Well you can't always get lucky. Following the general plan of prepping and moving to Bataan would have worked wonders and anything sent south to Sharp (including an independent command) would be gravy.
Better Outcome In the Phillipines Defense Dec 1941
- Thread starter Carl Schwamberger
- Start date
A strategic victory is not necessarily in permanently holding the PI. At Wake the first landing was stuffed & the IJN had to pull ships and men out of the schedule for a second try. OTL the Japanese ran ahead of schedule in their S Pacific campaigns. How many of these tactical or operational setbacks does it take to damage their schedule and forces at the end of the campaign?
To use this specific example. A more effective defense in PI attritions the 48th Div more, making it less effective on Java, & eventually unavailable on Timor, or perhaps defeated there. To use another example the Germans lost roughly 55,000 dead & 200,000+ general casualties in the six weeks of the campaign in the west. Leaving aside altering the breakout and encirclements, how much does the campaign change if a more effective Allied defense in the first week costs the attack 55,000 dead in the first three weeks? What can a better defense in the opening days or weeks cost the attack beyond the historical result, and how great does that cost have to increase before the strategic situation starts to alter. When the Germans launched the attack south to Paris and beyond roughly half their tanks were still inoperable & effectively lost to the campaign. How is the second half of the campaign affected if the attack is attrition a extra 15%, 25%, 50% in the first half. OTL The Red Army inflicted over 50,000 dead on the Germans in the first six weeks, about the same as the Allies in 1940. After nine weeks at the end of August the cumulative German loss was 390,000 men. If a alerted defense kills/wounds/sickens 25% more Germans & leaves 25% more tanks in the repair depots how do the 487,000 men lost affect the next month of campaigning?
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Point taken. If they can't take Singapore because of this they are in a world of hurt. The Brits will eventually reinforce Singapore and that is a great base for them to operate out of.
Some sort of American/Filipino enclave in the south is possible with a stronger defense of Luzon. The Japanese really want Manila as a logistics hub, and will put the effort in to taking Bataan and the Harbor Islands, T/Ls where this does not happen have significant PODs earlier. It is really the last 12 months or so before PH where reversion to the original defense concepts as well as making better use of the time and facilities there or planned over the next months before PH is a POD that does not depend on the USA to make some major changes militarily or politically - stuff that can be done on local initiatives.
The problem with any sort of "conventional" US/Filipino force holding on to some sort of southern enclave is resupply. Adequate food should be obtainable locally, but medical supplies, ammunition, etc would have to be brought in the face of Japanese sea and air control. Like the USA, in reverse, the Japanese could simply let these forces "wilt on the vine" on some southern islands - they can't really do much to harry the Japanese on the occupied islands. The could serve as a base for some guerilla operations elsewhere, but again getting significant forces from islands to island would be problematic. Of course, holdouts would be a positive propaganda/morale for the US/PI and negative for the Japanese.
As I, and many posters have said, from the earliest days of WPO the PI were going to be an outpost delaying the Japanese. MacArthur, for whatever reasons, did not plan along those lines giving the Japanese a gift far beyond tactical issues like the loss of his air power etc. Anything that throws sands in the gears of the finely tuned Swiss watch that was the Japanese plan works to the benefit of the Allies.
The problem with any sort of "conventional" US/Filipino force holding on to some sort of southern enclave is resupply. Adequate food should be obtainable locally, but medical supplies, ammunition, etc would have to be brought in the face of Japanese sea and air control. Like the USA, in reverse, the Japanese could simply let these forces "wilt on the vine" on some southern islands - they can't really do much to harry the Japanese on the occupied islands. The could serve as a base for some guerilla operations elsewhere, but again getting significant forces from islands to island would be problematic. Of course, holdouts would be a positive propaganda/morale for the US/PI and negative for the Japanese.
