Ares I Retained

I've been lurking around the forum for a couple years now, and read a lot of space timelines here. I bit the bullet and made an account today because I've been privately mulling over this timeline idea for a while, and think I need some help.

The basic idea here is that instead of cancelling Constellation and beginning work on SLS in 2010-2011, NASA decides instead to cancel every part of Constellation except the Ares-I. This, at first, sounds impossible, but I have some justification.

First of all, let quickly cover the fact that Ares-I was not a fundamentally flawed design. The 5-segment SRBs work, the J-2X was working until that program was shut down in 2014, and NASA believed the infamous vibration problems experienced during the Ares-IX launch to be resolvable. resolving technical problems is what NASA is best at, so I feel no need to argue with them.

Moving swiftly on..
The way I see it, SLS primarily does 2 things for NASA/the-government.

1. Enable human exploration missions Beyond Earth Orbit.
2. Keeps the Shuttle-era NASA contractors (contractors to be read as "high paying job providers") a-float and working, as well as NASA personnel.

Well take them one at a time.

1. Would the Ares-I enable human BEO missions?
Well no, an Ares I can't send humans beyond LEO ... but 2 Ares could.
Ares-I had about the same payload to LEO as the Delta IV Heavy did at the time, which means that almost any EELV based multi-launch architecture (and there were quite a lot proposed in the 00s) could be adapted to use the Ares-I instead. And while Ares-I wouldn't have been nearly as cheap per launch as an EELV, it would still be much cheaper than the Ares-V or SLS, and the economies of scale from a launching it frequently would help.

2. Would the Ares-I maintain Shuttle-era jobs?
Yes. In fact, the Ares-I was originally designed specifically to utilize the Shuttle-era contractors, workforce, and technology. As a bonus, the four or five launches require to do a lunar mission with the Ares I would result in NASA buying more SRBs overall than the 3 needed for Constellation or the 2 needed for SLS, which should make the solid lobby very happy.

That's what makes the Ares-I and realistic and interesting alternative to the SLS; it combines the politically necessary use of shuttle-era tech with the cheaper, more manageable multi-launch architectures of EELV proponents.

So Ares-I can fulfill the political objectives, is technically feasible, and might even be cheaper and available sooner. With all of that prior justification, I feel confident arguing that an alternate timeline where Ares I is selected over SLS is possible.

Which leads of course to the next obvious question; how do I make that change happen?
My knowledge of the machinations at NASA, the White House, and Capitol Hill over the period between constellation's cancellation and the decision to build SLS is not quite up to the task at hand, which is why I'm here.

What would have to happen to convince the powers at be to select Ares-I instead of a heavy lift vehicle? Is it even possible at all?
 
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marathag

Banned
Welcome!
Glad you decided to jump in.

Though I will bring up the joke that the SLS stands for the Senate Launch System, designed to deliver pork, and not a functioning system to reach orbit
:teary:
 
Ares I by itself would not have saved the Shuttle- and Constellation-related jobs. The whole program would have done that. NASA was considering an Ares V Lite (which did become SLS) for both the cargo and crew mission. Ares I was eating up so much money that there was hardly any funds to get Ares V going, let alone Altair (the lunar lander).

And Ares I could not have sent a vehicle to BEO by itself: you'd need a departure stage for that, and Ares V had that as part of the design.

Come on over to the Space exploration/politics thread in Chat: you'll find a LOT of discussion pro and con about that decision. Both from those who were in favor of Constellation (as I was) and those who were more supportive of the decision to kill it.
 
Ares I alone would not save the Shuttle-related jobs.
Here the program is to small.
Another issue is Ares I low payload to launch in Low earth orbit with 25tons, what match the Delta IV heavy payload.

If you want to save most of the Shuttle-related jobs.
goes for Jupiter launcher of Direct Initiative
who use A Shuttle derivative to launch Orion and other payloads from 25 tons up to 120 tons
but it need J-2X program and cheaper man-rated RS-68 engine

But it would cheaper and faster to fly as SLS...
 
I don't want to save Shuttle-related jobs; I want to save enough Shuttle related jobs to be politically viable.

