Es Geloybte Aretz Continuation Thread

Yet the greatest prize eluded him. Having alienated the Hungarian ruling class by insisting on an abbreviated coronation ceremony, he left the magnates in no doubt as to his ultimate intent for their country: Hungary would become a federal nation among nations, no longer able to negotiate special treatment by hiding behind ancient privileges and invented tradition. The endeavour was assured of support from all minor nationalities since most Slavic speakers found Magyar supremacy in the eastern half of the Empire more galling than German arrogance. What it lacked, nonetheless, was the critical mass of votes needed. The Ausgleich of 1917, still negotiated in the afterglow of victory, gave the emperor considerable leeway which a more diplomatic individual might have been able to turn into lasting compromise solutions. Franz II Ferdinand ended up all but threatening the Hungarian government with invasion in the event of civil disturbance, making them hostage to the whims of their national minorities and alienating them enough to ensure that overturning the minority rights ultimately enshrined in law became a rallying cry for Hungarian nationalists. Yet failing to secure equal recognition for the Slavic peoples in a triple monarchy – something he had never promised, but frequently hinted at – ensured that the gratitude of those who owed him most would be lukewarm at best. Memories of Pan-Slavic collaborationism died hard in the Habsburg domain.

Nonetheless, buoyed by victory and held together by a military whose stature was greatly enhanced by its conduct during the war (a matter much redacted for home consumption) the state had a good two decades that not even persistent economic trouble could put much of a dent in. The more rural economy of the Balkans was less affected than the industrial centres of Austria, Bohemia and Hungary which meant that the worst disaffected peoples had least to complain about. Yet the reckoning would come.
OK. I have several questions. Do we still have a duel Monarchy here with two different systems or have we created one overarching Federal structure? If it is the former, are we simply talking about reforming the Kingdom of Hungary such that the minority parties hold some sort of majority/veto in the elected chamber, or some kind of unalterable written Constitution?

Either way, what is happening to the Magyarisation policy pursued by the Kingdom of Hungary? If we believe the statistics of the time the Kingdom would be just over 50% ethnically Hungarian and depending on the electoral system (for example FTPT) would probably have a majority within any representative body, especially when considering the distribution of the Hungarians. Presumably the domination of the German language after the war in Central Europe will probably help the Germans of Hungary to retain their language/cultural identity somewhat better, unless the choose to leave to Austria proper of Germany for economic reasons. Will urban areas which were rapidly Magyarising see a reversal as German becomes vital, or will the process continue? I'm thinking of not only in cities like Budapest where German was obviously on the decline but places like Szombathely/Steinamanger which will be economically deeply connected German Austria as these areas begin to prosper economically. I'm imagining inter-State trade barriers being significantly lower. Will we see bilingualism spread in these urban areas as German becomes ever more dominant?

Thinking about what happens after the "two good decades" that you quote, presumably we should be seeing Germany tying its neighbours increasingly into a cohesive sphere and presumable Austria-Hungary (if it's still called that) will be no exception. Will we be seeing some internal troubles before Russia-Germany round two? It seems plausible if Hungarian Nationalism is forcing politicians to play towards an extreme base which is prevented by the Constitution whose legitimacy is only placed in the hands of a somewhat unpopular Hapsburg Monarch? Especially if German is seen as imposing itself culturally. We are still a little bit too far away from the effects of mass radio or television or even comics for that kind of soft power cultural erosion. But I imagine there is still a strong pull towards German, are tensions boiling or merely approaching a simmer?

Or am I reading this totally wrong? Is Magyarisation going to actually continue as presumably free movement and a strongly economically growing Germany attracts native speakers into Germany proper and local administrative organisations crack down on minority rights in all but the most isolated communities, be damned what the official line is with Vienna/Budapest/Emperor?

If Austria-Hungary is actually in some kind of crisis you could presumably remove them from the second war but I doubt that would fulfil the criteria of this being a German-wank. But this update has left me with more questions than answers. Any details into what the Ausgleich of 1917 actually entailed would be hugely welcome.
 
OK. I have several questions. Do we still have a duel Monarchy here with two different systems or have we created one overarching Federal structure? If it is the former, are we simply talking about reforming the Kingdom of Hungary such that the minority parties hold some sort of majority/veto in the elected chamber, or some kind of unalterable written Constitution?

