British Rearmament Before World War 2

[Gannt the chartist]

The problem with the Spain scenario is fourfold.

1. Spain is a freakin mess and has been for several years, a pronunciamento by some guy on a white horse is only to be expected and not totally unwelcome in the rest of Europe and Spain itself. There is continuing debate as to whether the 36 Elections were rigged and certainly at the time the Right - which is CEDA Monarchists and Catalan Nationalists not Falange believe it to be so.
2. While the at start and totally ineffectual Republican Government is 'moderate' by September ( the attempted coup is17/18 July) its headed by Largo Caballero a self proclaimed Marxist Revolutionary ( PSOE Left is a marxist and revolutionary faction) and Lenin of Spain, backed by the Communist party which is important in Madrid if nowhere else. without the inconvenience of elections or stuff, who has been circumventing the Government institutions since the beginning. To be clear this means that the various Militia columns have been going Shooty Stabby Rapey on behalf of the government but not necessarily under the control of anyone but their political leadership, and the Nats have been doing the same. There are no good guys here to back really at any point.
3. The Broad Left catechism is No Enemies on the Left which has traction in Spain and France, unfortunately not in Britain or the other English Speaking countries where the reaction FROM THE TRADES UNION MOVEMENT is, 'Sure there are you commie bastards now lads put the boot in.'

4. It does nothing to accelerate British rearmament, in fact more likely to retard it as it did Italy and arguably the USSR by forcing the continued production of obsolete weapons. Britain does not need Spanish gold it can print fivers which are good anywhere. While Germany may learn valuable lessons from Spain its difficult to see what they are outside a fairly minor issue on fighter tactics and lessons on how to operate sizeable forces at range, which the UK have been doing for centuries and kinda goes over their head anyway. Where it is valuable is in testing weapons and training for a military that has had no real chance to do either with its current inventory, unlike everyone else. Versailles has a very long shadow.

On some of the other tropes. Aircraft MG, while the 20mm is better than .303 even in a large battery and .50 even in a large battery its not there yet. There early models are all 35/36/37 and all adopted very very quickly anyway. The only allegedly earlier one is the Madsen which has the fundamental problem of only firing 180 rpm.

The Eries, ah the Alaska class of Escort ships. Its slow, underarmed even compared to a german merchant raider and needs the crew of three Flowers. Really neat idea on paper, dumb stupid in practice.

Also whats with the Ocean escorts. Its 1935 start date. There is no hard coding requiring France to collapse in 1940 and Germany to occupy northern Norway, to get to an operational area the U boats - the entire U boat arm in 1935 is 15 seamen, 8 engineering officers and 150 ratings btw- have to exit the North Sea sail around the British Isles and down into the western channel Biscay or randomly search the Atlantic for Convoys which can be routed just bout anywhere.

 

[sonofpegasus]

sorry got got Morley and Morris mixed up! My bad.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

That's not true. There were no communist or anarchist ministers in the spanish goverment before the attempted coup. The cabinet members were from Izquierda Republicana (Republican Left) Left-Center party mostly supported by liberal proffesionals and low rank public employees. After februry elections only the PSOE (spanish labour if you wish a reference) was invited to enter the cabiner, even to hold the "presidente del consejo" (Prime Minister) but his moderate leader was not supported by the left wing of the party and refused.

Only with the coup and the fall of the cabinet the communists and anarchists enter the cabinet.

I am certain you are correct - they were part of the Popular Front, but not already in the government. However that made no difference to HMG's attitudes.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

4. It does nothing to accelerate British rearmament, in fact more likely to retard it as it did Italy and arguably the USSR by forcing the continued production of obsolete weapons. Britain does not need Spanish gold it can print fivers which are good anywhere.

First of all, while ending the gold standard meant private citizens could no longer exchange currency for bullion, bullion was still the means by which governments balanced their foreign holdings. This is most obvious with the US Neutrality and Cash and Carry laws. The purchase of US goods were with US dollars, and if Great Britain, or France were short dollars, as they were in 1938-40, those dollars had to be purchased with bullion.

