The premise of this thread is earlier British Rearmament beginning in 1935; and therefore this post is skewed in favor of that premise. It was written about five years ago in a different framework and modified to fit here, but I may have overlooked correcting some details. It is unrelated to any previous posts, and therefore not a response to any.
Background:
July 1936-March 1939: The Spanish Civil War. This event was one of the most pivotal of the decade, and the pitiful HMG response reflected willful blindness to strategic realities on the part of the senior leadership of the Conservative Party. The Chief of the Imperial Defence Staff, and some senior naval and military leaders within Great Britain advocated actions well short of war to prevent a Fascist State in Spain, although First Sea Lord Ernle Chatfield was a notable and very influential dissenter.
Nazi Germany threatened directly the British Isles proper; Italy, the Mediterranean/Red Sea lifeline to the Near East and India; and Fascist Portugal could conceivably provide bases in the Azores, Cape Verde Islands and her African colonies within striking distance of sea lanes to South Africa and South America. (This was only a planning consideration – and is a very weak argument.) The addition of Spain to the ranks of Fascism threatened not only to close the Straits of Gibraltar, but add one more potential enemy when British resources are stretched too thin already. The loss of access to Spanish mineral resources would also impact British industry. Politically, failure to support a sovereign, legitimate government against an internal rebellion did not bode well for British efforts to maintain control of its own colonial subjects – especially in India.
Despite the objections from key defence, economic and colonial officials within HMG, and popular sentiments within much of the electorate, PM Stanley Baldwin, Chancellor of the Exchequer Neville Chamberlain, and other public officials opposed supporting the Spanish Republican Government. The Popular Front which won the January 1936 Spanish elections contained ministers from the Communist and Anarchist movements. Both previously supported nationalization of foreign (including British) property and at the time were viewed with greater ideological disdain than Nazis or Fascists by the Conservative Party leadership. Consequently Chamberlain advocated a policy of non-intervention in Spain that was openly flouted by Germany, Italy and the USSR; and which strained relations with France.
Foreign Minister Anthony Eden agreed with Chamberlain on the issue of Spanish Government ideology, but his Ethiopian Crisis experience generated a firm resolve to deny Italy any degree of influence in the Western Mediterranean. Baldwin delegated to Eden partial authority regarding Spain, as he was fully engaged in the escalating abdication crisis of King Edward VIII. On 4 August 1936, an Italian Savoia-Marchetti SM.81 bomber crash landed in Algeria, one of 12 en-route to Spanish Morocco to aid the Nationalists. To Eden, this is sufficient proof of Italian intervention, and he aimed to thwart Rome’s ambitions, but he did not prevail in resulting Cabinet debates.
The attitude of the interventionist powers is interesting to note. Italy was ideologically committed, and viewed its contribution as a source of great prestige. Mussolini provided aircraft, arms and warships without charge, and 75,000 “volunteers” from Italian military units were paid by Rome. The heavy casualties suffered among these hand-picked, high quality troops was a direct cause of later poor performance by Italian units in the Second World War. The Italian Navy employed submarines that routinely torpedoed without warning Soviet merchant ships bound for Spain. When neutral shipping not bound for Spain were also attacked, the RN engaged in an extensive antisubmarine campaign that resulted in a dress rehearsal for the Battle of the Atlantic: a destroyer, HMS Hunter being mined, and several Italian submarines depth charged. Italy ceased the campaign when an examination of a recovered torpedo which nearly hit HMS Havock conclusively proved Italian involvement. HMS Hotspur and Hyperion also severely depth charged the submarine RItNS Iride, and shook Italian confidence in their tactics. Labeled as a pirate nation, this loss of Italian prestige (a major factor earlier) led to a reduction in active Italian participation in the Spanish Civil War.
Germany’s intervention, although better known than Italy’s commitment of large infantry units, was probably less decisive. On the ground, the Germans tested panzer tanks and tactics, anti-aircraft guns, artillery and small arms; but only to obtain lessons learned from combat experience. In general, aircraft employed by the German Condor Legion was also for combat testing of individual aircraft, and therefore in small numbers: three He 112 fighters; ten Hs 123, four Ju-87A and five Ju-87B Stuka dive-bombers; three He 43 spotters; etc. Other aircraft, such as He 51 and Bf 109B/C fighters were sent in larger numbers to work out multi-squadron tactics and field maintenance practices. Only the dispatch of Ju-52 transports at the very beginning of the civil war can be described as driven solely by Spanish needs, and the Germans eventually exacted full payment in Spanish commodities for all of her aid.