I don't see any reason Ares-I wouldn't save just as many jobs as SLS did in OTL. Yes, Ares-I is a smaller rocket, but that doesn't mean it requires fewer people to build and operate. It's not like they had/have a separate team of personnel for each SRB.
The only real difference is that the Ares-I doesn't use the RS-25. I've assumed that those jobs would just be replaced by jobs working on the J-2X. Worst case scenario, if the RS-25 is essential to being politically viable, there were several earlier designs of the Ares-I which used the RS-25 as the upper stage engine, and they even give better performance.

If any of you know of a specific reason the Ares-I wouldn't maintain as many shuttle jobs as the SLS has in OTL, I'd love to hear it.

As I acknowledged in the OP, yes, the Ares-I had a payload similar to the Delta IV Heavy. But there have been dozens of proposals for how a lunar program could be conducted using only Delta IV Heavies, all of which apply to the Ares-I.
The key to such a program would be some sort of Earth departure stage. I think probably the cheapest/fastest approach would be to make the EDS a stretched Ares-I upper stage that launches itself. Similar proposals were made using the Saturn IB and S-IVB in the 60s. If that wouldn't have the delta V, it will have to be refueled in orbit. But it's doable. (This all of course assumes that we're still using the J-2X version of the stage.)

Anyway, I'm not here to ask about whether or not it's viable. I've spent time thinking about it, and I think it is viable, and I've tried to explain why I think that at length. What'd I'd like help with is figuring out how to make the change happen.
 
The issue I see with it is that I think even within NASA Ares I was the spare, not the heir. Its entire existence was conceived through a finger-on-the-scale in ESAS to justify not using the existing Delta IV Heavy or readily available Atlas IV Heavy, justified largely through "shared resources" with Ares V development. Whether Direct Jupiter, Ares V, or SLS, the heavy lift vehicle was always the more lucrative contract, and the only way to avoid an O'Keefe-style massive-repeated-docking or propellant depot-based architecture. Is it possible to launch enough Ares I vehicles in a year to support a crew launch to the moon? Probably, just about. Is it possible to do enough to do it more than once in a year? Probably not, and once you're launching payloads like propellant there's a strong incentive to bid it out to the cheapest available launch vehicles. Ditto for the eventual nearly identical payload of Ares I and commercial heavies.

To make it happen the way you want, you need Ares I to be viewed much more as an end in itself instead of just the understudy and stepping stone to Ares V, and you probably need multiple-launch long-loiter architectures to be considered enough within NASA that "propellant depot" and "orbital assembly" aren't dirty words in Alabama and its Senatorial offices. If you can get Marshall to buy into orbital propellant transfer and assembly and sell ATK and the Alabama Senate delegation on it, then you've got the start of making it happen. The other part is probably moving a lot of the Johnson-based Ares V funding directly into propellant depot demonstrations and lunar lander development, to keep the gravy train rolling. However, keeping non-NASA LVs like Atlas, Delta, and eventually Falcon from ending up with propellant launch contracts and constantly lobbying to take over the crew launch vehicle role is going to be a challenge--cost savings is something you'll need a lot of to sell a continuing lunar program on the Hill.

Given studies at the time indicating that by 2010 Ares I was still several years from flying, that pressure will only increase as the other vehicles demonstrate their ability to fill Ares I's role in this revamped lunar program and transitioning funding from Ares V to lunar programs renders the launch vehicle work force less critical in the overall political calculus. I think an Ares I/Orion-based end to the Constellation debacle is interesting, but it's hard to see it as a stable state with Atlas, Delta, and particularly Falcon available.
 
Yes that's true, e of pi
This let to cancelation of Constellation program and Ares I and transformation of Ares V into SLS
The dead blow came as cost analyses show that Ares I launch cost surpassed $1000 million compare versus $153 million for a Soyuz rocket and capsule

interestingly enough, the last attempt to save Ares I was the Liberty proposal
it use a standard shuttle SRB with modify Ariane 5 core build by Arianespace,
Since Arianespace is mass-produce the Ariane 5 rocket it could far cheaper to use
Liberty was to use for commercial and ISS launches
but here were problems:
1. Arianespace is not US manufacturer, so no go by Capitol Hill
2. Arianespace was not wanted to build the upper stage for a Rocket, that become the rival to Ariane 5 rocket.

irony, under CCDev program Liberty was consider to expensive while Boeing and SpaceX got deal
end of may 2020 SpaceX will launch fist Crew Dragon with US Astronauts from Cape Kennedy for cost of around $83 million...
 

