Second-Rate Battleship
By 1923, the Royal Netherlands Navy had grown to the point where it could operate its fleet of ex-German warships. However, the threats it faced overseas were evolving, and the
Java (the former German battlecruiser
Lutzow) had proved to be something of a disappointment. Hastily completed in wartime and damaged in action at Stavanger, she was proving to be the least reliable of the four Dutch capital ships.
The Washington Treaty imposed few limits on the Dutch; their limits were more the realities of limited manpower and facilities. Since the war, they had completed two 6,700-ton cruisers armed with 5.9” guns, and design work had commenced on a 10,000-ton cruiser when news of the Japanese ‘Myoko’ class reached The Hague. Intelligence suggested an armament of ten 8” guns and a high speed, probably on a displacement of well over the 10,000 tons the Japanese had declared.
Aware of the inadequacies of the
Java, the Dutch government decided to build a larger vessel in place of the large cruiser. She would be built in Holland, but with major components contracted out to German firms, and use of battleship tonnage was quite acceptable, as the Netherlands had plenty of Treaty tonnage to spare. After consideration of a variety of design, the one chosen was a 658’ ship armed with nine German-built 24-cm guns in triple turrets, one forward and a superfiring pair aft, separated by a machinery room.
Armour consisted of a deep and extensive 6” belt, with 6” barbettes and turrets, a 2.5” deck and 1.5” torpedo bulkhead, all intended to resist 8” fire at any likely range.
Assisted by the lure of a low price for certain components, the German-Dutch design team were allowed to experiment, and the ship had 120,000shp on three shafts, with a 6,000hp auxiliary diesel engine on the centre shaft for cruising. Displacement was 18,950 tons Standard, and 22,800 tons Full Load. The
Eendracht was laid down in November 1923 and was completed in 1927, and proved to be as fast as was promised, achieving 32.1 knots on trials when only 450 tons off Full Load.
Across the Atlantic, the construction of the French and Italian light battleships had been noted and largely ignored, however the ‘Myokos’ and the
Eendracht had a far greater effect. These fast, powerful cruisers and cruiser-killers would be deployed on the periphery of America’s overseas territories. Meanwhile, the US Navy had wanted a battlecruiser force for many years, but in 1924, it only had two such ships; the
Lexington and the
Constellation.
However, the authorisation for their four sister-ships had never been formally cancelled, only their construction and financing, as it was considered impossible to build them under the restrictions imposed by the Treaty.
Through 1922 and ’23, the US Navy commissioned their two giant battlecruisers and studied various options as to how they might best be deployed. The reality was that they needed to operate as a pair in the face of strong foreign battlecruiser forces; the Japanese ‘Amagis’ or the British ‘Admirals’. Individually, they were strong ships, but were perhaps rather large for the role of reinforcing cruiser squadrons and dealing with the threat of ships such as
Myoko.
By the autumn of 1923, the Navy had once again concluded that the ‘battle scout’ showed great potential in counterbalancing foreign fleets, but that they would need more than two of them to do so effectively. Use of the existing authorisations made that possible, although for different reasons neither the Navy Department nor the Treasury were keen to build four 36,000-ton ‘small Lexingtons’.
By a combination of improved technology and gaming the Treaty, the US Navy would finally lay down the first pair light battlecruisers in 1924. A further pair would follow in 1925.
On such a small displacement as 23,000 tons, sacrifices had to be made and the ships’ torpedo protection was not up to the usual American standard. A very thin, three-layer version of the normal five-layer system was backed by just a ¾” bulkhead, with the intention of limiting damage rather than keeping it out of the ship entirely. However, the designers tried to ensure that no one (or even two) torpedo hits could ever cripple the ship, by alternating the machinery and fire rooms, as was being done in cruisers. A hit might knock one ‘unit’, but the others would be far away from the explosion and might therefore be unaffected.
