So I've been reading John English's Failure in High Command, and I've noted some interesting things.
1) The Otter Committee (the board tasked with distributing CEF battle honours to Militia units and broadly coming up with the organization of the Canadian Military post WWI) recommended a army comprised of eleven infantry divisions and four cavalry divisions. Of those, six infantry divisions and one cavalry division would be earmarked for, and prepared to serve as, an expeditionary force should the Empire again call on Canada.
These provisions were not adopted as Canada adopted the British Ten Year Rule on an unofficial basis.
2) Canadian interwar spending was crazy low, around $1.43 per capita durring the 1920s, for comparison New Zealand spent $2.33 per capita, Australia $3.30, South Africans $4.27, Americans $6.51, and the British and French both spending over $20 per capita.
Canadian spending is really low, even by the standards of its fellow Dominions.
3) Canada had introduced the position of Chief of Staff in 1922, but then abolished it in 1927 at the behest of the navy.
4) By maintaining the Canadian militia as the basis of Canada's army Canada maintained its very traditional, political, and status based form, complete with inter-service rivalries. (problems the WWI CEF hadn't had to deal with as it was an entirely new force)
5) McNaughton seems like a bit of an air head. My personal favourite vices of his being:
-Using the army as a poverty relief service
-Believing that the future of warfare was small well equipped and mobile forces rather than large conscript armies (about 40 years early on that one...)
-Assuming no other nations would catch up with British armoured doctrines
-Not acquiring more modern equipment on the basis that it would obsolete by the time war broke out, and accordingly officers would be best off imagining how such equipment would be implemented durring drills.
And I'm not even finished chapter 2...
So, how can we beef of the Canadian military so as to be better prepared for WWII?
1) The Otter Committee (the board tasked with distributing CEF battle honours to Militia units and broadly coming up with the organization of the Canadian Military post WWI) recommended a army comprised of eleven infantry divisions and four cavalry divisions. Of those, six infantry divisions and one cavalry division would be earmarked for, and prepared to serve as, an expeditionary force should the Empire again call on Canada.
These provisions were not adopted as Canada adopted the British Ten Year Rule on an unofficial basis.
2) Canadian interwar spending was crazy low, around $1.43 per capita durring the 1920s, for comparison New Zealand spent $2.33 per capita, Australia $3.30, South Africans $4.27, Americans $6.51, and the British and French both spending over $20 per capita.
Canadian spending is really low, even by the standards of its fellow Dominions.
3) Canada had introduced the position of Chief of Staff in 1922, but then abolished it in 1927 at the behest of the navy.
4) By maintaining the Canadian militia as the basis of Canada's army Canada maintained its very traditional, political, and status based form, complete with inter-service rivalries. (problems the WWI CEF hadn't had to deal with as it was an entirely new force)
5) McNaughton seems like a bit of an air head. My personal favourite vices of his being:
-Using the army as a poverty relief service
-Believing that the future of warfare was small well equipped and mobile forces rather than large conscript armies (about 40 years early on that one...)
-Assuming no other nations would catch up with British armoured doctrines
-Not acquiring more modern equipment on the basis that it would obsolete by the time war broke out, and accordingly officers would be best off imagining how such equipment would be implemented durring drills.
And I'm not even finished chapter 2...
So, how can we beef of the Canadian military so as to be better prepared for WWII?