Better Outcome In the Phillipines Defense Dec 1941

[ExScientiaTridens]

Even if Japan can allocate more troops to the PI campaign, they don't have the shipping. As it was, they only had shipping to land 1 Brigade at Lamon Bay, while the remainder of the 16th Army troops sat on Chichi Jima.

Allocation of additional forces to the PI can only be done by delaying other operations (e.g. the DEI).

 

[eltf177]

[snip]Allocation of additional forces to the PI can only be done by delaying other operations (e.g. the DEI).

I wonder if Wake might have to wait...

 

[Draconis]

Even if Japan can allocate more troops to the PI campaign, they don't have the shipping. As it was, they only had shipping to land 1 Brigade at Lamon Bay, while the remainder of the 16th Army troops sat on Chichi Jima.
Allocation of additional forces to the PI can only be done by delaying other operations (e.g. the DEI).

Unless they had taken a two step approach. Use all available forces including the units sent to P.I. in OTL to capture the Southern Resource area as quickly as they can manage it. No Pearl Harbour attack. This is all a large gamble that the U.S. won't get seriously involved for the 2 or 3 months these operations would take. Then attack the P.I. and American forces with everything available.

As pointed out by sloreck this is a huge risk for Japan as the Americans will try to reinforce the Philippines as much as possible in the less than half a year of time before the Japanese assault. Would that be enough time for the U.S to bring in sufficient forces to face a much larger than OTL attack? Also there might be air and/or naval battles before Japan is ready to attack as the Japanese ignore American demands over who controls the sea lanes near the Philippines.

It's big gamble but what else was the OTL Pacific War for Japan? The advantage for Japan here is, especially without the infuriating Pearl Harbour surprise attack, if the Japanese inflict a costly defeat on U.S. army and naval forces on and around the Philippines in early to mid 1942 they have a better chance to negotiate a peace treaty.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

...if the Japanese inflict a costly defeat on U.S. army and naval forces on and around the Philippines in early to mid 1942 they have a better chance to negotiate a peace treaty.

One of the ugly little details of Islationism of that era is it did not extend to the Pacific and Asia. Between the China lobby, the Phillipines Lobby, the anti Japanese Lobby, US business interests across the Pacific rim of Asia & the S Pacific, and plain old racism the US voters were much more hawkish than for Europe. ie: the US maintained the Asiatic naval squadron in China, along with Marines and the 15th Army Infantry Regiment right up into 1941. The track record for US defeats for the 19th and first half of the 20th Century was: 1. Become angry & vengeful. 2. Dismiss some Generals or Admirals. Neither do US voters care for long wars, but they tolerate them. ie: the frinteri wars were near continual for over a Century. Some folks raised legitimate objections to that, but overall the US voters supported the western campaigns till there were no more Native Nations to defeat. 'The America Way of War' examines the 18th, 19th, and 20th Century wars of the US and proto US. How and why the Americans find a way to grind on both in limited and total wars is a worthwhile read.

 

[sloreck]

@Draconis : While the oil embargo and the timetable for the drawdown of Japanese oil supplies to zero was a major factor in the timing of the PH attack, another was the reality of the US military build up. The IJN knew that the the then current US building program (before the acceleration after PH) was going to result in a USN that would significantly outweigh the IJN. The longer the start of the war was delayed the more any advantages the IJN had over the USN (such as number of fleet carriers) would go away and be reversed. Assuming three to five months between the attack on Malaya and the DEI and an attack on the PI, the amount of US reinforcement to the PI will be a real problem for the Japanese. Even MacArthur won't be able to ignore building up Bataan, the Philippine Army will get more training and everyone will have a rifle, there will be more machine guns, mortars etc. There will probably be more tank battalions and even though the M3 is obsolescent in early 1942, it beat anything the Japanese have and their AT weapons are limited. There will be more and better aircraft, more airfields and revetments and radar. The AA defenses of the naval base will be completed. The defenses at Wake will be completed and manned, which means it very likely stands and if the Japanese really want it it will take a much larger effort and cost more than OTL.

With the Japanese at war with the UK and the Netherlands, there is simply no way any sort of surprise attack will be as effective as OTL. PH will be much better off, more sea searches, radar, etc. The PI will be on a war footing, potential MacArthur funk or not.

 

[Draconis]

@sloreck For the Japanese it certainly was a losing race against time. If they had attempted the two stage attack plan I have been describing they might have gained a little more time advantage by striking earlier. But how much earlier would be possible?

Japan started the Pacific War as soon as they had the Kido Butai at full strength and ready for the Pearl Harbour attack. How much earlier could the Japanese had launched their assaults against the British and Dutch if they weren't waiting on the Kido Butai's readiness? Oct. or even Sept. 1941?

If the IJN and IJA could begin their operations a couple of months earlier how much less ready would the British have been in Malaya and Burma? Not sure if it would have made any difference in the DEI. And if the U.S has to try to crash-reinforce the Philippines starting in Oct. 1941 that is two months less further along in the U.S's rearmament program. When the U.S. faces the massive Japanese assault on the Philippines in say, Jan. or Feb. 1942 would the Americans still have had enough time to produce and ship enough men and material to successfully defend the Philippines?

 

[stephen the barbarian]

i see 2 options
1. decentralization;

spread out the troops and supplies, create numerous hard points and redoubts, begin raiding japanese forces and turn pi in a manpower sink so as to buy time for other us held territory to get themselves in order​

2. abandonment;

send all available troops and supplies to australia,​