In August 1941 the UK and USSR invaded Iran out of fears that Reza Shah was allowing too much German influence in that nation. On September 16, Reza Shah was forced to abdicate. It was at first doubtful that with his abdication, the Pahlavi dynasty could continue. According to Elton L. Daniel, *The History of Iran* (p. 141), "the British and Russians toyed with the idea of restoring the Qajar monarchy, but unable to agree to a candidate or find one who would accept under such disgraceful conditions, they finally consented to continue the dynasty by transferring the crown to Reza Shah's son Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi. Reza Shah himself was sent into exile, going finally to South Africa, where he died in 1944." http://books.google.com/books?id=qmVUg_qHr2AC&pg=PA143
See also Cosroe Chaqueri, "Did the Soviets Play a Role in Founding the Tudeh Party in Iran?", http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/cmr_1252-6576_1999_num_40_3_1013: "It is important to recall that, while the Soviets at this time supported the idea of establishing a republic in Iran, the British wished to return the Qajar dynasty to the throne. It was only after the meeting in London between Sir Anthony Eden and the son of the last Qajar Crown Prince Mohammed Hasan Mirza, the next Qajar prince in line for kingship, Prince Hamid, that the British decided in favor of Mohammed Reza, because the Qajar candidate turned out to be illiterate in Persian."
As of 1941 the Qajar Pretender was Mohammad Hassan Mirza. However, making him Shah would only be a short-term solution, because he was to die on January 7, 1943. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammad_Hassan_Mirza The British had some interest in his son, Hamid Mirza Qajar (1918-1988) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamid_Mirza who served in the Royal Navy under the name David Drummond:
Q. Did people address you as "Your Highness", "Prince" or something?
A. No, no. No, no, no. Only if they wanted to pull our legs. In any event, during the years I was at sea in the Navy, I wasn't even Kadjar, I was David Drummond. For years and years, I responded to the name of David Drummond. I'd been asked to assume an English-sounding name by Sir Anthony Eden because, at that time, the British recognized Reza Shah as the official Shah of Iran, and it would have been a little embarrassing to all concerned if I had been serving in the Royal Navy under my own name.
Q. How did you happen to choose this name?
A. It came out of the telephone book.
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~iohp/kadjar2.html
Harold Nicolson gave an amusing account of his meeting with on September 13, 1941 with Mohammad Hassan Mirza: Nicolson asked Mohammad Hassan about his son, who had "just passed out of the *Worcester*":
"Il s'appelle Drummond," murmured the Prince.
"But what on earth," I ask.
"C'est un nom ecossais," he explains.
"Does he speak Persian?" I ask.
"Pas un mot," he replies delightedly, "pas un seul mot."
It is evident that this does not go down very well.
"Mais il pourrait bien l'apprendre," adds the King of Kings.
I fear my luncheon is not a success from the political point of view.
(Quoted in Denis Wright, *The Persians Amongst the English: Episodes in Anglo-Persian History*, p. 214.)
Obviously Hamid's lack of Persian was a handicap. (As he later explained, "The reason I didn't speak Persian was because in the family, in Azarbaijan, the language was Turkish, and it continued." http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~iohp/kadjar.html Later, of course, in England, he was educated in English.) Still, as his father remarked, he could learn the language--and did; indeed, he eventually worked in Iran despite the fact that the Pahlavi dynasty was in power: "We'd never abdicated the throne, ever. But there was no law against us, I think." http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~iohp/kadjar2.html
One has to remember that the eventual decision of the British and Soviets to let Mohammad Reza Pahlavi assume the throne was a reluctant one. They feared that he shared his father's pro-German bias. Wright (p. 214) quotes a British source referring to him as "a bad lot hand in glove with the German legation." Still, they thought that in view of Mohammad Hassan's long exile and his son's lack of Persian, letting Mohammad Reza Pahlavi become Shah but carefully watching him and restricting his power was the best option. (It was also feared that if the Qajar dynasty were restored, "the hundreds of Qajars still living in Persia would be a major embarrassment." Wright, p. 214) But it still seems to me that their decsion could have gone the other way, assuming that Hamid would agree to learn Persian.