Garrison

Donor
Yes that's true, e of pi
This let to cancelation of Constellation program and Ares I and transformation of Ares V into SLS
The dead blow came as cost analyses show that Ares I launch cost surpassed $1000 million compare versus $153 million for a Soyuz rocket and capsule

interestingly enough, the last attempt to save Ares I was the Liberty proposal
it use a standard shuttle SRB with modify Ariane 5 core build by Arianespace,
Since Arianespace is mass-produce the Ariane 5 rocket it could far cheaper to use
Liberty was to use for commercial and ISS launches
but here were problems:
1. Arianespace is not US manufacturer, so no go by Capitol Hill
2. Arianespace was not wanted to build the upper stage for a Rocket, that become the rival to Ariane 5 rocket.

irony, under CCDev program Liberty was consider to expensive while Boeing and SpaceX got deal
end of may 2020 SpaceX will launch fist Crew Dragon with US Astronauts from Cape Kennedy for cost of around $83 million...
Failing to see the irony in Dragon being about half the price of Soyuz? Also a quick look at the Liberty wiki reveals that for all ATK's hype they dropped it the instant it was clear they weren't getting any public money and that their projected launch cost was $180 million dollars, so more expensive than even Soyuz. You are also forgetting that as part of the Liberty program they would have had to design a new Orion derived capsule so even if the mating of a first and second stage in a configuration neither of them was designed for went smoothly that would create plenty of opportunities for unexpected technical obstacles to delay the program and drive up costs still further. The likelihood is that it if it were built Liberty would end like the Antares, a rocket with a single customer in the shape of NASA and a low launch rate that would drive prices up again.
 
If we clean sheet the OP intentions going back farther, to the roll-out period of Ares as a concept back in the mid-2000s, and have NASA thinking much much more along the lines of rational economics of carrying over Shuttle tech on a different concept (no Orbiter, though a reusable human space flight vehicle conceptually on Orion lines might be spun as "Orbiter II") then something much closer to Jupiter/DIRECT might have been conceived as a single launch vehicle. Then as e of pi notes, an actual space program from there probably involves accepting instead of rejecting LEO depot based systems as the main line of development.

"Preserving Shuttle workforce," which @JEF_300 you yourself say is not really the actual goal, but maybe should be, is a two-headed monster. Do we want to preserve the jobs of the established Shuttle crews, NASA and private contractor, doing their work routinely, hopefully rationalized to reduce or anyway stabilize costs, or do we want to keep the corporate boards of the contractors sweet, and to hell with the actual line workers, they can sink or swim as expedient? In the pork-barrel perspective, you want to do both--the line workers are voters and while total headcount of them does not amount to many CD/Senate votes themselves, they have families, they work in communities dependent on their paychecks to be sustained--there is a multiplier effect at work politically. Meanwhile the corporations holding the contracts are huge hitters, in contributions to campaigns, in general lobbying influence. In a neoliberal age such as the past few decades, the corporations take priority, but ideally, one keeps the whole momentum of the whole mass of them happy. Working people get sloppy seconds, but ideally there is enough to go around so no one is pissed off.

Coming at it from an amateur engineering perspective, STS was only somewhat half-assed; by certain metrics (tonnage to LEO for instance) it was quite respectable. The trick, from the point of view of a space geek who wants to get more useful tonnage to orbit at a fixed price, Eliminating the dead weight of the Orbiter's 100 tonne return to Earth mass in favor of zero returned to Earth for uncrewed launches or a fraction in the form of an Orion-concept capsule of some kind frees up that tonnage for LEO delivery. Now we are eliminating line workers--the people who refurbished Orbiters are out on the street. But the solid fuel supply line is soldiering on, as are the people who make the tanks at Michoud, and some of the Orbiter refurb people can be kept on to work on the Orions, which we make a small fleet of reusable ones.

The conservative approach then is to go with a version of Shuttle-C, keeping the sidesaddle load philosophy, which limits how much redesign of the tank we have to do and keeps the overall stack height of the system within familiar VAB constraints. Basically this means Yankee Energia--instead of liquid fueled Zenit-type new boosters, we stick with the solids, and frankly admit the damn things are not economical to recover, so eliminate the parachutes and the like, and let them splash and sink for people with a mind to to salvage or let rot as reefs. Someone might suggest it is perhaps worthwhile to recover and reuse the nozzle segments, maybe--those were a bit fancy with gimbaling the thrust and were designed for reuse, but it is just a silly charade to pretend the actual solid fuel segments were reusable. Giving up on shipping those back to Utah to be refilled eliminates some jobs, but if we recover, refurbish and reuse the nozzle sections, there are still recovery crews and reduced shipping and refurb work being done on just them.