Within two months of the outbreak of the Nationalist revolt, the Republican Government transferred most of its gold reserves abroad. 510 tonnes (U.S. $ 522 million; £108 million) was shipped from Madrid to Moscow; 196 tonnes (U.S. $ 201 million, £41.5 million) to Paris; and 40 tonnes (U.S. $ 41 million, £8.5. million) to Barcelona. About U.S. $ 324 million (£67 million) in Moscow gold was used to pay for Soviet military aid, some of the remainder for other supplies, but the remainder was simply never returned to Spain; and never been accounted for. Despite propaganda or pledges of fraternal aid, the Soviets drove a hard bargain, usually quadrupling the price of arms or supplies; a position of power they held only because the British Policy of Non-Intervention made the Soviets a sole supplier. The Soviets did supply personnel for their equipment, and were every bit as much interested in developing or testing tactics as the Germans on a mass scale. These actions are strong indications the Soviets would have provided considerable aid free of charge for these reasons, and for ideological goals similar to Italy. This would have placed Spain on par with Nationalist China where the Soviets freely provided massive amounts of aid to fulfill a strategic aim of weakening Japan.
Moscow was not the preferred destination for Spanish gold. London was; as the premiere financial and banking center in the 1930s, gold could be most easily transferred to any final recipient in London than anywhere else. Thus in addition to the political and military reasons for British aid to the Spanish Republican Government, there were powerful financial incentives as well. Traditionally, these had been so strong that HMG offered to transfer gold aboard RN warships; which the Spanish would regard as significantly safer than aboard the four vulnerable Soviet cargo ships sailing past Italy to Odessa without any naval escort. It is likely that had the gold gone to London (if the British would have allowed it); some of it would have gone to the USSR for arms and supplies. It is also just as likely that at least the U.S. $ 324 million (£67 million) previously mentioned would have been spent on British arms.
Nor was this the only economic aspect; when the Republican fortunes waned, the USSR obtained title to nearly U.S. $ 500 million (£103.5 million) in mining, manufacturing and other property to pay for aid. These were lost with the Nationalist victory. Much of this was expropriated British property – in effect HMG’s non-intervention policy made permanent the very consequences that generated Chamberlain’s opposition. Had London instead aided a sovereign nation in suppressing a rebellion, it is doubtful any further expropriation would have extended past the property of Fascist supporters, to include the Catholic Church. The remainder of the U.S. $ 500 million would have been issued in bonds. The effect of increased British foreign exchange reserves by some £175 million (U.S. $631 million) needs to be put into perspective. In September 1938 British gold reserves totaled
£700 million, in February 1940 about £400 million, and in January 1941 they were completely exhausted – an extra
£175 million equals about six more months financing of World War II.
What must change:
First, PM Baldwin resigns as the King’s First Minister before May or June 1936, the most plausible reason to me being his opposition to King Edward VIII’s pro-German attitudes. His designated successor is Chamberlain, leaving the post of Exchequer vacant. The post is offered to Winston Churchill, in the belief that if Churchill were given the responsibility for finding the money for rearmament, his criticism of its pace would be muted. It would also keep the party united until Chamberlain has put his stamp on it, and Churchill becomes expendable. Churchill will tackle the challenge with zeal, and his position as Chancellor of the Exchequer is sufficient to ensure Spanish gold will arrive in London. Churchill is also Eden’s father-in-law, and where he leads Eden will surely follow in Cabinet debates. Despite the distaste for the Republican Government, Churchill secures the Cabinet’s blessing for arms sales. Church also loathes the Government in Madrid, but this is not the first time his ambitions overcome that obstacle.
