The war that the Russian navy would face in its northern theatre, both the Baltic and the White Sea, was prophetically described by then Vice Admiral Semyon Alexeyev after the occupation of Muurman: “We shall have a short but exciting life”.
In fact, the Russian sailors on the ultimately doomed mission to secure the port facilities were initially surprised by the leeway the opposition gave them. Ships moving in and out of port were shadowed by Finnish and German patrols, aeroplanes flew overhead on reconnaissance missions, but no attempts were made to intercept them. Finnish troops assembled outside the perimeter, but kept a respectful distance from the Russian marines. This tense mood of hesitancy prevailed even into the first week of the war, with both fleets keeping major surface vessels in port as they felt out each other's dispositions and began exploratory thrusts.
The first shots of the naval war were fired by Russian submarines in the Baltic and North Sea attacking German merchant shipping. The days between 03 and 15 October 1944 were remembered as the 'Black Dozen' in Hamburg and Bremen as the list of losses mounted, unprotected merchant vessels heading for the safety of neutral ports and German navy destroyers fanning out to hunt the elusive menace. The outcome of these early confrontations was inconclusive and disappointing. On 6 October, the Russian submarine K-13 won the first naval engagement of the war, torpedoing destroyers Leberecht Maass and Berend Karpfanger and sinking the former. The following days saw clashes between submarine and surface units throughout the Baltic, with the German navy losing two more destroyers and seven torpedo boats against four Russian destroyers, nine torpedo boats and seven submarines, the majority of them destroyed by naval air forces.
The trajectory of the naval war changed with the sortie of the Baltic main battlefleet from Kronstadt. The strategic purpose of this operation remains unclear, except potentially as an effort to drive a wedge between the allies by threatening the Swedish coast. Russian Admiral Kotenkov, famously a devotee of the Kolchak school of aggressive naval warfare, had proposed shelling Stockholm early in the war in the expectation that the German fleet could be bottled up in Kiel, hoping to force Sweden out of the war. In the event, the gamble failed predictably and very badly.
The heavy cloud cover in the lead-up to the assault gave the Russians hope of evading reconnaissance, but they were tracked throughout their approach by German and Swedish ranging stations. Advanced radio detection equipment carried by LZ 48 even allowed a rough count of the fleet size. Instead, it was the Russians that were caught between a combined Swedish and Finnish force at sea and the German fleet headed north past Gotland. The advantage of speed gave the Russians half a day in which they could apply superior numbers to defeat the Swedish navy, but their performance in the Battle of the Alands was not encouraging. Warned too late of the approaching Germans, Admiral Kotenkov ordered a retreat that led him into range of the Württemberg class battleships' superior gunnery. His order to the heavy cruisers to evade shelling by using their speed robbed him of their anti-air cover as the skies cleared. The next two hours saw shells and bombs destroy Yaroslav and Rurik and cripple Dmitri Donskoi and Ivan Kalita while Finnish aeroplanes sank the heavy cruiser Aurora and severely damaged Pallada and Polarniy. The fact that Russian fleet submarines scored crippling hits on Großer Kurfürst, Heinrich I and Tre Kronur was little comfort. The Russian fleet returned to Kronstadt under clear blue skies, running the gauntlet of naval aviation out of Finland and Estonia, Admiral Kotenkov dying of wounds suffered in the sinking of Yaroslav five days later. The remaining naval war in the Baltic was fought mainly by small units, with Russian forces bottled up in Kronstadt until the devastating dawn raid of 21 May 1945 when the Swedish air force sank the remaining battleships and cruisers at anchor.
In fact, the Russian sailors on the ultimately doomed mission to secure the port facilities were initially surprised by the leeway the opposition gave them. Ships moving in and out of port were shadowed by Finnish and German patrols, aeroplanes flew overhead on reconnaissance missions, but no attempts were made to intercept them. Finnish troops assembled outside the perimeter, but kept a respectful distance from the Russian marines. This tense mood of hesitancy prevailed even into the first week of the war, with both fleets keeping major surface vessels in port as they felt out each other's dispositions and began exploratory thrusts.
The first shots of the naval war were fired by Russian submarines in the Baltic and North Sea attacking German merchant shipping. The days between 03 and 15 October 1944 were remembered as the 'Black Dozen' in Hamburg and Bremen as the list of losses mounted, unprotected merchant vessels heading for the safety of neutral ports and German navy destroyers fanning out to hunt the elusive menace. The outcome of these early confrontations was inconclusive and disappointing. On 6 October, the Russian submarine K-13 won the first naval engagement of the war, torpedoing destroyers Leberecht Maass and Berend Karpfanger and sinking the former. The following days saw clashes between submarine and surface units throughout the Baltic, with the German navy losing two more destroyers and seven torpedo boats against four Russian destroyers, nine torpedo boats and seven submarines, the majority of them destroyed by naval air forces.
The trajectory of the naval war changed with the sortie of the Baltic main battlefleet from Kronstadt. The strategic purpose of this operation remains unclear, except potentially as an effort to drive a wedge between the allies by threatening the Swedish coast. Russian Admiral Kotenkov, famously a devotee of the Kolchak school of aggressive naval warfare, had proposed shelling Stockholm early in the war in the expectation that the German fleet could be bottled up in Kiel, hoping to force Sweden out of the war. In the event, the gamble failed predictably and very badly.
The heavy cloud cover in the lead-up to the assault gave the Russians hope of evading reconnaissance, but they were tracked throughout their approach by German and Swedish ranging stations. Advanced radio detection equipment carried by LZ 48 even allowed a rough count of the fleet size. Instead, it was the Russians that were caught between a combined Swedish and Finnish force at sea and the German fleet headed north past Gotland. The advantage of speed gave the Russians half a day in which they could apply superior numbers to defeat the Swedish navy, but their performance in the Battle of the Alands was not encouraging. Warned too late of the approaching Germans, Admiral Kotenkov ordered a retreat that led him into range of the Württemberg class battleships' superior gunnery. His order to the heavy cruisers to evade shelling by using their speed robbed him of their anti-air cover as the skies cleared. The next two hours saw shells and bombs destroy Yaroslav and Rurik and cripple Dmitri Donskoi and Ivan Kalita while Finnish aeroplanes sank the heavy cruiser Aurora and severely damaged Pallada and Polarniy. The fact that Russian fleet submarines scored crippling hits on Großer Kurfürst, Heinrich I and Tre Kronur was little comfort. The Russian fleet returned to Kronstadt under clear blue skies, running the gauntlet of naval aviation out of Finland and Estonia, Admiral Kotenkov dying of wounds suffered in the sinking of Yaroslav five days later. The remaining naval war in the Baltic was fought mainly by small units, with Russian forces bottled up in Kronstadt until the devastating dawn raid of 21 May 1945 when the Swedish air force sank the remaining battleships and cruisers at anchor.