Secondly, how does expanding British tank production from Vickers to include Nuffield October 1936 instead of July 1937; and Vulcan Ltd in October 1936 instead of December 1937 fail to increase the potential for British rearmament? How does adding additional production lines from military trucks, Bren carriers, and 2pdr guns retard rearmament?

In June of 1937, satisfied with the superiority of the monoplane, 100 additional Hurricane Mk I with the Merlin II are ordered, the RAF agreeing to release every sixth plane produced by Hawker. The Canadian Car and Foundry in Montreal had been designated as a “shadow factory” in 1936, but the decision to produce there is accelerated 19 months over the historical timeline. The first of 100 Canadian-built Hurricane Mk Is takes to the air in June 1938, and the pace of deliveries to the RAF is soon restored. In January 1939, 60 Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) Hurricanes are ordered from Canadian Car and Foundry as historical.

How does the accelerated production of Hurricane fighters pre-1939 represent a retardation of British rearmament?
My point was arms sales to Spain allows the expansion of the trained British design and skilled labour force prewar at little cost to the British Government rather than by training those draftsmen, electricians, artificers, etc. on weapons that were clearly obsolescent and either unused or underutilized. Expanding total capacity facilitates modernization. For example, if additional Canadian production lines for 2pdr anti-tank guns helps fulfill the current requirements for combat, then one by one British production lines can convert to 6pdr anti-tank guns without the historical delay.

 

[marathag]

As noted the only real way to improve here is to increase force size via conscription in peacetime. Rather a hard sell

Or increase the pay, and have an equivalent to the GI Bill.
Why force people in? You can do more with volunteers than draftees

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

First of all, while ending the gold standard meant private citizens could no longer exchange currency for bullion, bullion was still the means by which governments balanced their foreign holdings.

Studying the history of the Bank of International Settlements <https://www.bis.org/about/history_1foundation.htm> can clarify how gold was used to balance exchange accounts.

This is most obvious with the US Neutrality and Cash and Carry laws. The purchase of US goods were with US dollars, and if Great Britain, or France were short dollars, as they were in 1938-40, those dollars had to be purchased with bullion.

In March 1940 France dispatched two cruisers with a load of Gold to Canada. Stored in bank depository in Toronto it was to be used in the purchasing of material from US industry.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Or increase the pay, and have an equivalent to the GI Bill.
Why force people in? You can do more with volunteers than draftees

The US had no problem in finding 100,000+ volunteers for the Army & Navy authorized by the 1938 budget bill (covering 1939-40)

 

[Gannt the chartist]

First of all, while ending the gold standard meant private citizens could no longer exchange currency for bullion, bullion was still the means by which governments balanced their foreign holdings. This is most obvious with the US Neutrality and Cash and Carry laws. The purchase of US goods were with US dollars, and if Great Britain, or France were short dollars, as they were in 1938-40, those dollars had to be purchased with bullion.

Secondly, how does expanding British tank production from Vickers to include Nuffield October 1936 instead of July 1937; and Vulcan Ltd in October 1936 instead of December 1937 fail to increase the potential for British rearmament? How does adding additional production lines from military trucks, Bren carriers, and 2pdr guns retard rearmament?

How does the accelerated production of Hurricane fighters pre-1939 represent a retardation of British rearmament?
My point was arms sales to Spain allows the expansion of the trained British design and skilled labour force prewar at little cost to the British Government rather than by training those draftsmen, electricians, artificers, etc. on weapons that were clearly obsolescent and either unused or underutilized. Expanding total capacity facilitates modernization. For example, if additional Canadian production lines for 2pdr anti-tank guns helps fulfill the current requirements for combat, then one by one British production lines can convert to 6pdr anti-tank guns without the historical delay.