The Arms Sales Policy:
Estimating what arms would be purchased is best done by starting with the Spanish Navy. After the disasters suffered in the Spanish-American War, the Spanish Fleet abandoned the French and Italian designs it previously embraced, and turned to more expensive, but better British suppliers. In 1908, a consortium of British firms (Vickers, Armstrong-Elswick, John Brown and Coventry Ordinance) took over management of Spanish shipyards, and hundreds of British technicians worked in Spain for three decades. Thereafter all Spanish warships were built to British designs except submarines, which used both American and Dutch technology. When the Spanish Armed Forces attempted their coup in July 1936, the crews of all commissioned warships except a light cruiser and a destroyer mutinied and deposed their officers, and remained loyal to the Republic. This prevented the transfer of troops from Spanish Morocco to the Iberian Peninsula until the Germans and Italians provided transport aircraft. The delay ensured the Republic did not collapse in a matter of weeks, but had a fighting chance at survival. This is why the Nationalist Navy had to “purchase” Italian destroyers and submarines manned by Italian “volunteer” crews in order to contest control of the seas.
The Nationalists quickly seized the nationalized shipyards at Ferrol and Cadiz, and HMG should have responded by withdrawing British technicians still there. This would have made it difficult for the Nationalists to commission two heavy cruisers (Canarias and Baleares) in the final phases of outfitting. British line and petty officers placed on half-pay due to austere RN budgets should be encouraged to apply for “secondment”; a British practice of allowing personnel to serve temporarily in the armed forces of a friendly nation. This would allow the Republican ships to be competently commanded, navigated and committed to battle by trained leaders instead of low-ranking ratings. In addition to the remaining Republican shipyard at Cartagena, repairs to Spanish Republican ships should be made in RN Dockyards such as Gibraltar if necessary. No warships would be sold to Spain by Great Britain due to lack of qualified Spanish crews. The effect would be to moderately tighten a Republican naval blockade that already had most Nationalist supplies being transported through “neutral” Portugal. The cost would be small, no more than 5% of the total spent in Britain.
A much larger share, at least 55-60% would be devoted to supplies for the Spanish Army. Although pre-Civil War, the rifle had been standardized on the German Mauser K98, mortars, and both tanks and trucks were primarily of French World War I pattern; the Vickers .303 heavy machine gun, most artillery including 18-pdr, 4.5-inch and 6-inch howitzers, and other field equipment from binoculars, short-wave sets and medical supplies to entrenching tools were of British pattern. Spanish needs fit uniquely with British requirements as well. The British Army is attempting to simultaneously modernize its own equipment; replace material used by Territorial units; replace older material in storage since the First World War (kept to account for wastage in the early stages of a conflict); and to train a large labor force in munitions work which has been largely dormant for a generation.
This latter requirement had three major components: expanding capacity for traditional armaments firms; establishing “shadow factories” both in Great Britain and the Commonwealth (which are concealed from foreign observation) to augment production; and providing both with machine tools and skilled workers. Lack of foreign gold reserves limited the amount of machine tools that could be imported from Sweden, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia or Switzerland, which meant that much of the training of the labor force was done on existing patterns dating from World War I. Attempts by the mother country to offset wastage by selling obsolete material to her Commonwealth offspring only strained relations and impeded coordination of Imperial Defence. A substantial amount of British equipment manufactured between 1936 and 1939 was not used at all, not even for training, due to its obsolescence; and thus discarded while still in pristine condition. In the case of aircraft, production of planes exceeded the pace of training pilots.
Obsolescent equipment, however, is often simpler than more modern, more capable and more complex weapons. The Spanish Republican Army, having lost much of its peacetime officer and enlisted strength to the Nationalists, required simpler equipment for its enthusiastic but inexperienced recruits. If Great Britain sold its war reserve of equipment as soon as practical after the start of the Spanish Civil War, the Republican Spanish Army receives suitable equipment rapidly; and Great Britain receives the foreign exchange to accelerate its modernization and replenish the war stocks sold. Later contracts cover the sale to Spain of equipment manufactured solely for labor expansion; and as with the Navy, Army secondment is encouraged. For some special requirements, there will be orders that take considerable time for British industry to fill.
Spanish orders greatly accelerate production in British factories. In July 1936, the only producer of tanks in the entire British Commonwealth was Vickers. Nuffield – a shadow company of Morris LTD started up in July 1937 and Vulcan Ltd, a subsidiary of Vickers was started the following December. Vickers in July 1936 had in production the 6-ton Model E light tank (20 on order for China, 32 for Finland) and the Lt Tank Mk III and Lt Tank Mk V (the two types had only detail differences) for which production was ending. British Army orders for Lt Tank Mk VIA were scheduled to begin rolling off the lines in October and Lt Tank Mk VIB Indian Pattern vehicles in December 1936. The prototype Cruiser Tank Mk I was delivered to the British Army in July 1936 and an order for 50 is already placed. The first prototype Infantry Tank Mk I was due for delivery for trials in September 1936. Production of five different tank types at Vickers is very inefficient.
