Is it? I mean you see some of the Nordic nations having a form of Conscription up until right now, can hardly argue they aren't well equipped or with current systems?
British forces in axis Cold War
- Thread starter BurkeanLibCon
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NI had its own government so different rules apply, just like with the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man. Also you don't chuck a lit match into a powder keg and it was well known NI was just that.
Funny I would call the 1940 offer doing a hell of a lot more than just that if it had ever been moved forward not that I imagine it would even if Dev did trust the UK Government.
I guess the old Channel Island militias would survive here. Given that they surrendered in 1940 without a fight I can imagine that they would be fortified massively.
Possibly made easier with all the nice forts Germany built.
All this assuming that the islands are returned to Britain, which in the event of a Soviet-Japanese 1956 / Tashkent 1966 no-treaty peace is possible but not in the event of an informal ceasefire AANW-style. I’m still torn on which scenario is more likely to bring fighting to and end. Either scenario still ends up with a “Twilight war” that @Simon Darkshade already mentioned. The difference being that that the former gives you an embassy to run spy rings out of and the latter doesn’t.
I am also of the opinion that technology and attitudes would bring conscription in Britain to an end around the ‘60s.
A really out there idea I thought of is a US-style Selective Service system following some kind of basic training as a compulsory A-level/Higher course (or whatever the equivalent is outside the UK), whilst volunteers can join the forces immediately. This may work in getting necessary numbers plus a somewhat trained reserve without recourse to conscription.
This particular example is probably unlikely, but I believe OTL China does some kind of student military training, so this doesn’t seem totally ASB.
Also, what defences Britain would need depends partly on Germany and its allies. I imagine the Atlantic Wall would see a larger proportion of German client states manning the fort (under German overall command). Perhaps something like @CalBear’s AANW world where the Germans control much of the armoured and mechanised forces with local forces serving as infantry support and garrison troops.
That depends on who is in charge in Berlin and whether they trust their client states.
Selective service wouldn't be acceptable to the British public, particularly as the US experience shows the burden falls much more heavily on the lower levels of society with the rich and powerful able to manipulate the system to get their sons out of it.
Because the communists can hide in the countryside in the interior of China. The KMT had a hard time fighting the Japanese despite being supplied by the U.S., the UK, and the USSR. The KMT would risk overstretching if they continue to pursue the communists inland. After all, the communists had the support of the rural farmers in the countryside.
Which states had conscription during the Cold War?
West Germany, France, Sweden, Italy, the USA (until post Vietnam), Australia, Denmark, South Africa, Portugal, Spain, Finland, the Netherlands, Austria, Brazil, Belgium, Luxembourg, Chile, New Zealand, Norway, even freaking Argentina.
The only major Western state that didn’t exercise conscription during the peacetime CW period was Canada, so let us be spared the post facto rationales.
Britain ended NS not because of lack of a military need, but because of the combination of economic excuses and the wholesale retreat from great power status/defence cutting.
That isn’t possible as a frontline state.
This keeps being airily dismissed or waved away with references to other countries defending Britain/nuclear weapons doing everything/leaving it to the reserves/why not field a 1990s level regular army? They fail the test of strategic need and requirements.
The reference to a “US style Selective Service System” has cropped up several times, being described firstly as for university students and then for A levels, of all things (they only emerged in 1951, by the by). At this point, the levels of students completing secondary school in England and Wales were not at modern levels and, as said, there were ~3% at university. None of these Clayton’s approaches give enough numbers.
What is the SSS? Are we talking the modern contingency, the US draft laws of the 1950s, those of the 1960s or something else entirely? How is it somehow superior to National Service, which in this case would need to be universal?
Saying that ‘conscription would go in the 1960s’ is just built upon the assumptions that our own history has drilled into us. When the facts change, the assumptions should shift.
This is a Britain that needs millions of trained reserves, 1.5 million to 2 million in the Home Guard and over a million active duty troops/airmen/sailors. It is a national necessity as there is no peace that can be had with the actual Nazis right across the Channel.