The Gold standard issue matters with international balances yes, but that only matters if you are involved in trade outside of the Sterling Zone. The French were highly interested in US kit particularly aircraft, the British less so Their interest was either in tooling, for which there are supply issues on the US end and its comparatively cheap, or in munitions directly ( explosives) which are problematic until the plant has been created in the US and consumables like foodstiffs or POL. The the cash and carry weapons tend to be French ( or Dutch Norwegian etc) orders take on by the British after the fall of that country or later orders for delivery to the Med or Far East which are hard for UK based production to get delivered to. Out of choice there is a limited range of aircraft wanted by the RAF but these tend to be lend lease no cash and carry.

The problem with the rest of your argument is twofold.

The dates dot work and Spain cant afford it

The general principle for the British ( RAF in this instance) is Parity moving to War Potential about 2 years after a decision is made. This is basically a decision to fight an offensive war. The supposition is that about 34/5 i.e. at the same time as and probably as a reaction to German rearmament Britain moves from Parity to War Potential.

To do that several things need to happen, such as expansion of factory space, recruitment of workers, selection of types and then production alongside expansion of the RAF. At best this brings the factory space back 1-2 years ( OTL the expansion was ordered in 1936) with the constraint actually being training workforce.

First flight of the Hurricane is Nov 35, First flight of Spitfire March 36. with orders for 600 Hurricane and 310 Spit in June 36. But the first 50 Hurricanes do not enter squadron service until mid 38. There are export orders ad licences granted but only because rate of production exceeds RAF rate of absorption. Even if the factory space expansion is earlier the best you are going to get is deliveries - to an RAF better placed to receive them would be first half of 37.

Production rate for the Hurricane in sept - dec 39 is 239 a/c so say 1000 per annum on wartime conditions ( 24/7 working) but still actually spinning up production. 1940 with about full industrial mobilisation 2,500 Spit is 171 ( say 750 pa) rising to 1252 in 40. Assuming this is all pushed back to 37 that would give Hurricane production 37. 38. 39 of
say 239 + 2,500 + 3,000 or more likely half that so 120+1250+ 1500 = 2870 Hurricanes by 39 and 80+600+ 1250 = 1880 Spit - The latter number is abotu pre 1939 production of the Me109 btw.

The RAF War Potential Requirement though is either 8,000 or 12,000 a/c ( war potential more likely 12,000) all types. so if you have only 320 fighters delivered in 37 and can absorb then you are nowhere near to being in a position to deliver them to a third party

And who is the third party . Well by September 36 is the Marxist revolutionary Largo Caballero is in charge and by November the gold reserves ( less the ones sent to France) are on the way to Odessa in a soviet ship. Now its possible that slightly earlier the Gold could have been shipped to France or the UK but Britain is in no position to deliver modern aircraft unless it as the expense of British rearmament and to an Extreme leftist government. You can probably have as many Gladiators as possible and good luck with that.

Same issue with land vehicles. If you shift production back two years ( so 41 is in 39) you will get a couple of hundred early cruisers, then 650 A15 1500 Matilda II 13,000 carriers say 4,500 25lb on a 25lb carriage.

Which is a lot more than OTL but the British army is a lot bigger earlier so needs most of the production.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

And who is the third party . Well by September 36 is the Marxist revolutionary Largo Caballero is in charge and by November the gold reserves ( less the ones sent to France) are on the way to Odessa in a soviet ship.

I am agnostic on this point. It deals with likelihoods. My purpose in writing this was to support the original thesis presented. Outside that purpose is also outside the scope of my post. Therefore, to support the original thesis the gold is sent to London.

The dates dot work and Spain cant afford it

Arguably no country can afford a civil war, and equally arguably Spain could not afford the one it fought from 1936-39. As for payment, I presuppose Spain does what it did in the OTL; pawn its gold reserves and offer economic compensation collectable only if the war is won.