Either way, what is happening to the Magyarisation policy pursued by the Kingdom of Hungary? If we believe the statistics of the time the Kingdom would be just over 50% ethnically Hungarian and depending on the electoral system (for example FTPT) would probably have a majority within any representative body, especially when considering the distribution of the Hungarians. Presumably the domination of the German language after the war in Central Europe will probably help the Germans of Hungary to retain their language/cultural identity somewhat better, unless the choose to leave to Austria proper of Germany for economic reasons. Will urban areas which were rapidly Magyarising see a reversal as German becomes vital, or will the process continue? I'm thinking of not only in cities like Budapest where German was obviously on the decline but places like Szombathely/Steinamanger which will be economically deeply connected German Austria as these areas begin to prosper economically. I'm imagining inter-State trade barriers being significantly lower. Will we see bilingualism spread in these urban areas as German becomes ever more dominant?

Thinking about what happens after the "two good decades" that you quote, presumably we should be seeing Germany tying its neighbours increasingly into a cohesive sphere and presumable Austria-Hungary (if it's still called that) will be no exception. Will we be seeing some internal troubles before Russia-Germany round two? It seems plausible if Hungarian Nationalism is forcing politicians to play towards an extreme base which is prevented by the Constitution whose legitimacy is only placed in the hands of a somewhat unpopular Hapsburg Monarch? Especially if German is seen as imposing itself culturally. We are still a little bit too far away from the effects of mass radio or television or even comics for that kind of soft power cultural erosion. But I imagine there is still a strong pull towards German, are tensions boiling or merely approaching a simmer?

Or am I reading this totally wrong? Is Magyarisation going to actually continue as presumably free movement and a strongly economically growing Germany attracts native speakers into Germany proper and local administrative organisations crack down on minority rights in all but the most isolated communities, be damned what the official line is with Vienna/Budapest/Emperor?

If Austria-Hungary is actually in some kind of crisis you could presumably remove them from the second war but I doubt that would fulfil the criteria of this being a German-wank. But this update has left me with more questions than answers. Any details into what the Ausgleich of 1917 actually entailed would be hugely welcome.

OTL the hungarian elit were already working on a reform of the election system. Their goal was to widen the suffrage in a way that the hungarian domination of the pairlament was not threatened. Add Franz Ferdinand and that its pretty hard to imagine that any exsoldiers, war-widows or later war-orphans would be denied a vote. So some kind of reform will come in Hungary and the minorities will have a much better representation.

From Carlton post I think that what he was saying is that after the war the hungarian minority law of 1868 was adheret to rigidly. It acknowledged the right of national minoritites to have their trials on low and middle level in their own language in every district where they are at least 20% of the population. In those district the hungarian state was also responsible for the creation and maintaince of minority schools. It also acknowledged the right of any minorities to create national organisations as long as they are not working towards the dissolution of the Hungarian state.

The biggest problem with this law was that it was at the time less than the national minorities wanted and whats more it was ignored by the hungarian authorities. According to some books I read on the question most minorities would have been content with the adherence of this law by WWI - I have my doubts about the validity of this claim.
 
The thing is, I don't know enough about Austria-Hungary to detail this without spending a lot of time I don't have doing research, but I do know enough about Austria-Hungary to know that whatever I find is going to be rabbit-hole complex and difficult. My assumptions as the basis for 'winging it' were:

1) Franz Ferdinand is far more interested in strengthening central power than in accommodating minorities. The Hungarian elites are not interested in that at all, but their ability to resist after that victory (and the poor reputation they got during the war) is limited. A compromise is going to happen, but they can represent any 'loss' to their constituency as the result of imperial bullying.

2) The Slavic minorities will have a hard time making their case in public because of the war. That is not fair (any more than the anti-Hungarian resentment felt by many in Cisleithania), but it is a political fact. They will support the monarch in getting them what they can get, but compared to their hopes prior to the war, it will be a disappointment. .

3) The actual settlement of 1917 is going to be incremental - somewhat more central power, especially in civil service matters, somewhat better (and more effectual) minority rights, a fairer suffrage law and stricter parliamentary rules, but not the fundamental shift everyone expected and many hoped for.

