The IJN has 8 carriers in this scenario, and because the air attacks were concentrated on the airfields, the striking power is fairly intact. The US Fleet is moving out to sea in a confused fashion, warships and fleet train, and is being challenged with an air-sea battle under exceptionally poor conditions. The only real wild cards are Enterprise and Lexington.
Could Yamamoto have pulled off an even more devastating PH attack?
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The IJN has 8 carriers in this scenario, and because the air attacks were concentrated on the airfields, the striking power is fairly intact. The US Fleet is moving out to sea in a confused fashion, warships and fleet train, and is being challenged with an air-sea battle under exceptionally poor conditions. The only real wild cards are Enterprise and Lexington.
How would the brawl take place at night? The airattack was in the morning. Are the battleships to wait until nightfall to attack? That would mean they can't really use spotterplanes, will have more trouble neutralising the coastal artillery and give the USN half a day to reorganise. Or are you suggesting the brawl would last into the night. If it does that, it's quite likely the Japanese take significant damage as well.
Cooler heads say stay in port. The USN does not know it, but the Kates have only 50 torpedoes that can be dropped in the shallow water of the harbour. Running to sea does seem like the default position when under this kind of attack, but if it is known that the IJN battleline is loose, staying in port and letting the AA and coastal artillery do its work is the smarter move.
I note there are so many scenarios being simultaneously discussed here that folks are arguing at cross-purposes.
It just occurred to me that it would be funny if Enterprise and/or Lexington stumbled across the IJN fleet oilers and sank them all, while the KB and battleline are distracted by attacking Oahu over and over.
I agree but I am sticking with my original scenario of KB airstrikes mainly aimed to take out US airpower and then using the IJN battleline during the late afternoon to shell PH from offshore and/or take on any USN ships that do depart the harbor.
And all those who continue to ask why, it is to really devastate PH as a base and to permanently destroy ships in the fleet. Basically, a more satisfying victory to commence a war
LEXINGTON is too far away to participate but ENTERPRISE is close enough to launch attacks on the IJN surface forces but will face fighters from ZUIHO and RYUJO (and I would make sure both carriers are carrying A6M fighters here for this scenario meaning beg, borrow or steal them from wherever possible before departing home waters)
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Well since we are back to the first senario and Handwavium, I will sortie the fleet by noon and sail south I will link up with the Enterprise task Force and the Task Force Near Johnston Island. Once Linked up since I have mostly full fuel tanks (95%) as stated in the Action Reports. By the time I round up the Fleet the Japanese will be on fumes. I can return to port When Enterprise gets really low on fuel and hits bingo status. In the end you get to bomb the port miss the vast majority of the fleet. I lose my job just like Kimmel, but I preserve some really old battleships only fit for being used in shore Bombardment later in the war, and you get to commit seppaku when you return to Japan for failing to sink the fleet
And what to stop the KB carrier airwings from hitting those old battleships as they are maneuvering in the harbor and after they have exited? They won't have any air cover to protect them.
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They won't need aircover your first wave expended all ordinance on the airfields. Your 2nd wave will be mopping up the airfields and harbor facilities. The smoke from the burning tank farms on both sides of the channel will obscure the fleet escaping to the south. Through more handwavium enterprise will provide CAP over the fleet. The battleships with radar will see all aircraft out to 50 miles. An engagement at night can be lead by the radar equipped ship's, illuminating the closest targets for destruction. See more handwavium.
Fine you win because I really don't care anymore...I am growing quite weary of this thread
There's a very big difference in skill between the battle fleet at Pearl, who had their prewar crews and were fresh off their prewar training, and the cruisers at Savo, who had had their crews gutted for new construction, hadn't trained in surface combat in months, and had been thrown together without any practice in working together.
The USN's struggles in surface combat off Guadalcanal are at best 25% because of the deficiencies of prewar doctrine and training. Most of it was the necessities of war shooting their skill and cohesion in the foot.
