earlier commitment to relocate to Damascus under the agreement. Aleppo government propaganda now refers to the Jordanians as “occupiers” of Syrian territory.
December 20, 1973
Spanish prime minister Luis Carrero Blanco is assassinated in Madrid by the terrorist organization ETA.
In response to the APA’s de-listing of homosexuality as a mental illness, Sen. Jesse Helms (R-NC) , Sen. Paul Fannin (R-AZ), Rep. John Ashbrook (R-OH) and Rep. William F. Nichols (D-AL) announce that they will introduce legislation to declare sodomy a federal crime to be punishable with life imprisonment at hard labor.
December 21, 1973
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upholds the lower court ruling in the case of Helms v. Gavin.
Sen. Helms announces his intention to take the question to the United States Supreme Court.
December 23, 1973
After consultations with the Gavin Administration, NASA announces that it will continue the Skylab project with a Skylab 5 and Skylab 6 mission. This spending will, in part, keep Skylab contractors from having to lay-off workers.
The OPEC Gulf Six ((Iran, Iraq, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar) decide to raise the posted price of marker crude from $5.12 to $11.65 per barrel effective January 1, 1974.
Former White House Chief of Staff Donald Rumsfeld announces that he will run for the Republican nomination for the United States Senate in Illinois. He recruits Karl Rove to work on his campaign.
December 25, 1973
Arab Oil Ministers meet and decide to re-affirm the production cuts first announced in November, although they chose to cut production by 10% rather than the 25% previously announced. The EEC countries (except Britain) and Canada are exempted from the oil embargo due to their “reasonable approach” to the Israel’s role in the Yom Kippur War. The embargo against the United States is continued for its support of Israel, and Britain and Japan are included in the embargo for their support of the United States.
The forecast world price of crude oil rises to $ 12.50 per barrel effective January 1, 1974.
Pro-Muslim Brotherhood groups demonstrate against the Lebanese government in Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon and Tyre . The demonstrations are timed to agitate the Christians in Lebanon on the holiest day of their calendar.
From his capital at Hama in Syria, Ali Sadreddine Bayanouni calls on all Muslims to rise against their secular governments and join the Islamic Caliphate in forming one pan-Islamic power to “drive the infidels from the Holy Lands of Islam forever.”
December 28, 1973
The U.S. Congress passes the Endangered Species Act.
December 30, 1973
The terrorist Carlos (Ilich Ramirez Sanchez) fails in his attempt to assassinate British businessman Joseph Sieff.
Lebanese President Suleiman Frangieh, a Christian, complains that the uncontrolled Muslim Brotherhood uprising in Syria is “a mortal danger to the domestic peace of Lebanon.”
Iraqi forces move in force against the Muslim Brotherhood stronghold in central Syria.
Turkish military forces are put on alert in reaction to the Iraqi move.
December 31, 1973
The British government announces that – due a series of agreements between the British government and the Trades Union Council regarding long-term industrial investment – coal shortages are not as bad as had been previously feared. There will be no coal shortage in the UK over the winter of 1973-1974, which eases some concerns about inflation and results in an increase in the value of the British pound sterling.
December 31, 1973 – January 1, 1974
The end of 1973 is celebrated by millions of people around the world.
January 2, 1974
The Gavin Administration announces that it will submit legislation to Congress that will allow individual taxpayers to be refunded (at no tax penalty) their payroll deductions for the tax year 1973, and the last six months of 1972. This is to be administered on percentage scale based on income, and is seen as spending stimulus program to combat the current recession. President Gavin announces that he will submit a bill to incorporate the late Gov. John McKeithen’s proposal for an Earned Income Tax credit into the Tax Code.
Iraqi forces are defeated by Muslim Brotherhood forces after a series of desert battles around Tadmur and along the Jabal al Ruwaq mountains in central Syria. The Iraqi defeat is blamed on the Muslim Brotherhood’s superior use of desert terrain and foothills to their advantage, plus their skillful use of captured Syrian military equipment, including Soviet made warplanes and attack helicopters, several of which are used in suicide attacks against Iraq armored units. The Iraqis also seem to have underestimated the capability of the Muslim Brotherhood forces and showed signs of incompetence in their command (several high level executions in the Iraqi military occur after the failed attempt to dislodge the Muslim Brotherhood). The Iraqi military had also not recovered from the pounding it received from Israel in the October War.
More disturbing to many, and especially to the leadership in Baghdad (and Amman and Riyadh) is the news that some Iraqi units defected to the Muslim Brotherhood during the battles, while others were crippled by mutinies among the troops.
January 3 - 6, 1974
PLO military units move against several groups in Palestinian Refugee camps in Lebanon, resulting in a three day long shoot-out between the PLO and Palestinian dissidents. Only after the incident does the world learn that these clashes are the result of Muslim Brotherhood emissaries radicalizing young Palestinians and helping them to form their own religious militias. The PLO forces moved into the camps to disband the nascent militias before they could present a danger to the secular Palestinian movement, but the action leads to deep divisions among the Palestinians themselves.
January 4, 1974
Japan is suffering economically and cutting back its exports 15 to 25 percent. With the rise in price of oil, Japan is shifting auto production to more fuel efficient models, and Japan is shifting from oil-intensive industries to more investment in electronics.
The Japanese government begins negotiations with the governments of Mexico, Venezuela and Iran with the intent of establishing bi-lateral trade deals which will allow Japan to buy oil from these nations at lower than OPEC world prices in exchange for Japanese aid and technical development for the export nations economies.
January 8, 1974
The United States Supreme Court declines to review the lower court rulings in Helms v. Gavin, removing the last legal roadblock to the nomination of William Scranton for the office of Vice President.
From Egypt Umar al-Tilmisani, the General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, (the country where the movement was founded) issues a statement denouncing Bayanouni’s violent activity in Syria. While al-Tilmisani states that he sympathizes with Bayanouni’s political aspirations, his statement re-affirms that the Muslim Brotherhood has been opposed to violence except in situations of self-defense. Al-Tilmisani calls on Bayanouni and his followers to aid in restoring order in Syria and to end the violent confrontations which “serve no purpose other than to spill innocent blood and cast poor views upon the Brotherhood and its goals of Islamic justice and a society governed by the values of the Holy Quran.”
January 9, 1974
The Senate votes 54 – 45 to override President Gavin’s veto of the War Powers Bill (1973). This is vote is insufficient to override the Presidential veto.
The Senate Judiciary Committee begins hearings on the nomination of former Gov. William Scranton for the office of Vice President of the United States.
Unemployment for the last quarter of 1973 is calculated at 17%. The period known as the Depression of the 1970’s is said to have begun (this is a disputed analysts term; no official government body uses the word Depression). Among the drivers causing the further decline in economic activity are inflation, the high price of oil and a continuing softness in consumer demand for retail goods and producer demand for components and raw materials.
Ali Sadreddine Bayanouni issues a statement from his headquarters in Hama confirming that Umar al-Tilmisani is a wise and learned leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and that while his Caliphate “welcomes the counsel of our learned Egyptian brother, Umar al-Tilmisani, we do not agree with his views.” The statement then goes on to imply that al-Tilmisani’s views are outdated and that the Syrian branch has grasped the ‘time of transformation for an Islamic Revolution.” Bayanouni says that while he respects the Brotherhoods tradition of non-violent thought he argues that the violence has been “imposed upon the Ummah by the Zionists and their Imperialist, infidel backers, and that ours is the war of self-defense and survival against the blood-thirsty enemies of Islam.”
Rep. Ron Dellums (D-CA) and Rep. Shirley Chisholm (D-NY) introduce legislation (The End the Vietnam War Resolution of 1974) that would require President Gavin to end all U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia within 90 days of the proposed Act being signed into law.
Dellums and Chisholm address a large crowd of supporters after introducing the bill on the floor of the House. This group then stages an anti-war protest outside the White House.
Much to the consternation of the Secret Service, President Gavin appears outside of the White House to speak with the protesters. In the 16F weather, the President tries to engage the protesters. The session ends when some protesters begin throwing eggs at President Gavin (which in the low temperature have partially frozen, becoming hard projectiles) and the Secret Service literally pulls him back into the White House grounds.
(From James M. Gavin A Call to Duty: A Memoir)
By stepping outside the White House to confront the protestors I hoped to show that – unlike my three predecessors – that I was willing to be accessible to the people and to actively engage in debate on the question of our involvement in Vietnam. Unfortunately I found that superheated emotion, encouraged by certain disruptive elements, had superseded reason on the question. That was as much the fault of my predecessors’ approach to governing on the question as it was that of those on the sidewalk who let their emotions overwhelm their reason.
A woman on the sidewalk asked me: “How can you let the killing go on? Hasn’t there been enough?”
P: Indeed there has, and I would like it stop. If I could wave a magic wand and return us to this time last year, I would gladly do so and prevent this nightmare from coming about. But that’s not the reality. We need to deal with the situation as it is, and my policy is to bring about a decent end for ourselves and the Vietnamese people.
Woman: Just bring the troops home and let the Vietnamese people solve it.
P: If that alone would do it, I would gladly do so. But it isn’t that simple. Our government helped to create the current difficulty in South Vietnam, so we have a moral responsibility to make it right, and that means staying long enough so that they can elect a new government, and helping to build-up our military…
At this point some of the protesters behind us began shouting, and both the young woman and I were showered with eggs which, in the cold air, had begun to freeze. I’ll tell you, they stung. The Secret Service pulled me back inside, which lead to some unfortunate and unflattering photos of me being pelted by eggs, while agents pulled me back inside. Some irresponsible news publications used these photos as a symbolic of the lack of control in our administration, as if to say that we had no firm grip over the issues, but were being pulled willy-nilly by events. Nothing could have been further from the truth in most areas.