What ‘attitudes’ would develop to end conscription? Not youthful rebellion, rock music, mods, Beatlemania or the like, as none of them have a skerrick of a hope of emerging here. Not war weariness, as there isn’t a full Day War. Actually drill down and interrogate *why* you think National Service will be viewed in the same way as @ in a completely different world, rather than just drifting towards @ beliefs and solutions out of familiarity.
West Germany, France, Sweden, Italy, the USA (until post Vietnam), Australia, Denmark, South Africa, Portugal, Spain, Finland, the Netherlands, Austria, Brazil, Belgium, Luxembourg, Chile, New Zealand, Norway, even freaking Argentina.
The only major Western state that didn’t exercise conscription during the peacetime CW period was Canada, so let us be spared the post facto rationales.
Britain ended NS not because of lack of a military need, but because of the combination of economic excuses and the wholesale retreat from great power status/defence cutting.
That isn’t possible as a frontline state.
This keeps being airily dismissed or waved away with references to other countries defending Britain/nuclear weapons doing everything/leaving it to the reserves/why not field a 1990s level regular army? They fail the test of strategic need and requirements.
The reference to a “US style Selective Service System” has cropped up several times, being described firstly as for university students and then for A levels, of all things (they only emerged in 1951, by the by). At this point, the levels of students completing secondary school in England and Wales were not at modern levels and, as said, there were ~3% at university. None of these Clayton’s approaches give enough numbers.
What is the SSS? Are we talking the modern contingency, the US draft laws of the 1950s, those of the 1960s or something else entirely? How is it somehow superior to National Service, which in this case would need to be universal?
Saying that ‘conscription would go in the 1960s’ is just built upon the assumptions that our own history has drilled into us. When the facts change, the assumptions should shift.
This is a Britain that needs millions of trained reserves, 1.5 million to 2 million in the Home Guard and over a million active duty troops/airmen/sailors. It is a national necessity as there is no peace that can be had with the actual Nazis right across the Channel.
What ‘attitudes’ would develop to end conscription? Not youthful rebellion, rock music, mods, Beatlemania or the like, as none of them have a skerrick of a hope of emerging here. Not war weariness, as there isn’t a full Day War. Actually drill down and interrogate *why* you think National Service will be viewed in the same way as @ in a completely different world, rather than just drifting towards @ beliefs and solutions out of familiarity.
Not only do I think it would be necessary for National Service to extend into Northern Ireland, which wasn't seen as a powderkeg in the 1940s in any way, shape or form, but also that the epoch of Irish neutrality is well and truly over.
At a minimum, there will need to be extensive air and naval bases in Eire and they will need to pull their weight with manpower equivalent to 4-5 divisions and change; whether those are under their flag or another is of less importance than getting it on the overall Commonwealth team. The least objectionable form would be for the Irish Army itself to have its 2 regular divisions devoted to home defence and a further two semi-reserve divisions backing them up; this is based on the @ numbers of 41000 active and 106000 reserves during The Emergency. The redirection of volunteers to the British Army would need to tacitly allowed with no blowback.
At a minimum, there will need to be extensive air and naval bases in Eire and they will need to pull their weight with manpower equivalent to 4-5 divisions and change; whether those are under their flag or another is of less importance than getting it on the overall Commonwealth team. The least objectionable form would be for the Irish Army itself to have its 2 regular divisions devoted to home defence and a further two semi-reserve divisions backing them up; this is based on the @ numbers of 41000 active and 106000 reserves during The Emergency. The redirection of volunteers to the British Army would need to tacitly allowed with no blowback.
You're correct, although a lot of them also gave it up as the Cold War continued. It would also be interesting to know what roles those conscripts were expected to fill. I don't particularly care about attitudes to conscription in the general populace - I think you're right that the situation would be viewed quite differently with Nazi Europe just over the channel. What I care about is the military rationale for conscription.
Conscription, when it's working well, gives you a large pool of somewhat-trained personnel who can be mobilised relatively quickly. They still need refresher training when mobilised, but that's in the order of months rather than years. They can be used to round out formations which are short of their designated strength, or provide bulk for new formations which already have cadre staff and will then be undergoing further training. If you're willing to accept high casualties, you can also throw them straight into combat, and they won't be a complete disaster while they're learning on the job.