4) Nobody is going to be content with this because in the 1910s and 1920s, ethnic nationalism is what everyone wants and believes in. Nobody will accept that their oppressed nation cannot have their own state. In the Austrian domain, this is going to be mainly a mtter of electoral politics. THe Poles and Ruthenians got their states, and the Czechs and Solvaks don't feel too inclined to reprise their experience of actual war in order to pursue some grand Slavic project. The Southern Slavs are the biggest problem in that they are a big group and Serbia, though militarily emasculated, still feels aggrieved. But in Hungary, it's going to become violent. With an expanded franchise, we'll see more populist politics, and just as the Bohemians and Galicians feel they defended the ungrateful Hungarians, Hungary feels it's paying too much of its money for eternally malcontent Slavs who overstate the war damage to their homes. Everybody talks big about the virtues of their nation and the purification of their soil, but the Hungarian conservative parties mean it. That'll be a powderkeg waiting to go very wrong once the central state slips in its watchfulness because they long to go back to the old days when non-Magyars knew their place, but the minorities are now organised and often armed. And unlike the people along the northern frontier, they don't have first-hand experience of Slavic brotherhood to dissuade them.
 
The thing is, I don't know enough about Austria-Hungary to detail this without spending a lot of time I don't have doing research, but I do know enough about Austria-Hungary to know that whatever I find is going to be rabbit-hole complex and difficult. My assumptions as the basis for 'winging it' were:

1) Franz Ferdinand is far more interested in strengthening central power than in accommodating minorities. The Hungarian elites are not interested in that at all, but their ability to resist after that victory (and the poor reputation they got during the war) is limited. A compromise is going to happen, but they can represent any 'loss' to their constituency as the result of imperial bullying.

2) The Slavic minorities will have a hard time making their case in public because of the war. That is not fair (any more than the anti-Hungarian resentment felt by many in Cisleithania), but it is a political fact. They will support the monarch in getting them what they can get, but compared to their hopes prior to the war, it will be a disappointment. .

3) The actual settlement of 1917 is going to be incremental - somewhat more central power, especially in civil service matters, somewhat better (and more effectual) minority rights, a fairer suffrage law and stricter parliamentary rules, but not the fundamental shift everyone expected and many hoped for.

4) Nobody is going to be content with this because in the 1910s and 1920s, ethnic nationalism is what everyone wants and believes in. Nobody will accept that their oppressed nation cannot have their own state. In the Austrian domain, this is going to be mainly a mtter of electoral politics. THe Poles and Ruthenians got their states, and the Czechs and Solvaks don't feel too inclined to reprise their experience of actual war in order to pursue some grand Slavic project. The Southern Slavs are the biggest problem in that they are a big group and Serbia, though militarily emasculated, still feels aggrieved. But in Hungary, it's going to become violent. With an expanded franchise, we'll see more populist politics, and just as the Bohemians and Galicians feel they defended the ungrateful Hungarians, Hungary feels it's paying too much of its money for eternally malcontent Slavs who overstate the war damage to their homes. Everybody talks big about the virtues of their nation and the purification of their soil, but the Hungarian conservative parties mean it. That'll be a powderkeg waiting to go very wrong once the central state slips in its watchfulness because they long to go back to the old days when non-Magyars knew their place, but the minorities are now organised and often armed. And unlike the people along the northern frontier, they don't have first-hand experience of Slavic brotherhood to dissuade them.

I can see what you write mostly happening. However the part about the hungarian conservatives I find problematic. Hungarian politics was dominated by aristocrats even OTL interwar period and I dont expect a victory in the war would change that. They were mostly pro magyarization for sure however the purification part is really unlikely. They were for assimilation and thats it. There were of course purist and such but those came from lower society.
 
Als Österreich-Ungarn eines Morgens aus unruhigen Träumen erwachte, fand es sich in seinem Bett zu einem ungeheueren Bundesstaat verwandelt.
Gah! Realized that had to be a mangled quote, but forgot what 'verhandeln' was and totally missed the Kafka reference. Somehow.
Good line, though, once I figured it out.
 