The first Spanish orders, in August 1936 would be for vehicles which could be most rapidly delivered. Orders for 6-ton Model E light tanks will eventually total 153 delivered between November 1936 and December 1938, one version with two .303-inch machine guns (Type A) and another with a single 47mm low-velocity gun (Type B). 75 Lt Tank Mk V are produced between August 1936 and March 1937 when the remaining factory space is converted to Spanish Pattern Lt Tank Mk VIB orders. 315 Spanish Lt Tank Mk VIB are delivered between January 1937 and June 1939. With Vickers’ capacity thus filled, Spanish orders for 80 Infantry Tank Mk I are placed in October 1936 with Vulcan LTD after a cursory examination of the prototype; and delivered in March 1937 through September 1938. British orders for the Infantry Tank Mk I are not received until April 1937 after thorough trials were concluded. Production of the 50 Cruiser Tank Mk I is moved to Nuffield concurrent with receipt of a Spanish order for 115 more for delivery between July 1937 and April 1939. The addition of 738 Spanish tanks built in Great Britain more than doubles historical production, and is a tremendous expansion of the labor force even if the relative simplicity of 543 light tanks is factored in. However, relatively few of the Light Tank Model E Type B or Cruiser Tank Mk I ever engage German or Italian supplied tanks, and little of tank combat is learned.
With most of Spain’s requirements filled by British factories, there is a significant shift of other orders to Commonwealth factories. In addition to vast quantities of canned food required by the Spanish Army, wool from Australia and New Zealand and cotton from India are in high demand for perhaps ten million uniforms. In Australia, production of tracked Bren Carriers will commence in January 1937, not only for the Australian and New Zealand Armies but for British units in India as their intended Bren carriers are diverted to Spain. Production of Bren Carriers in Canada is added in late 1938. The arsenal at Robert’s Heights, South Africa, reactivates mothballed World War I facilities to produce 18-pdr howitzers.
Although larger towed artillery employed mostly British built Scammell or Morris trucks, about 2,600 Canadian Military Pattern 4x4 trucks are delivered in two versions, one by Ford and one by Chevrolet between January/March 1937 and the end of March 1939 when remaining orders are amicably taken over by the Canadian Army. 600 Chevrolet 6x4 trucks (a licensed-built Canadian version of the Scammell Pioneer) are also delivered to Spain between December 1938 and August 1939. Although 80 2-Pdr (40mm) anti-tank guns were built in Canada, the Spanish preferred French 25mm guns, and placed most orders for that type.
The Spanish Air Force, whose personnel are younger on average than other services, and which had been expanded since the monarchy was overthrown in 1931 was the most loyal of the three services to the Republic. British Aviation industry would benefit in similar manner to other British armaments industries, although unlike other industry, the British Air Ministry paid all design costs of an aircraft and for required tooling, and could allocate production to any factory besides the designer’s. The first category of British aircraft sold is a clearing of war reserve aircraft, many of which were used by the RAF, but still in serviceable condition. Not all war stock is released – no heavy bombers, no army cooperation aircraft configured for colonial policing duties, no Fleet Air Arm planes, and no primary trainers needed for RAF expansion. Depending on number of flight hours, these planes went for 20 to 60 per cent of original cost.
The most valuable are 124 Bristol Bulldog fighters, aging biplanes of a type in Spanish service since 1932, and 35 trainer versions which allowed rapid instruction of the dozens of volunteers joining the anti-Fascist cause. 46 Hawker Fury Mk I biplanes supplied are superior to, and more highly esteemed by pilots than the Bulldog – three samples were delivered to Spain in July 1935 for evaluation had been flown by a limited number of Republican pilots. The three Spanish Fury aircraft and the planned factory for co-production are now in Nationalist territory. Nineteen Gloster Gauntlet Mk I and 14 Demon two-seat fighters (for bomber interception duties) are unfamiliar to Spanish pilots in both tactics and design, and will be assigned to RAF pilots on secondment as instructors and to volunteers with some previous flying experience. Finally 159 Hawker Hart bombers and 40 Hart trainers (a rather easy and forgiving plane to fly) provide an instant capability to attack Nationalist troops, aerodromes and transport facilities despite a small bomb load of only 500 lbs and its short range. All of these aircraft are delivered to Spain by the end of October 1936, and a number become casualties of inexperienced pilots. Nevertheless, the availability of nearly 400 aircraft gave Republican pilots tremendous advantages in the initial phases of the civil war.
