Fall Gelb fails: What does the French army/war effort look like in 1941/2?

[neopeius]

Er... like this?

 

[raharris1973]

I may possibly have done this ⬇️

"this" meaning that:
a) as author of Blunted Sickle, you've written on the overall topic of the thread, a Fall Gelb fail or b) you may have done something in a specific post above yours, like written into it what I mentioned in post #14 about a "smashing Allied victory in spring 1941" and the Wehrmacht being simultaneously 'sharp as a razor blade', but only 'durable as cotton candy'.

 

[Post]

"this" meaning that:
a) as author of Blunted Sickle, you've written on the overall topic of the thread, a Fall Gelb fail or b) you may have done something in a specific post above yours, like written into it what I mentioned in post #14 about a "smashing Allied victory in spring 1941" and the Wehrmacht being simultaneously 'sharp as a razor blade', but only 'durable as cotton candy'.

a)

 

[pdf27]

"this" meaning that:
a) as author of Blunted Sickle, you've written on the overall topic of the thread, a Fall Gelb fail or b) you may have done something in a specific post above yours, like written into it what I mentioned in post #14 about a "smashing Allied victory in spring 1941" and the Wehrmacht being simultaneously 'sharp as a razor blade', but only 'durable as cotton candy'.

Both? It’s a bit of a monster, but the peanut gallery seem to like it.

 

[raharris1973]

Both? It’s a bit of a monster, but the peanut gallery seem to like it.

Thank you @pdf27 for responding! I love it when it is the person who I actually addressed the question provides the answer! I think it was a fairly current post in the sequel thread where it is spring or summer 1941, and Hitler is still alive, but a lot of German forces are cut off in central Belgium, so that seems like major Allied successes, pretty disastrous for the Germans, and a warand Nazi regime that probably cannot extend into 1943 or possibly even 1942.

 

[Bougnas]

Thank you for acknowledging that the war may go on as late as 1944, and is not guaranteed to win with a smashing Allied victory in spring 1941, or an anti-Hitler coup in winter 1940-1941.

Such are the usual results posited in 'Sedan fails' PoDs, which seem to operate on the assumption that while the Wehrmacht was simultaneously 'sharp as a razor blade', it was only 'durable as cotton candy'.

I do also think the 1941 offensives wouldn't be sufficient to win against Germany as long as the Germans are only blunted and not cut off after a failed Fall Gelb. I don't think it would go as far as 1944, but whether the war ends in 42 or 43 is hard to say. There are things going for an Entente win, and things going against it compared to the OTL war:

Pro:
- Germany never accumulates a shitton of captured materiel like it did with France, the BEF and the USSR initially, they only have Czech and Polish stocks mainly, which are quite a bit smaller, which restricts the size the Wehrmacht can actually grow into for lack of equipment.
- Germany similarly never acquires as many additional ressources, workers and factories in occupied Europe to bolster the weapon's industry beyond what the pre-1940 Reich could achieve
- The Entente holds actual material superiority in the field earlier than the USSR/Wallies
- The Entente has a far smaller distance than the Wallies and the USSR to cover before entering Germany and taking its main production regions
- Germany doesn't get the kind of relative operational rest it had right after the fall of France, and right after Barbarossa when the Soviet military was heavily disorganised
- The combination of a more comparable airforce than the Soviets, and better geographical conditions than the Wallies allow an earlier depletion of the Luftwaffe
- For the same reasons, and due to French bomber production (though limited), the Entente's strategic bombing can have some effects earlier than OTL, though it will never hurt as hard as 1943+ bombing
- Entente logistics (eg no ocean to cross, more dense rail and road network than in the USSR, and not busted like in 1944 France) are far more favourable than those available to the Soviets and Wallies, so powerful offensives can be set up earlier and quicker

Cons:
- The Entente holds material superiority earlier, but it doesn't really grow to the same lopsided ratios as OTL
- German manpower, industry and ressources are not as depleted as in 1943-45
- The Entente may still be somewhat less effective than 1943-45 USSR and Wallies, which means they aren't finishing the war in just one year

 

[pdf27]

Thank you @pdf27 for responding! I love it when it is the person who I actually addressed the question provides the answer! I think it was a fairly current post in the sequel thread where it is spring or summer 1941, and Hitler is still alive, but a lot of German forces are cut off in central Belgium, so that seems like major Allied successes, pretty disastrous for the Germans, and a warand Nazi regime that probably cannot extend into 1943 or possibly even 1942.