Not sure I understand the point made with production of Hawker Hurricanes. Did you factor in the earlier production of Hurricanes in Canada?

Which is a lot more than OTL but the British army is a lot bigger earlier so needs most of the production.

This is the part I am most interested in. In what ways do you believe the British Army would be much larger, since that was not a part of my post? To me it is a new line of thought.

 

[Gannt the chartist]

I am agnostic on this point. It deals with likelihoods. My purpose in writing this was to support the original thesis presented. Outside that purpose is also outside the scope of my post. Therefore, to support the original thesis the gold is sent to London.

Arguably no country can afford a civil war, and equally arguably Spain could not afford the one it fought from 1936-39. As for payment, I presuppose Spain does what it did in the OTL; pawn its gold reserves and offer economic compensation collectable only if the war is won.

Not sure I understand the point made with production of Hawker Hurricanes. Did you factor in the earlier production of Hurricanes in Canada?

This is the part I am most interested in. In what ways do you believe the British Army would be much larger, since that was not a part of my post? To me it is a new line of thought.

The basis of the thread is improved british rearmament. The Cabinet Papers are clear even before commitment to deployment to continent is agreed on a move to a larger BEF equipped for offensive warfare is part of that programme the only question is when do you start with that. An earlier decision to rearm is also an earlier decision to have a deployable BEF earlier which means all the equipping has to start earlier.

The Army wont actually be bigger ( still 12 - 18 divs deployable) but it will be fully equipped with the bells and whistles and attached Bde on day 1.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

The basis of the thread is improved british rearmament. The Cabinet Papers are clear even before commitment to deployment to continent is agreed on a move to a larger BEF equipped for offensive warfare is part of that programme the only question is when do you start with that. An earlier decision to rearm is also an earlier decision to have a deployable BEF earlier which means all the equipping has to start earlier.

The Army wont actually be bigger ( still 12 - 18 divs deployable) but it will be fully equipped with the bells and whistles and attached Bde on day 1.

Not sharpshooting here... open ended questions. The OTL BEF was five regular divisions (1-5), and 42 (EL), 44 (HC), 48 (SM), 50 (N) and 51 (H) Divisions from the TA. Parts of 1 AD, plus 52 (Low) Division were sent after 10 May 1940. 12 (HC), 23 (N) and 46 (M&WR) Divisions arrived in April 1940 as labour troops without artillery, signals, transport etc. From this starting point, the 12 divisions cited is not difficult, 15 is possible, but 18 requires more data. Any thoughts there? Also, would any significant changes fit in - i.e Welsh, Wessex, West Lancashire or East Anglia as opposed to both TA Divisions from Home Counties and Northumberland? Is emphasis on making 2 AD ready, or 23 and 24 (Army) Tank Brigades? I assume I and II British Corps HQ are formed in peacetime and maneuvers expanded in scope and realism. Any resulting significant doctrinal changes?

Would there be any resuscitation of regiments disbanded under the Geddes Axe of the early 1920s, such as decoupling amalgamated regiments, or re-adding a third battalion to the former "large regiments?" In your mind, how much would the rearmament acceleration would make it past the BEF and into Middle East Command or elsewhere overseas? For example, earlier full equipment of 7 AD, and addition of artillery components to 7 and 8 Divisions in Palestine? Is the wealth spread, or absorbed entirely by the German threat? These questions are are off-center perhaps, but I am curious as to your thinking.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Not sharpshooting here... open ended questions. The OTL BEF was five regular divisions (1-5), and 42 (EL), 44 (HC), 48 (SM), 50 (N) and 51 (H) Divisions from the TA. Parts of 1 AD, plus 52 (Low) Division were sent after 10 May 1940. 12 (HC), 23 (N) and 46 (M&WR) Divisions arrived in April 1940 as labour troops without artillery, signals, transport etc. From this starting point, the 12 divisions cited is not difficult, 15 is possible, but 18 requires more data. Any thoughts there? Also, would any significant changes fit in - i.e Welsh, Wessex, West Lancashire or East Anglia as opposed to both TA Divisions from Home Counties and Northumberland? Is emphasis on making 2 AD ready, or 23 and 24 (Army) Tank Brigades? I assume I and II British Corps HQ are formed in peacetime and maneuvers expanded in scope and realism. Any resulting significant doctrinal changes?