The second category is aircraft sold as soon as they left active RAF service. These are delivered in penny packets of two to five planes at a time: 60 Hart, 48 Demon and 32 Bulldogs by June 1937. 96 Gauntlet Mk II are delivered between September 1937 and December 1938, and 60 Fury Mk II in January-June 1938. These aircraft kept Spanish squadrons equipped with the first batch of deliveries up to full strength, cost a modest amount, and are tactically useful; but did not offer any great qualitative improvements. This was also generally true of the third category – brand new planes built to British orders to train workers, but sold to Spain at about a 10% profit after delivery to the RAF. 86 Hawker Hind light bombers (delivered June 1937-January 1938) are Harts with more powerful engines. Army cooperation planes such as 110 Audax (September 1936 to September 1937 – 67 from Avro and 43 from Westland) and 80 Hectors (February-December 1937 – Westland built) of the same Hart design family are available straight from the factory. A larger type, Vickers Vincents first delivered in December 1937, totaled 57 when the type went out of production seven months later.
These close support and reconnaissance aircraft are highly valued in Spain where tactics reflected conditions found in the First World War more than in the Second. 145 Fairey Battle light bombers (May 1938 until May of 1939) and 80 Hawker Henley (Built by Gloster – January 1938 to February 1939) reflected the winner and loser of the RAF competition to replace the Hart. The end of the Civil War finally curtailed any further purchases. The Henley proved a death trap in service – prone to engine failure and poor handling characteristics; the only thing to commend it being the high degree of component commonality with the Hawker Hurricane. (The 200 Henleys built for the RAF by Gloster were completed as target tugs.)
It is notable that an additional 50 Gauntlet Mk II aircraft are the only fighters among the designs used for training industry, as opposed to over 550 bomber or attack planes. To a large degree this reflected the dominance that Bomber Command held over Fighter Command in the pre-war RAF. Consequently, orders for planes tailored for the needs of the Spanish Air Force (the fourth category) are for late-model fighters, long-range twin-engine bombers and torpedo planes – types not found among RAF cast-offs or off-the-shelf inventory. These newly manufactured planes are the most profitable, both for British factories and in the Commonwealth.
99 Fury Mk II with more powerful Hispano-Suiza engines, and 100 Hurricanes fitted with the prototype’s Rolls-Royce Merlin C engine are ordered in September 1936. Hawker was readily able to produce the wings and fuselages of Hurricanes, but the June 1936 RAF decision to fit improved Merlin II engines required additional flight trials, and the first Hurricane Mk I was not accepted from Hawker until October 1937. Selling 100 planes with Merlin Cs unloaded a backlog of unpowered airframes at Hawker and brought Merlin production on line earlier. The Spanish Hurricanes are delivered between March and December 1937. Ironically, due to the Hurricane’s higher priority, the smaller, simpler Spanish Fury Mk II with no design challenges took longer to deliver. Despite starting four months earlier, Spanish Fury production ended three months later than its famed successor.
In June of 1937, satisfied with the superiority of the monoplane, 100 additional Hurricane Mk I with the Merlin II are ordered, the RAF agreeing to release every sixth plane produced by Hawker. The Canadian Car and Foundry in Montreal had been designated as a “shadow factory” in 1936, but the decision to produce there is accelerated 19 months over the historical timeline. The first of 100 Canadian-built Hurricane Mk Is takes to the air in June 1938, and the pace of deliveries to the RAF is soon restored. In January 1939, 60 Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) Hurricanes are ordered from Canadian Car and Foundry as historical.