In Vietnam we were driven by events, based on policy decisions which had been made by those who came before us, and whose choices still influenced events over which we were playing catch-up. When I took office I had to make the best of Operation Bold Eagle, and try to restore democratic government to South Vietnam in light of the coup, which had occurred under my predecessor’s watch and which, in part, had been an outcome of the reckless assumptions made around the Bold Eagle planning. My own numerous public statements of the period reflect my views, and there was nothing disingenuous or any hidden meaning implanted into many of them, so I will not waste a lot of space here going over what is already well known. From the beginning I was determined to bring an honorable, viable and sustainable end to the Vietnam conflict. The fact that my administration had to become more deeply involved in that war before we could achieve that goal was a fact of the situation which no one of us, and not even the President, could do quickly or easily.
Jack Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon had all grappled with this problem, and it had outlasted each of their Presidencies, so my dilemma was not unique. Perhaps the only unique characteristic about it was that I could look back to the recent past and see a point when the War had almost been resolved, only to have that fall away from us. I won’t call that fact a guiding principle of my policy, but it informed me about the frailties of policy and the gave substance to the idea that whatever we developed, it had to be sufficiently in place that no one could come along and undo it.
Otherwise, our work was temporary and not a true solution.
In the other endeavors of my administration though, we had definite policy designed to promote U.S. interests and reinforce our leadership position in the world.
From the beginning I was encouraged by what Henry Kissinger and George Bush had to say about President Sadat of Egypt. Both felt strongly he was an Arab leader with whom we could do business, and I felt strongly that, after their meetings with him in Cairo, that I should meet him face-to-face as soon as possible, which lead to my Morocco summit with Sadat, along with the Kings of Jordan and Saudi Arabia, both impressive statesmen in their own rights. My principle focus was to develop a U.S. strategy of outreach to Arab regimes who wished to improve our relations with us, both to off-set the image in the Middle East that the United States was blindly pro-Israel, and to shore-up those regimes against the kind of extremist nonsense which had Syria in its grip.
The oil embargo showed how much we needed the Arabs on our side from an economic perspective, but equally from a question of strategy and in terms of developing any framework for a wider Middle Eastern peace, we had to have better relations with those nations like Egypt, who, up until recently, had been in the Soviet orbit. Moderate leaders like King Hussein of Jordan, King Hassan of Morocco and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia were willing to help us, and I felt we should exploit the opportunity being presented. Most importantly, if we could build an understanding with these nations, we would be able to keep the Soviets on the margins of the Middle East, and without their interference through various client states, there was the opportunity to calm down the tension in the region.
To that end I was even willing to reach out to the Iraqi regime, though their reckless behavior in Syria quickly showed that the regime in Baghdad was not ready to enter into any sort of peaceful dialogue with us or anyone else.
On the Soviet front, after my meetings with Foreign Minister Gromyko in November 1973 – which helped pave the way to a Middle East cease-fire, I instructed Bush and Kissinger to push them for a higher level meeting, preferably between myself and Brezhnev. As soon as possible I wanted to get us back on the détente road which had worked so well for the Nixon Administration and which I believed, as Richard Nixon had, held the best hope for peaceful coexistence between the superpowers, and consequently would produce more stability in the world.
That was the reason I authorized the release of the Soviet pilot Fillitov, who had been captured in Vietnam the previous September, as a goodwill gesture. I hoped it would send the Kremlin the message that we were ready to do business on a wide variety of issues, including Vietnam and a treaty framework for strategic weapons. Sadly, our initial attempts went unheeded, although it soon became apparent that this was the result of a power struggle among the Soviet leadership itself. Like ourselves, the Soviet Union was not immune to the deliberative effects of power politics, though in their case it was all so much more obscured by a veil of secrecy.
The actions of the new Communist Chinese leadership made it impossible for me to return to the Nixon-Kissinger triangulation policy, though Dr. Kissinger made a stab at it before the their Tenth Communist Party Congress in December shut everything down, which was too bad. Clearly a golden opportunity had been squandered by fumbling and ignorance on the part of both sides, though I hold the so called “Lesser Mao” to blame for putting personal ambition over common sense. But, until the leadership in Peking changed their isolationist tune, there was little we could do about it.
I did order continuing protests to try and recover the five Air Force crewmen the Chinese were holding in their prisons, together with other American citizens we knew that regime had languishing in their prisons. I even tried to send a personal letter to Chairman Mao seeking leniency for our people, and promising that we would not – as a government – use their release for anti-Chinese propaganda. My letter was never answered; I cannot even be sure it reached the illustrious Chairman.
On the domestic front I vetoed the War Powers resolution because I believed it to be a violation of the separation of powers. Article I of the Constitution may have given Congress the right to declare war – and with it the right to debate the involvement of our armed forces in conflicts. I will be the first to agree with the position that Congress has a right to debate these issues (not all my successors have recognized even this), but equally Article II reserves to the President the right to command the troops and to make policy on behalf of the United States in foreign affairs, including in our defense. My objection (and that of many Constitutional scholars whose advice I sought on the question) was that by imposing a limitation on how long a President could commit troops before reporting to Congress, and providing other qualifiers on the use of our armed forces, the current Congress was muddying the line between Article I and Article II, and in so doing they were trying to re-write the Constitution.
In my veto statement I suggested that the War Powers resolution was unwise in the tense international situation we faced, and that in a national emergency it would be impractical. It is unfortunate that some chose to see this as my being overly pro-military, or prone to using military force as first resort rather than a last resort, for it was the exact opposite of my personal views. That was politics, though despite my best efforts not to, I bristled at those who wanted to compare my attitude on the matter with Chilean strongman General Pinochet: that was nothing more than hyperbole and histrionics thrown about for political ends.
Bill Scranton was the best candidate for the Vice Presidency. Carl Sanders was an excellent choice too, and in letting Governor Sanders know of my choice I apologized to him for not nominating him, for he was equally as qualified. Governor Sanders took it in good stride, and I kept this in mind. Bill Scranton had both an excellent mind and a superb record as a governor and political leader. He was not in the least concerned about running for President, which signaled to me that he would devout his energies to the office of Vice President as long as he held it. I chose Bill in part because he was a moderate Republican: many in that party still thought my association with the Kennedy administration marked me as a closet Democrat. I knew that in picking Bill I would not please the hard-line conservatives like Goldwater and Reagan, but I would pick-up support in the Rockefeller wing, and Bill was acceptable to most centrist Democrats as well. This seemed to assure an easy confirmation under the still untested twenty-fifth amendment.
I had nothing but contempt for Senator Jesse Helms’ attempt to block the nomination. The courts didn’t accept his reasoning, which was just as good. I know Helms had voted to acquit my predecessor, which was his right, but I felt that trying to play politics with the Vice Presidential nomination, particularly in so critical a period as late 1973 and early 1974, and to further compound it by dragging it through the courts, was brazenly irresponsible. It may have served to shore-up Senator Helms’ base, but it was done at the expense of doing further damage to our Constitutional government at a time when it had already received numerous body blows. I will never understand such a low level of petty self-interest, which to me seems to border on being unpatriotic. I do not question Senator Helms’ patriotism, more I think his political maturity. Fortunately, he ended-up wearing the goat over the whole thing; even Goldwater distanced himself from that. Reagan, on the other hand, was conspicuously silent throughout, as he had been during much of the controversies of the past year. Reflecting on that, I saw political calculation in that silence.
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January 11, 1974
Secretary of Defense Alexander Haig resigns.
President Gavin nominates Sen. Stuart Symington (D-MO) to replace Haig as Secretary of Defense.
Henry Kissinger’s second round of secret negotiations with Le Duc Tho in Paris prove inconclusive, as the North Vietnamese demand that the US pay them reparations up-front and that the NLF (Viet Cong) be immediately recognized as the government of South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese are willing to release all American POWs but refuse to include the show trial six in that number (according to North Vietnam they are convicted criminals and no longer subject to “US jurisdiction” and cannot be considered prisoners-of-war any longer).
(from Henry Kissinger Years of Crisis: Why America failed in Asia)
The Paris peace accords with all their ambiguities reflected the balance of forces in Vietnam in the wake of the climactic battles of 1972. As with any peace settlement, it depended on the maintenance of that balances of forces. We had no illusions about Hanoi’s long-range goal of subjugating all of Indochina. I repeatedly warned Nixon to that effect.
Unhappily, I could see that the damage done by President Agnew in the intervening year had done little to change this assessment, if anything it had hardened North Vietnamese intransigence on any negotiations, and re-affirmed their resolve to be a dominant power in their corner of the planet. On our honesty, who could blame them for their lack of trust? Agnew had made us appear like the biggest liars on the planet (though I would not have put it so bluntly at the time; Le Duc Tho did, though he diplomatically couched it in a reference to the past President and did not apply it to the current one).
North Vietnam had been militarily weakened by our continued activities there in 1973, especially by the bombing. Their repeated failure to dislodge us from Tchepone in Laos and Dong Hoi in North Vietnam proved this, together with the quality of the troops they had thrown at us in the last attacks. Many had been children, reminding me of the Hitler Youth troops the Third Reich had employed in its last desperate efforts to turn back Soviet advances on Berlin in 1945. North Vietnam was not in quite so desperate a position as Nazi Germany, but then neither were we in the strong position of the Allies in 1945, or even the relative strength we had enjoyed throughout 1972. Operation Bold Eagle had squandered that.
In South Vietnam the triumvirate of General Duong Văn Minh, General Phan Van Phu and Marshall Nguyen Cao Ky had undone much of what President Thieu had accomplished, so much so that President Gavin had done something which none of his predecessors had even considered – taken direct U.S. control of South Vietnam’s political affairs. This had been necessary because after President Nixon had built-up President Thieu’s regime through the policy of Vietnamization of the War, Agnew had completely undercut Thieu through Operation Bold Eagle, making it appear that we had lost faith in our ally. Minh, Phu and Ky had been emboldened to act because of Thieu’s loss of political and military face.