Would there be any resuscitation of regiments disbanded under the Geddes Axe of the early 1920s, such as decoupling amalgamated regiments, or re-adding a third battalion to the former "large regiments?" In your mind, how much would the rearmament acceleration would make it past the BEF and into Middle East Command or elsewhere overseas? For example, earlier full equipment of 7 AD, and addition of artillery components to 7 and 8 Divisions in Palestine? Is the wealth spread, or absorbed entirely by the German threat? These questions are are off-center perhaps, but I am curious as to your thinking.

Just to jump in on the expansion question

I think it would simply be splitting the TA Battalions and forming 2 battalions from each already in the 13 TA Divisions as OTL

An earlier decision to return the BEF to the Continent and an earlier Limited conscription act will have the manpower to fill those 26 TA Divisions

A subtle rise in wages will attract more volunteers for the regular army

It takes 6 months to train a Soldier, trooper, gunner etc

18 months to train a Specialist and JO and longer for JNCO to be identified and 'grown'

The earlier they start the better

 

[Gannt the chartist]

Not sharpshooting here... open ended questions. The OTL BEF was five regular divisions (1-5), and 42 (EL), 44 (HC), 48 (SM), 50 (N) and 51 (H) Divisions from the TA. Parts of 1 AD, plus 52 (Low) Division were sent after 10 May 1940. 12 (HC), 23 (N) and 46 (M&WR) Divisions arrived in April 1940 as labour troops without artillery, signals, transport etc. From this starting point, the 12 divisions cited is not difficult, 15 is possible, but 18 requires more data. Any thoughts there? Also, would any significant changes fit in - i.e Welsh, Wessex, West Lancashire or East Anglia as opposed to both TA Divisions from Home Counties and Northumberland? Is emphasis on making 2 AD ready, or 23 and 24 (Army) Tank Brigades? I assume I and II British Corps HQ are formed in peacetime and maneuvers expanded in scope and realism. Any resulting significant doctrinal changes?

Would there be any resuscitation of regiments disbanded under the Geddes Axe of the early 1920s, such as decoupling amalgamated regiments, or re-adding a third battalion to the former "large regiments?" In your mind, how much would the rearmament acceleration would make it past the BEF and into Middle East Command or elsewhere overseas? For example, earlier full equipment of 7 AD, and addition of artillery components to 7 and 8 Divisions in Palestine? Is the wealth spread, or absorbed entirely by the German threat? These questions are are off-center perhaps, but I am curious as to your thinking.

The cabinet papers are talking about the 5 regular ( in UK) Divs an 12 TA divs in 1936 and then on to 39, At which point the intention is to split one of the regular divisions - the Mobile division into two smaller divisions. the issue is always the level of equipment available not the manpower.

What you have in 1939 is 1st London ( later 56th) 42, 43, 44, 48.49. 50. 51,52,53,54,55 ID of the first line TA, all of which are intended to form duplicate divisions some of which are extant pre war but not trained or equipped. 1-5 ID ( reg) plus 6/7 ID and 8 ID in the middle east and the Mobile division ( 1 amd) but the pre war intention was to split that into two smaller Mobile Divs ( 1 amd 1 inf bde like the later war Amd divs).

That gets to a deployable force of 17 ID and 1 or 2 Amd divs deployable within say 4 months of mobilisation with training cadre for others in the UK and 2 colonial divs plus 7 amd in the middle east plus 1st Cav in Palestine. Plus India Africa and the Dominions.