As I, and many posters have said, from the earliest days of WPO the PI were going to be an outpost delaying the Japanese. MacArthur, for whatever reasons, did not plan along those lines giving the Japanese a gift far beyond tactical issues like the loss of his air power etc. Anything that throws sands in the gears of the finely tuned Swiss watch that was the Japanese plan works to the benefit of the Allies.
These three threads have caused me to return to consideration of cumulative effects.
A strategic victory is not necessarily in permanently holding the PI. At Wake the first landing was stuffed & the IJN had to pull ships and men out of the schedule for a second try. OTL the Japanese ran ahead of schedule in their S Pacific campaigns. How many of these tactical or operational setbacks does it take to damage their schedule and forces at the end of the campaign?
To use this specific example. A more effective defense in PI attritions the 48th Div more, making it less effective on Java, & eventually unavailable on Timor, or perhaps defeated there. To use another example the Germans lost roughly 55,000 dead & 200,000+ general casualties in the six weeks of the campaign in the west. Leaving aside altering the breakout and encirclements, how much does the campaign change if a more effective Allied defense in the first week costs the attack 55,000 dead in the first three weeks? What can a better defense in the opening days or weeks cost the attack beyond the historical result, and how great does that cost have to increase before the strategic situation starts to alter. When the Germans launched the attack south to Paris and beyond roughly half their tanks were still inoperable & effectively lost to the campaign. How is the second half of the campaign affected if the attack is attrition a extra 15%, 25%, 50% in the first half. OTL The Red Army inflicted over 50,000 dead on the Germans in the first six weeks, about the same as the Allies in 1940. After nine weeks at the end of August the cumulative German loss was 390,000 men. If a alerted defense kills/wounds/sickens 25% more Germans & leaves 25% more tanks in the repair depots how do the 487,000 men lost affect the next month of campaigning?
A strategic victory is not necessarily in permanently holding the PI. At Wake the first landing was stuffed & the IJN had to pull ships and men out of the schedule for a second try. OTL the Japanese ran ahead of schedule in their S Pacific campaigns. How many of these tactical or operational setbacks does it take to damage their schedule and forces at the end of the campaign?
To use this specific example. A more effective defense in PI attritions the 48th Div more, making it less effective on Java, & eventually unavailable on Timor, or perhaps defeated there. To use another example the Germans lost roughly 55,000 dead & 200,000+ general casualties in the six weeks of the campaign in the west. Leaving aside altering the breakout and encirclements, how much does the campaign change if a more effective Allied defense in the first week costs the attack 55,000 dead in the first three weeks? What can a better defense in the opening days or weeks cost the attack beyond the historical result, and how great does that cost have to increase before the strategic situation starts to alter. When the Germans launched the attack south to Paris and beyond roughly half their tanks were still inoperable & effectively lost to the campaign. How is the second half of the campaign affected if the attack is attrition a extra 15%, 25%, 50% in the first half. OTL The Red Army inflicted over 50,000 dead on the Germans in the first six weeks, about the same as the Allies in 1940. After nine weeks at the end of August the cumulative German loss was 390,000 men. If a alerted defense kills/wounds/sickens 25% more Germans & leaves 25% more tanks in the repair depots how do the 487,000 men lost affect the next month of campaigning?
Driftless
Donor
Add to the problems in usable forces available for the attacker, and the depletion of supplies for attack; that hard fight for short gain may increase the defenders' morale - or at least prevent some of the despair that would occur with units being overrun. I'd guess it's maybe a wash on the defenders supplies either way - they've likely shot up more ammunition and burned through more fuel and food holding the line, but they also haven't lost those resources by avoiding being overrun?
As I recall Costello (& others), Brereton was repeatedly denied permission, always by Sutherland, & never spoke to MacArthur directly.