Entirely possible, with these provisos:
While still inside the harbour, there will be quite a density of ship and ground based AA by the afternoon, likely warned by radar, so the attack runs by strike aircraft will be much more difficult than the OTL first wave, and likely still more difficult than the OTL second wave. There were a maximum of 50 torpedoes that could be dropped in the shallow water of the harbour. These could be used against BBs, or any other ship, or even the dry dock gates, but only 50 shots, without the element of surprise. You might get some BB hits this way, but torpedoes are the only weapon that will hurt a BB. The dive bombers did not have bombs heavy enough to penetrate the decks of the BBs. The B5N level bombers are not going to hit a maneuvering ship with their 800kg armour piercing bombs. Those bombs need to be dropped from 10,000 feet to penetrate the BB decks, and you would not get a hit vs. a maneuvering ship from that altitude.
Outside the harbour, once the USN ships are out of shallow water and out of range of the land based AA, things would be easier for the IJN strike planes. The ship based AA would still be something of a threat, but it will not be as concentrated. The torpedo bombers will be able to drop as many torpedoes as they have aircraft. The level bombers will not get any hits. Still, it would be worth pressing a coordinated attack with dive bombers and torpedo planes, since the dive bombers will distract and maybe suppress or destroy some of the AA, and will distract the ships from trying to rake the torpedo attacks. The dive bombers will work just fine against any ship with less deck armour than a BB.
I think the greatest obstacle to mounting this kind of attack is coordinating the timing. The KB needs to recover the first and second wave strikes, refuel and rearm them, launch and have them arrive just at the right time to be useful, and then have enough daylight left to recover them. The closer the KB comes to Hawaii, the easier this will be. They could hang around the next day if they wanted, and maybe catch Enterprise in the bargain, but I recall they were worried about fuel and how extended they were OTL.
As this "interesting" thread continues to meander, the original question should be revisited, "Could Yamamoto have pulled off an even more devastating PH attack?"
I believe the answer is a resounding YES!, but for which side? Given the historic success despite many challenges and missteps, the IJN had fantastic good luck and did as well as could be realistically expected, much better than they even thought possible.
Now, given this "What If" scenario, could things have been even more devastating? I think definitely yes, but not for the US. Most of the expanded IJN fleet would end up out of fuel and ammo far from home. Yamamoto would have lost his fleet and the war in one bold reckless move with little long term gain. In the end, Seppuku .
The P-38s don't have to wait 16 months to hunt him down.
I believe the answer is a resounding YES!, but for which side? Given the historic success despite many challenges and missteps, the IJN had fantastic good luck and did as well as could be realistically expected, much better than they even thought possible.
Now, given this "What If" scenario, could things have been even more devastating? I think definitely yes, but not for the US. Most of the expanded IJN fleet would end up out of fuel and ammo far from home. Yamamoto would have lost his fleet and the war in one bold reckless move with little long term gain. In the end, Seppuku .
The P-38s don't have to wait 16 months to hunt him down.
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It would be interesting yo discuss a few of these alternatives. The surface engagement one is of interest to me as are a few others. However this topic is predicated on a more devastating PH attack. And most of these alternatives do not create a better (for the IJN)
As for the idea that the USN is just going to drunkenly leave the harbor and let the IJN blow them out of the water one at a time is frankly insane.
It was well known prior to PH that an enemy fleet could surprise a fleet in its home harbor. This was a known hazard and as such this was planed for and trained for. Go look at the Royal Navy and the French Navy just a bit early in the war, if you need an example of this actually happening.
So you are NOT going to get a Keystone Cobs type of exist from the harbor running into the prepared IJN battle line,
Note this is made worse for the IJN for a couple reasons, 1) the IJN battle line has yo take time to close on land as it can’t get close before the Air attack as that would ruin the surprise. So they won’t just suddenly be there. So the USN has time to get steam up get organized and get ready to depart in an orderly fashion. And 2) if you are going yo insist that the IJN battle line stays out of range of the shore guns then you are giving the USN battle line room to maneuver and get organized.
As for the idea that the USN is just going to drunkenly leave the harbor and let the IJN blow them out of the water one at a time is frankly insane.
It was well known prior to PH that an enemy fleet could surprise a fleet in its home harbor. This was a known hazard and as such this was planed for and trained for. Go look at the Royal Navy and the French Navy just a bit early in the war, if you need an example of this actually happening.