On Manpower the issue the issue in introducing conscription as stated is potential opposition from the Pacifist Left if there is a recognition of a Nazi threat Foot and his ilk are probably taken behind the woodshed and beaten bloody by the Ernie Bevin Left and that opposition disappears. I suspect conscription is still unlikely but with a popular support for rearmament there is a very likely to be a high level of volunteering. In WW1 conscription did not actually increase the manpower available at the start what it did was allow for more selective service so the right numbers go into the right place.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

The cabinet papers are talking about the 5 regular ( in UK) Divs an 12 TA divs in 1936 and then on to 39, At which point the intention is to split one of the regular divisions - the Mobile division into two smaller divisions. the issue is always the level of equipment available not the manpower.

What you have in 1939 is 1st London ( later 56th) 42, 43, 44, 48.49. 50. 51,52,53,54,55 ID of the first line TA, all of which are intended to form duplicate divisions some of which are extant pre war but not trained or equipped. 1-5 ID ( reg) plus 6/7 ID and 8 ID in the middle east and the Mobile division ( 1 amd) but the pre war intention was to split that into two smaller Mobile Divs ( 1 amd 1 inf bde like the later war Amd divs).

That gets to a deployable force of 17 ID and 1 or 2 Amd divs deployable within say 4 months of mobilisation with training cadre for others in the UK and 2 colonial divs plus 7 amd in the middle east plus 1st Cav in Palestine. Plus India Africa and the Dominions.

On Manpower the issue the issue in introducing conscription as stated is potential opposition from the Pacifist Left if there is a recognition of a Nazi threat Foot and his ilk are probably taken behind the woodshed and beaten bloody by the Ernie Bevin Left and that opposition disappears. I suspect conscription is still unlikely but with a popular support for rearmament there is a very likely to be a high level of volunteering. In WW1 conscription did not actually increase the manpower available at the start what it did was allow for more selective service so the right numbers go into the right place.

Appreciate it!

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Link to Post 31 on Page 2 which was British expenditure from 1st April 1939 to 31st March 1940 according to the Annual Abstract of Statistics.

Link to Post 48 on Page 3 which was the Statement showing the numbers borne, the Expenditure on Naval Services, for the Years 1930-37 and the Estimates for 1938 and 1939 from Pages 8 and 9 of the Navy Estimates 1939-40 which are dated 15th February 1939. (Royal Navy Museum, Portsmouth's copy.)

To compliment the above this is a transcript of Pages 4 and 5 of the Army Estimates 1939-40 which are dated 15th February 1939. (National Army Museum's copy.)

It shows the actual expenditure for the 8 financial years commencing on 1st April 1930 and ending on 31st March 1938 and the estimated expenditure for the two financial years starting on 1st April 1938 and ending on 31st March 1940.

I've added the average Net Cash Expenditure for the five financial years 1930-34 and the five financial years 1935-39. As can be seen the average spending before the POD is half the average spending after it.

The spending exclusive of issues under the Defence Loans Act is within a few hundred thousand Pounds of what the table compiled from contemporary Annual Abstracts of Statistics in Post 31 says, including 1939-40, which is £81.9 million in both documents.

In the Statement the issues under the Defence Loans Act for 1937-38 were £9,940,000, but according to the Annual Abstract of Statistics the issues were £14,867,000 in that financial year, which is nearly £5 million more. Furthermore, the equivalents of the Statement in the Army Estimates for 1937-38 and 1938-39 show that the estimated issues for the 1937-38 financial year were £19,054.000.

So the actual issues under the Defence Loans Act in 1937-38 were either:

• £5 million less than the estimate - according to the Annual Abstract of Statistics. Or;
• £9 million less than the estimate - according to the Army Estimates for 1937-38 and 1938-39.

In the Statement the issues under the Defence Loans Act for 1938-39 were £21,143,000, but according to the Annual Abstract of Statistics say they were £35,700,000. That's a different of about £14,500,000. This could be because the first figure was the estimated issues and the latter was the actual issues.