This point was not lost on our adversary, who equally saw our 1973 actions in Vietnam as a lack of trust in our nominal ally, and as an acknowledgment of our outright duplicity in the policy of Vietnamization and our approach to them throughout the Nixon administration peace talks. Le Duc Tho now approached us warily, with the sense of a burned customer being asked to return to the shop that cheated him.
What Le Duc Tho’s real views of me were must await Hanoi’s adoption of a Freedom of Information Act. He thought it expedient to maintain the façade of cordiality throughout our discussions. As a professional Leninist he despised the bourgeois values of compromise I put forward. On one level he undoubtedly hated me as the representative of an “imperialist” power seeking to deprive North Vietnam of what it considered its birthright – hegemony over all of Indochina. Yet in the past, and in our current encounters, I faced a man who – while a hard negotiator – thought on many levels and had a subtlety of mind which allowed for honest, candid exchanges to take place.
It was along this vein that at our second meeting in Paris in January 1974 that he informed me that little was going to happen until we sorted-out the mess in Saigon. Of course, for his part, he insisted we give the NLF (Vietcong) leadership a role in any new government, but this was as much posturing by him as a real demand. He knew we would do no such thing, and it really wasn’t that important to him. However, he made his point. The situation in South Vietnam was such a mess, that nothing could proceed until we sorted it out. Hanoi would never agree to an American occupational government, and they were unwilling to move forward while was one was being enforced. In this sense, Agnew and the three South Vietnamese coup leaders had tied our hands behind our backs, well past the departure of all four from the scene.
I tried to make progress on the question of our men – the six prisoners of war who had been sentenced to death in a show trial in Hanoi. One of them was the son of our Secretary of State, which I pointed out to Le, suggesting that his inclusion had been completely arbitrary and was a consequence of who his father was (both men were named George Bush) and had less to do with any “war crimes” he may have committed himself.
Le was unmoved on the question. He stuck by his position that the tentative 1972 agreement – which we had broken in 1973 – had covered prisoners of war, and that our default through 1973 had left the question open to interpretation. Now he used an argument worthy of a Southern Governor: Le maintained that the North Vietnamese judicial system had acted in accord with North Vietnamese law on the question of the trials, and that as a result the North Vietnamese government was legally unable to change the outcome. He even used the phrase “separation of powers”, which had a bizarre quality coming from the mouth of a Communist. The North Vietnamese government could not act to arbitrarily free these men, he said, because they had been convicted in a lawful court and that their lawful sentences had to be carried out. He did suggest that their Head of State could exercise leniency in reviewing the sentences, and possibly commute the death sentences, but in order to do that the convicted would have to “express regret for their criminal acts and admit their full guilt.” I found such a position impossible to agree with.
I think too that the withdrawal of China from world affairs had caught the North Vietnamese by surprise. Although the Soviet Union had been their largest patron, assistance from the People’s Republic of China had played an important supporting role in the North Vietnamese war effort. Without it, Hanoi was now wholly dependent on Soviet assistance, and the narrow gateway of the port of Haiphong to receive it. What was more, with Communist China reverting to ancient Chinese policy of insularity, there was a direct possibility that the national interests of China and Vietnam would clash along their mutual border and in Laos, as had happened in the pre-Communist history of both nations.
This could play into our hands in the longer term, but it wasn’t going to solve our immediate problems. For now, before we could get anywhere with North Vietnam, we were going to have to solve our problems in the South.
I was saddened when I heard of Chou Enlai’s removal from the Communist Chinese leadership. More than Le, Chou and been an engaging counter-part and throughout our conversations I had felt myself to be talking with a statesman of the first order. Chou’s personal fall – and subsequent fatal illness (which may not have been a natural occurrence, if one believes the dark rumors that come from behind the wall Peking has built around itself) were a personal tragedy that saddened me.
On a professional level, our slow, meticulous work had produced a solid result which culminated in President Nixon’s 1972 trip to China. We had laid the groundwork for a steadfast relationship – not as allies or friends in the real sense – but as strategic partners in a global policy to check Soviet expansionism and bring order to the chaotic flux of the international system.
First Agnew – who lacked any sort understanding for this kind of subtlety – had undercut our work, and then the new Communist leadership put to death the last vestiges which had held on through 1973.
In regard to China we had suddenly slipped from a developing relationship to the abysmal depths we had been at twenty years earlier at the end of the Korean War. This was a true tragedy wrought by those unwilling to think strategically and with nuance about world affairs, and highlighted – at least for me – the need for on-going education in world affairs for all political figures.
Of all the leaders I dealt with over this period, perhaps only President Sadat of Egypt equaled Chou in his understanding of the larger issues and forces involved.
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January 12, 1974
The oil ministers of Iran, Venezuela, Mexico and Nigeria meet in Acapulco, Mexico to discuss the establishment of a non-Arab oil export cartel.
January 14 – 17, 1974
President Gavin holds direct talks with President Sadat of Egypt in Rabat, Morocco. The two Presidents agree to restore diplomatic relations between their two nations, and also discuss a wide-ranging series of issues covering the Middle East. President Gavin also meets with King Hussein of Jordan and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia while in Rabat.
Not recorded for the press is a secret meeting arranged by King Hassan of Morocco between President Gavin, Secretary Bush, and Ambassador Kissinger with Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) [officially listed as “King Hassan’s guest”], as a diplomatic representative of PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. The four discuss initiatives for bringing the Palestinians into the wider Middle East Peace Process.
January 17, 1974
Several oil production facilities in Iraq are damaged by home-made bombs and other sabotage.
The ARAMCO tanker terminal at Ras Tanura, Saudi Arabia (one of the Kingdom’s major oil export terminals) suffers severe damage after a bomb triggers a series of explosions in oil storage and processing facilities. Pro-Caliphate terrorists take credit for this action, saying that they are striking at the “infidels desecrating the Holy Land of Islam.”
It is unclear if the two acts of sabotage are linked, or if the timing was a coincidence. The world price of crude oil doubles to $ 24.75 per barrel on the news, and soon rises to $ 28.50 per barrel.
January 18, 1974
Lebanese Prime Minister Takieddin el-Solh, a Sunni Muslim, is assassinated by attackers ready to commit suicide to achieve their goal. The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria takes credit for the attack, declaring that it will strike against “all apostates and infidels who disgrace the Holy Lands of Islam with their corrupt and un-Godlike adherence to un-Islamic values and ideas.”
An armed clash between Syrian and Turkish border patrol troops near Zawaghar along the border lead to a threat from Turkey to intervene in Syria.
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Note: Blue portions of Henry Kissinger’s memoirs are words actually written by Henry Kissinger in Years of Upheaval 1982, Little, Brown and Company pp. 23-25 (I: A Visit to Hanoi) and pp. 644 (XXIII: First Middle East Breakthrough). (Some passages edited for economy of space).
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(From Colin Powell My American Journey)
I can't say that the attacks known collectively as the Third Battle of Dong Hoi came as a surprise to anyone; we had been planning for the contingency. What came as a surprise was the ferocity of the final NVA assault on the city (which by November 18 was in ruins) which was, if anything, a human wave suicide attack. Much has been written about the heavy casualties (over 30,000 estimated for the NVA) and that many of the NVA soldiers who attacked were adolescents, which was said to indicate that our enemy was becoming increasingly desperate. My own personal interpretation, based on the evidence which we accumulated after the battle, was that while desperate, Hanoi wasn't down for the count either. Many of those NVA kids everyone talks about were armed with new and relatively well maintained Kalashnikov and PK assault weapons, indicating that supplies were still getting into Hanoi from the Soviet Bloc.
At the time I gave General Emerson an estimate that while the enemy had tried for a knock-out blow at Dong Hoi, they were still holding their best troops back, meaning that we would have to attack North in strength - and expect heavy resistance - if indeed we did go further North. (Our objective for November - December had been to take Nghe An Province from North Vietnam and cut off their supply lines in to Laos, but the coup and supply factors - together with the discipline and morale problems in the ARVN resulting from the coup [not to mention our own political problems back in the States] - had forced us to hold off on an offensive into North Vietnam.) My finding was controversial and not much appreciated back in Washington, but "Gunfighter" stood-up for it.
Our casualties at Dong Hoi III were severe, 2,112 Americans killed, 4,081 seriously injured, over 8,000 casualties among the ARVN who, despite their political problems, had fought well when push came to shove. At Dong Hoi we faced massed enemy charges and rather primitive armoured thrusts that reminded us of what we had studied about trench warfare during the First World War. It was clear their strategy was to overwhelm us, and we had to hold our ground and stop them through attrition. That made the battle a mess and destroyed the city. Our air power, support from Naval guns, and a Marine landing in their rear made the difference, but it was still closely run throughout.
Our strength was tested in the days before the battle when units of the NVA and the Viet Cong staged diversionary attacks at Tchepone, and throughout the Laos and Cambodia border areas. We could hold them off, but with our added responsibilities in controlling the country as "caretakers" of the South Vietnamese government, we were stretched to thin for any but the most concentrated offensive action. We did receive word that President Gavin was committed to sending more troops to reinforce our position, but that did not address the immediate situation.
General Emerson had resented the order from Washington to take control of the South Vietnamese government; he didn't believe it was our role to be ruling the country. However, after some volatile arguments with Ambassador Whitehouse, he carried out his orders. We captured General Minh and General Phu and put them in jail, where the Vietnamese judicial authorities could take care of them. Marshall Ky had sensed something in the wind though, and he slipped past us and made it out into the countryside where, I presume, he had followers. Within months he organized a guerrilla band of his own, adding to our problems as the Vietcong now had a better equipped junior partner.