Meanwhile most of the value added work done in Utah is still done; brand new segment exteriors are being stamped out, fresh one-shot solid fuel filler is still being churned out, the heavy filled segments are being shipped to Florida (and hey, maybe the Air Force might want to unmothball the Vandenberg facility and launch some loads from California, or perhaps someday Kodiak?)

Continue to use 4 segment boosters, in pairs, on the same tank design, with the now-to-be-discarded RS-25s mounted on a sidesaddle platform preserving much of Orbiter thrust dynamics, but with no intention to recover them.

One thing I hate about Ares/SLS that I suppose you like is the potlatch involved in taking engines designed to be used many times and discarding them. That mentality was pretty predominant in the mid-2000s though and hate it though I might I suppose it prevails--of course with the promise that an allegedly cheaper disposable design is in the pipeline, so burning up the SSMEs is OK as a stopgap, or potlatch in my more acerbic view--a lot of irrational atonement for the supposed sin of STS hubris in seeking a reusable design. Now rationally of course the SSMEs were not so economical, since refurbishment costs were high, but it is not clear to me that one could rationally hope to save a lot of money in cheaper manufacture and still maintain reliability levels. The sin, if there was one, of SSME design was seeking heroic high levels of chamber pressure to justify them as sea level lit engines in booster mode, and thus justify ignoring the J-2S design which was quite good if air-lit, and could be air lit of course. Given the high performance needed to deliver mediocre Isp and thus fairly good thrust at SL, I doubt a disposable design would be a lot cheaper really--though the fact of one use and disposal would mean ongoing line production, which surely would lower unit costs if the overall program could enable launches frequent enough to justify keeping the production line going steadily! For the moment, the "interim" early program would require using pretty standard SSMEs at full cost of production, somewhat diminished if delays in producing the disposable version required new ones to be made after the old stock is exhausted. But NASA is the home of Success Oriented Management and the assumption would be that the new allegedly cheaper engines are going to be available in time.

Speaking as you do as someone who says Ares 1 was a good design, why are 5 segments better than 8? Going with Shuttle C/Yankee Energia means wasting those RS-25s of course, but perhaps not three at a time. STS was able to operate with one of the three SSMEs out during later portions of a launch burn--the reason there were three was mainly I think for this engine-out capability since the Orbiter crews would not have a prayer of survival if one of two went out, but Shuttle C versions proposed often went down to just 2 SSMEs for their cargo launches, the hit in performance was something like 20-30 tonnes reduced LEO payload, versus the savings of destroying just 2 main engines instead of 3.

As for crewed launches in this ATL Ares, they go up in an Orion of sorts, an alternate payload on the sidesaddle booster. Side mount complicates launch escape but not so tremendously I'd think; a rapid capsule escape straight up should still be feasible I'd think, or perhaps angled over 5-15 degrees away from the tank. So your basic Mercury-Apollo style escape system, perhaps fancied up a bit, covers the crew escape a hell of a lot better than on Shuttle, and there are tricks we can consider doing that salvage the dead weight delta-V penalty of having an escape system that God willing we never actually use, or using a light enough crew capsule, we just eat the cost as part of the price of a crewed system.

So regarding development of 5-segment boosters, NASA should have told ATK "look, you want this for DoD market purposes, go partner with the Air Force for a separate contract, NASA does not need 5 segment boosters." To do it more diplomatically, and keeping options open, NASA can offer to partner with the Air Force on a limited basis for long term development of the option of a 5 or more segment system, as a possible upgrade path of Ares, keeping the booster contractor happy with the pork of this speculative development by brokering the deal with Defense and at some modest cost staying in the loop of development. But not risking holding up their successor launch system on this bet!