Conscription does not give you highly-trained specialists, however. Two years is just not long enough to train a specialist and give them enough experience to be useful in their role, and without fairly frequent usage their skills will drop off quickly. As weapons and equipment become more sophisticated and proliferate through the military establishment, the level of specialisation required to effectively operate them increases and so does the proportion of specialists required. Fortunately, the absolute number of such systems goes down a bit (hopefully), as the increased effectiveness of newer systems allows you to do more with less.
All this is building up to saying that conscription is only militarily useful up to a certain point. It's useful while you have lots of jobs that just need warm bodies to fill them. It becomes less useful when the technical complexity and tactical sophistication rises, and it becomes counter-productive when you have to use valuable professionals and resources to baby-sit large numbers of people who can't do much that's of use, and who don't have the same level of motivation anyway.
The 1950s and 1960s were a time when military technology changed very quickly. A cutting-edge aircraft or ship in 1945 was obsolete junk in 1955, and it's replacement was just as outdated in 1965. Heavy guns were generally replaced by missiles, two generations of aircraft came and went, electronic warfare and counter measures spread like cancer. At the same time, the pace of operations increased significantly as well. By the end of that period it was clear that "fitted for, but not with" was a dated concept, and that went for personnel just as much as equipment. If a war kicked off, there would not be time to equip and train units with modern weapons, or to mobilise and integrate significant numbers of troops. The war would be fought and won (or lost) with what you had ready to go.
I think conscription is useful until the early 1960s - up until then things are still relatively simple, and the ability to field large numbers with second-tier equipment and training is still relevant even against first-line formations. After that point, however, the accumulation of factors starts swinging against having conscripts on the battlefield.
I think that conscription also has a role to play as a way of identifying the people you want to have in your regular formations. Since theoretically everyone is coming through conscription, you can skim off the cream of them and induce them to go regular. But as the Cold War goes on, the gap in performance between conscripts and regulars only widens, and the effort of trying to close it becomes counterproductive.
i.) A lot of them did not. The USA, Australia and NZ did. That is not a lot.
ii.) Much of what you say is correct, but it does ignore the different circumstances of this scenario: the enemy is at the gates and the enemy is the Nazis. That can't be ignored simply to isolate the military rationale or any rationale, as we cannot separate force structure and composition from its purpose. It is one thing to write a homily on 'Conscription as it occured historically in the circumstances of @', but what we need is to apply it to these circumstances, not just speak about what occurred for us.
iii.) That means that bodies for defence are still needed. The Regular Army will have quite a lot of professionals/volunteers, but there are plenty of niches within it that are suited to the conscript, such as labour, catering, transport, Royal Pioneer Corps, the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, the Royal Army Service Corps and of course PBI. Israel managed to extend this into armour and artillery quite effectively, so it isn't utterly impossible. Put simply, Home Defence/Home Service Forces/Home Guard duties do not involve any of the shibboleths of increasing technical complexity. Neither, by and large, do static defence positions along the coast or, while they are in place, AA Command and Coastal Defence Command.
iv.) The model I have proposed is 24 months Regular Army service after training, followed by a minimum of 10 years reserve service obligation. The latter would involve being 'shifted' through the Army Reserve through to the Territorial Army and perhaps thence the Home Guard. The RAF and RN would have lesser needs for conscripts in the same way, but there will still be roles for some.
v.) It is useful well past the early 1960s in all of the roles outlined in iii above. The notion of 'baby sitting' conscripts who don't want to be there involves there being an alternative; it involves this being an unfair imposition, rather than simply a completely compulsory part of life. This, dare I say it, is informed by the particular intepretations of British National Service in the 1950s of @, more than the experiences of wartime conscription or that in frontline states. One can't simply glibly transpose the attitudes of @ into completely different circumstances. Here, there may not be daily bombing raids, but there is still shooting and hostile action going on, around the world.
vi.) Rather than non-frontline states, it is more useful to consider Taiwan, Singapore, Israel and South Korea during the CW. Those are the paradigms closest to our scenario here, not non-universal conscription for a grudging military.