There were Supplementary Estimates between then and the outbreak of war in September 1939, but I don't have any information on their financial details.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

This compliments the tables in Post 31 on Page 2, Post 48 on Page 3 and Post 235 on Page 12.

Unlike the tables on the Army and Navy Expenditure this isn't a transcript of the original document. I compiled it from the articles on the Air Estimates in the Flight Archive.

• The figures for 1930 to 1934 come from the article on the Air Estimates for 1936.
• The figures for 1936 and 1937 come from the article on the Air Estimates for 1937.
• The figures for 1938 and 1939 come from the article on the Air Estimates for 1939.

It shows the actual expenditure for the 5 financial years commencing on 1st April 1930 and ending on 31st March 1935 and the estimated expenditure for the 5 financial years starting on 1st April 1935 and ending on 31st March 1940. This isn't the same as the tables on the Army and Navy because the articles in the Flight Archive didn't say what the Net Cash Expenditure for 1935, 1936 and 1937 was so I had to use the estimated expenditure.

I've added the averages for the five financial years 1930-34 and the five financial years 1935-39. As can be seen the average spending (exclusive of defence loan receipts) for 1935-39 was five times the average for 1930-34 and the Estimates for 1939 (exclusive of defence loads receipts) were twelve times the average for 1930 to 1934!

The spending exclusive of issues under the Defence Loans Act is within a few hundred thousand Pounds of what the table compiled from contemporary Annual Abstracts of Statistics in Post 31 says, including 1939-40, which is £66.6 million in both documents.

According to the Navy Estimates the issues under the Defence Loans Act were:

1937-38 £26,000,000 which matches the Annual Abstract of Statistics.​

1938-39 £52,900,000 which is less than the £61,000,000 for that year in the Annual Abstract of Statistics.​

1939-40 £142,900 which increases the Estimate from £66,561,000 to £208,561,000 which is 213% more.​

There may have been Supplementary Estimates between Friday, 3rd March 1939 (when the Air Estimates for 1939 were issued) and the outbreak of war in September 1939.

 

[Issei Uzumaki]

I’m probably treading over old ground here so I apologise.

But I was curious how people here would go about British Rearmament, Planning and organisation before world war 2 for both the Army, Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force?

Assuming the POD is 1935 how much can get done? Will it be enough to prevent the fall of France assuming the follow the same operation, tactical and strategic focuses and deficiencies they had OTL. Also will this change who things kick off in the desert and the Far East?

edit: adding to this can there be anything done to enhance the British and Commonwealths intelligence efforts.

I've often wondered by the UK didn't offer up their Caribbean possessions, including Guyana, in exchange for either partial or complete debt relief from WW 1 debt. They could have easily used the money saved from that to boost military spending which would have not only left them better prepared but provided badly needed jobs.
This means more money available to better prepare Singapore and points east from Japanese aggression which had already had one war with China in 1931. I don't know if it's enough to save France from falling in 1940 but it sure improves the odds of them stopping it as well as a stronger Pacific fleet.

EDIT: just to be clear, it should be obvious but I meant relief from US. Not to mention the money saved by no longer having to police those colonial possessions, a win all round for UK in my book.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Not to mention the money saved by no longer having to police those colonial possessions...

The amount of money that would have been saved is hardly worth a mention.

The RAF didn't have a presence in the West Indies (including Bermuda) between the World Wars.

The establishment of the British Army's garrison in the West Indies (including Bermuda) declined from about 3,800 in the 1920-21 Army Estimates and declined to about 1,100 in the 1928-29 Estimates and remained at that level until the 1938-39 Estimates. I don't know what the number for 1939-40 was because that year's Army Estimates didn't include the information.