What would the effects of a Qajar dynasty restoration be? In the short run, they might be slight because, as Elton L. Daniel notes, *The History of Iran* (pp. 143-4):
"Although the British and Russians had opted not to restore the Qajar monarchy after their invasion of Iran, they had effectively turned back the clock to the late Qajar era. In many ways it was as if Reza Shah had accomplished nothing. Foreign troops were again on Iranian soil, the country was divided into British and Soviet zones, foreign ambassadors dictated essential policies, the tribes brought out weapons they had hidden away and reasserted their autonomy, demands for ethnic and provincial separatism were revived, the economy was in shambles, and factionalism was rampant. Imprisoned communists were released and, with Soviet support, founded the influential Tudeh Party. A host of politicians from the pre-Reza Shah period resurfaced, many of them bent on revenge..."
In spite of this, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi survived and after World War II became far more than a figurehead. Could Hamid Mirza Qajar have done the same thing? I doubt it; he would be seen as too much a puppet of the British, and would not have the support in the Iranian armed forces that the Pahlavis did. Republicanism in Iran would become stronger than it was in OTL--and it was pretty strong in OTL in the early 1950's--at least if Hamid tried to exercise real power. You might say that this wouldn't matter if the British and Americans supported him, but while it is true that the Shah's triumph over Mossadeq in OTL was in part made possible by Anglo- American support, it is also true that there was considerable genuine popular support for the Shah (however much the CIA helped organize it) which there might not be for a Shah Hamid. (Of course in 1979 everyone in Iran said they had opposed the Shah and supported Mossadeq in 1953, but it would be naive to take such claims at face value.)
So much for restoring the Qajar dynasty in 1941. But here is more to it: some British and Iranian politicians toyed with the idea as late as 1952! I learned this from a reading of Gholem Reza Afkhami's book *The Life and Times of the Shah* (University of California Press 2009):
"The question of replacing a Pahlavi with a Qajar, however, would recur several times during the 1940s *and early 1950s* [my emphasis--DT], though the then pretender, Hassan's son Hamid, had taken the name Drummond, enlisted in the merchant marine, and become a British subject, much to [Harold] Nicholson's amazement. 'How it came about that the King of Kings was so careless about his dynastic progeny as to allow his Valiahd [crown prince] to become a member of the British Merchant Navy and to speak no language except English passes my comprehension,' observed Nicholson to Eden as he nonetheless recommended Mohammad Hassan for the throne." p. 67 http://books.google.com/books?id=M9xbJQyFMe8C&pg=PA67
Later (pp. 139-40), discussing former Prime Minister Qavam's http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmad_Qavam attempt at a comeback in 1952 (Qavam thought that with British support he could oust Mossadegh) Afkahmi writes:
"[Julian] Amery [a British Conservative MP and supporter of the Qajars] met with Qavam in the latter's hotel in Paris around the 20th of March. Qavam was not alone; he had also invited Prince Hamid Qajar, 'the Pretender to the Throne,' as Amery reported. The invitation may have been with Amery's prior knowledge and approval, though Amery does not say so in his report. Amery knew and was fond of Prince Hamid (alias Captain David Drummond) and had in fact sought to have hin reinstated on the Iranian throne when Reza Shah resigned, if Hamid's father, Prince Hassan (whom Amery's father, Leopold, supported) proved unacceptable. But the matter had become irrelevant once Mohammad Reza Shah was formerly sworn in as king.
"As [Selwyn] Lloyd had instructed, Amery assured Qavam that the British government 'would regard his return to power as a change for the better' and that the American and British views 'were very much closer than they had been.'...[After discussing how he intended to solve the oil problem once he returned to power] Qavam now raised the question of the dynasty. He did not trust the shah, having suffered from his intrigues before. It might be necesary for him to change the regime and restore Prince Hamid, because a republic would not suit the Iranians. 'What would be the British reaction to this?' he asked Amery. 'We [have] been rather disappointed by the present shah,' replied Amery, 'and it would be a matter of complete indifference to us whether he stayed or went.' At this point Amery asked Prince Hamid to leave the room, and when alone he asked Qavam if he was serious about the regime change. Qavam was serious. 'Admittedly,' said Qavam, 'the old dynasty had ended badly, but Prince Hamid was a much better man than the present shah and his English education and connections might make for better relations with London.' Amery was left with the impression that Qavam was 'attracted by the idea of putting in a shah who would be dependent upon him, at least in the early stages of his reign, and who might provide a useful link with London.'