I would submit that, whilst your analysis of historical conscription is correct, trying to not apply it to the scenario here, but trying to slip in historical attitudes and malcontentedness is of slightly less utility for this scenario. When the facts change, the assumptions should shift.
ii.) Much of what you say is correct, but it does ignore the different circumstances of this scenario: the enemy is at the gates and the enemy is the Nazis. That can't be ignored simply to isolate the military rationale or any rationale, as we cannot separate force structure and composition from its purpose. It is one thing to write a homily on 'Conscription as it occured historically in the circumstances of @', but what we need is to apply it to these circumstances, not just speak about what occurred for us.
iii.) That means that bodies for defence are still needed. The Regular Army will have quite a lot of professionals/volunteers, but there are plenty of niches within it that are suited to the conscript, such as labour, catering, transport, Royal Pioneer Corps, the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, the Royal Army Service Corps and of course PBI. Israel managed to extend this into armour and artillery quite effectively, so it isn't utterly impossible. Put simply, Home Defence/Home Service Forces/Home Guard duties do not involve any of the shibboleths of increasing technical complexity. Neither, by and large, do static defence positions along the coast or, while they are in place, AA Command and Coastal Defence Command.
iv.) The model I have proposed is 24 months Regular Army service after training, followed by a minimum of 10 years reserve service obligation. The latter would involve being 'shifted' through the Army Reserve through to the Territorial Army and perhaps thence the Home Guard. The RAF and RN would have lesser needs for conscripts in the same way, but there will still be roles for some.
v.) It is useful well past the early 1960s in all of the roles outlined in iii above. The notion of 'baby sitting' conscripts who don't want to be there involves there being an alternative; it involves this being an unfair imposition, rather than simply a completely compulsory part of life. This, dare I say it, is informed by the particular intepretations of British National Service in the 1950s of @, more than the experiences of wartime conscription or that in frontline states. One can't simply glibly transpose the attitudes of @ into completely different circumstances. Here, there may not be daily bombing raids, but there is still shooting and hostile action going on, around the world.
vi.) Rather than non-frontline states, it is more useful to consider Taiwan, Singapore, Israel and South Korea during the CW. Those are the paradigms closest to our scenario here, not non-universal conscription for a grudging military.
I would submit that, whilst your analysis of historical conscription is correct, trying to not apply it to the scenario here, but trying to slip in historical attitudes and malcontentedness is of slightly less utility for this scenario. When the facts change, the assumptions should shift.
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Ok, I admit, you’ve now convinced me on National Service here.
This question is more about technicalities, but would all the old line infantry regiments survive (Somerset Light Infantry, Cameronians, Welch Fusiliers) etc, or would there still be some amalgamations.
I can imagine the King’s Royal Rifle Corps and Rifle Brigade still amalgamating into the Royal Green Jackets.
What do you think?
There were no amalgamations post 1881 until the post WW2 contraction. That was driven by a smaller army and the end of the old deployment system of 1 at home, 1 in India or the Empire.
Here, there isn’t the basis for a contraction. All of the ~140 battalions will be needed for Home Forces, overseas armies and assorted garrisons. For the 5-6 mech inf divisions, there needs to be 30-36, 20-24 for 5-6 armoured, 3-4 for each independent brigade (of which there will be a few, then a bunch (~16-20) for minor deployments around the world, then more for the strategic reserve and public duties. If there are spares, all the better - gives flexibility and options.
This seems a lot, but it is just the pre WW2 regular structure; we are used to a constant series of cuts and amalgamations.
Thus, I can’t really see it.
Here, there isn’t the basis for a contraction. All of the ~140 battalions will be needed for Home Forces, overseas armies and assorted garrisons. For the 5-6 mech inf divisions, there needs to be 30-36, 20-24 for 5-6 armoured, 3-4 for each independent brigade (of which there will be a few, then a bunch (~16-20) for minor deployments around the world, then more for the strategic reserve and public duties. If there are spares, all the better - gives flexibility and options.