The US Army Historical Series volume on the Fall of the Philippines has some amazing information on the campaign. Even with the loss of his air force, MacArthur had the opportunity to deal a devastating blow to the Japanese--and he blew it. He correctly predicted that the main Japanese landing on Luzon would be at Lingayan Gulf and he concentrated his forces there. He had more than enough force to crush the Japanese landings (including over 100 M3 Stuart tanks). But when the moment came he panicked and instead of attacking he gave orders to flee to Bataan "War Plan Orange is now in effect!" No fortification had been built and no supplies collected (there was a half million tons of rice left in warehouses near Manila, enough to feed the garrison for a year) so the defense was ultimately doomed. There is no doubt that the Philippines would have fallen eventually, but MacArthur did about as bad a job of defensing the place as it was possible to do.
There's also Hart's screwups. He didn't mine the approaches to Lingayen Gulf. He didn't have any subs on station in the approaches, & only one S-boat (S-39?) in the Gulf itself. (I'll allow, more S-boats in the Gulf does increase the risk of fratricide.)
Before the war started, simple things like planning gun emplacements in the hills or caching material for roadblocks weren't done.
Before the war started, simple things like planning gun emplacements in the hills or caching material for roadblocks weren't done.
"second week of December"? You mean, "second day of the war".
You do know he wasn't because FDR wanted him as far from DC as he could manage. (It unfortunately never crossed FDR's mind to give him to Chiang.)
Driftless
Donor
"second week of December"? You mean, "second day of the war".
You do know he wasn't because FDR wanted him as far from DC as he could manage. (It unfortunately never crossed FDR's mind to give him to Chiang.)
Love it! Has anyone done a Mac in China timeline? That just screams high opera on both political and military levels. Mac, Chiang, Mao, during the war and later???
(2nd edit) Mac in China during the war opens up whole cans of worms for the post-war political landscape of Asia. Would Mac/Chiang work to sideline or crush Mao? Or co-exist long enough to battle the Japanese, or ???? What would Mac's position be post-war?
That leaves Wainwright? (or whomever) in a hole, but that's why Mac would have been sacked. To paraphrase Sam Spade, "We're going to need a fall guy here", and Mac's the guy. Put him in China, he can bark to his heart's content and bicker with the British commander in India over strategy and supplies.
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"second week of December"? You mean, "second day of the war".
You do know he wasn't because FDR wanted him as far from DC as he could manage. (It unfortunately never crossed FDR's mind to give him to Chiang.)
Send him on an "inspection tour" of the Aleutians?...
Driftless
Donor
IF he would go, that tour could offer him an unlikely chance at redemption, or if he blows off the assignment as a non-strategic waste of time; then his career is really toasted. Oooh, oooh, the possibilities!
Timing would be an issue, with the historic Aleutian Campaign really starting in early June
Jack Brisco
Banned
Unless War Plan Orange was drastically changed, and the Philippine Army properly trained, equipped, and supplied, the Japanese would still have taken the Philippines. Yes, you had the 194th Tank Battalion and the 31st US Infantry Regiment, but on the ground the rest of the forces would have been some Philippine Scouts and Philippine Army.
The first 35 pages of this volume describe the US logistical situation in and regarding the Philippines before the war, going to the surrender of Corregidor. Not pretty.
https://history.army.mil/html/books/010/10-14/CMH_Pub_10-14.pdf
The first 35 pages of this volume describe the US logistical situation in and regarding the Philippines before the war, going to the surrender of Corregidor. Not pretty.
https://history.army.mil/html/books/010/10-14/CMH_Pub_10-14.pdf
marathag
Banned
But would have taken far longer, and more casualties, two things the IJA did not have a surplus of.
If you can impose higher costs on the elite 48th Infantry Division, it has butterflies for the rest of their offensive...
Is defending Bataan really the way to go given no relief is possible?
Would a mountain redoubt have perhaps been a better plan?
Would a mountain redoubt have perhaps been a better plan?
IDK about mountain, but a withdrawal south seems like a good idea.
marathag
Banned
Yes.
Problem was, Dugout Doug advanced supplies to the beachheads, then burned them there on retreat.