So far I’ve made it to January 1942.

 

[seraphim74]

I do also think the 1941 offensives wouldn't be sufficient to win against Germany as long as the Germans are only blunted and not cut off after a failed Fall Gelb. I don't think it would go as far as 1944, but whether the war ends in 42 or 43 is hard to say. There are things going for an Entente win, and things going against it compared to the OTL war:

Pro:
- Germany never accumulates a shitton of captured materiel like it did with France, the BEF and the USSR initially, they only have Czech and Polish stocks mainly, which are quite a bit smaller, which restricts the size the Wehrmacht can actually grow into for lack of equipment.
- Germany similarly never acquires as many additional ressources, workers and factories in occupied Europe to bolster the weapon's industry beyond what the pre-1940 Reich could achieve
- The Entente holds actual material superiority in the field earlier than the USSR/Wallies
- The Entente has a far smaller distance than the Wallies and the USSR to cover before entering Germany and taking its main production regions
- Germany doesn't get the kind of relative operational rest it had right after the fall of France, and right after Barbarossa when the Soviet military was heavily disorganised
- The combination of a more comparable airforce than the Soviets, and better geographical conditions than the Wallies allow an earlier depletion of the Luftwaffe
- For the same reasons, and due to French bomber production (though limited), the Entente's strategic bombing can have some effects earlier than OTL, though it will never hurt as hard as 1943+ bombing
- Entente logistics (eg no ocean to cross, more dense rail and road network than in the USSR, and not busted like in 1944 France) are far more favourable than those available to the Soviets and Wallies, so powerful offensives can be set up earlier and quicker

Cons:
- The Entente holds material superiority earlier, but it doesn't really grow to the same lopsided ratios as OTL
- German manpower, industry and ressources are not as depleted as in 1943-45
- The Entente may still be somewhat less effective than 1943-45 USSR and Wallies, which means they aren't finishing the war in just one year

I would add
Pro:
- Limited U-boot activity in Atlantic (no bases in France); easier and safer trade with USA and other countries.
Cons:
- Possibly smaller US involvement before Pearl Harbor, exactly because limited activity of German submarines and much smaller German successes (Germany is considered less of a threat). OTOH it will not be so necessary for the Allies who migth be able to manage the situation themselves.

 

[Bougnas]

I would add
Pro:
- Limited U-boot activity in Atlantic (no bases in France); easier and safer trade with USA and other countries.
Cons:
- Possibly smaller US involvement before Pearl Harbor, exactly because limited activity of German submarines and much smaller German successes (Germany is considered less of a threat). OTOH it will not be so necessary for the Allies who migth be able to manage the situation themselves.

Yeah, in fact to expand on the U-boot thing, the aspect I forgot to mention is that British supply wouldn't be disrupted by the loss of France (which sent materials and such) and the disruption by U-boots would be reduced. If we also add the effects of basically not being bombed (which disrupted some factories) and not having to build extra transport shipping to invade France and support a much larger war, the British can also devote far more ressources to the production required for a land army so the ramp up in 1940-42 will be faster.

Ignoring the OTL Dunkirk effect of maintaining production of some old gear because for all we know the high attrition caused by fighting in France might have resulted in the same policy still, and also the fact that some equipment being delayed had nothing to do with the Dunkirk effect.

I would actually disagree with the con being a con for the following reasons:
- naval help is not particularly required anyway
- in terms of material help, US assistance would actually be somewhat higher than OTL because the ramp up of military production was abruptly slowed down by the loss of French financing. This was also a factor in a France Fights On scenario because FFO France can send its gold, but here it would be further reinforced by France keeping its metropolitan income to further fund US industrial buildup.
The economists and historians calculated the potential benefit of continued French financing for FFO (which would allow the US to switch to more shifts because there was still a lot of slack in the US industry): 28.75% increased production compared to OTL in the 2nd semester of 1940, 30-40% extra production over OTL in 1941. Note this is total production including US defence demands, and it actually corresponds to a doubling of the value of production for the French in 2nd semester of 1940, and quadrupling in 1941.

That said, I still included that factor in the "material strength ratio of the Entente over Germany is not as lopsided as in 1943-45".

