Versailles was a very particular treaty, the treaty was so harsh because the French wanted to humiliate the Germans more than they had been humiliated in the Great War, this was a revenge and a tentative to not get invaded for a third time by limiting the German army too 100k men.
The Germans don't really have a reason to humiliate the French as they have already done that by defeating them and occupying the Northern part of the country for the entire war. This would probably mean a lighter peace deal than Versailles, obviously it would be a humiliation for France but not some insane reparations like OTL, also the reparations OTL were so harsh on Germany because it was the only CP that had an economy that could pay back all of this money.
So violating this treaty is much harder than violating Versailles, the French really don't have a reason to violate the treaty as round three is certainly lost and the Germans want to recover from the Great War not start a new one.
IMHO Germany had as much motivation to make the peace treaty after a victory as 'humiliating' as the french IOTL. During the last somewhat over 100 years french rulers had 3 times attacked german lands
Napoleon I (Rheinbund 1806 and its further encroachments/occupations until 1813)
Napolen III and ofc the
III. Republique (as the german understood it being 'forced' by encirclement and 'forced' to take arms against France once again)
Three times french arms 'failed' to defeat german soldiers in the end and obviously the french nation needed to be contained in a much more thorough way it was the last times. Not to forget, the german populace esp. at home- as it 'feeled' it - had suffered more than the french populace esp. at home and as a whole with its access to food and other goodies from abroad.
Nevertheless ...
The german civilian politicians of the goverments of Bethmann-Hollweg as well as Georg Michaelis as well as Georg von Hertling as well as Max von Baden were much more concilliatorily minded than the nationalist bawlers of tirpitzian or ludendorffian kind. These politicians were open to almost everthing to reestablish relations with France even a 'white-peace' outcome esp. regarding territorial changes on the continent. During the war heir demands were constantly winded down though changed somewhat in parallel to changes on the battlefield admittingly.
And NO:
the so called 'September program' never was a 'program'. As said the goverment politicians in charge were VERY flexible regarding demands on France.
And also NO:
the 'dynamic duo' of H-L (or otherwise called the mythical 'silent dictatorship') had not much of a say in diplomatics if any (regardless their numerous attempts to best the politicians there).
They were able to change the heads of goverment but - unfortunatly for them - these did NOT simply followed their orders. ... quite the opposite as the numerous and quick changes after Bethmann-Hollweg IMHO strongly indicate.
Regarding reparations ...
Worth of war bonds with the last of september 1917 (
'peace' per OP 1917/1918) : ~ 144 billion marks probably be the base of demands. I would assume the germans - to make it also more 'digestible' - 'open' to account other ... 'benefits 'n services' against like ...
estimated worth of certain colonies,
estimated worth of economical rights within the Longwy-Briey basin ... or even additional mining operations,
some 'special' concessions in the remaind french colonies for i.e. mining and or railways, etc., etc.
therewith reducing the actual sum to be paid in kind which probably - similar to 1871 and the german delivery of goods postwar IOTL - would/could be paid in delivery of other goods as well.
Even if the to be paid sum could be reduced to ... dunno 100 ? ... 75 ? ... 50 billions with an according payment plan it would be an unheard of sum (
though still far from what the Entente demanded).
Militarily ...
French fortresses - as the german ones IOTL - would VEERY likely have to be grinded. ... right to build new ones far more westernly ... I'm not sure what the politicians would vote for tbh ...
Troop reducement also VEERY likely though I have no idea down to what number, for its 'roudness' about 100.000 ? ... 200.000 men in metropolitan France? Additional colonial troops would very likely be allowed too though with some further restriction esp. regarding northern africa. This part would be a very hard thing to negotiate. IIRC even the militaries were somewhat malleable and more realistic reagrding postwar military 'needs' even of a defeated France.
So, yes: I would agree that after a german victory the demands of the treaty could/would be less severe than the ToV to be at least somewhat better 'digestible' for the french politicians - in the minds of the german politician (
who due to their 'legalistic' proveniance and claim for acceptability would insist on 'real' negotiations contrary to what happened IOTL in Versailles)... though still conveived as by the french populace and french national propaganda esp. as utterly humiliating.
... about the 'reasonability' of such nationalistic circles regarding some revanche again ... despite the last failed attempts ...
But I would agree that every french postwar goverment ITTL would do its very best to avoid - at least for the next 5 to 10 years ... I would assume ... how long is the half-worth time of a french goverment of the III.republic again?