I celebrated Christmas with the staff in Saigon; all of us were homesick in the way most soldiers are at that time of the year when far from home. But, as 1973 became 1974, there was among us an unspoken apprehension about what we were doing here, and a real sense of foreboding that we (by which I mean the US military collectively, and not us as individuals in particular) would be fighting in this place for a long time to come; all because of political arrogance and poor planning. On reflection, this was the point when I began to appreciate the true meaning of the term “mission creep,” and why it was not a good thing.
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November 11 – 18. 1973
The Third Battle of Dong Hoi
November 14, 1973
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko arrives in Washington for meetings with President Gavin, Secretary of State George Bush, Dr. Henry Kissinger and General Scowcroft. This is the first high-level meeting between American and Soviet officials since President Nixon left office.
In the United Kingdom, Princess Anne marries a commoner, Captain Mark Phillips, in Westminster Abbey.
The Government of Saudi Arabia acquires a 25% stake in ARAMCO (Arabian American Oil Company). ARAMCO (a wholly owned U.S. company up to this point) was forced to sell the shares to the Saudi Royal Trust after King Faisal threatened to nationalize all ARAMCO holdings in his country as a punitive action in retaliation for the U.S. support of Israel in the Yom Kippur War.
November 16, 1973
The United States and the Soviet Union sign an interim agreement on the cease-fire in the Middle East, acknowledging a cease-fire in place along the Suez front, and calling for a phased Israeli withdrawal from Southern Syria to positions along the Golan Heights. Jordanian forces are then to move into Southern Syria and secure the area on behalf of the Syrian National Government. Future talks are to be held to conclude a permanent cease-fire and to settle the border disputes between Israel and Syria and Israel and Egypt. Both superpowers agree not to introduce troops into the area, except under the auspices of a larger United Nations peacekeeping force which is to supervise the truce lines.
This communiqué marks the official end to the October (Yom Kippur/Ramadan) War (October 6 – November 16, 1973).
NASA launches Skylab 4 (Gerald Carr, William Pogue, Edward Gibson) from Cape Canaveral, Florida on an 84-day mission.
President James Gavin signs the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act into law, authorizing the construction of the Alaska Pipeline.
November 17, 1973
Greek troops with a tank crash through the iron gates of the Athens Polytechnic University to help police dislodge around 2,000 students who have seized the campus in a protest against the dictatorship of George Papadopoulos.
The United States Military Assistance Command in Vietnam takes direct control of the executive authority of the Government of the Republic of (South) Vietnam. The U.S. military arrests coup leaders Duong Van Minh and General Phu, however Marshall Ky escapes. MACV then imposes a provisional American Military Government in place of the national executive authority. The mission of the TAMGOV-SV (Temporary American Government – South Vietnam) is to stabilize South Vietnam and supervise elections for a new President.
General Earle Wheeler (USAF Ret.), a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is named as the interim Administrator of South Vietnam.
North Vietnam and the North Vietnamese backed Provisional Liberation Government both protest the U.S. action. The People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union also protest this move by the United States.
President Gavin appears on American television to defend his approach to the Vietnam problem. He also orders an increase in troop strength to 225,000 U.S. personnel. During his speech he pledges to end U.S. involvement by the end of his term in office.
November 19, 1973
Papadopoulos has imposed martial law. In Athens since the night of the 17th, there have been clashes in scattered areas between the police and demonstrators, the police firing their handguns into the air and using tear gas to disperse hostile crowds.
The United States House of Representatives passes the War Powers Bill (1973) by a vote of 297 – 138. The title of the War Powers Bill states in part:
“It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgement of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicate by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.”
As a good will gesture the United States announces that it will release the Soviet MIG-25 pilot, Gennady R. Filitov, captured in South Vietnam on September 1, and return him to Soviet authorities. The Gavin Administration uses the occasion to warn the Soviet Union against direct involvement in Vietnam, and to urge the Soviets to put pressure on the North Vietnamese government to reach an early settlement with the United States.
November 21, 1973
President Gavin announces the nomination of former Governor William Scranton (R-PA) to the office of Vice President. The nomination of Scranton, a moderate Republican, was well received by the Congressional leadership during the President’s consultations with them.
November 22, 1973
The chief of the Greek armed forces outlaws 28 student organizations, while demonstrations continue.
President Gavin attends a memorial service in Washington to mark the tenth anniversary of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.
November 23, 1973
Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) says that he will oppose the nomination of Gov. Scranton to the Vice Presidency because, under the law, James Gavin is an acting President and as such cannot – according to Helms’ interpretation of the 25th amendment and the Presidential Succession Act – appoint a Vice President as he does not have the authority.
Robert Bork, now working on Helms’ staff, files a petition with the DC District Court seeking an injunction to block acting President Gavin from nominating Governor Scranton. The petition also asks the court to enjoin Gavin from being referred to as the 39th President of the United States.
The Arab summit conference adopts open and secret resolutions on the use of the oil weapon. Embargo extended to Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa.
November 24, 1973
In Greece, demonstrating students are joined by young construction workers.
November 25, 1973
Greek dictator Papadopoulos is ousted in a military coup lead by Lieutenant General Phaidon Gizikis.
November 26, 1973
Rep. John Ashbrook (R-OH) attempts to introduce an article to impeach President Gavin on the grounds that he has overstepped his constitutional authority in trying to nominate Gov. Scranton for the Vice Presidency. Ashbrook is booed by other members as he speaks, and the House declines to vote on his motion.
President Gavin orders an end to the bombing of North Vietnamese targets, except in direct support of U.S. ground troops. After a meeting with British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home he encourages Henry Kissinger to meet with Le Douc Tho at the earliest opportunity to see if the Paris peace process can be revived. He orders the NSC and the Pentagon to develop a plan for the withdrawal of U.S. ground troops from Vietnam: this to be a phased withdrawal once the South Vietnamese Army is built back-up under new elected political leadership. In essence Gavin is asking for a new program of Vietnamization.
The Gavin Administration calls on the Greek Junta to restore democratic government in that country and hints that it will seek unspecified measures (most likely economic sanctions) unless the Junta follows through with a democratic program.
November 27, 1973
President Gavin signs the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act authorizing price, production, allocation and marketing controls. He also calls on Congress to join with him in developing a domestic oil and energy conservation program which will limit America’s dependence on foreign oil.
The new Greek leadership, moving to generate public support, begins releasing students and others jailed in the demonstrations and riots against Papadopoulos.
The North Vietnamese Court convicts the six POW’s currently on trail:
Lt. George W. Bush USAF (held since Jan. 1973)
Maj. Leo Thorness USAF (held since April 1967)
Cmdr. Jeremiah Denton USN (held since July 1965)
Ernest C. Brace (CIA-officially an Air America employee) (held since May 21, 1965)
Cmdr. Everett Alvarez USN (held since Aug. 5, 1964)
Capt. Floyd James Thompson USA (held since Mar. 26, 1964)
Each is sentenced to death for their alleged crimes. At no time were the defendants allowed to present a defense during the show trial as the court had ruled at the outset that their crimes were “so evident and so heinous as to be indefensible under human law.” The United States formally protests the trials, the verdicts and the lack of opportunity for the defendants to defend themselves.
The dates of execution are not set by the court or the North Vietnamese government.
November 28, 1973
The new military rulers of Greece move to consolidate their power by purging from the armed forces high-ranking officers who supported George Papadopoulos.
The Senate passes the War Powers Bill (1973) by a vote of 54 – 45.
November 29, 1973
President Gavin vetoes the War Powers Bill.
December 1, 1973
Papua New Guinea gains self-government from Australia.
President Gavin announces a blue ribbon panel (The Fowler-Kennedy Commission) composed of Former Treasury Secretaries Henry Fowler, David M. Kennedy and John Connally, along with former Governors Pat Brown (D-CA) and John H. Reed (R-ME) will investigate policy initiatives for managing the economy and leading it out of its current downturn.
December 3, 1973
NLF (Vietcong) forces destroy 18 million gallons of fuel stored near Saigon.
Maryland State Attorney-General Francis (“Bill”) Burch, a Democrat, announces that he will open a State investigation into former Governor Spiro Agnew’s corrupt activities. Asked if he can do this, since Agnew pardoned himself, AG Burch says that the Federal pardon, which addressed Federal crimes then under investigation, does not apply to the State charges which – if any are brought – will be under the Maryland penal code.
Spiro Agnew’s lawyer’s immediately try to block Burch’s investigation through court action.
Pioneer 10 sends back the first close-up images of Jupiter.
December 4, 1973
The Federal District Court for the District of Columbia rules in the case Helms v. Gavin that President Gavin “in his discharge of the duties of the office of the President, even as an acting President, and with no reasonable challenge to his position as acting President by another Constitutionally qualified candidate foreseeable through the end of the present Presidential term, this Court finds no merit in the plaintiff’s challenge and no legal of Constitutional ground why the acting President cannot exercise the authority of his office in nominating a candidate for the office of Vice President of the United States, in accordance to his Constitutional duty as prescribed by the twenty-fifth amendment of the Constitution of the United States.”
Sen. Helms immediately announces that he will appeal this ruling to the DC Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.
December 4 -7, 1973
Secretary of State George Bush and Ambassador Henry Kissinger have a summit in Cairo with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.
(from Henry Kissinger The October War and The Pursuit of Peace in the Middle East)
Our preliminary negotiations with Sadat met with an early success in part because the Egyptian leader had a broad sense of the policy goals which he was seeking to achieve. His was a depth and subtlety of vision which few other world leaders I met in my career possessed in such unlimited quantities as he did. To begin with for him to break with the past and engage with us in seeking a broader Middle East settlement was not only a sea-change in national policy, but also personally dangerous for Sadat as well.