A pair of 4 segment solids, for a total of 8 segments and at a cost of having to use 2 fancy nozzle segments (instead of one undeveloped one resized for 25 percent more mass flow; the two known nozzles are a cost but also birds in the hand) clearly have more oomph than one paper 5 segment deal, and at the cost of using up at least two, or perhaps for more modest payloads one, SSME/speculative future disposable hydrogen engine, and perhaps for conservatism and higher payloads three, maybe four or more, sustainer engines, the overall payload of even the most barebones Shuttle C type approach should quite exceed that of OTL proposed Ares 1. In terms of economically competing in the existing launch market, that is not good, but Ares 1 clearly would not be a commercial launcher! The idea is to have workhorses for a NASA BEO program, and for that we definitely want more capacity not less.

So--conservative seems the way to go--stick to the 2 4 segment solids, tried and true and with an established supply line maintained; this does not entirely please ATK but they have DoD paying for the 5 segment development and meanwhile their established line workers keep churning out segments. We can envision upgrading from the baseline by replacing the 2 side boosters with 2 5 segments, for a 25 percent increase, or alternatively an even bigger redesigned tank can take 3 boosters, 4 segment for a 50 percent increase, 5 segment for a near doubling to 15/8, which given the overcapacity of 3 SSMEs in STS might not require using more than 4 hydrogen burning sustainers--maybe 5, but not 6! I suspect this is already exceeding volume capabilities at Michoud for the tank, so there is no point in going crazy with 6 segment boosters or trying to strap on 4 4 segment ones.

I'm fairly sure Jupiter/Direct considered all these variations. Sort of; Jupiter as I understand it did not give consideration to side saddle loads since part of the whole irrational fashionable head trip was to abjure the sins of the Shuttle and repenting, return to in-line as well as expendable philosophies. Well, I actually like in-line too, but I suspect that overall, the tank redesign involved would be at any rate heavier if perhaps simpler, with the compressive load of full thrust having to be carried full length through the entire tank, and as mentioned, there would be concerns about VAB height issues too sidesaddle largely sidesteps.

Let's look at extremes here. The basic minimum cost no frills simplification of basic Shuttle tech carried over is:

2 side boosters, simplified by ripping out the recovery stuff, which lightens them a bit for better performance at the cost of having to manufacture new nozzle segments (the cost of new fuel sections is actually a savings versus the costs of recovery and refurbishment). One tank, restressed just a little bit because we are going to use just one SSME type engine, that is what is minimal here. It might also not be feasible, though I suspect it is--the most critical difference is pathetic low thrust after the solids burn out. We can clearly go straight to a two SSME design and have something clearly viable anyway, and only use up SSMEs at 2/3 the rate of Orbiter sorties. But we don't have 100 tonnes of Orbiter return to Earth mass burdening it either, so I suspect one engine might work, at some prodigal waste of tank propellant of course, but overall match or exceed on the shelf expendable alternatives perhaps while frugally using up just one SSME. The fuel tank ought to be a bit lighter too.

With 2 SSMEs, we have well explored Shuttle C type designs, which IIRC ought to put 80 tonnes or more into LEO after discarding the tank. With three SSME, we have the bog standard Shuttle tank, slightly better performance due to tossing the recovery gear from the solids, and thus a good 125 or more tonnes in LEO, including of course the 3 SSMEs. This approximates closely what Saturn V put into LEO, so a reprise Lunar Apollo is possible already, or pretty near.

If Michoud can accommodate a 50 percent volume increased tank, we can go on to design one to take 3 solids instead of 2, thus a 4 SSME sidesaddle stage should orbit with about 180 or more tonnes, so with modest improvements on J-2S Isp and thrust, we should then be able to go on to the Moon with considerably more mass than Lunar Apollo. If it is possible to manage hydrogen boiloff during a LLO loiter, with lunar orbit rendezvous, the greater Isp of hydrogen burning engines should further multiply the mass available for the lunar lander/ascent vehicle while still enabling a somewhat heavier thing than an Apollo CM to return to Earth.

I believe part of the Ares/Orion package of concepts was that the lunar lander should shoulder the burden of insertion into LLO, to enable the Orion capsule system to be sized for LEO missions by itself. The people who wanted Constellation also wanted to ditch ISS, but I think it should be clear that the politics of continuing ISS would prevail (and I am glad it did, though I resent that we did not use the decade or so "going round and round Earth" to better explore free fall/low gravity medicine and biology with an eye toward long lunar stays and missions to Mars.