One advantage of royal favour is that general economic malaise is not usually a problem for the recipient. Even after the century’s most disastrous wars, Russia’s famous ballets continued operating without so much as a reduction in props budgets. Britain’s hunting circuit remained undiminished through the dour years of crisis and imperial decline that followed the Long government. And Germany in the decades following 1908, by any account a hard country to make a decent living in, remained a paradise for the natural sciences through the active and generous sponsorship of Emperor Wilhelm III.

Germany’s tradition of scientific excellence, the institution of the research-based university and the Prussian discipline of its strictly hierarchical laboratories formed the foundation on which the explosion of knowledge in the early twentieth century was based, but imperial sponsorship was its necessary precondition. Like other monarchs lavishing money on art, music, or upper-class diversions, the emperor dedicated himself and the considerable funds of his extremely generous personal revenues to the fostering of science and technology. Universities, government and corporate laboratories throughout the Western world may have been hospitable to scientists and engineers, but only in Berlin could the crisis precipitated by the epic personal confrontation between Einstein and Planck have been resolved by giving each of them an independent institute to run.

Today, it is impossible not to see these developments through the prism of the atomic bomb, but at the time this was not what most of those involved were working towards. German propaganda cast Wilhelm III as a visionary genius who invested in the science that gave his empire a war-winning weapon in its hour of need, but in fact, he was uninvolved in the early stages of its development. Wilhelm was an aficionado of science, a man whose education allowed him to see it as a diversion. He was no more a scientific genius than Joseph II was a musical prodigy for his appreciation of the golden age of classical composition. Science was to him as ballet was to Louis XIV something he dabbled in, used to enhance his personal status, and generously funded. Through most of the 1910s and 1920s, however, his personal interest focused much more on the large number of engineering projects his Hohezollernstiftung funded. It was improvements in practical technology – faster cars, electric trains, wireless voice transmission, chemicals, vaccines, recording and tabulating machines, and especially air travel - that endlessly fascinated the young ruler. Theoretical physics appealed to him for its disconcerting implications, but it is unlikely he truly understood what it was his ‘genius factory’ churned out.

Britain, with its established powerhouses in Cambridge, Oxford and the Royal Society, was shaken out of its complacency when the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut tried to recruit Ernest Rutherford. The effort failed, but the funds they offered caused consternation and the episode triggered a hectic search for funding to the sciences that produced several influential foundations. In France, the Republican government raised expenditures for the Institut Pasteur and founded several research universities dedicated to science and engineering to uphold the reputation of their country as the home of scientific genius and innovation. Ultimately, though Germany outspent its rivals in this field, the difference in funding was far less than popular legend makes it out to have been.

What Germany had and no amount of money could duplicate was an aggregate of genius that historical accident and a tradition of educational excellence had assembled in Berlin. Max Planck and Albert Einstein, Werner Heisenberg, Lise Meitner, Niels Bohr, Otto Hahn, Fritz Strassmann, Leo Szilard, Eduard Teller, Hans Bethe, Felix Bloch, Richard Berger, Erwin Schrödinger and Victor Weisskopf were all associated, at least for a time, with the physics research funded by the Hohenzollernstiftung either directly through its Berlin compounds (Physikalisches Institut I – Einstein-Institut – and II – Planck-Institut) or through generous grants to universities (Heisenberg’s department in Leipizig, Bohr’s in Göttingen and Hahn’s in Jena). This fortuitous constellation of great minds was responsible for the breakthroughs that eventually gave Germany a commanding lead in atomic research and the basis for developing Project Mjolnir.

The Economist, 32/2007 ("Fifty Years in the Shadow of the Bomb")
 
How does the United States compare to the German Empire in this regard? Will Congress move to emulate the Kaiserreich model without a World War or Cold War driving the need for more science?
 
I have a comment about your earlier post about Austria:
You said at one time, that even if Austria collapses, it would not be at all likely, that any annexations for Germany would happen as a result of this (because of too many catholics or something like that). I find this rather unlikely. As can be seen by the reaction of Austrian politicians after the end of WW1 IOTL, as soon as the idea of a greater Habsburg monarchy died, German nationalism became the overwhelmingly powerful narrative in the german speaking parts of the former empire, be it among conservatives or liberals or socialists.
If there were to be broad political support for a referendum on unification with germany, winning something like 80% of the votes in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the empire, I think there is no conceivable German government that could actually get away with refusing this.
Similarly I don't think the Germans could get away without intervening in Bohemia in some form, reading about interwar politics in the area, the conflict between Czech and German nationalists was just so unbelievably ugly, it seems hard to imagine a solution without some kind of separation, especially as Jews seem to be more likely to be counted as Germans in TTL.
 
