Austria says no to the Anschluss

Can't find anything substantial which starts with a 'no' vote in the plebiscite for union with Germany. I appreciate that it's a very unlikely scenario (even if not quite ASB territory) but if anyone has any suggestions to work already done on this I'd love to hear them.
 
The Germans had already taken over Austria before the plebiscite so a no vote make no difference, other than Austria is recognised as an occupied country and perhaps sanctions are imposed on Germany.
 
The Germans had already taken over Austria before the plebiscite so a no vote make no difference, other than Austria is recognised as an occupied country and perhaps sanctions are imposed on Germany.

Which would be a huge deal after WW2 !

Austria would be seen not as a Nazi state but as a brave country that resisted Nazism even when there was no hope. It would probably gain back Südtyrol (as it would not be considered evil it would probably receive German-speaking territories in Italy). Maybe Austria could liberate itself in an uprise if it is so anti-nazi, so it would be freer than OTL with the Treaty of State forbiddening any military alliance as well as Hapsburg restauration
 
If Austrians truly oppose Nazi takeover, the Powers woud feel compelled to stop Hitler. Italy would almost certainly do so if Mussolini feels that France has his back (he did not sharing a border with a powerful united Germany, even if he eventually came to accept that and allied with Berlin), and while I do not think that Britain would want to go to war over Austria, a steelier approach from London would either:
a) make Hitler back down.
b) make Hitler accept to go to war in far less favourable conditions, having to fight (probably) France and Italy with Britain as a very hostile neutral and most of everyone else also hostile (the only country likely to possibly be pro-German here may be Hungary, Poland might not be actively inimical but still not a friend either).
 
The Germans had already taken over Austria before the plebiscite so a no vote make no difference, other than Austria is recognised as an occupied country and perhaps sanctions are imposed on Germany.
Sorry, I was postulating that had Schussnigg resisted Hitler's demands at Berchetsgaden and when pressure was put on him he issued a Plebiscite which rejected union. I agree with David F that Itay would have backed Austria. I guess Schussnigg's other option would have been to call for the return of the Hapsburgs in a constitutional monarch.
 
Hungary would support Italy and not Germany. They had close ties to them, and they were ready to wage war on the Italian side.
 
IMO, without an POD years earlier a "no" vote in the plebiscite is ASB. By March 1938 any alternative to Anschluss had been thoroughly discredited. In addition to struggling economically, the Austrofascists had essentially lost Italian support against Germany and the Socialists had not come up with a solution to the fundamental economic problems facing Germany other than Anschluss. It should be noted that a large number of Austrian socialists including Karl Renner himself favoured Anschluss! To put it another way, by 1938 most Austrians had lost faith in their country's future as an independent state, though this number wasn't as high as the plebiscite indicated, all indications point to it being a solid super majority facing a listless and hopelessly divided opposition.

The best POD would be for Hitler to try and force the issue earlier, say during the Juliputsch of 1934 when the Austrofascists had more support from Italy.
 
OTL Austria attempted to do as such. From Wikipedia:

On 9 March 1938, in an effort to preserve Austria's independence, Schuschnigg scheduled a plebiscite on the issue of unification for 13 March. To secure a large majority in the referendum, Schuschnigg dismantled the one-party state. He agreed to legalize the Social Democrats and their trade unions in return for their support in the referendum. He also set the minimum voting age at 24 to exclude younger voters because the Nazi movement was most popular among the young.

Three days later on 12 March the Germans marched into Austria unopposed. After this it's impossible for Austria to vote "no" in the plebiscite - even if they did Germany would just report a majority "yes" vote. To make Anschluss not happen you would need Italy to still be backing Austria as opposed to tacitly allowing it. The PoD for this to happen would probably be no Anglo-German Naval Agreement, and France (and maybe, though this is less likely) the UK agreeing to look the other way when it came to Ethiopia. This would mean Italy remains firmly anti-German, and when the topic of Anschluss came around, Italy would be backing Austria. But then and again if Italy has such a stance to begin with it's likely Germany gets stopped at trying to remilitarize the Rhineland.
 