 

[seraphim74]

I would actually disagree with the con being a con for the following reasons:
- naval help is not particularly required anyway
- in terms of material help, US assistance would actually be somewhat higher than OTL because the ramp up of military production was abruptly slowed down by the loss of French financing. This was also a factor in a France Fights On scenario because FFO France can send its gold, but here it would be further reinforced by France keeping its metropolitan income to further fund US industrial buildup.

I am more worried about American public opinion. With Germany being lesser and somewhat confined threat the isolationists will have more arguments about USA staying neutral in conflict and let the Europeans settle it between themselves. American people will be less sympathetic and less willing to help the Allies in any way, instead of purely commercial transactions. Would Lend Lease Act be passed, e.g.?
And with USA less involved, would Hitler declare war on USA after Pearl Harbor (if Japan really attacks, but I think it will happen)? Would Hitler invade USSR? Would USSR attack Hitler (IMO in 1942 at earliest).

 

[duckie]

Less American Influence should also be seen as an Pro. Without Lend Lease the debt at the end of the war, would be lower. Also postwar the empires of France and England should be intact and both in an better shape to resist American attempts to become the dominant power. Also without the Fall of France, would the Manhatten Project been started?

 

[John Farson]

With France still in the fight, Japan stays out of Indochina, which OTL caused the US to freeze Japanese assets and establish their oil and gasoline embargo, spurring Japan to plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor and their southern invasions.

 

[arctic warrior]

Less American Influence should also be seen as an Pro. Without Lend Lease the debt at the end of the war, would be lower. Also postwar the empires of France and England should be intact and both in an better shape to resist American attempts to become the dominant power. Also without the Fall of France, would the Manhatten Project been started?

Perhaps not Manhattan but Tube Alloys and its predesessors would work anyway and Bohr may still get out to participate.

 

[CB13]

With France still in the fight, Japan stays out of Indochina, which OTL caused the US to freeze Japanese assets and establish their oil and gasoline embargo, spurring Japan to plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor and their southern invasions.

I'm not sure I agree with that.

I think the Japanese felt entitled to its larger empire and that their racial superiority was destined to ensure their victory. They would come up with a casus belli to attack someone.

 

[Gannt the chartist]

Assuming the Entente stop the German attack but do not eliminate a large part of the german army there are several issues and yes the German army is soft as cotton candy.

In terms of force generation the Germans lose about 1,7m French POW who were used as labour and that has to be replaced with something or OTL german production levels are not achieved. Someone has to bring in the harvest, cut coal and shovel stuff. The only source for that is now Germans or mass enslavement of Dutch and Belgians with the neutral press watching. OTL the sequence after the BoF is furlough a lot of the army to make stuff, wait for the harvest to be gathered, raise new divisions and with the years worth of production and very little expenditure of manpower, ammunition and materiel ( which you can regulate the British are rarely if ever attacking something you have to defend) and making use of captured weapons ammunition and transport to move and train your new army attack Russia. Which gets you a lot of land, a lot of stuff, notably the stuff to feed your army in Russia and causes casualties.

One of the items they get is Romanian Oil, which they now have to buy for money in competition with the Entente who have more money. In this context Russia may be a source but they also want money or battleships and they are not scared of you so money, battleships, blueprints. The USSR is not your friend and can only give support at the expense of the Soviet people

TTL May - June 40 the Heer suffered 22-29k KIA that would give per month, assuming for no good reason the fighting dies down a little to 20k pcm by May 41 the Heer would have lost as many dead as OTL they had by October 41. At that point the Germans were in severe difficulties over rifle strength and thats with a bigger mobilisation pool and trained army than they will have here. Tooze gives a good discussion on steel but the short version is the Germans can either produce ammunition or materiel but not both in the required numbers.

Over the whole of the BoF the Luftwaffe lost about 20-25% of its aircrew and aircraft strength which OTL were recovered from French POW cages after the battle, mainly and had committed a large part of the instructor force to combat. The strength of the LW is largely a matter of surprise and concentration. Once the front settles into semi static positions they can no longer concentrate on single point of attack and as neither side immediately has a working GCI network ( the Entente will build one way before the Germans, this is a matter of method not kit, the British have the method the Germans do not and it will take years to invent it) so both can rapidly concentrate on any given day and temporarily overwhelm the local defence they cannot sustain that unless they can force the displacement of enemy airfields or shoot them down. In that regard the Entente air forces start with 100% materiel reserve and short term the French get US production, longer term they will switch to French aircraft for the most part as their own production picks up. When the Radar system is built in France - and initially only needs to cover northern France the Entente get to see 100 - 160 miles behind German lines so the can vector interceptors on assembling German raids and counterinterceptors onto German fighters.