The latest Supermarine Spitfire and Bolton Paul Defiant are not released by the Air Ministry for export. As an insurance against the failure of the monoplane fighter, 88 Gloster Gladiator Mk I the successor to the Gauntlet) are ordered in October 1936 and delivered to Spain from April 1937 through January 1938. Upon receipt of this (for the time) large order, Gloster sent design drawings and jigs to Hawker-Australia to establish co-production there to ensure fulfillment of RAF needs. The Air Ministry hoped in vain that the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) would take advantage and place orders, this being a major part of the reason for the decision. Unlike Canadian Car and Foundry, Hawker-Australia had been producing aircraft for over 15 years, and represented an underutilized asset.
The first 16 Australian-built Gladiators are delivered to the RAF squadrons in the Middle East; then an order from China for 36 planes is assigned there; then two batches of 12 and 18 respectively for Iraq and Egypt followed; and the final six aircraft to RAF Middle East units by June 1938. To replace Spanish combat losses, another 166 Gladiator Mk II are ordered in November 1937 for delivery from June 1938 onward, but only 98 had been delivered by the end of the war and the last 68 taken over by the RAF. This second order was split between Gloster and Hawker-Australia; upon cancellation, Gloster ended production, but Hawkers-Australia resumed deliveries to RAF-Middle East until its requirements are met.
The Spanish Republican Air Force also coveted torpedo bombers. From 1933 through 1935, 25 Vickers Vildebeeste Mk II were built under license by CASA in Spain. Although the factory in Getafe was in the Republican zone, it was moved to Alicante for added safety, and then began production of Polikarpov I-15 biplanes instead. Spain will order 113 improved Vildebeeste IV, delivered beginning in April 1937, but when RAF needs shifted to the Vincent army cooperation version in December, the last 57 are accepted as Vincents by July 1938. Still looking for torpedo bombers, Spain found the most unlikely source. The RCAF had a coastal defence requirement, and Boeing secured a license for Blackburn Shark, the current type used aboard RN aircraft carriers in early 1936 and opened a factory in Vancouver. Blackburn delivered seven Shark Mk III pattern aircraft for assembly in early 1937, but the RCAF later cut the Boeing order to only 17 as its range and open cockpit did not seem suitable for Canada’s long and frigid coastline. The underutilized Boeing factory was ideal, the Spanish placing an order for 60 in October 1937, and 38 are delivered before the war’s end – 45 in total (the last 15 are cancelled). Once competent tactics are developed with the help of seconded British personnel, these planes are successful in forcing German and Italian warships away from Spanish waters.
The RAF also allowed the Spanish to receive Bristol Blenheim Mk I bombers from its production runs, a courtesy also extended to Finland, Yugoslavia, Romania, Turkey and Greece. In January 1937, 60 of 318 planes ordered from Rootes (a shadow factory) and 60 of 434 aircraft ordered from Bristol a month earlier are transferred to a Spanish account, and another 60 Blenheim Mk I from Avro in September 1937. The first 120 are replaced by orders at Fairchild Canada, which received an order for 18 planes from the RCAF in February 1937, and the Avro replacement order is transferred seven months later. The Spanish Blenheims are delivered between December 1937 and February 1939; and the Canadian-built RAF replacements between June 1938 and November 1939. The other large bomber order is for Armstrong-Whitworth Whitley bombers. 46 Mk II and 80 Mk III are ordered immediately after the Condor Legion bombing of Guernica in April 1937, and delivered November 1937-April 1939.
Blenheims and Whitleys were intended to be used as “city-busters”, capable of neutralizing from the air the industrial or transportation value of a major city. Ports would be left idle, mines and factories disrupted, and the morale and fighting spirit of a civilian population shattered. In fact this did not happen. Targets are attacked too infrequently; maintenance, weather and navigation difficulties were constant; attrition and losses to flak are greater than expected; training and bombing accuracy were inadequate. Nevertheless, the attacks in the last half of the war forced the Nationalists to divert fighter and anti-aircraft units to defensive duties where they spent a considerable amount of time idle.
