The Soviet-Swedish War - Part I
Contrary to his reputation before the war as a hardliner who was reinvigorating a stagnating USSR and who as early as 1978 Western leaders were incredibly fearful of, Yuri Andropov was not a gambler. He certainly leaned into his public image as a man who brooked no nonsense and suffered no fools, and his much-publicized anti-corruption campaign had been compared, limply and incorrectly, to the Great Purges of the 1930s, but at heart he was a shrewd, cautious man who preferred to build consensus within the Presidium and Politburo for his actions and was loathe to make moves if he was unable to credibly predict what might happen two or three steps down the road. He had been committed to continuing the
detente of the Nixon and Ford years, not because of any particularly warm and fuzzy feelings towards the West but because he was well-versed enough with the economic and military data to know that the USSR needed a lull in tensions to restructure its economy (like much of the West, only with much more severe problems) while also maintaining its slight edge in military hard power in central Europe. The decision to attack Sweden after the capture of S-363 at Karlskrona was thus one that Andropov took extremely reluctantly - Sweden, contrary to her image in the West as a fairyland of promiscuous blondes, peaceful forest villages and perhaps most crucially a progressive neutrality, was no pushover, as the Soviets would quickly discover, and the choice to attack neutral Sweden when it was a Soviet submarine that had run aground in restricted areas was almost certain to end
detente for good.
Andropov, directed by Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov, elected to make the bulk of the raid one driven by the Air Force, out of concern for the safety of the underfunded Baltic Fleet still being sortied out of the Gulf of Finland. At 0515 on the morning of October 28th, wings of Mig-25s (interceptors) and Mig-27s (ground attack planes) were launched from air bases in Estonia, Kaliningrad, and East Germany. Soviet recon over the previous decade had been very strong and they were well aware of what Sweden's capabilities were like in the southern third of their country, and thus each Mig-27 pilot had a list of radar installations, missile batteries and other exclusively military targets to attack in the opening raid. The Soviet aircraft were of good quality but were close to being phased out in favor of the superior Su-27, Mig-29 and Mig-31 - all of which would be introduced formally in 1982 or 1983, making late October of 1981 a uniquely disadvantageous time for Moscow to decide to go on the attack. Nonetheless, Andropov was confident that what he was putting in the air was superior to Sweden's
Flygvapnet.
This was not necessarily the case. The Saab 37 Viggen, when introduced in the early 1970s, had been possibly the most advanced jet fighter in Europe, and was the backbone of the Swedish Air Force. While its eventual replacement was in development as the Viggen's design aged and technology became more sophisticated (particularly around electronics), it was no slouch of an aircraft and matched up well with the Mig-25s and Mig-27s streaking into Swedish airspace before dawn on a Wednesday morning. The defense of southern Sweden was largely in the hands of the Scania Wing and Blekinge Wing, both at airbases near Karlskrona; additional support could be provided from Uppsala and Skaraborg. As dozens of contacts appeared across Swedish radar screens (despite best efforts to come low across the Baltic, many Migs were still detected), dozens of planes were scrambled to intercept and defend Swedish territory. Prime Minister Falldin was woken up from his sleep and the whole Swedish Cabinet taken to a secure location outside of Stockholm; King Carl XVI Gustaf and his family, including his young daughter and heir Viktoria, were evacuated from Drottningholm Palace as well.
At approximately 0600, less than an hour after taking off, the first Soviet planes struck at Karlskrona Naval Station, attempting to decimate whatever vessels were still in port and shatter defensive installations in its vicinity, blow Swedish fuel tanks and crater naval aviation runways and access roads. The second wave, after coming in on attack vector, hammered the site where S-363 had run aground, attempting to destroy the submarine entirely. The third wave struck at air bases and even civilian airfields in Gotland and across Scania and Smaland, attempting to break the ability of Swedish aircraft to respond effectively to the attacks and, most crucially, limit their ability to strike at the Baltic Fleet squadron heading out to help establish continuous sorties for air superiority.
The Soviet raid on the morning of the 28th was largely successful in most of its first-order objectives, less so on others. S-363 was entirely destroyed and the Karlskrona Naval Base was badly damaged, as were access roads, runways and radar and anti-aircraft installations across south-eastern Sweden. Total military and civilian casualties in the opening salvo was close to a thousand dead and approximately three times that number wounded. However, the Swedish Air Force was designed for interception in precisely such an event, and dogfights erupted across the Scanian skies as the run rose over Sweden, and the covering Mig-27s were not entirely able to screen their fleeing ground attack craft from Viggens streaking in at Mach 2 to shoot them down. Fourteen Soviet planes were shot down against four Swedish ones, and only four of the Soviet pilots were able to bail out in time against all four Swedish aviators successfully parachuting to safety.
Shortly after 0700, Moscow confidently messaged Stockholm and proposed an immediate ceasefire, describing the raid as a proportionate response to the S-363 incident. Swedish officials, with thousands across Scania and Smaland dead or wounded and having been at the receiving end of a unilateral surprise attack not dissimilar to Pearl Harbor, had a response that is not fit for print.