Where's Curie? Historically she disliked the Germans because she was a staunch Polish nationalist, and the Poles saw the Germans as occupiers and French as the last ally of Poland and potential future liberator. Now the German empire has liberated Poland, (if lacking the westernmost provinces), while France stood by and watched.

Also, the Parisian public never liked her much, to the point of spontaneously forming riots/lynch mobs that forced her to hide whenever bad news came out about her. I wonder if she would be adverse to a position in a German university, especially if offered at a good time. (Say, after her affair with Langevin came out and she had to run and her home got trashed.)
 
Where's Curie? Historically she disliked the Germans because she was a staunch Polish nationalist, and the Poles saw the Germans as occupiers and French as the last ally of Poland and potential future liberator. Now the German empire has liberated Poland, (if lacking the westernmost provinces), while France stood by and watched.

Also, the Parisian public never liked her much, to the point of spontaneously forming riots/lynch mobs that forced her to hide whenever bad news came out about her. I wonder if she would be adverse to a position in a German university, especially if offered at a good time. (Say, after her affair with Langevin came out and she had to run and her home got trashed.)
OTOH, she went to France way before the German-Russian war in OTL. I think the POD wouldn't have affected her life much by then. And as soon as she is a Curie (I suppose this would require a butterfly net), staying in France makes sense.
 
Schwarzchild on the other hand isn't likely to die of a disease contacted on active service TTL
It is Schwarzschild, 'Black Shield' and it is also pronounced that way, the same for the Red variant.

The disease you allude to seemingly can be triggered by virus, but I am not certain whether it is contacted (?). Actually I was trying to eat, so on research I was distressed to see that one can suffer symptoms of Mustard Gas w/o exposure.
 
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It is Schwarzschild, 'Black Shield' and it is also pronounced that way, the same for the Red variant.

The disease you allude to seemingly can be triggered by virus, but I am not certain whether it is contacted (?). Actually I was trying to eat, so on research I was distressed to see that one can suffer symptoms of Mustard Gas w/o exposure.
Thanks. I am away this weekend and nearly out of mobile data so didn't spellchecker or fact check either. However the basic point is that the very specific circumstances leading to his death OTL are unlikely to be repeated TTL where he will either do peacetime military training in a barracks in Germany or be excused military training due to either his valuable contribution to scientific research or to him failing his medical or not being needed in circumstances where the German Army is in a peacetime position to be more selective.
 

yboxman

Banned
I must say that regarding Austria the most difficult issue I see is that it now has an independent Poland AND an independent "Ruthenia" right across the border. Given the difficult relationship between Poles and Ukrainians/Ruthenians in Galicia, The dynamic I see is that even if the governments of Poland and Ruthenia are constrained to avoid pressing claims against AH, they are going to end up hosting, and sponsoring nationalist organizations of their respective Galician co-nationals, and that linguistic and administrative quarrels in Galicia will become increasingly millitant.

(For that matter, The Jews of Poland may end up sponsoring "self defense" millitas in Galicia as well - whenever Poles and Ukrainians (or Gemrans and Czechs or...) come to blows Jews often ended up being the first casulties- witness the Lvov Pogrom.)

As the AH empire leaves the post war Euphoria and FFs promises of reform dissapoint, Galicia could end up being AHs Nagorno-Karabach- the place where competing national groups seeking to improve their position against each other prepratory to the day of eventual imperial collapse, hasten that collapse by coming to blows with the center unable to effectively respond.

Also, ultimately non of the new or expanded German Client states will be really satisfied with being separated from their kin in AH. They will likely be lobbying "big brother" in Berlin to squeeze Vienna for concessions- which will be a constant source of tension between Berlin and Vienna. And, I suppose, between the German Emperor and his wife*

*BTW, did she convert to Lutheranism?
 
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