Economic very broad strokes, long term, with a stagnant India and China, one thing I can add is is you wouldn't see the demographic transformations that overtook China and India early in our timeline.
In our world, you saw Asian demographic growth slow down in the late 19th century, just like in industrialising Europe and the British colonies in North America. That leads to our present day where Europe+North America has about 2x the population of China+India+Rest of Asia, and although the world is centered on Asia, the North Atlantic sphere is still relatively important. The pattern's been, everywhere, that as people get richer, child mortality lowers and people choose to have fewer children.
In another world where the industrial revolutions in Asia happened later, demographic slowdown would happen much later, you might see China+India+Rest of Asia reach very large populations relative to the North Atlantic sphere (OOC: in OTL, about 4x in 2012), and where actually when you take into account population growth in South America and Africa, most of the population is not in Asia.
In time, once these large populations industrialised and converged roughly in term of income (at least to the relatively small regional differences we see in our world), you'd see a much more Asia centered world than our world or the historical norm!
Another thing that strikes is that the world wouldn't be more globalized, exactly, but have a different shape. In our world, industrialisation in each broad region (Indian, Chinese, Euro-North Atlantic) was fed by fairly local demand within each region, and industrialisers were not competitive outside it.
(Geopolitically, this was much enforced by the dividing up of the world into rival multipolar armed camps, during the 20th century "Cold War"!)
In the another world, late industrialisers might try and develop a global export led model of industrialisation, using cheaper local wages as an advantage, and ultimately this would move production from the early industrialisers to cheaper late entering countries, and deindustrialising early industrialisers. In our time line this has happened to a limited extent with the Spanish colonies in South America, but largely hasn't, because so much of the world industrialised at the same time (plus automation)...
Put them together and we'd be looking at world which, at our point in their timeline, would be Eurocentric in terms of a relatively much richer Europe and North America, but which would be contrasted to much younger and larger populations in Asia and find that as Asia industrialised, it could be facing a sharp transition to world order where Europeans hold much less power than anything we've ever seen in our time line.