So you are NOT going to get a Keystone Cobs type of exist from the harbor running into the prepared IJN battle line,
Note this is made worse for the IJN for a couple reasons, 1) the IJN battle line has yo take time to close on land as it can’t get close before the Air attack as that would ruin the surprise. So they won’t just suddenly be there. So the USN has time to get steam up get organized and get ready to depart in an orderly fashion. And 2) if you are going yo insist that the IJN battle line stays out of range of the shore guns then you are giving the USN battle line room to maneuver and get organized.
Band in China
Banned
I mean it is Japanese doctrine that America drunkenly stumbles towards Japan, gets defeated, then sues for peace like the effeminate white dough they are.
From a delusional point of view it makes perfect sense. The only problem would be that it required the the Americans to also believed it.
I think the 'run out of fuel' argument is wrong. If the IJN is coming, fuel states are not going to help the USN escape the predicament.
Here,
Is the actual fuel consumption statistics of all major US warship classes in WW2 (with the annoying exception of the Yorktown Class). I compiled this information to give a general pattern of fuel consumption of general classes of US warships by type as follows.
Type.............BB......CA........DD........CV
12kt.............50.......33.........20..........44
14kt.............40.......26.........16..........35
18kt.............24.......16.........10..........20
24kt.............9.4......7.5........4.6..........8
26kt.............5.9.....5.8.........3.4...........5.5
Range at.......18kt...............24kt.....14kt
BB................10,000............5,400
CV.................9,936.............6,600
CA................6,900.............4,300
DD...............4,320.............2,650....5,376
- Both sides in this fight are starting about 2,000nm from a friendly harbor, (IJN to Marshalls, USN to California or Alaska).
- The IJN striking force was fully topped up as of Dec 6th, 6am, it then ran south for 24 hours at 24 kt. The carriers and cruisers appear to have burned their extra stored oil at this point, the destroyers did not. So the IJN cruisers, battleships and carriers are still topped up as of 6am December 7th, the destroyers are not.
- The IJN carriers would not run slower than 24kt during the day, would not need to run faster than 18kt at night.
- IJN surface forces would probably run at 24kt during the battle, slowing to 18kt after a few days.
So, at 6am on December 7th, the IJN warships are basically restricted by a 30% range penalty, (6 days needed to reach the Marshalls at 14kt, plus a 15% fuel reserve), (IJN destroyers have a 50% range penalty because they needed a higher % of their fuel to reach the Marshalls):
BB - 3,800 miles of pursuit, (6.5 days)
CA - 3,000 miles of pursuit (5 days)
CV - 5 days, (about the same as the cruisers)
DD's; 1.3 days (2.3 days fighting with ability to withdraw to Marshalls at 14kt with fuel reserve, 1 day burned on the run in).
DD's: 2.3 days (assuming a willingness to push the destroyers to a 50% fuel load before breaking off to refuel).
Put this way, the fuel problem are the destroyers. By the time they reach Oahu, they only have 16 hours of fighting time before they can no longer reach the Marshall Islands without refueling from a warship or an oiler. At the point where they cannot return to Marshalls and have a fuel reserve, they will still be at about 65% of their fuel load, (it should take about 38% of their fuel to reach Marshalls at 14kt, with a 12% reserve).
So it all boils down to the IJN battleship force refueling their destroyers on the night of Dec 7th-8th, and the IJN carriers keeping their own oiler force closer by to the north than was the historical case. The IJN battleships would need pre-war training to refuel DD's at night, but if it's done south of Oahu, the weather should be good. IJN carriers might have rougher weather north of Oahu, so they too would be best to move south of Oahu to refuel in better weather. If they pass west of Oahu, they cannot pursue USN ships moving to California from Oahu. If they pass east of Oahu, then they will be putting their oiler train at a bit more risk.
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Coulsdon Eagle
Monthly Donor
And you are missing my point. The IJN battlefleet couldn't hit a barn door from inside. I'm not entirely sure if they aimed at Pearl they would hit Oahu.
I think the OP - if he doesn't walk away - needs to stick to one battle plan per thread for discussion.