Sadat showed no nervousness about the dangers of the course to which he had committed himself. Like a surgeon coldly considering the best course of action, he invited Bush and I to suggest a specific proposal: he averred that I knew better than he what Israel would accept. It was another exhibition of daring, psychological insight and guile. It also showed a commitment to the peace process since he was, by this statement, allowing us to lead him to a cease-fire agreement with Israel, rather than setting pre-conditions. It was dangerous for him, but ultimately productive for us.
During those three days – and later during the first Presidential summit in Morocco – we laid down the changing of a relationship between the United States and Egypt which fostered hope for an evolution of our position throughout the Middle East. By winning Sadat over (or rather him allowing us to win him over) we affected a consequential change in the whole dynamic of the US-Arab relationship, and to some extent in the Arab-Israeli dynamic as well, though this would be a process which would take many years and undergo many tests.
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December 6, 1973
The House of Representatives votes to override President Gavin’s veto of the War Powers Bill (1973) by a vote of 295 – 139 (1 absent).
The House Judiciary Committee votes 28 – 11 to begin hearings for the nomination of former Governor Scranton for the office of Vice President.
December 7, 1973
Former President Nixon’s lawyers cannot explain an 18 ½-minute gap in one of the subpoenaed Oval Office tapes. Special Prosecutor Cox considers indicting Nixon for tampering with evidence and obstruction of justice over the issue.
Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho begin preliminary negotiations in Paris aimed at arranging a cease-fire in the Vietnam conflict. Kissinger demands a North Vietnamese withdrawal from South Vietnam and the border areas in Cambodia and Laos. He also insists on the end of the trials of American POWs in Vietnam, and the suspension of the death sentences imposed on the six POWs recently convicted in the Hanoi show trials.
Le in return insists on an American withdrawal from occupied areas in Laos and North Vietnam, reparations for the destruction of Dong Hoi and an end to the U.S. “occupational government” in Saigon before North Vietnam will consider substantive talks.
Kissinger informs Le that his list of pre-conditions are excessive and will stall the talks. As did the Nixon Administration, the Gavin Administration is willing to discuss post-war development aid and technical assistance to North Vietnam, but it will not pay these as “reparations,” rather they will be part of a package to be included in an overall settlement.
Israel, Egypt and Jordan sign a formal cease-fire accord.
December 9 - 13, 1973
The Tenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party removes Chou Enlai from all his Party and Governmental positions. Chairman Mao Tse Tung is eased into retirement as a “senior leader” and “wise teacher of the Party.” The Gang of Four (Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen.) and Mao’s nephew, Mao Yuanxin (“The Lesser Mao”) exert direct control of the Chinese Communist Party and the government of the People’s Republic of China.
The Tenth Party Congress announces the program of “Purification of the Revolution” and “the Three Strengths” as the new polices of the PRC government.
At the close of the Tenth Party Congress the government of China announces that it will withdraw all of its diplomatic personnel overseas and that all Foreign Embassies and Legations in Peking are to be closed. The PRC announces that it will maintain a liaison complex office in a “Special Zone” on the mainland side of the border with the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong. Any foreigners wishing to contact the PRC government will have to go t that liaison compound in order to communicate with the PRC government.
One of the casualties of the “Purification” is the archaeological excavation of a large Song Dynasty trade ship of c. 1277 A.D. that was being dredged up from the waters near the southern coast of China. Under orders from the Politburo the wreckage is returned to the ocean and declared to be off limits.
Arab oil ministers announce a further production cut of 5 percent for January for non-friendly countries.
December 12 - 19, 1973
Pursuant to the ceasefire agreement, and in accord with the Faisal plan, Israeli forces begin their withdrawal from Southern Syria into a “secure defense area” around the Golan Heights (in what had been Syrian territory).
Jordanian forces move into secure Southern Syria, but are forced to fight with guerrilla forces from the Muslim Brotherhood and Iraqi armed forces. The Iraqis, in violation of the Faisal plan, are seeking to extend their grip on Syrian territory.
December 14, 1973
Hua Houfang, the PRC Ambassador to the United Nations, defects to American authorities in New York.
In his first public appearance since his removal from office, removed-President Spiro Agnew, speaking to a gathering of conservatives in Richmond, Virginia, denounces the Senate for removing him attacks them for what he calls an illegal act. Agnew is applauded by many of those in attendance.
The United States launches a formal protest with the government of the People’s Republic of China restating its demand that the PRC government return the five B-52 crew members currently being held by the Chinese (their bomber strayed into Chinese territory near the PRC-North Vietnam border before crashing in late 1972). The PRC government does not respond to this demand.
December 15, 1973
The American Psychiatric Association removes homosexuality from its list of mental disorders.
December 16, 1973
O.J. Simpson of the Buffalo Bills became the first running back to rush for 2,000 yards in a pro football season.
Footage of an interview of Lt. George Bush jr. conducted by the East German state broadcaster Fernsehen der DDR is shown on U.S. television. Many who watch Bush believe that his responses are affected by drugs and possible torture. In the interview Bush, in slow and slurred speech, denounces U.S. involvement in Vietnam (notably his answers are slow and seem forced) and applauds the justice of the North Vietnamese courts and claims that he and the other defendants deserve the death sentences they have been handed, and he even says – in a very halting manner – that he looks forward to his “just execution.”
December 18, 1973
Islamic Development Bank created as a specialized agency of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) (effective 12 August 1974).
The Bush family denounces the broadcast of the FdD interview of George Bush jr. and claim that he was tortured and drugged by the North Vietnamese and the East Germans.
December 19, 1973
President Gavin orders NASA to proceed with the Space Shuttle program. Spending on the project will help to stimulate the economy.
Alabama State Police shoot dead three members of the Black Liberation Army who attempted to shoot their way into the Alabama Governor’s Mansion with the intent of assassinating (or kidnapping) Governor George Wallace. One Alabama state trooper is killed and three are wounded. Governor Wallace is unhurt but uses the incident to denounce lawlessness in the country.
The Faisal Plan suffers a set back when Jordanian and Iraqi forces clash over their zone of control in Southern Syria. Moreover, the Syrian government in Aleppo reneges on an earlier commitment to relocate to Damascus under the agreement. Aleppo government propaganda now refers to the Jordanians as “occupiers” of Syrian territory.
December 20, 1973
Spanish prime minister Luis Carrero Blanco is assassinated in Madrid by the terrorist organization ETA.
In response to the APA’s de-listing of homosexuality as a mental illness, Sen. Jesse Helms (R-NC) , Sen. Paul Fannin (R-AZ), Rep. John Ashbrook (R-OH) and Rep. William F. Nichols (D-AL) announce that they will introduce legislation to declare sodomy a federal crime to be punishable with life imprisonment at hard labor.
December 21, 1973
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upholds the lower court ruling in the case of Helms v. Gavin.
Sen. Helms announces his intention to take the question to the United States Supreme Court.
December 23, 1973
After consultations with the Gavin Administration, NASA announces that it will continue the Skylab project with a Skylab 5 and Skylab 6 mission. This spending will, in part, keep Skylab contractors from having to lay-off workers.
The OPEC Gulf Six ((Iran, Iraq, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar) decide to raise the posted price of marker crude from $5.12 to $11.65 per barrel effective January 1, 1974.
Former White House Chief of Staff Donald Rumsfeld announces that he will run for the Republican nomination for the United States Senate in Illinois. He recruits Karl Rove to work on his campaign.
December 25, 1973
Arab Oil Ministers meet and decide to re-affirm the production cuts first announced in November, although they chose to cut production by 10% rather than the 25% previously announced. The EEC countries (except Britain) and Canada are exempted from the oil embargo due to their “reasonable approach” to the Israel’s role in the Yom Kippur War. The embargo against the United States is continued for its support of Israel, and Britain and Japan are included in the embargo for their support of the United States.
The forecast world price of crude oil rises to $ 12.50 per barrel effective January 1, 1974.
Pro-Muslim Brotherhood groups demonstrate against the Lebanese government in Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon and Tyre . The demonstrations are timed to agitate the Christians in Lebanon on the holiest day of their calendar.
From his capital at Hama in Syria, Ali Sadreddine Bayanouni calls on all Muslims to rise against their secular governments and join the Islamic Caliphate in forming one pan-Islamic power to “drive the infidels from the Holy Lands of Islam forever.”
December 28, 1973
The U.S. Congress passes the Endangered Species Act.
December 30, 1973
The terrorist Carlos (Ilich Ramirez Sanchez) fails in his attempt to assassinate British businessman Joseph Sieff.
Lebanese President Suleiman Frangieh, a Christian, complains that the uncontrolled Muslim Brotherhood uprising in Syria is “a mortal danger to the domestic peace of Lebanon.”
Iraqi forces move in force against the Muslim Brotherhood stronghold in central Syria.
Turkish military forces are put on alert in reaction to the Iraqi move.
December 31, 1973
The British government announces that – due a series of agreements between the British government and the Trades Union Council regarding long-term industrial investment – coal shortages are not as bad as had been previously feared. There will be no coal shortage in the UK over the winter of 1973-1974, which eases some concerns about inflation and results in an increase in the value of the British pound sterling.
December 31, 1973 – January 1, 1974
The end of 1973 is celebrated by millions of people around the world.
January 2, 1974
The Gavin Administration announces that it will submit legislation to Congress that will allow individual taxpayers to be refunded (at no tax penalty) their payroll deductions for the tax year 1973, and the last six months of 1972. This is to be administered on percentage scale based on income, and is seen as spending stimulus program to combat the current recession. President Gavin announces that he will submit a bill to incorporate the late Gov. John McKeithen’s proposal for an Earned Income Tax credit into the Tax Code.