This seems a lot, but it is just the pre WW2 regular structure; we are used to a constant series of cuts and amalgamations.
Thus, I can’t really see it.
And how do you imagine that happening exactly, short of the U.K. et al invading and then trying to conscript Irish while being an occupying force?
With all this discussion of what kind of peacetime forces the Allies have what is the Axis peacetime military like? Everyone is assuming the German military is at full wartime strength. To have a long-term functioning economy they have to demobilize several million men. I'd read years ago the Germans could've had a motorized army of 70 divisions after the fall of France. They decided if they were going to attack Russia and occupy Europe, they need about 200 divisions, with most of them being horse dependent infantry. So, assuming they have 20 Pz, 15 Pz/Gr, 2 Luftwaffe Parra, 2 air mobile, 4 SS Pz, 27 Motorized Inf, 20 security divisions, and 20 reserve infantry divisions for a total 110 divisions.
This assumes most of the security divisions are in the East, along with half of the regular army, and the SS divisions. A Vichy State with German advisors is in charge of France except for Corsica. Italy except for Sicily, and Sardinia is still run by the Black Shirts. The rest of Europe is run by collaborationist Right Wing Regimes and Axis allied countries with their own occupied territories to control.
The Luftwaffe in peacetime is able to build up to a higher level than its wartime peak of 6,000 aircraft, to around 8,000 of more modern types, including jet aircraft. The dominant fighter types planned for 1946 would be the Ta-152, and the Do-335 Arrow. The Navy restarts a modified Z Plan, with an emphasis on the new Electro Boats, and Naval Aircraft. So that would be the start of the Nazi plan for a force structure.
This assumes most of the security divisions are in the East, along with half of the regular army, and the SS divisions. A Vichy State with German advisors is in charge of France except for Corsica. Italy except for Sicily, and Sardinia is still run by the Black Shirts. The rest of Europe is run by collaborationist Right Wing Regimes and Axis allied countries with their own occupied territories to control.
The Luftwaffe in peacetime is able to build up to a higher level than its wartime peak of 6,000 aircraft, to around 8,000 of more modern types, including jet aircraft. The dominant fighter types planned for 1946 would be the Ta-152, and the Do-335 Arrow. The Navy restarts a modified Z Plan, with an emphasis on the new Electro Boats, and Naval Aircraft. So that would be the start of the Nazi plan for a force structure.
The problem for the Germans is that they face a continent wide low level insurgency and will have semi open warfare on the eastern border of their new empire with whatever post Stalin government has formed on the far side of the Urals. They can't demobilise their military to a financially sustainable level.
No, not at all, nor was that my meaning or intent.
Rather, Ireland should get substantial economic aid and military equipment from America and Britain to help develop and equip its own military capacity. That would follow their existing structure set in place during WW2, but better supported and coordinated with the Allies, so as to not require quite so extensive Anglo-American intervention in the event of small scale trouble.
In terms of basing, it would most likely need to be under the US flag and with US forces due to political issues, but it doesn't matter what colour the cat is, so long as it catches mice. Shannon Airport in particular sticks out as a useful asset for transatlantic ferrying of aircraft.
There wouldn't be any question of telling them or forcing them to enforce conscription, as that is politically impossible for another state to impose, nor right.
Getting Ireland to move from a situation of being an Allied-friendly neutral to part of the overall worldwide Allies/United Nations would be a combination of consistent and friendly political pressure from the US, replete with bushels of carrots (aid and trade), strategic use of information warfare as the true nature of the thoroughly evil Nazi regime comes to the fore and as much buttering up through propaganda and diplomacy as needed. It is hard to contemplate neutrality when the British Isles are the very frontline of freedom; neutrality as in WW2 won't be sustainable in a longer Twilight struggle.
It wouldn't be a way or tactic aimed at curtailing Irish independence, but amplifying it and giving it real recognition and meaning.