All of this may seem tedious to the reader, perhaps the topic could have been dispensed with a couple of sentences that the Republican Government could have won, and Britain could have profited greatly therefrom. The purpose is to demonstrate that in mid-1936, Great Britain still possessed the world’s greatest aircraft industry, with military designs second to (only perhaps) the United States. Great Britain was capable of delivering roughly the same number of aircraft as all other nations combined. This position was lost by the outbreak of war in 1939. The Spanish Civil War was the last, best hope of keeping up. The three modern aircraft manufacturing centers established in Canada and the one in India, influenced as they are by American assembly line and manufacturing practices, on average build planes with one-third the man-hours a British factory required. Having these lessons learned and absorbed in peacetime will give wartime manufacturing of critical aircraft an incredible boost. The effect of this British policy on the balance of power in the Spanish Civil War can be illustrated by the following table:
With British sales of admittedly mostly second-rate aircraft, the Republicans seize unquestioned air superiority, and maintain it throughout the conflict. Neither Italy nor Germany could afford to send additional pilots; they were needed to maintain the healthy combat readiness of their respective air services at home. Slowly the Nationalists will be crushed. On the other hand, British aircrew gaining experience in Spain will expand the auxiliary RAF and FAA aircrews by perhaps 10-12% and 4-5% each.
Two other sources of Spanish Republican aircraft should be noted, as they arose out of attempts to evade Neutrality Laws enacted by the U.S. Congress. Before it received Hurricane orders, Canadian Car and Foundry made an earlier foray into aviation hoping to capture a lucrative Spanish order. Obtaining a license from Grumman Aircraft in New York for the tooling and design staff for a discontinued U.S. Navy scout dive bomber, the design was updated with a slightly more powerful engine and lighter weight with naval gear deleted. The Spanish order for 50 duly arrived in December 1936, but delays with recruiting skilled workers, lack of timely orders for materials, and diversion of attention to the Hurricane delayed the project. Two batches totaling 34 were sent to Spain in April and June 1938. Although greatly liked by pilots and crews, the Grumman G-23 Delfin was clearly vulnerable by that late date and Spain refused to pay for the last 16 planes. They sat around the factory for a couple of months until the Sudeten Crisis exposed the near naked state of the RCAF, and they were reluctantly taken into service. (Historical note: The 34 Grumman G-23 were in fact delivered through false paperwork originating in Turkey.)
The second American aircraft is well-deserving of a page in the annals of iconic designs. The Curtiss Hawk 75A was the ancestor of both the P-36 and P-40 of World War II fame. Curtiss had sold hundreds of its biplane predecessors in Asia and Latin America, and set up an assembly plant in China. Curtiss had high export hopes for its first all-metal monoplane fighter as well, and to evade neutrality laws sought an overseas manufacturing site after the Hawk 75A demonstrator was favorably received in Europe in 1936. The only one that materialized was in Cordoba, Argentina, the decision by the French Popular Front Government to nationalize its aerospace industry scuttling any plans to locate in that country. Curtiss representatives surveyed sites in South Africa, India, Singapore, Hong Kong and Australia, but an unhelpful attitude on military exports by British officials led to Curtiss choosing Canton, China. Japanese troops occupied that city before production commenced.
The change in British policy towards arms sales to Spain will change attitudes towards a Curtiss factory as well. The next Curtiss choice would be Hindustan Aircraft in Bangalore, India instead of Canton as its preferred co-production partner. It was close to the Tata Steel Works and an expatriate American work force would be comfortable there. A possible runner up would be near Tengah Airfield on Singapore Island. Bangalore is close to anticipated Asian customers and Curtiss-Wright Cyclone engines would also be manufactured there, which were in demand for civilian airliners in that part of the world. British bureaucratic approval would take about six months (until about February 1937), and the first Spanish order for 90 improved Hawk H models a month later. To speed production, the first 24 are manufactured in the United States, assembled at Bangalore with a first flight in August 1937, and first delivery in Spain in October 1937. The Curtiss Hawk was more expensive than the Hurricane, and as it came late in the war there are no follow-on orders. The final delivery was in November 1938.
The first Hawk 75H assembled was held back as a sales demonstrator (and replaced by a 67th locally manufactured plane) and flown via Burma, Thailand and French Indochina to Canton where it was examined and purchased by COL Claire Chennault (of Flying Tigers fame) on behalf of the Chinese Air Force. This led to an order in October 1937 for 112 Hawk 75M with fixed landing gear and derated engines for simplified maintenance on austere Chinese airfields. Design work had to be done in the United States, so the first Hawk 75M was not completed until May 1938. Only 30 had been delivered when Canton, the last Chinese port was captured by the Japanese in October 1938. Production did not cease – Spanish orders had run dry and there was no other work. Two dozen Hawk 75M piled up at an ad-hoc hanger until trucks could be bought to transport them in crates over the Burma Road in mid-1939.