The U boats have been touched on but one item I don't think mentioned is the Entente can simply route convoys further south limiting the time on station of any boats and by using French bases extend air cover and the North Atlantic route is less important anyway.

As the front starts to become more stable air recon will allow both sides to detect assembling large scale forces with the Entente having a slight advantage in moving troops behind the lines. The way the transport net works tends to funnel the Germans into the Low Countries on a good but ultimately limited rail net which is open to interdiction. Or you charge the Maginot line. On no occasion in WW2 were the Germans able to launch a successful mobile attack without either air superiority at least locally or the absence of enemy air recon ( either due to weather or distances).

Unlike OTL this means the LW is forced into continual fighting and losses there is no great stand down over 40/41 to rebuild the losses and train crews. This is the same issue as the Heer has, but more so. Air forces are expensive - all combatants spent about half their resources on aircraft in WW2 - the German problem is they are at 75% of strength against an enemy who very quickly will outnumber you 2:1 anyway and can strafe the commuters in the Ruhr. They have to fight and while the aircraft pipeline may struggle on the training pipeline won't. They don't have the fuel the manpower or the population available to train. The British started the war intending to train 50,000 aircrew per year for the duration.

US involvement is self limiting. As long as they demand payment in USD well there are only so many USD available so the Entente will prioritise is spending. Which also impacts US recovery. So high Octane fuel some aircraft maybe explosives and munitions but unlikely. The US does not have the plant and while it can be produced first you have to build the plant and thats unaffordable in USD, aero engines are another matter. Canada, India, North Africa have boom times. Early on the British were sourcing stuff from West Africa.

Does that reduce the overall materiel available. Maybe not. By 42 the AAF was about half of all aircraft in the ETO the other half being RAF. Well with TTL thats achieved in about May certainly say September 40. US ground and naval forces way less than the French can provide. Its really not until 42 on that US production takes off the combined British and French and Canadian will not match that at that time but up to 1942 they can make more. French planning was for around 500 per month from late 40. British production will move to 6lb models much earlier and they don't have to build so many escorts and probably merchies so all the steel and manpower used in producing those is available for other purposes.

The Entente is actually in no rush. The original idea was to hit full strength in about 42. What you need to imagine is the Heer and LW being forced to fight under the club of superior air power and artillery from late summer 40 onwards with no ability to disengage and the transportation system in western Germany devastated - Portal loved attacking transport systems. Limited fuel supply, limited food lower production levels for materiel more limited manpower and at some point a very large mechanised force first writing down German reserves then exploiting into the rear.

 

[raharris1973]

and yes the German army is soft as cotton candy.

The Entente is actually in no rush. The original idea was to hit full strength in about 42.

So you anticipate the Germans lasting that long (into 1942, maybe May or June?), but perhaps no longer?

How did Imperial Germany manage to not collapse in defeat by the two year mark after starting its attempt to take down France in August 1914, failing and remaining unremittingly engaged on the western front afterward, while also have to do with Russian and Italian fronts, that this alternate WWII Germany wouldn't have to and not having occupied Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway at its disposal? Imperial Germany also was constrained to keep order in its ranks by due process, whereas Nazi Germany could compel military and labor discipline through unlimited police powers and summary executions of a totalitarian state. (Military executions of deserters/accused deserters in WWII were orders of magnitude higher than in WWI)

Imperial Germany, though it's situation was becoming desperate and serious by August 1916, still fought for two more years and a few more months after that, about have the time the 2nd Russian front still not wrapped up.

Why would the ratio of German endurance to Allied punishment power after a blunted sickle cut have been so much less after 1940 than German endurance to Allied punishment after the OTL blunted Schlieffen plan of 1914?

Technological differences and vast differences in the scale of depletion of consumables? The greater influence and scale of air power's impact on the battlefield and the hunger of its supporting infrastructure making for a multiplier effect on resource burning?

 

[Palantir]

I am more worried about American public opinion. With Germany being lesser and somewhat confined threat the isolationists will have more arguments about USA staying neutral in conflict and let the Europeans settle it between themselves. American people will be less sympathetic and less willing to help the Allies in any way, instead of purely commercial transactions. Would Lend Lease Act be passed, e.g.?
And with USA less involved, would Hitler declare war on USA after Pearl Harbor (if Japan really attacks, but I think it will happen)? Would Hitler invade USSR? Would USSR attack Hitler (IMO in 1942 at earliest).