Iraqi forces are defeated by Muslim Brotherhood forces after a series of desert battles around Tadmur and along the Jabal al Ruwaq mountains in central Syria. The Iraqi defeat is blamed on the Muslim Brotherhood’s superior use of desert terrain and foothills to their advantage, plus their skillful use of captured Syrian military equipment, including Soviet made warplanes and attack helicopters, several of which are used in suicide attacks against Iraq armored units. The Iraqis also seem to have underestimated the capability of the Muslim Brotherhood forces and showed signs of incompetence in their command (several high level executions in the Iraqi military occur after the failed attempt to dislodge the Muslim Brotherhood). The Iraqi military had also not recovered from the pounding it received from Israel in the October War.
More disturbing to many, and especially to the leadership in Baghdad (and Amman and Riyadh) is the news that some Iraqi units defected to the Muslim Brotherhood during the battles, while others were crippled by mutinies among the troops.
January 3 - 6, 1974
PLO military units move against several groups in Palestinian Refugee camps in Lebanon, resulting in a three day long shoot-out between the PLO and Palestinian dissidents. Only after the incident does the world learn that these clashes are the result of Muslim Brotherhood emissaries radicalizing young Palestinians and helping them to form their own religious militias. The PLO forces moved into the camps to disband the nascent militias before they could present a danger to the secular Palestinian movement, but the action leads to deep divisions among the Palestinians themselves.
January 4, 1974
Japan is suffering economically and cutting back its exports 15 to 25 percent. With the rise in price of oil, Japan is shifting auto production to more fuel efficient models, and Japan is shifting from oil-intensive industries to more investment in electronics.
The Japanese government begins negotiations with the governments of Mexico, Venezuela and Iran with the intent of establishing bi-lateral trade deals which will allow Japan to buy oil from these nations at lower than OPEC world prices in exchange for Japanese aid and technical development for the export nations economies.
January 8, 1974
The United States Supreme Court declines to review the lower court rulings in Helms v. Gavin, removing the last legal roadblock to the nomination of William Scranton for the office of Vice President.
From Egypt Umar al-Tilmisani, the General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, (the country where the movement was founded) issues a statement denouncing Bayanouni’s violent activity in Syria. While al-Tilmisani states that he sympathizes with Bayanouni’s political aspirations, his statement re-affirms that the Muslim Brotherhood has been opposed to violence except in situations of self-defense. Al-Tilmisani calls on Bayanouni and his followers to aid in restoring order in Syria and to end the violent confrontations which “serve no purpose other than to spill innocent blood and cast poor views upon the Brotherhood and its goals of Islamic justice and a society governed by the values of the Holy Quran.”
January 9, 1974
The Senate votes 54 – 45 to override President Gavin’s veto of the War Powers Bill (1973). This is vote is insufficient to override the Presidential veto.
The Senate Judiciary Committee begins hearings on the nomination of former Gov. William Scranton for the office of Vice President of the United States.
Unemployment for the last quarter of 1973 is calculated at 17%. The period known as the Depression of the 1970’s is said to have begun (this is a disputed analysts term; no official government body uses the word Depression). Among the drivers causing the further decline in economic activity are inflation, the high price of oil and a continuing softness in consumer demand for retail goods and producer demand for components and raw materials.
Ali Sadreddine Bayanouni issues a statement from his headquarters in Hama confirming that Umar al-Tilmisani is a wise and learned leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and that while his Caliphate “welcomes the counsel of our learned Egyptian brother, Umar al-Tilmisani, we do not agree with his views.” The statement then goes on to imply that al-Tilmisani’s views are outdated and that the Syrian branch has grasped the ‘time of transformation for an Islamic Revolution.” Bayanouni says that while he respects the Brotherhoods tradition of non-violent thought he argues that the violence has been “imposed upon the Ummah by the Zionists and their Imperialist, infidel backers, and that ours is the war of self-defense and survival against the blood-thirsty enemies of Islam.”
Rep. Ron Dellums (D-CA) and Rep. Shirley Chisholm (D-NY) introduce legislation (The End the Vietnam War Resolution of 1974) that would require President Gavin to end all U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia within 90 days of the proposed Act being signed into law.
Dellums and Chisholm address a large crowd of supporters after introducing the bill on the floor of the House. This group then stages an anti-war protest outside the White House.
Much to the consternation of the Secret Service, President Gavin appears outside of the White House to speak with the protesters. In the 16F weather, the President tries to engage the protesters. The session ends when some protesters begin throwing eggs at President Gavin (which in the low temperature have partially frozen, becoming hard projectiles) and the Secret Service literally pulls him back into the White House grounds.
(From James M. Gavin A Call to Duty: A Memoir)
By stepping outside the White House to confront the protestors I hoped to show that – unlike my three predecessors – that I was willing to be accessible to the people and to actively engage in debate on the question of our involvement in Vietnam. Unfortunately I found that superheated emotion, encouraged by certain disruptive elements, had superseded reason on the question. That was as much the fault of my predecessors’ approach to governing on the question as it was that of those on the sidewalk who let their emotions overwhelm their reason.
A woman on the sidewalk asked me: “How can you let the killing go on? Hasn’t there been enough?”
P: Indeed there has, and I would like it stop. If I could wave a magic wand and return us to this time last year, I would gladly do so and prevent this nightmare from coming about. But that’s not the reality. We need to deal with the situation as it is, and my policy is to bring about a decent end for ourselves and the Vietnamese people.
Woman: Just bring the troops home and let the Vietnamese people solve it.
P: If that alone would do it, I would gladly do so. But it isn’t that simple. Our government helped to create the current difficulty in South Vietnam, so we have a moral responsibility to make it right, and that means staying long enough so that they can elect a new government, and helping to build-up our military…
At this point some of the protesters behind us began shouting, and both the young woman and I were showered with eggs which, in the cold air, had begun to freeze. I’ll tell you, they stung. The Secret Service pulled me back inside, which lead to some unfortunate and unflattering photos of me being pelted by eggs, while agents pulled me back inside. Some irresponsible news publications used these photos as a symbolic of the lack of control in our administration, as if to say that we had no firm grip over the issues, but were being pulled willy-nilly by events. Nothing could have been further from the truth in most areas.
In Vietnam we were driven by events, based on policy decisions which had been made by those who came before us, and whose choices still influenced events over which we were playing catch-up. When I took office I had to make the best of Operation Bold Eagle, and try to restore democratic government to South Vietnam in light of the coup, which had occurred under my predecessor’s watch and which, in part, had been an outcome of the reckless assumptions made around the Bold Eagle planning. My own numerous public statements of the period reflect my views, and there was nothing disingenuous or any hidden meaning implanted into many of them, so I will not waste a lot of space here going over what is already well known. From the beginning I was determined to bring an honorable, viable and sustainable end to the Vietnam conflict. The fact that my administration had to become more deeply involved in that war before we could achieve that goal was a fact of the situation which no one of us, and not even the President, could do quickly or easily.
Jack Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon had all grappled with this problem, and it had outlasted each of their Presidencies, so my dilemma was not unique. Perhaps the only unique characteristic about it was that I could look back to the recent past and see a point when the War had almost been resolved, only to have that fall away from us. I won’t call that fact a guiding principle of my policy, but it informed me about the frailties of policy and the gave substance to the idea that whatever we developed, it had to be sufficiently in place that no one could come along and undo it.
Otherwise, our work was temporary and not a true solution.
In the other endeavors of my administration though, we had definite policy designed to promote U.S. interests and reinforce our leadership position in the world.
From the beginning I was encouraged by what Henry Kissinger and George Bush had to say about President Sadat of Egypt. Both felt strongly he was an Arab leader with whom we could do business, and I felt strongly that, after their meetings with him in Cairo, that I should meet him face-to-face as soon as possible, which lead to my Morocco summit with Sadat, along with the Kings of Jordan and Saudi Arabia, both impressive statesmen in their own rights. My principle focus was to develop a U.S. strategy of outreach to Arab regimes who wished to improve our relations with us, both to off-set the image in the Middle East that the United States was blindly pro-Israel, and to shore-up those regimes against the kind of extremist nonsense which had Syria in its grip.
The oil embargo showed how much we needed the Arabs on our side from an economic perspective, but equally from a question of strategy and in terms of developing any framework for a wider Middle Eastern peace, we had to have better relations with those nations like Egypt, who, up until recently, had been in the Soviet orbit. Moderate leaders like King Hussein of Jordan, King Hassan of Morocco and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia were willing to help us, and I felt we should exploit the opportunity being presented. Most importantly, if we could build an understanding with these nations, we would be able to keep the Soviets on the margins of the Middle East, and without their interference through various client states, there was the opportunity to calm down the tension in the region.
To that end I was even willing to reach out to the Iraqi regime, though their reckless behavior in Syria quickly showed that the regime in Baghdad was not ready to enter into any sort of peaceful dialogue with us or anyone else.
On the Soviet front, after my meetings with Foreign Minister Gromyko in November 1973 – which helped pave the way to a Middle East cease-fire, I instructed Bush and Kissinger to push them for a higher level meeting, preferably between myself and Brezhnev. As soon as possible I wanted to get us back on the détente road which had worked so well for the Nixon Administration and which I believed, as Richard Nixon had, held the best hope for peaceful coexistence between the superpowers, and consequently would produce more stability in the world.
That was the reason I authorized the release of the Soviet pilot Fillitov, who had been captured in Vietnam the previous September, as a goodwill gesture. I hoped it would send the Kremlin the message that we were ready to do business on a wide variety of issues, including Vietnam and a treaty framework for strategic weapons. Sadly, our initial attempts went unheeded, although it soon became apparent that this was the result of a power struggle among the Soviet leadership itself. Like ourselves, the Soviet Union was not immune to the deliberative effects of power politics, though in their case it was all so much more obscured by a veil of secrecy.