"Amery asked Selwyn Lloyd to show his letter to Anthony Eden, 'as I have written to him previously about Qavam.' Lloyd apparently did. On 16 April Eden cabled a telegram 'of particular secrecy' to the embassy in Tehran, sending a copy of Amery's report and advising that Qavam would return to Iran to take power and that he would get in touch with the embassy soon after his return. On the question of the dynasty, however, Eden demurred:
"'While we certainly have not been impressed by the shah's recent performance, we find it hard to believe that we should gain by an attempt to restore the Qajars, which would probably split the country or at least very seriously weaken it. Moreover, we are by no means certain that if it came to a show of force between the shah and Qavam the latter would win, and we should be blamed by the shah even if we had in fact given Qavam no encouragement...I hope that you will have an opportunity to make it clear to Qavam that we could not countenance any attempt on his part to restore the Qajars and that on the contrary we should expect him to do his best to help support the shah. We for our part would do our best to further good relations between the shah and the prime minister.'" http://books.google.com/books?id=M9xbJQyFMe8C&pg=PA139
As it turned out, the issue of whether a successful Qavam government would restore the Qajars became academic. Mossadaq did resign after the Majlis denied his request for full powers, and Qavam was named as his successor, but only for a few days. Mossadeq was just too popular at the time. Neither the left nor the right nor the shah liked Qavam, and the British weren't too enthusiastic about him, either. There were massive anti-Qavam demonstrations and riots, and Mossadeq was soon back in power.
So it does seem that we have to go back to World War II to get a Qajar restoration. Here I agree with Nicolson: If Mohammad Hassan wanted the dynasty to be restored, he should have educated his son to know Persian and not to be quite so blatantly British--a shah who could have good relations with Britain was one thing, but an actual British sailor would just be too obviously a British puppet to be politically acceptable in Iran. If not for this, there would actually be a plausible case for the restoration of the Qajars. They were admittedly unpopular toward the end of their reign, but they were after all a relatively well-established dynasty compared to the Pahlavis, whose dynasty only dated back to the 1920's and who had made their own share of enemies, especially among the religious.
See also Cosroe Chaqueri, "Did the Soviets Play a Role in Founding the Tudeh Party in Iran?", http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/cmr_1252-6576_1999_num_40_3_1013: "It is important to recall that, while the Soviets at this time supported the idea of establishing a republic in Iran, the British wished to return the Qajar dynasty to the throne. It was only after the meeting in London between Sir Anthony Eden and the son of the last Qajar Crown Prince Mohammed Hasan Mirza, the next Qajar prince in line for kingship, Prince Hamid, that the British decided in favor of Mohammed Reza, because the Qajar candidate turned out to be illiterate in Persian."
As of 1941 the Qajar Pretender was Mohammad Hassan Mirza. However, making him Shah would only be a short-term solution, because he was to die on January 7, 1943. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammad_Hassan_Mirza The British had some interest in his son, Hamid Mirza Qajar (1918-1988) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamid_Mirza who served in the Royal Navy under the name David Drummond:
Q. Did people address you as "Your Highness", "Prince" or something?
A. No, no. No, no, no. Only if they wanted to pull our legs. In any event, during the years I was at sea in the Navy, I wasn't even Kadjar, I was David Drummond. For years and years, I responded to the name of David Drummond. I'd been asked to assume an English-sounding name by Sir Anthony Eden because, at that time, the British recognized Reza Shah as the official Shah of Iran, and it would have been a little embarrassing to all concerned if I had been serving in the Royal Navy under my own name.
Q. How did you happen to choose this name?
A. It came out of the telephone book.
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~iohp/kadjar2.html
Harold Nicolson gave an amusing account of his meeting with on September 13, 1941 with Mohammad Hassan Mirza: Nicolson asked Mohammad Hassan about his son, who had "just passed out of the *Worcester*":
"Il s'appelle Drummond," murmured the Prince.