It’s very hard to see that happening for a host of reasons, not least because that was effectively the exact opposite of what happened in OTL once the decision was made to stay out of NATO. It’s important to remember that in many regards the US administration was more hostile to the Irish position than the British were (leaving aside the Punch and Judy show between Dev and Churchill of course) during the war, but British positions as well hardened after the war. For example according to some research into the matter when the Irish Navy was trying to be created post WW2 while the RN was happy to help, Whitehall itself was hostile to any supports because of not joining NATO and frustrated parts/spares/training, playing its part in neutering the NS from the start.
Trying to win over Dev with economic aid is well frankly a forlorn hope imo, not with his economic policies and with the clear intention of what that aid was intended for, and diplomatically of course the price Dublin would ask for is a price the U.K. would never give. Moreover Dublin has just witnessed the UKs cities take a pounding while avoiding the same fate by and larger, can’t think of any political party that would survive openly suggesting courting the same risks even long term.
At which point it somewhat comes back to a version of OTL, which suits the U.K. et al more, an Ireland that is Pro Allies but unable to frustrate anything the Allies might do that it disagrees with (for example if Dublin had said no to the Donegal Corridor the Allies could have ignored the answer and used it anyway), and an Ireland that provides free manpower to both the military and the British economy due to how limited the options are at home…
Or an Ireland that may eventually join the Allies but in the meantime has been built up to be able to enforce its sovereignty even against the wishes of the Allies if it wanted to, an industrial improvement paid for by the Allies but perhaps lessening the dependency of Ireland on them, and a reduced amount of manpower as both the DF have a larger demand and the baseline economy is improved creating more domestic employment?
All very cogently described and correct, but this isn't OTL or NATO.
Rather, it is an effective continuation of the War for decades, which may possibly push the Allies into some not very nice territory to fully oppose the Nazis. They would definitely prefer to do things the nice/easy way, but countering the dominance of an entire continent can lead to shifts in perceptions of what is possible.
Irish economic improvements won't suck up all the available manpower, nor match the wages across the water, so there isn't a real threat of aid being necessarily self-defeating. If the alternate is being cut off economically and politically from the rest of the free world, the options available to Ireland's political leadership grow thinner; I don't see there being a fence that can be sat on anymore. Once we extend the exigencies of the Second World War for a much longer time, the further we get away from what prevailed in OTL.
In any event, this isn't a thread on Ireland, but British forces. That particular aspect of it would play out in time; real estate abutting the North Atlantic, particularly islands, will become very attractive. The Canaries would likely go the path of the Azores.
Rather, it is an effective continuation of the War for decades, which may possibly push the Allies into some not very nice territory to fully oppose the Nazis. They would definitely prefer to do things the nice/easy way, but countering the dominance of an entire continent can lead to shifts in perceptions of what is possible.
Irish economic improvements won't suck up all the available manpower, nor match the wages across the water, so there isn't a real threat of aid being necessarily self-defeating. If the alternate is being cut off economically and politically from the rest of the free world, the options available to Ireland's political leadership grow thinner; I don't see there being a fence that can be sat on anymore. Once we extend the exigencies of the Second World War for a much longer time, the further we get away from what prevailed in OTL.
In any event, this isn't a thread on Ireland, but British forces. That particular aspect of it would play out in time; real estate abutting the North Atlantic, particularly islands, will become very attractive. The Canaries would likely go the path of the Azores.
One thing about Ireland here is that they still had diplomats in Europe during OTL WW2.
In a hostile continent, Irish diplomats may prove a great source of intel behind the Atlantic Wall.
All of that would be lost if Ireland joins the war.
"May" be a great source; if they are fully cooperative and to the extent that diplomatic intelligence is useful. That doesn't seem to be a huge benefit in and of itself, even before we offset it against the lost benefits of Ireland in the Allies.
I'm not completely closed to the idea that diplomatic intelligence may prove to be useful, but it does need to be proved. In any event, there are still the Swedes, Swiss and Spanish/Portuguese.
I'm not completely closed to the idea that diplomatic intelligence may prove to be useful, but it does need to be proved. In any event, there are still the Swedes, Swiss and Spanish/Portuguese.