Main armament was the subject of much debate, with arguments for four or six 16” guns ranged against eight or nine 14”. In the end, an arrangement of eight 14”/45 guns was selected, but for somewhat unfortunate reasons. Four or six guns was considered too few, and while the idea of nine guns in three turrets was attractive, the 14”/50 guns and their triple turrets were rejected, as they were proving to be miserably inaccurate in service, so much so that the lower-powered 45-calibre weapons were considered to be superior at the time the ships were being designed.
Less than a year after the ships were laid down, the problems with the 50-calibre guns were overcome, ironically thanks to the new shell that was being designed for the 14”/45 guns of the light battlecruisers. A scaled-down version of the ‘long’ (one ton) 16” shell, the new 14” shell was heavier and longer than the old one. Quite by accident, that was found to be partly the cause of the trouble, as the shorter old shells sometimes slipped back out into the chamber after they were loaded.
However, it was too late to change the design, and the ships would be built with eight 14”/45 guns, which could fire a 1,500-lb shell at 2,525 ft/sec, capable of penetrating a 12” vertical plate at 20,000 yards.
Armour was somewhat lighter than the Lexingtons, with a 436’ long, 14’ deep, 9” belt and a 2.5” deck, covering machinery and magazines in the usual American ‘all or nothing’ arrangement. However, this would be partially augmented by 1” splinter protection that ran along the edges of the upper deck for the entire length of the belt. Primarily intended to protect AA guns and keep out small bombs, it would be fitted as part of improvements to air defence, as permitted by the Treaty. Elsewhere, armour was relatively light by American standards, with 9” barbettes, 10” turret faces and thin 1” splinter protection to the secondary battery of ten 5” guns.
Several weights were omitted from the declared ‘Standard’ displacement, as the designers considered that they were not part of the equipment needed to make the ship ‘ready for battle’. These included the two scout aircraft, their fuel, cranes and stores, and there was an allocation of only 60 rounds-per-gun for both 14” and 5” armament, a saving of 340 tons over the magazines’ full capacity of 100 and 250 respectively.
The design came out at 23,060 tons, which the designers considered quite acceptable.
However, they then took advantage of the 3,000-ton modification allowance to retro-fit the ships with six 4” anti-aircraft guns, plus the weight of their magazines, hoists, spotting and sighting positions. The 1” deck and other details of splinter protection were added as part of these improvements. In the condition in which the ships would actually sail, true Standard displacement would be about 24,300 tons, while Full Load was close to 29,000 tons.
Power output was to be 108,000 shp using lightweight geared turbines and the fine, deep hull was intended to provide considerable speed. However, propulsive coefficient was somewhat disappointing and the ships were overweight, and so they never reached their design speed of 32 knots, except when run light. On trials in 1927, at a relatively realistic seagoing displacement of 27,050 tons, USS
Alaska achieved 31.43 knots with 114,200 shp, although it was noted that the machinery could probably have been forced harder.
In service they proved a bit inclined to roll, but were otherwise good steamers, capable of 30 knots in most weathers thanks to their high, flared bows.
It was originally proposed to use the names of the four cancelled ‘Lexingtons’, but there were objections to the use of the name USS
United States on a comparatively small ship, while the accidental loss of the
France a few years earlier had provided a further warning that naming vessels after the nation itself could have unfortunate drawbacks.
Nevertheless, the Navy did not consider them battleships, traditionally named after States of the Union, nor were they ordinary cruisers, named after towns and cities. Ultimately, a compromise was reached; larger than a town, smaller than a state, and the lead ship, USS
Columbia, would give her name to the class.
The Italians had been first to take advantage of a loophole in the Treaty, although through a combination of financial constraints and the need to use existing equipment meant that they hadn’t exploited it as fully as they might have done.
Quite independently, but a little later, the French had taken full advantage of the ‘Light Battleship’ clause, while the Americans had stretched it to a point at which they were arguably cheating, by making almost immediate use of the 3,000-ton growth allowance that was allowed under the Treaty.
Unfortunately for all of them, the British would then choose to show that they were no strangers to bending the rules.