"But what on earth," I ask.
"C'est un nom ecossais," he explains.
"Does he speak Persian?" I ask.
"Pas un mot," he replies delightedly, "pas un seul mot."
It is evident that this does not go down very well.
"Mais il pourrait bien l'apprendre," adds the King of Kings.
I fear my luncheon is not a success from the political point of view.
(Quoted in Denis Wright, *The Persians Amongst the English: Episodes in Anglo-Persian History*, p. 214.)
Obviously Hamid's lack of Persian was a handicap. (As he later explained, "The reason I didn't speak Persian was because in the family, in Azarbaijan, the language was Turkish, and it continued." http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~iohp/kadjar.html Later, of course, in England, he was educated in English.) Still, as his father remarked, he could learn the language--and did; indeed, he eventually worked in Iran despite the fact that the Pahlavi dynasty was in power: "We'd never abdicated the throne, ever. But there was no law against us, I think." http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~iohp/kadjar2.html
One has to remember that the eventual decision of the British and Soviets to let Mohammad Reza Pahlavi assume the throne was a reluctant one. They feared that he shared his father's pro-German bias. Wright (p. 214) quotes a British source referring to him as "a bad lot hand in glove with the German legation." Still, they thought that in view of Mohammad Hassan's long exile and his son's lack of Persian, letting Mohammad Reza Pahlavi become Shah but carefully watching him and restricting his power was the best option. (It was also feared that if the Qajar dynasty were restored, "the hundreds of Qajars still living in Persia would be a major embarrassment." Wright, p. 214) But it still seems to me that their decsion could have gone the other way, assuming that Hamid would agree to learn Persian.
What would the effects of a Qajar dynasty restoration be? In the short run, they might be slight because, as Elton L. Daniel notes, *The History of Iran* (pp. 143-4):
"Although the British and Russians had opted not to restore the Qajar monarchy after their invasion of Iran, they had effectively turned back the clock to the late Qajar era. In many ways it was as if Reza Shah had accomplished nothing. Foreign troops were again on Iranian soil, the country was divided into British and Soviet zones, foreign ambassadors dictated essential policies, the tribes brought out weapons they had hidden away and reasserted their autonomy, demands for ethnic and provincial separatism were revived, the economy was in shambles, and factionalism was rampant. Imprisoned communists were released and, with Soviet support, founded the influential Tudeh Party. A host of politicians from the pre-Reza Shah period resurfaced, many of them bent on revenge..."
In spite of this, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi survived and after World War II became far more than a figurehead. Could Hamid Mirza Qajar have done the same thing? I doubt it; he would be seen as too much a puppet of the British, and would not have the support in the Iranian armed forces that the Pahlavis did. Republicanism in Iran would become stronger than it was in OTL--and it was pretty strong in OTL in the early 1950's--at least if Hamid tried to exercise real power. You might say that this wouldn't matter if the British and Americans supported him, but while it is true that the Shah's triumph over Mossadeq in OTL was in part made possible by Anglo- American support, it is also true that there was considerable genuine popular support for the Shah (however much the CIA helped organize it) which there might not be for a Shah Hamid. (Of course in 1979 everyone in Iran said they had opposed the Shah and supported Mossadeq in 1953, but it would be naive to take such claims at face value.)