The actions of the new Communist Chinese leadership made it impossible for me to return to the Nixon-Kissinger triangulation policy, though Dr. Kissinger made a stab at it before the their Tenth Communist Party Congress in December shut everything down, which was too bad. Clearly a golden opportunity had been squandered by fumbling and ignorance on the part of both sides, though I hold the so called “Lesser Mao” to blame for putting personal ambition over common sense. But, until the leadership in Peking changed their isolationist tune, there was little we could do about it.
I did order continuing protests to try and recover the five Air Force crewmen the Chinese were holding in their prisons, together with other American citizens we knew that regime had languishing in their prisons. I even tried to send a personal letter to Chairman Mao seeking leniency for our people, and promising that we would not – as a government – use their release for anti-Chinese propaganda. My letter was never answered; I cannot even be sure it reached the illustrious Chairman.
On the domestic front I vetoed the War Powers resolution because I believed it to be a violation of the separation of powers. Article I of the Constitution may have given Congress the right to declare war – and with it the right to debate the involvement of our armed forces in conflicts. I will be the first to agree with the position that Congress has a right to debate these issues (not all my successors have recognized even this), but equally Article II reserves to the President the right to command the troops and to make policy on behalf of the United States in foreign affairs, including in our defense. My objection (and that of many Constitutional scholars whose advice I sought on the question) was that by imposing a limitation on how long a President could commit troops before reporting to Congress, and providing other qualifiers on the use of our armed forces, the current Congress was muddying the line between Article I and Article II, and in so doing they were trying to re-write the Constitution.
In my veto statement I suggested that the War Powers resolution was unwise in the tense international situation we faced, and that in a national emergency it would be impractical. It is unfortunate that some chose to see this as my being overly pro-military, or prone to using military force as first resort rather than a last resort, for it was the exact opposite of my personal views. That was politics, though despite my best efforts not to, I bristled at those who wanted to compare my attitude on the matter with Chilean strongman General Pinochet: that was nothing more than hyperbole and histrionics thrown about for political ends.
Bill Scranton was the best candidate for the Vice Presidency. Carl Sanders was an excellent choice too, and in letting Governor Sanders know of my choice I apologized to him for not nominating him, for he was equally as qualified. Governor Sanders took it in good stride, and I kept this in mind. Bill Scranton had both an excellent mind and a superb record as a governor and political leader. He was not in the least concerned about running for President, which signaled to me that he would devout his energies to the office of Vice President as long as he held it. I chose Bill in part because he was a moderate Republican: many in that party still thought my association with the Kennedy administration marked me as a closet Democrat. I knew that in picking Bill I would not please the hard-line conservatives like Goldwater and Reagan, but I would pick-up support in the Rockefeller wing, and Bill was acceptable to most centrist Democrats as well. This seemed to assure an easy confirmation under the still untested twenty-fifth amendment.
I had nothing but contempt for Senator Jesse Helms’ attempt to block the nomination. The courts didn’t accept his reasoning, which was just as good. I know Helms had voted to acquit my predecessor, which was his right, but I felt that trying to play politics with the Vice Presidential nomination, particularly in so critical a period as late 1973 and early 1974, and to further compound it by dragging it through the courts, was brazenly irresponsible. It may have served to shore-up Senator Helms’ base, but it was done at the expense of doing further damage to our Constitutional government at a time when it had already received numerous body blows. I will never understand such a low level of petty self-interest, which to me seems to border on being unpatriotic. I do not question Senator Helms’ patriotism, more I think his political maturity. Fortunately, he ended-up wearing the goat over the whole thing; even Goldwater distanced himself from that. Reagan, on the other hand, was conspicuously silent throughout, as he had been during much of the controversies of the past year. Reflecting on that, I saw political calculation in that silence.
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January 11, 1974
Secretary of Defense Alexander Haig resigns.
President Gavin nominates Sen. Stuart Symington (D-MO) to replace Haig as Secretary of Defense.
Henry Kissinger’s second round of secret negotiations with Le Duc Tho in Paris prove inconclusive, as the North Vietnamese demand that the US pay them reparations up-front and that the NLF (Viet Cong) be immediately recognized as the government of South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese are willing to release all American POWs but refuse to include the show trial six in that number (according to North Vietnam they are convicted criminals and no longer subject to “US jurisdiction” and cannot be considered prisoners-of-war any longer).
(from Henry Kissinger Years of Crisis: Why America failed in Asia)
The Paris peace accords with all their ambiguities reflected the balance of forces in Vietnam in the wake of the climactic battles of 1972. As with any peace settlement, it depended on the maintenance of that balances of forces. We had no illusions about Hanoi’s long-range goal of subjugating all of Indochina. I repeatedly warned Nixon to that effect.
Unhappily, I could see that the damage done by President Agnew in the intervening year had done little to change this assessment, if anything it had hardened North Vietnamese intransigence on any negotiations, and re-affirmed their resolve to be a dominant power in their corner of the planet. On our honesty, who could blame them for their lack of trust? Agnew had made us appear like the biggest liars on the planet (though I would not have put it so bluntly at the time; Le Duc Tho did, though he diplomatically couched it in a reference to the past President and did not apply it to the current one).
North Vietnam had been militarily weakened by our continued activities there in 1973, especially by the bombing. Their repeated failure to dislodge us from Tchepone in Laos and Dong Hoi in North Vietnam proved this, together with the quality of the troops they had thrown at us in the last attacks. Many had been children, reminding me of the Hitler Youth troops the Third Reich had employed in its last desperate efforts to turn back Soviet advances on Berlin in 1945. North Vietnam was not in quite so desperate a position as Nazi Germany, but then neither were we in the strong position of the Allies in 1945, or even the relative strength we had enjoyed throughout 1972. Operation Bold Eagle had squandered that.
In South Vietnam the triumvirate of General Duong Văn Minh, General Phan Van Phu and Marshall Nguyen Cao Ky had undone much of what President Thieu had accomplished, so much so that President Gavin had done something which none of his predecessors had even considered – taken direct U.S. control of South Vietnam’s political affairs. This had been necessary because after President Nixon had built-up President Thieu’s regime through the policy of Vietnamization of the War, Agnew had completely undercut Thieu through Operation Bold Eagle, making it appear that we had lost faith in our ally. Minh, Phu and Ky had been emboldened to act because of Thieu’s loss of political and military face.
This point was not lost on our adversary, who equally saw our 1973 actions in Vietnam as a lack of trust in our nominal ally, and as an acknowledgment of our outright duplicity in the policy of Vietnamization and our approach to them throughout the Nixon administration peace talks. Le Duc Tho now approached us warily, with the sense of a burned customer being asked to return to the shop that cheated him.
What Le Duc Tho’s real views of me were must await Hanoi’s adoption of a Freedom of Information Act. He thought it expedient to maintain the façade of cordiality throughout our discussions. As a professional Leninist he despised the bourgeois values of compromise I put forward. On one level he undoubtedly hated me as the representative of an “imperialist” power seeking to deprive North Vietnam of what it considered its birthright – hegemony over all of Indochina. Yet in the past, and in our current encounters, I faced a man who – while a hard negotiator – thought on many levels and had a subtlety of mind which allowed for honest, candid exchanges to take place.
It was along this vein that at our second meeting in Paris in January 1974 that he informed me that little was going to happen until we sorted-out the mess in Saigon. Of course, for his part, he insisted we give the NLF (Vietcong) leadership a role in any new government, but this was as much posturing by him as a real demand. He knew we would do no such thing, and it really wasn’t that important to him. However, he made his point. The situation in South Vietnam was such a mess, that nothing could proceed until we sorted it out. Hanoi would never agree to an American occupational government, and they were unwilling to move forward while was one was being enforced. In this sense, Agnew and the three South Vietnamese coup leaders had tied our hands behind our backs, well past the departure of all four from the scene.
I tried to make progress on the question of our men – the six prisoners of war who had been sentenced to death in a show trial in Hanoi. One of them was the son of our Secretary of State, which I pointed out to Le, suggesting that his inclusion had been completely arbitrary and was a consequence of who his father was (both men were named George Bush) and had less to do with any “war crimes” he may have committed himself.
Le was unmoved on the question. He stuck by his position that the tentative 1972 agreement – which we had broken in 1973 – had covered prisoners of war, and that our default through 1973 had left the question open to interpretation. Now he used an argument worthy of a Southern Governor: Le maintained that the North Vietnamese judicial system had acted in accord with North Vietnamese law on the question of the trials, and that as a result the North Vietnamese government was legally unable to change the outcome. He even used the phrase “separation of powers”, which had a bizarre quality coming from the mouth of a Communist. The North Vietnamese government could not act to arbitrarily free these men, he said, because they had been convicted in a lawful court and that their lawful sentences had to be carried out. He did suggest that their Head of State could exercise leniency in reviewing the sentences, and possibly commute the death sentences, but in order to do that the convicted would have to “express regret for their criminal acts and admit their full guilt.” I found such a position impossible to agree with.
I think too that the withdrawal of China from world affairs had caught the North Vietnamese by surprise. Although the Soviet Union had been their largest patron, assistance from the People’s Republic of China had played an important supporting role in the North Vietnamese war effort. Without it, Hanoi was now wholly dependent on Soviet assistance, and the narrow gateway of the port of Haiphong to receive it. What was more, with Communist China reverting to ancient Chinese policy of insularity, there was a direct possibility that the national interests of China and Vietnam would clash along their mutual border and in Laos, as had happened in the pre-Communist history of both nations.
This could play into our hands in the longer term, but it wasn’t going to solve our immediate problems. For now, before we could get anywhere with North Vietnam, we were going to have to solve our problems in the South.
I was saddened when I heard of Chou Enlai’s removal from the Communist Chinese leadership. More than Le, Chou and been an engaging counter-part and throughout our conversations I had felt myself to be talking with a statesman of the first order. Chou’s personal fall – and subsequent fatal illness (which may not have been a natural occurrence, if one believes the dark rumors that come from behind the wall Peking has built around itself) were a personal tragedy that saddened me.
