An old post of mine, not exactly on the "no Nasser in 1952" but rather on "Naguib prevails over Nasser in 1954" but still relevant:
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The conflict in 1954 between President Muhammad Naguib on the one hand and Gamal Abdel Nasser and his supporters in the RCC (Revolutionary Command Council) on the other was crucial for the future of Egypt. For a while it seemed that the popular Naguib, a critic of the RCC's increasingly repressive policies and an advocate of restoring political parties, was going to be triumphant. Some background:
The conflict came out in the open in February 1954, when Naguib decided that he would no longer allow the RCC to use him as a figurehead. On February 23, Naguib submitted his resignation to the RCC in an attempt to force the junta's hand. The junta replied by placing Naguib under house arrest and declaring the office of the President temporarily vacant. The news of Naguib's removal led to big popular demonstrations in Naguib's favor. According to Robert Stephens (*Nasser: A Political Biography*, p. 125) they "were organized by the remaining cadres of Wafdists and the left-wing groups who, with the Muslim Brothers, could still bring masses of students and workers into the streets. This united front of the Brotherhood, the left and the Wafd aimed to use Naguib's popularity in the hope of forcing the junta to restore the political parties, parliament and a freer press." What worried Nasser, however, was not so much the demonstrations themselves but the support they drew in the army. There was a stormy meeting of cavalry corps officers loyal to Khaled Mohieddin, the youngest and most left-wing member of the RCC, and the only RCC member other than Naguib who had opposed the repressive measures of the Council. Nasser himself went to the meeting, where he faced demands for Naguib's restoration. There were rumors that Nasser was in danger of arrest at this meeting. Khaled Muhieddin later denied that the corps was planning a coup or that Nasser faced arrest, but did acknowledge that some of the officers present tried to make Nasser think that their tanks had the barracks surrounded.
Anyway, the next day, Nasser beat a temporary retreat. He informed the RCC that to avoid a split that would destroy the army, it was necessary to bring back Naguib as President and make Khaled Muhieddin Premier. The RCC reluctantly agreed. However, the triumph of Khaled was sort-lived; Free Officers loyal to Nasser began to organize counter-action against the cavalry corps. So a new compromise was reached, with Naguib to become President again and Nasser Premier. Naguib accepted it. Naguib became President, and announced the abolition of press censorship and plans to create a constituent assembly and provisional parliament within a few months. On March 9, Nasser handed over the premiership to Naguib until free elections would be held. It looked as though Naguib had won all along the line.
Appearances were deceptive, though; Nasser had already begun preparing what virtually amounted to a second coup. First, he had used his ten days as premier to purge pro-Naguib elements in the army. (It helped that Naguib was in Khartoum at the time to inaugurate the Sudanese Parliament.) Khalid Mohiedden was sent on a "special mission" to Europe. Nasser also tightened his hold on the trade unions by appointing a loyal Free Officer, Kamal al-din Hussein, as Minister of Social Affairs.
Nasser's strategy was to make it plain to the army that--contrary to what Naguib and much of the public might think--there was no middle ground, that they could not have both the fruits of the revolution and a return to the political parties, that a return to parliamentary life "would mean the end of the army movement and probably of most of what it had set out to achieve." (Stephens, p. 127) Accordingly, on March 25 the RCC announced that it would "surrender its powers to a constituent assembly on 24 July 1954 at which time it will proclaim the end of the Egyptian Revolution."
This declaration had the desired shock effect on all those in the army and the public who feared a return to the old regime, even if without a king. The Liberation Rally (the political arm of the RCC) and the trade unions staged huge demonstrations demanding the retention of the Council and calling for Nasser instead of Naguib. The demonstrations were backed up by a general transport strike. Most important, Nasser was given a free hand by an assembly of the Free Officers to settle the crisis.
"Nasser thus demonstrated conclusively that, whoever might hold the titles, he held the keys to power--in the army, among the workers and in the streets. It was only a matter of time before he took the titles too. On 17 April, Naguib, suffering from a nervous breakdown, still popular but shorn of organized support from any source, was forced to resign again as prime minister. He was also dropped from the Council of the Revolution." (Stephens, p. 128). Nasser took over the premiership again; political parties were once more banned and elections postponed. Nasser kept Naguib as President, but this became increasingly a figurehead role until in October the attempted assassination of Nasser by a member of the Muslim Brotherhood provided an excuse for ousting Naguib once and for all.
So, could Naguib have won? The odds seem to me to have been against it because the real power was with the RCC, which except for Khaled Muhieddin never seems to have had much sympathy for Naguib, though it might temporarily make concessions to him. Still, the RCC was not the entire military, and if Naguib had refused the compromise which gave Nasser a crucial ten days as Premier to purge pro-Naguib elements, it is conceivable that Naguib's opponents would have backed down. Anyway, if Naguib had prevailed and political parties restored, would it have been a good thing for Egypt? Stephens--who is sympathetic to Nasser but not uncritical--is skeptical on this point (pp. 128-9):
"So the parliamentary constitutional system which Egyptian liberals had struggled so long to establish and which had suffered so many abuses was finally destroyed. Did Egypt's parliament deserve to die? What would have happened if Naguib had won? It might be argued that with all its faults the parliamentary system in Egypt at least held out some prospects of a political evolution which might gradually reduce its corrupt basis and enable an increasing educated public to learn from political discussion. British parliamentary life until the last century was also corrupt and dominated by land-owners. Against this has to be weighed three probabilities. First, a parliament dominated once again by the Wafd would probably have undone the land reform and held up other economic and social reforms. There would probably also have been no High Dam and a slower industrialization. Second, there would have been no negotiated agreement with the British over the Canal Zone base, because no political group, even if it wanted to, would have been strong enough to make such an agreement. Third, even if Naguib had won and the parliament had been re-created, it is probable that it before long would have broken down again in the throes of a revolution more violent and bloody than the 1952 coup. For the combination of social and economic pressures and of a possible resumption of the struggle against the British in the Canal Zone would almost certainly have been more than the old parties could cope with. Disillusion would have been widespread and the way would have been open for action by the Muslim Brothers and the Communists waiting in the wings..."