So much for restoring the Qajar dynasty in 1941. But here is more to it: some British and Iranian politicians toyed with the idea as late as 1952! I learned this from a reading of Gholem Reza Afkhami's book *The Life and Times of the Shah* (University of California Press 2009):
"The question of replacing a Pahlavi with a Qajar, however, would recur several times during the 1940s *and early 1950s* [my emphasis--DT], though the then pretender, Hassan's son Hamid, had taken the name Drummond, enlisted in the merchant marine, and become a British subject, much to [Harold] Nicholson's amazement. 'How it came about that the King of Kings was so careless about his dynastic progeny as to allow his Valiahd [crown prince] to become a member of the British Merchant Navy and to speak no language except English passes my comprehension,' observed Nicholson to Eden as he nonetheless recommended Mohammad Hassan for the throne." p. 67 http://books.google.com/books?id=M9xbJQyFMe8C&pg=PA67
Later (pp. 139-40), discussing former Prime Minister Qavam's http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmad_Qavam attempt at a comeback in 1952 (Qavam thought that with British support he could oust Mossadegh) Afkahmi writes:
"[Julian] Amery [a British Conservative MP and supporter of the Qajars] met with Qavam in the latter's hotel in Paris around the 20th of March. Qavam was not alone; he had also invited Prince Hamid Qajar, 'the Pretender to the Throne,' as Amery reported. The invitation may have been with Amery's prior knowledge and approval, though Amery does not say so in his report. Amery knew and was fond of Prince Hamid (alias Captain David Drummond) and had in fact sought to have hin reinstated on the Iranian throne when Reza Shah resigned, if Hamid's father, Prince Hassan (whom Amery's father, Leopold, supported) proved unacceptable. But the matter had become irrelevant once Mohammad Reza Shah was formerly sworn in as king.
"As [Selwyn] Lloyd had instructed, Amery assured Qavam that the British government 'would regard his return to power as a change for the better' and that the American and British views 'were very much closer than they had been.'...[After discussing how he intended to solve the oil problem once he returned to power] Qavam now raised the question of the dynasty. He did not trust the shah, having suffered from his intrigues before. It might be necesary for him to change the regime and restore Prince Hamid, because a republic would not suit the Iranians. 'What would be the British reaction to this?' he asked Amery. 'We [have] been rather disappointed by the present shah,' replied Amery, 'and it would be a matter of complete indifference to us whether he stayed or went.' At this point Amery asked Prince Hamid to leave the room, and when alone he asked Qavam if he was serious about the regime change. Qavam was serious. 'Admittedly,' said Qavam, 'the old dynasty had ended badly, but Prince Hamid was a much better man than the present shah and his English education and connections might make for better relations with London.' Amery was left with the impression that Qavam was 'attracted by the idea of putting in a shah who would be dependent upon him, at least in the early stages of his reign, and who might provide a useful link with London.'
"Amery asked Selwyn Lloyd to show his letter to Anthony Eden, 'as I have written to him previously about Qavam.' Lloyd apparently did. On 16 April Eden cabled a telegram 'of particular secrecy' to the embassy in Tehran, sending a copy of Amery's report and advising that Qavam would return to Iran to take power and that he would get in touch with the embassy soon after his return. On the question of the dynasty, however, Eden demurred:
"'While we certainly have not been impressed by the shah's recent performance, we find it hard to believe that we should gain by an attempt to restore the Qajars, which would probably split the country or at least very seriously weaken it. Moreover, we are by no means certain that if it came to a show of force between the shah and Qavam the latter would win, and we should be blamed by the shah even if we had in fact given Qavam no encouragement...I hope that you will have an opportunity to make it clear to Qavam that we could not countenance any attempt on his part to restore the Qajars and that on the contrary we should expect him to do his best to help support the shah. We for our part would do our best to further good relations between the shah and the prime minister.'" http://books.google.com/books?id=M9xbJQyFMe8C&pg=PA139
As it turned out, the issue of whether a successful Qavam government would restore the Qajars became academic. Mossadaq did resign after the Majlis denied his request for full powers, and Qavam was named as his successor, but only for a few days. Mossadeq was just too popular at the time. Neither the left nor the right nor the shah liked Qavam, and the British weren't too enthusiastic about him, either. There were massive anti-Qavam demonstrations and riots, and Mossadeq was soon back in power.
So it does seem that we have to go back to World War II to get a Qajar restoration. Here I agree with Nicolson: If Mohammad Hassan wanted the dynasty to be restored, he should have educated his son to know Persian and not to be quite so blatantly British--a shah who could have good relations with Britain was one thing, but an actual British sailor would just be too obviously a British puppet to be politically acceptable in Iran. If not for this, there would actually be a plausible case for the restoration of the Qajars. They were admittedly unpopular toward the end of their reign, but they were after all a relatively well-established dynasty compared to the Pahlavis, whose dynasty only dated back to the 1920's and who had made their own share of enemies, especially among the religious.