That leaves the cost of the naval base at Bermuda and the handful of RN cruisers in the North America Division of the America & West Indies Station. Disposing of them may be false economies. The Bermuda naval base might be missed by the RN and RCN in the Battle of the Atlantic between 3rd September 1939 and 7th December 1941. And in 1939 the cruisers wouldn't be available to take part in the search for the Deutschland & Graff Spee and after that they won't be available to reinforce the main fleets.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I've often wondered by the UK didn't offer up their Caribbean possessions, including Guyana, in exchange for either partial or complete debt relief from WW 1 debt. They could have easily used the money saved from that to boost military spending which would have not only left them better prepared but provided badly needed jobs.
This means more money available to better prepare Singapore and points east from Japanese aggression which had already had one war with China in 1931. I don't know if it's enough to save France from falling in 1940 but it sure improves the odds of them stopping it as well as a stronger Pacific fleet.

EDIT: just to be clear, it should be obvious but I meant relief from US. Not to mention the money saved by no longer having to police those colonial possessions, a win all round for UK in my book.

Would the USA want to buy them? And if they did how much would they be prepared to pay?

The British National Debt was £7,500 million at 31st March 1919 and had increased to £8,300 million at 31st March 1939. (See the table in Post 31 on Page 2.)

Any money saved in servicing the National Debt between the sale of the West Indies and the POD (1st January 1935) will be used to pay off some of the remaining debt. That in turn would reduce the amount of interest that had to be paid and the money saved would be used to pay off another portion of the remaining debt. Which in turn would produce a further reduction in the amount of interest that had to be paid. And so on.

There's no way that any money saved on servicing the National Debt will be used to increase military spending before the POD. The Governments of the day didn't want to spend more on HM Forces. Neither did enough of the voters. If anything limiting military expenditure was a vote winner. The money saved might be used to increase non-military spending, which might create some badly needed jobs, but it won't be able to cut that extra non-military spending after the POD and spend it on HM Forces because it would be political suicide and (to paraphrase 1066 and All That) would be "a bad thing" in general.

However, it's much more likely that HMG will cut taxes in line with the reduction of debt interest as part of the Geddes Axe which reduced taxes as well as government spending. (See the table in Post 31 on Page 2.) OTOH the reduced taxation might help the British economy between the sale and the POD.

None of the three alternatives will help HM Forces and their supporting industries before the POD. However, they might help afterwards because HM Treasury would be able to find more money to finance the rearmament programmes. In the first case the money not needed to pay the interest on the National Debt can be transferred from paying off more of the National Debt to increasing military spending. In the second and third cases a healthier economy means more tax revenue and less unemployment related spending.

E.g. IOTL HM Treasury said that the most it could raise for military spending in the five financial years beginning on 1st April 1937 and ending on 31st March 1942 was £1,500 million. IIRC (and I'm not sure that I do) the rearmament programme recommended by the 3rd Report of the Defence Requirements Committee was £1,650 million was estimated to cost £1,650 million. IIRC (and I'm reasonably sure that I do) the "short straws" were drawn by the Expeditionary Force of the field army and what would become the Anti-Aircraft Command of the British Army. That is the 14 TA infantry divisions were only to be provided with "training scales" of modern equipment which in the event of war would be "pooled" and allow the mobilisation of 4 divisions instead of the Report's recommendation that all of the TA divisions be provided with modern equipment and that the increase in what became the Army's Anti-Aircraft Command that the Report recommended would be completed in the middle of the 1940s instead of by 31st March 1942.

Except that selling the British West Indies to the Americans in the early 1920s is ASB. That is unless someone knows better than me and can prove that the British Government did consider doing so IOTL.

 

[Driftless]

I can't imagine the US having much interest in the British West Indies, at least as a whole. Even the purchase of the Danish Virgin Islands was more to stifle any perceived German interest.

The US might have been more interested in snaffling up some of the German possessions in the Central Pacific, but as non-belligerents in 1914, the US could only watch while the Japanese and Commonwealth forces snapped those islands up