Tl;dr? Read the abstract and last couple paragraphs and I didn't find his comments on the military feasibility of Austrian resistance.
"Despite its aggressor state's overpowering size, army comparisons indicate that Austria would have been not only well matched, but also timely mobilized to face an invading German army."

Schuschnigg underestimated what he had and overestimated what the Germans were capable of at that point. Like many other European leaders at the time he fell for appeasement.
 
While I really doubt a refused Anschluss would have led to a shooting war, I'd also point out that the Austrian army would only have to defend a few approaches to Vienna. Heedless of how small their army may be, they'd probably be a formidable speed bump until the Italians (and possibly Hungarians) arrive.
 
In Mein Kampf, Hitler stated that the true shame of Versailles Treaties was italian annexion of Sudtyrol, while he downplayed Danzig question - probably because he was austrian and not prussian, he knew there was more german in Sudtyrol than in Danzig corridor and he respected a lot Pilsudski.
What was needed is Mussolini reading Mein Kampf and some rigged ballot boxes.
 
"Despite its aggressor state's overpowering size, army comparisons indicate that Austria would have been not only well matched, but also timely mobilized to face an invading German army."

Schuschnigg underestimated what he had and overestimated what the Germans were capable of at that point. Like many other European leaders at the time he fell for appeasement.

Does that paper account for loyalty issues among the Austrian army? It may not matter if they have the theoretical strength to stop the Germans. If the soldiers support the Anschluss, they might not fight.
 
Doesn't matter. Provided some of the Austrian units fight, then the German Army will have to assume they all will and treat them as hostile. Once a few defecting troops have been cut down then the Austrian's will believe they'll be killed out of hand and have no choice but to fight.
 
Provided some of the Austrian units fight, then the German Army will have to assume they all will and treat them as hostile.
Or the Nazis could show restrain as a propaganda tool.
Those would not be ucrainian subhuman uncapable to topple Stalin themselves, but fellow Ubermesch victim of the Versailles Treaties: Hitler had a wonderful propaganda machine, he mesmerized the whole Europe. Do not understimate him.
 
Does that paper account for loyalty issues among the Austrian army? It may not matter if they have the theoretical strength to stop the Germans. If the soldiers support the Anschluss, they might not fight.

"Contrary to assertions that the Austrian army had been subjected to National Socialist infiltration, lie the facts that only 5% of soldiers were members of the "National Socialist Soldier's Ring" and that an enormous percentage (30-50%) of generals and officers were dismissed following the Anschluss." In OTL, she notes, "The invading German forces met with no resistance, with the exception of an incident in Tirol, where unaware of previous orders to allow undisrupted passage, border guards refused entry to German police forces. This incident was ironically demonstrative of the reliability of Austrian forces to defend the border..." http://digitool.library.mcgill.ca/webclient/DeliveryManager?pid=28268&cusrom_att_2=direct

The politicians were another matter: "Jansa was not oblivious to the National Socialist infiltration in Austria and distrusted many of the politicians. Thus, he chose to keep his plans as secretive as possible. In fact, he noted that not even Schuschnigg was informed of all his actions..."

Nevertheless to put the paper in perspective, what it says is that Jansa's plans (which were the product of years of planning, unlike Hitler's makeshift invasion plan) would have allowed Austria to "defend Austria's borders for a minimum of two or three days." Granted that Hitler much preferred a "no resistance at all" scenario, would that have been enough to deter him, or to induce Mussolini to intervene? True, Mussolini still did not want a common German-Italian border, much as his relations with Hitler had improved since the days of the Stresa Front. But so much had happened since then--both in terms of German rearmament and with regard to Spain, Ethiopia, etc.--that I doubt he would be willing to risk his relations with Hitler over a small country which was obviously deeply divided on whether to resist Germany (even if its army was loyal).
 
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