Top of the line I suspect this version of "Direct" might enable in terms of capacity to LEO would be using three five segment solids for a near doubling of Orbiter overall mass to LEO which brings us to over 200 tonnes to LEO. Note that this is Musk's target for Starship to routinely boost into LEO. The cost of this version of Ares doing that launch will be tremendously higher than SpaceX is aiming for since nothing is being reused, but it ought to be a hell of a lot lower than ten Shuttle sorties! And it is a huge load orbited all at once. Again since the 3 SSMEs of Orbiter numbered that many in part to enable engine out capability, whereas crewed Ares launches would involve a spacecraft with a launch emergency escape capsule instead of crossing fingers and hoping nothing goes wrong, we don't need to worry about that with Orion, and so I suspect no more than 5 SSME type engines are needed for even this maximal version, and we might do well with just 4; going to 6 would maximize payload I suppose, and by the time we can do this, with both triple booster and 5-segment booster feasibility checked out and debugged, we really ought to have the allegedly cheaper one-shot hydrogen engines on hand.

At some point we might also go over to putting some or all these engines on the bottom of the tank instead of sidesaddle on the payload. Indeed the main reason to put the hydrogen engines sidesaddle on the payload, once we abandon the idea of reusing the engines, is to lift the weight of the payload during launch so it is not burdening the tank, and for that we might never want more than two there, and any engines in excess of those doing just that ought to go on the tank to lift the propellant most efficiently.

I obviously consider Ares 1 to have been quite a turkey, and see no reason for it at all.
 
Is it possible to launch enough Ares I vehicles in a year to support a crew launch to the moon? Probably, just about. Is it possible to do enough to do it more than once in a year? Probably not, and once you're launching payloads like propellant there's a strong incentive to bid it out to the cheapest available launch vehicles. Ditto for the eventual nearly identical payload of Ares I and commercial heavies.

I suppose it would be too much to ask for congress to support the Ares-I AND to pay for building LC-39C & LC-39D?

I think an Ares I/Orion-based end to the Constellation debacle is interesting, but it's hard to see it as a stable state with Atlas, Delta, and particularly Falcon available.

The theory is that it doesn't matter how much more sense it makes to use commercial vehicles instead of the Ares-I, because at the end of the day Congress cares more about the contractors and the votes than the national budget. That said, I do agree that this would be really pushing it.

Perhaps, after a lot of pressure from launch providers and the public, the missions architecture is modified so that the fuel is launched commercially. NASA has a "Commercial Propellant Tanker Program" or something similar, based off commercial cargo. You end up with a mission architecture that looks something like this:

1. A hypergolic stage for braking into LLO (Orion needs one) is launched first on Ares-I. The Ares-I upper stage is modified so that it can be refueled, and will serve as the EDS.
2. Over the next 1-3 months, there's a slew of commercial launches to refuel the EDS.
3. The Lander is Launched on an Ares-I and docked to the braking stage.
4. Then the crew launch on Orion on an Ares-I, dock to the top of the lander on the EDS.
5. The whole stack is pushed TLI.

From a very quick delta-V calculation, looks like the Ares-I upper stage probably needs to be about 4/5ths refilled to push 75 tons through TLI (1 Ares-I launch = 25 tons, we have three Ares-1 launches worth of payload in the lunar stack), which means there's some room for growth which intrigues me. NASA could, say, choose to launch one more Commercial Tanker so they could send the stack into lunar polar orbit, things like that.

Pushing refueling off onto commercial providers should help keep program costs down, but will mean the Ares-I launch costs will stay pretty high, unless they decide to push for 2 missions a year.

To make it happen the way you want, you need Ares I to be viewed much more as an end in itself instead of just the understudy and stepping stone to Ares V, and you probably need multiple-launch long-loiter architectures to be considered enough within NASA that "propellant depot" and "orbital assembly" aren't dirty words in Alabama and its Senatorial offices. If you can get Marshall to buy into orbital propellant transfer and assembly and sell ATK and the Alabama Senate delegation on it, then you've got the start of making it happen. The other part is probably moving a lot of the Johnson-based Ares V funding directly into propellant depot demonstrations and lunar lander development, to keep the gravy train rolling.