On a professional level, our slow, meticulous work had produced a solid result which culminated in President Nixon’s 1972 trip to China. We had laid the groundwork for a steadfast relationship – not as allies or friends in the real sense – but as strategic partners in a global policy to check Soviet expansionism and bring order to the chaotic flux of the international system.
First Agnew – who lacked any sort understanding for this kind of subtlety – had undercut our work, and then the new Communist leadership put to death the last vestiges which had held on through 1973.
In regard to China we had suddenly slipped from a developing relationship to the abysmal depths we had been at twenty years earlier at the end of the Korean War. This was a true tragedy wrought by those unwilling to think strategically and with nuance about world affairs, and highlighted – at least for me – the need for on-going education in world affairs for all political figures.
Of all the leaders I dealt with over this period, perhaps only President Sadat of Egypt equaled Chou in his understanding of the larger issues and forces involved.
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January 12, 1974
The oil ministers of Iran, Venezuela, Mexico and Nigeria meet in Acapulco, Mexico to discuss the establishment of a non-Arab oil export cartel.
January 14 – 17, 1974
President Gavin holds direct talks with President Sadat of Egypt in Rabat, Morocco. The two Presidents agree to restore diplomatic relations between their two nations, and also discuss a wide-ranging series of issues covering the Middle East. President Gavin also meets with King Hussein of Jordan and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia while in Rabat.
Not recorded for the press is a secret meeting arranged by King Hassan of Morocco between President Gavin, Secretary Bush, and Ambassador Kissinger with Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) [officially listed as “King Hassan’s guest”], as a diplomatic representative of PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. The four discuss initiatives for bringing the Palestinians into the wider Middle East Peace Process.
January 17, 1974
Several oil production facilities in Iraq are damaged by home-made bombs and other sabotage.
The ARAMCO tanker terminal at Ras Tanura, Saudi Arabia (one of the Kingdom’s major oil export terminals) suffers severe damage after a bomb triggers a series of explosions in oil storage and processing facilities. Pro-Caliphate terrorists take credit for this action, saying that they are striking at the “infidels desecrating the Holy Land of Islam.”
It is unclear if the two acts of sabotage are linked, or if the timing was a coincidence. The world price of crude oil doubles to $ 24.75 per barrel on the news, and soon rises to $ 28.50 per barrel.
January 18, 1974
Lebanese Prime Minister Takieddin el-Solh, a Sunni Muslim, is assassinated by attackers ready to commit suicide to achieve their goal. The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria takes credit for the attack, declaring that it will strike against “all apostates and infidels who disgrace the Holy Lands of Islam with their corrupt and un-Godlike adherence to un-Islamic values and ideas.”
An armed clash between Syrian and Turkish border patrol troops near Zawaghar along the border lead to a threat from Turkey to intervene in Syria.
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This timeline is nowhere near finished and I think has a lot of potential to continue; however I will be unable to make regular contributions to it for the next three months (at least to the middle to end of July) as I will be busy. I may add some things from time-to-time; but at the same time I want to maintain the quality of what I have been doing, so that will happen as time presents itself. In future I hope to continue the time line into the seventies and further, provided they don't blow-up the world in my absence.
Excellent TL Drew, interesting to see how direct US rule in SVN works out. All the OTL South Vietnamese leaders are dead or discredited, and Marshal Chavez (Ky) has become a North Vietnamese ally.
John Farson
Banned
Take your time, Drew. I can see that you've done a lot of research for this TL. It has a lot of angles, and it feels like the retelling of actual history. One of the many things that fascinates me here is that Islamic radicalism has basically come to the scene five years earlier than OTL as a result of a longer and bloodier than OTL Yom Kippur War that has lead to the collapse of one of the three main adversaries of Israel. This at a time when Palestinian nationalist groups are still very active on the world stage in the form of airplane hijackings and the like. Basically, the PLO and its splinter groups have just got a new and dangerous enemy.
Before you go on hiatus, I'd like to know a few things. First, Syria has a substantial Christian minority. How does the Muslim Brotherhood treat Christians (and other non-Muslims, like the Druze) in the area under its control? Are they treated leniently as fellow "Peoples of the Book", or do they use the "Convert or die/fuck off" approach?
Second, how do you think the Ayatollah Khomeini is reacting to this? During this time he's in exile in Iraq, and he's got a bone to pick with the Shah. Although he too strives for an Islamic theocracy, he's aiming for a Shia theocracy while Bayanouni is striving for a Sunni one. I think Khomeini would regard Bayanouni and his people with their ideas of a Caliphate as "satanic heretics" who are "worse than the infidels", IMHO. Likewise I can imagine what Bayanouni thinks about the Shiite beliefs of the Mahdi and the Hidden Imam ("The Muslim Brotherhood has no time for such vile heresy!!!")
Of course, ignorant people might very well be peeing their pants in paranoia of the two working in cahoots, that is if Khomeini ever reaches a position of power in TTL.
Before you go on hiatus, I'd like to know a few things. First, Syria has a substantial Christian minority. How does the Muslim Brotherhood treat Christians (and other non-Muslims, like the Druze) in the area under its control? Are they treated leniently as fellow "Peoples of the Book", or do they use the "Convert or die/fuck off" approach?
Second, how do you think the Ayatollah Khomeini is reacting to this? During this time he's in exile in Iraq, and he's got a bone to pick with the Shah. Although he too strives for an Islamic theocracy, he's aiming for a Shia theocracy while Bayanouni is striving for a Sunni one. I think Khomeini would regard Bayanouni and his people with their ideas of a Caliphate as "satanic heretics" who are "worse than the infidels", IMHO. Likewise I can imagine what Bayanouni thinks about the Shiite beliefs of the Mahdi and the Hidden Imam ("The Muslim Brotherhood has no time for such vile heresy!!!")
Of course, ignorant people might very well be peeing their pants in paranoia of the two working in cahoots, that is if Khomeini ever reaches a position of power in TTL.
pnyckqx
Banned
Just out of curiosity Drew, how many pages did that update take in what ever text editor/word processor you use?
I've just started writing the second installment of my timeline and so far the whole thing is just 19 pages in Open Office.
Yes, the spacing is different, and my styling is a bit different --More like World of Laughter, World of Tears--but i can't seem to get the volume of writing that other members of this board seem to get.
I mean, so far, your time line, which I've copied into Open Office for my own reading, takes up 289 pages. That's at 12 point text size.
You guys are all truly impressive with the volume of work you're able to create.
pnyckqx: Drew's prodigious writing is indeed impressive, but it depends how you want to structure your TL. If you detail things on a daily basis, then the TL will be incredibly detailed and realistic, but take forever to write. But going too fast, which I did myself until fairly recently, does a disservice to your readers. If you want to commit to a TL for a year or more, then details can abound and the pace can be slow but interesting.
pnyckqx
Banned
Thanks for the 411 on that RB. My time line is extensive in places, but moves along rather rapidly in others. It is the conversations between principal players that become rather extensive.
Have to agree that the research is a bit daunting. The most difficult parts are to avoid slipping into ASB territory, and trying not to put my politics and thinking into somebody else's words. Drew has done an excellent job on that last point. I hope i've stolen some of that technique.
pnyckqx:
I look forward to reading your TL. Have fun with it. Don't worry about the volume, it will come, just keep looking around in the nooks and crannies (discerningly) the internet. Have fun and be creative. That's how I've been able to keep plugging away at my "Course of Human Events" TL for the past 2 years. The on file document, which containes the "finished and posted" version is now over 180 pages long, and I've taken the TL from 1763/4 up to the late 1850's.
pnyckqx
Banned
That is very impressive. I don't plan on going that far. Maybe with a subsequent effort. My TL will run from 1974 to maybe 1995. Haven't quite decided where to end. Can you shoot me a link for "Course of Human Events"? I'd enjoy reading it.
Roughly 25 + years of personal interest and reading. For AH to work it should read like actual history and be internally consistent. That includes randomness, frustration and above all human idiocy, which are the unintended ingredients of real history.
It has been there all along in various forms; in the modern era it just required a catalyst to set it off. OTL it was the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the Islamic revolution in Iran. TTL it was the disintegration of Syria and an early rising by the Brotherhood (which did OTL try to rise against the Asad regime in 1982)
Lots of refugees pouring into Lebanon. In the early stages much will depend on whether the Christians and Druze make trouble for the Brotherhood, or accept their rule from Hama. For now Bayanouni has enough troubles to deal with from the outside. Over time, if his regime survives, it will depend upon how radicalized it becomes.
I actually would think that Khomeini would be quite pissed that a Sunni has achieved this. I don't think the question of co-operation would really enter into his head at this point because of theocratic divide between them. Khomeini would still be looking toward an Islamic revolution in Shia Iran; secretly he may even hope that Bayanouni Caliphate goes down to defeat. In that sense the two may become rivals.
The Iraqis are letting Khomeini live in exile in their country during this period because he is a thorn in the Shah's side.
Although power makes for strange bedfellows. Revolutionary Iran denounces Israel, but buys weapons from them. Their theocracy hates everything secular, yet they have a close alliance (of convenience) with Ba'athist Syria and are getting closer to Russia. So who knows what might evolve out of this.
pnyckqx
Banned
Possible that the US might 'do a deal' with Khomeini in France (in OTL) to play against the Brotherhood?
Our history shows lots of deals of convenience with various despots --some worse than others--.
Say for example, we facilitate Khomeini cutting a deal with Iraqi Shiites --while supporting them in an uprising against Iraqi Baathists--, and Syrian Baathists to clear the Brotherhood from Syrian territory?
Yeah, we already know that Khomeini has his primary sights on Iran, but one thing at a time. If nothing, the man was very pragmatic for an extremist. Almost a contradiction.
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