The German war crimes during the Benelux and Northern France campaign ITTL might give the Entente some good PR in the US, and mitigate some of the isolationists' influence.

For the extension of the war, Germany doesn't have the manpower and material to attack the USSR. Stalin might try something against Germany in 42.
Japon might try something in the Far East, but the Entente position is still far better than OTL.
And the US won't get involved directly unless attacked directly like OTL.

 

[John Farson]

The German war crimes during the Benelux and Northern France campaign ITTL might give the Entente some good PR in the US, and mitigate some of the isolationists' influence.

For the extension of the war, Germany doesn't have the manpower and material to attack the USSR. Stalin might try something against Germany in 42.
Japon might try something in the Far East, but the Entente position is still far better than OTL.
And the US won't get involved directly unless attacked directly like OTL.

In any case, Japan won't do anything until their last aircraft carriers are finished. Without them marching into Indochina, the US embargo won't come at least for a while. Even so, the war in China is a constant sucking wound for them, and sooner or later they will have to decide whether to pull back to Manchuria or risk going the "Southern Road" and thereby start a war with the colonial powers, with Britain and likely also France reinforcing their naval strength in the Far East.

 

[Gannt the chartist]

The quick answer is 1914 is not 1940.

In 1914 the main combat units for all armies are batallion and company. All those men will be armed with bolt action rifles at Bn there may be a couple of heavy mg and the Bn commander might have to coordinate with a Battery commander sometimes. Its pretty much the same job as a colonel of captain has done since Breitenfeld. The Battery commander will aim his guns by looking for the target through his binoculars aiming and firing a time fused shrapnel shell, apart from the Binos with the mil scale and the time fuze, pretty much the same job Colonel Blood was doing in the rose field of Minden.

In 1918 the main combat units are platoon and section. The men have bolt action rifles, automatic weapons, grenade launchers and are required to coordinate and communicate with artillery, direct support mortars tanks aircraft, this job has been invented in the last 2-3 years. The battery commander will be in a bunker linked by telephone to a comms centre using telephone and radio to receive information from ground and air observers which are then translated into angles elevations charge setting and fuze setting ( the fuzes now have multiple modalities in a single fabrication) relative to a map with grid lines which is common across the whole army and by understanding the ballistic effects of weather storage barrel wear and temperature he can make a reasonable guess he will land rounds pretty close to the point he wants to hit but has never seen and if he does not pretty good chance his observer, who may be an Air Force officer totally different arm of service, will sed him corrections. He may even have access to remote sensors to enable him to fire at a target only detected by sound and light flashes. All of that was invented in the last two years.

When that army goes onto the attack it will launch a series of coordinate army and corps level attacks that start suddenly then stop when another formation starts suddenly then stops. over a period of 100 days that progressively wrecks the German army crushes its defensive positions built up over a number of years with the platoon and very often company commanders being Sargeant's and CSM under the age of 22 with less than a years service. The Educated boys with the pips are doing the hard sums for guns. The idea of fighting the war that way was invented 3-6 months ago.

In1940 you start with the 1918 army in capability but not size. Size takes time. And the hard sums will be done by Sergeants and Bombardiers with slide rules.

In 1941 Barbarossa starts with 3.8 million axis troops, of which 3 million are German with at best 4-5 years of trained conscripts to draw on. 1914 starts with 3.8 million German troops mobilised and able to draw on 44 years of trained conscripts. In 1940 the Germans are a smaller army than 41 and the 1940 call up only part trained within that. Same applies but more so to air forces this is not just aircrew but also ground crew. Aviation personnel in Germany have only existed for maybe 4 years and most of the production capacity has only existed for the same period. Both the British and French aircraft industries and air forces have continually existed so there is a lot of capacity to produce, train and maintain aircraft. This is very important for the French, the French have a large air force and therefore a large maintenance force dedicated to unproductive uses - divisional and army level recon assets mainly. Provide them with modern bombers and fighters to fly and maintain there is a big and very quick step up that can be made.