When an order for 25 similar Hawk 75N was received from Siam in January 1939, production shifted immediately to fill it at the expense of Chinese orders. Other orders are fitted in – a French order in March 1939 for 100 Hawk 75A-2 specified nine planes are built at Bengalore for delivery to Indochina. When Hawk 75M production resumed, the last 32 are eventually taken over by the Royal Indian Air Force in August 1939. In the summer of 1939, when a Dutch order for 35 Hawk 75A-7 sparked protests from Isolationists in the U.S. House of Representatives, the entire order was shifted from Buffalo, New York to Hindustan.
The improvement in the Spanish Republican Army allows a counteroffensive to begin about December 1936 to reunite the Basque Provinces with the rest of Republican Spain. Primarily credit is due to the assignment of MG Henry Wilson (later Field Marshal) to command the unofficial British Military Mission to Spain. Wilson was on half-pay from February 1936 until July 1937 when he was appointed command of 2 Division. He is assisted by COL George Gifford, also on half pay, who in World War II expanded the Royal West African Frontier Force from 11,000 to over 200,000 troops who fought well in East Africa and Japanese in Burma. Wilson also had two key Spanish partners, COL Segismundo Casado and COL Cipriano Mera. Casado was one of the few completely apolitical army officers, and Mera was sympathetic to the Anarchist Party, which the Socialists and Communists in the Government refused to arm. Both were highly competent, and just as important, very lucky officers.
Arriving in Spain in September 1936, Wilson finds about 45,000 volunteers, mostly Anarchists, but some Socialists and conservative Basques. (Note: the Anarchists had become more accepting of order and structure during the chaos of 1931-5, but retained their name and lip-service to the cause.) Wilson obtained first delivery on British equipment and after training by Gifford, Casado and Mera, three brigades (about 12,000) captured the city of Sargossa – held by Nationalists since the uprising in July by Christmas. This reopened the rail lines from Northern Spain to Barcelona. Continuing to expand, Wilson’s forces also defeated the Italian Expeditionary Corps between March and June 1937 when they attempted to conquer Northern Spain. The Condor Legion bombing of Guernica was part of this offensive. Wilson organized a counterattack into Nationalist-controlled Galicia before he returned home.
Later in 1937, the Republicans will do much better in the battles around Madrid and to control Southeastern Spain. Since Republican manpower always exceeded Nationalist, early delivery of proper equipment is enough to turn the tide. Nationalist forces are gradually driven off the Iberian Peninsula by the end of 1938, and Spanish colonies and the Canary Islands are back under Madrid’s control by March 1939.
Conclusion:
Arms sales to Spain brings British production of Army and Air Force equipment much closer to full wartime production as anything else I can imagine. It does so with little additional cost to the British taxpayer. It will also reduce unemployment in key wartime industrial sectors.
The Spanish Civil War was full of ironies. Although from the overthrow of the monarchy in 1931 until mid-1935 the nation was wracked with chaos and civil strife, order was beginning to prevail by late 1935. Extremists on both the right and left had burned themselves out. The relative integrity of the January 1936 elections demonstrated to the Nationalists that if a coup was not staged soon, the Republic would acquire too much popular support and legitimacy. British aid would likely strengthen moderate forces within the Republican Government – the Stalinists in Spain were able to violently liquidate Anarchists, Trotskyites, and Communists not aligned with Moscow (in purges of the type George Orwell barely survived) only as the Spanish Government weakened. Key anti-Communist parties such as the Anarchists control a powerful counterforce in Wilson’s trained army. Just as HMG was officially neutral in the Spanish Civil War, Spain remains officially neutral in any Second World War. But her shipyards would build merchant vessels to British orders, factories and mines supply Britain’s needs, and volunteers are available serve in various non-combat capacities.
As a final note – I have strong doubts the British Cabinet was big enough for both Chamberlain and Churchill for too long. It is quite possible Churchill resigns when Chamberlain’s reaction to Adolf Hitler’s Anschluss with Austria is flaccid. A breech is certain by the Sudeten Crisis. Which one is booted out, and whether the Munich Agreement goes as historically, or Churchill stares Hitler down in a face-to-face meeting is for the reader to decide.