I believe you're making a hugely incorrect assumption that the USN is going to turn tail and attempt to run away. Doctrinally, politically and from a national pride mindset, the fleet abandoning Hawaii in the face of a massive Japanese assault is never going to happen. Even if staying and fighting were to mean the loss of every ship in the Pacific Fleet, which it certainly would not, Washington and the on-scene commanders would fight to the end. Holding Hawaii was the most important part of the U.S. west coast/Pacific defense. The USA and USN would easier survive the loss of the entire fleet than the humiliation of running away in the face of the enemy and leaving Hawaii to its fate.
As has been amply pointed out, the lag time between the morning air assault that concentrated on destruction of land based air and suppression of coast artillery, will allow a substantially intact Pacific Fleet to organize, complete arming and sortie. The ensuing series of engagements will drag on for a long time and deplete IJN fuel and ammunition.
As massive as the air assault could be, some land based air will survive to be able to locate and harass the approaching IJN battleline. Numbers, logistics, training and enraged fighting spirit do not favor the Japanese. If they stick around after the initial few waves of air attacks, particularly if they attempt to close into shore bombardment range, they will lose their fleet.
This thread is an example of the OP or at least someone that likes the original concept getting attached to an OUTCOME and not a POD so if one POD has an issue and won’t work they suggest another and another and another trying to achieve the outcome they desire. Sometimes it is possible to find a POD that achieves the outcome desired but often it is not.
In this particular case the desired outcome is a better or more damaging Peril Harbor Raid, (to the US) But it was presented as a package as if the OP had a definitive POD that would achieve this aim. But many disagreed that the suggested change would have the desired outcome. This results in multiple variations f the plan to in theory would address the most recent issues others had brought up.
This topic would have worked much better if presented in a different fashion. Either present it as a open discussion such as “How does the IJN achieve a better result in its raid on PH” kind f thing were the OP sets the goal and we all discuss how to achieve that goal and what the trade offs are. Or present one POD and let the group reach a general consensus on the outcome of that, Then once that POD is mostly talked out present a new POD in a new Thread and discuss that version. Rinse and repeat until either everyone gets board or you “achive” your desired goal.
But when you have someone that insists on achieving a given goal and it turns into a contest of wills more or less with someone doing a bit of…Ok well if A does not work what if they do B then C then D then E. Then you get to the point that the reason E won’t work can be offset by B but you. Tossed B because of a different reason and now you have multiple discussions going on and everyone gets confused.
This is not intended as a slam to the OP or anyone else it s a simp observation as We see this reasonably often on this forum.
How you present the original post wi set the tone of the whole discussion and it will determine if it is a cooperative disc or an argumentative one.
In this particular case the desired outcome is a better or more damaging Peril Harbor Raid, (to the US) But it was presented as a package as if the OP had a definitive POD that would achieve this aim. But many disagreed that the suggested change would have the desired outcome. This results in multiple variations f the plan to in theory would address the most recent issues others had brought up.
This topic would have worked much better if presented in a different fashion. Either present it as a open discussion such as “How does the IJN achieve a better result in its raid on PH” kind f thing were the OP sets the goal and we all discuss how to achieve that goal and what the trade offs are. Or present one POD and let the group reach a general consensus on the outcome of that, Then once that POD is mostly talked out present a new POD in a new Thread and discuss that version. Rinse and repeat until either everyone gets board or you “achive” your desired goal.
But when you have someone that insists on achieving a given goal and it turns into a contest of wills more or less with someone doing a bit of…Ok well if A does not work what if they do B then C then D then E. Then you get to the point that the reason E won’t work can be offset by B but you. Tossed B because of a different reason and now you have multiple discussions going on and everyone gets confused.
This is not intended as a slam to the OP or anyone else it s a simp observation as We see this reasonably often on this forum.
How you present the original post wi set the tone of the whole discussion and it will determine if it is a cooperative disc or an argumentative one.
This just an academic exercise put forth for discussion and if one scenario doesn't make sense to propose I see no reason why other scenarios cannot be substituted? I mean PH happened more than 82 years ago now and it is relegated to history. I thought the reason for having a forum such as this was to consider alternatives to that history and how those might have created a different outcome.