Compared to 1939 german munitions production declines to 80% in 40 and 75% in 41 partly thats a choice made in the circumstances ( production favoured things other than munitions like U boats and aircraft) but mostly its because the production capacity is not built until 43 and someone has to build it, and then someone has to work there. The Germans could of course enslave the Dutch and Belgians ( which they did in WW1 btw) Norwegians and Danes ( Polish POW they have anyway) but the Norwegians and Danes will probably bugger off to Sweden and all of it will be reported on by the Neutral press and embassies. British production increases every year but they were building the plant in the late 30s and both they and the French have world manpower to draw on plus whatever they choose to buy from the US.

For almost all of WW1 the danger zone for troops was maybe 10 miles back from the front lines more likely 2-5. With aircraft that zone stretches back 2-300 miles. Provided you have the aircraft and the ability to use them. Anyone in that area is subject to attack and as the Entente have more and better air forces and artillery they will be the ones doing the killing. You also need to remember that most of the German army is horse drawn so to preserve any sort of mobility you have to shelter feed and water the horses, or start extensive light rail works. The Entente uses trucks, the British entirely the French increasingly ( and France has the 2nd or 3rd largest motor industry in the world US is 1 UK 3 or 2.)

All the evidence is when a British ( or French in 1918 and 44/5) attack a German defensive position using their methods they break it and by doing a series of attacks on different axes they suck in and write down German reserves. then break through with an unstoppable armoured attack, its unstoppable because the mobile reserves have already been used. It normally takes about a month after that its a steady 10 miles an hour subject to demolitions. German leg formations move at about 10 miles a day if they have horses with them.

Case in Point, If you look at the Allied attack on the Gothic line which is a mix of well fortified mountains and well fortified lowland with rivers so not unlike the Franco German border or North French/Belgian plains ( you could also choose Normandy Hurtgen, Alamein Mareth Bernhard Winter etc etc) Wiki says it lasts 4 months and is inconclusive. Read the detail though and the British part which is in the lowlands lasts about a month and advances about 40-50 miles or the length of the Belgian coast, the Americans have much harder time in the mountains and keep going too but the offensive is stopped by winter and events in Northern Europe not German resistance. The distances are just not that great on the Western Front a 50 mile advance is significant for the whole front, a 150 mile advance puts you on the Rhine or in Paris. But outside maneuver around an enemy position the Germans show no evidence that they are capable of attacks against a defended position on anything above a tactical level.

 

[raharris1973]

@Riain - I'd love for you to weigh in on the 1914 & 1940 comparison I've been discussing with @Gannt the chartist and @Bougnas here.

Specifically, to check what the relevance of your arguments about the advantages to Germany of winning the 'race to the sea' in 1914, and the handicaps to the British, might be for a 1940 situation if the spring/summer 1940 frontlines stabilize with the channel ports north of the Somme river on the German side with the French and British holding strong to all of France to the south.

If you want Britain to have real economic troubles in WW1 you need Germany to win the Race to the Sea.

Coastal shipping was still a huge part of Britain's domestic transport task in 1914 and other forms of transport like rail could take up the slack until the 30s, some 80-100 ships a day passed through the Dover strait and took food directly up the Thames to the London docks. Admiral Bacon of the Dover Patrol stated that if this through Channel shipping was stopped 1/3 of London would have to be evacuated to where the people could be more easily fed.

Winning the Race to the Sea makes the French half of the Dover strait a dead zone totally covered by German guns and mines, with a defended shipping channel able to be used by the Germans. Beyond that through channel shipping would be subject to harassing gunfire (ineffective to be sure, but try telling your insurance company that) and aggressive mining from German light forces based in Dunkirk, Calais and Bolougne. The RN would have a huge task countering this threat, it would take up a large part of Britain's war effort, likely to the detriment of things like the Gallipoli campaign and the ultimate expansion of the BEF into 5 field armies.

What economic troubles would an occupied Belgium and French channel ports/Flanders/Picardy north of the Somme cause for the France and Britain of 1940? After all, this front-line, although falling short of Germany's OTL 1940 performance, is performing pretty evenly in these sectors with a 1914, 'Germany wins the race to the sea' improvement.

Is Britain not nearly as bad off, because its internal rail and motor vehicle logistics network became far more developed over the 20s and 30s, leaving domestic shipping through the Channel much less of a checkpoint than it was in 1914? France loses the Bethune coal mines here - but is this less of a blow, having built up more mines and industries further back in the French interior during WWI and the interwar decades?