I don't think anyone would look at the Norse and say that since their conquests were autonomous from Scandinavian chiefs, and based on pillage, they weren't a maritime culture.
You're ignoring the structural difference between Norse and Arabo-Islamic polities at this time. The first was essentially made of independent chiefdoms, turned for various reasons to sea : economy (being separated from main trade centers by either sea of navigable riviers), strategy (either blockaded by large armies in the case of Danemark, or by simple geography for Norway) to take on continental holdings, or even food sources (for Norway especially, where fishing representated an important source).
On the other hand, Arabo-Islamic relationship to these three factors was more continental. When it came to economic roads, Arabo-Islamic harbours didn't launch fleets of their own but rather attracted other ones; the Arabo-Islamic expeditions were essentially land ones (you had maritime military expeditions, but not really comparable to what existed in North Sea in the same period).
The comparison with Vikings is at best ill-fitted : when they raided Al-Andalus in 844, they were defeated not on sea (they managed to coast without real troubles), but on hinterland; while battle between Scandinavian navies were much more current.
You're also ignoring litterary evidences that I linked you.
If you don't read french (a likely possibility) maybe you'd allow me to translate (I apologize if translation falls under "double standard" of Nevill Barbour on medieval western Islam) on western Arabo-Islamic minorisation of seafare and wariness on it.
Western Arabs didn't gave the look of a people with a natural naval vocation. At the contrary, their litterature is full of expression of reject on this element.
We have lines from Ibn Hamdis saying that man was created from mud, and that sea water, and water, as everyone know, can dissolve mud.
Another Sicilian, Abul' Arab Mus'ab apologized about a naval journey, saying that sea belonged to Christians, and it was only land that belonged to Arabs; and a poet of Ceuta refusing to visit Sevilla saying he wasn't Moise to walk on water neither his pendfriend Noah to build an ark.
I've to point out a strawman argument there.
Contrary to what you argue, "traditional minorisation of seafare" doesn't mean "overarching fear of the sea". It means that seafare is
traditionally minorized.
On the post I linked to you, I as well compared it to the perception Roman culture had to seafare : it existed, but wasn't well considered. Not that Romans were hydrophobic.
I'll be grateful if you simply stick to what I posted when you're answering or criticizing it, and not just making things up, as tempting it may be : some could think it's dishonest, prevents an actual discussion and decredibilizing you.
In short : there was a cultural feature about reluctance when it came to seafare in medieval Arabo-Islamic culture.
Reluctance means pretty much what it's say on tin : it doesn't mean you can't have an Arabo-Islamic seafare, but that it would be limited and more prone to decline.
For medieval Arabo-Islamic view, seafare was never a major (as opposed to minor then) focus; and arguably didn't became that before Ottoman Empire in Mediterranean basin, where Turkish fleets were used not only as independent raiding, but with a coherent geostrategical view.
Muslims were able to seize the Balearics, Sardinia, Sicily, etc. from the Christians.
(On an aside note, not really true for Sardinia, whom some judicates fall under Ifriqyan influence, especially during Fatimid era)
It's actually highlighting something there : all these were taken from a period where Byzantine power was at the weakest and these islands basically were let to themselves.
That's probably not the highest maritime feat of the era.
(Balearic Islands, for example, were already more or less a protectorate of the Ifriqyian wali since the capture of Carthage).
It didn't prevented regular reconquest : Balearic Islands taken back by Carolingians, whom seafare wasn't exactly stellar (at the point to be virtually unexistant), and Sicily was practically cut off Ifriqyian reinforcement in spite of the proximity with Madhia and Kairwan; while similar Christian expeditions on Africa itself regularly failed.
Again, it doesn't mean that Arabs, and western Arabic cultures didn't have a naval tradition (raiding/merchant or governmental), just that it didn't recieved the same focus than Byzantine or later Italian one (critically for the latter, whom power was essentially owed to naval dominance). But when it came to actual naval confrontation, Arabo-Islamic navies didn't fared that well on a general scale.
t's why taking control of main harbours (such as Alexandria or Carthage) was important strategically : not only to crush strongpoints able to launch counter-invasions, but as well to take control of more sea-minded cities and populations.
This wasn't a fluke. And again, you have sustained interest from the Umayyads in building up a navy.
More of a ponctual interest than a maintained effort (critically with the fall of Umayyads). The famed
Battle of the Mastes involved mostly Coptic and Syrians sailors with Arab troops.
How the Umayyad navy fared on the Sieges of Constantinople is quite telling : their relative inferiority to Byantine was more relevant than a
Wunderwaffe vision of Greek Fire for explaining their failure to blockade the straight.
It's more obvious when it came to "civil" seafare.
Hugh N. Kennedy said:
In Antiquity, and again in the High Middle Ages, the voyage from Italy to Alexandria was a commonplace; in early Islamic times the two countries were so remote that even the most basic information was unknown
As for Arabo-Andalusian fleet (as in "governemental" one), it was at first a coastal guard that appear mostly after the Vikings raids (no real mention of it in 844, but in 861). The takeover, in the late Xth century, of Maghrib doesn't owes much to a strong navy, but rather to the clientelisation of Maghrib tribes in face of Fatimid or Fatimid-sided neighbours, against which was used Arabo-Andalusian fleets.
I'll concede you that Yemeni Arabs (Kalbids) weren't really so, and it's interesting to see they took over places that had an important maritime tradition, such as Ifriqiya or Levante.
Please note my previous point : while Arab culture have a reluctance over seafare, Arabo-Islamic civilization embrace different culture, some more seafare-minded (it could be compared to Ancient Persians using Phoenicians as their main mediterranean naval force).
When it comes to Arab Maghrib culture, the absence of a real Berber naval tradition eventually means that the metissed culture wouldn't have much chance to devellop one big naval tradition out of nowhere, contrary to Arabo Egyptian, or Turkish-Byzantine culture.
This is ignoring people like the Omanis, who managed to build a major Indian Ocean trading system.
Something probably as much relevant than pointing out the Saudi Royal Navy is a thing when it comes to medieval mediterranean arabo-islamic seafare.
Again, sorry to repeat myself but you seem to have overlooked all of my posts, it's not the only factor : Christian dominance over Mediterranean basin probably led to some sort of rationalisation.
This rationalisation, however, didn't magically appeared : it was build on an actual negative perception of seafare, whom importance was variable but never disappeared.
Furthermore pointing out the appearance of Christian maritime dominance, while Arabs had a upper hand, ask for fiding the reasons of the situation.
To resume : cultural trend on seafare doesn't mean there wasn't an Arab dominance, but it owed much to the weakening of Byzantine navy (and the absence of a Latin navy worth of mention) rather than a maintained focus on naval matters from Arabs.
It's why I say that giving this cultural trend, use of seafare (while being considered by some leaders and dynasties, as Saadians for Maroc) wouldn't be the obvious way taken, especially for Arabo-Berbers and western Arabs that lacked a strong naval tradition.