That makes a lot of sense. It occurred to me that strangling Commercial Crew in it's cradle, as sad as that would be, would probably be a good way to make the Ares-I and Orion seem essential. if you somehow kill off Commercial Crew in early 2010, then it would make a lot of sense to still cancel the most expensive parts of Constellation (Altair and Ares-V) but keep Orion and Ares-I around for access to the ISS. That decision could be justified further by saying it was the first step to a multi-launch lunar program in the 2020s.
 
Speaking as you do as someone who says Ares 1 was a good design, why are 5 segments better than 8?

I'm sorry, but I can't answer that question, because I don't think that Ares I was a good design.

I will admit that I'm very fond of the Ares I; when I see an image of Ares I, I think about waking up at 6-am back in 2006, spending the morning watching NASA TV with my Dad, and learning about how we were gonna go back to the Moon. So yes, I quite like Ares I, but my nostalgic feelings for the Ares I are totally separate from my thoughts on it's technical merits. For the time it was proposed in, Ares I was clearly a bad design (it would've been quite good in the 80s).

Shuttle-C, in my opinion, is quite clearly the best possible Shuttle-derived launch vehicle, and what NASA should have started working on in 2010 (or, even better, in 2005).
The Space Launch System, on the other hand, I would say is the worst possible Shuttle-derived launch vehicle (in particular, expending 4 RS-25s every flight is just offensive).

And that get's to the heart of why I'm interested in this timeline; I like the Ares I, and while it's not a great vehicle, I think it could still be better than the SLS has been.
Also, it's a fun challenge making the Ares I work for 2010 NASA, both technically and politically.
 
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Coming at it from an amateur engineering perspective, STS was only somewhat half-assed; by certain metrics (tonnage to LEO for instance) it was quite respectable. The trick, from the point of view of a space geek who wants to get more useful tonnage to orbit at a fixed price, Eliminating the dead weight of the Orbiter's 100 tonne return to Earth mass in favor of zero returned to Earth for uncrewed launches or a fraction in the form of an Orion-concept capsule of some kind frees up that tonnage for LEO delivery.
There's a spectrum of possibilities between throwing away the SSMEs and having the entire Orbiter hoopla, you know. In particular, there were a lot of sidemount proposals that would have basically had a little spacecraft just for the SSMEs that could reenter and return to allow reuse after delivering a payload to orbit. This squares the circle somewhat, in that it allows a large increase in useful tonnage (since the little spacecraft is of course much lighter than the full Orbiter) without throwing away the SSMEs.

Of course, for this to happen NASA probably needs to decide to go that way in the beginning instead of aiming for Ares I/V, which is going to have larger knock-on effects.

Top of the line I suspect this version of "Direct" might enable in terms of capacity to LEO would be using three five segment solids for a near doubling of Orbiter overall mass to LEO which brings us to over 200 tonnes to LEO.
Three solids are totally impractical because you'd have to completely rebuild the Mobile Launch Platforms and probably the launch pads as well. You might need to do crawler upgrades to handle the extra weight, too, I think that was a problem with some ideas for using four boosters. Anyway, there's little real reason to go with more than two boosters because at that point you have more payload than you can really do anything with. Also, it's probably cheaper, given the number of changes that you would need to make to enable more than two boosters, to just introduce liquid-fueled boosters instead.
 
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Writing the above, I was not particularly aware of this iteration of Shuttle-C, proposed in 2009 as part of the Augustine Commission process. To get the Silverbird figures to close on the affirmed 70 tonne payload, noting 23 tonnes devoted to the fairing, I reflect too that actually the STS was a three stage vehicle--it would have been possible to orbit the propellant tank, but they never wanted to do that, so ascent profile involved separating the Orbiter while the orbit would still intersect the atmosphere, to guarantee the tank burned up and did not become space junk, and burning for a while on the OMS propellant reserve. So conceptualizing the STS as a 90 tonne dry orbiter (which jibes with maximum reentry mass around 100 tonnes and downmass of 10 tonnes) with 15 tonnes nominal OMS load, 10 of which would be used to put 115 tonnes into LEO, and thus overall three stages (or 2.5 if one is pedantic about the solid booster stage being parallel with SSME burn for part of the latter, as Silverbird calculator is set up to accommodate nicely, I find that if we assume the SRBs average 10660 kN during their burn, that we can pretty much match the real performace (assuming 267 sec Isp for SRBs, both are vacuum figures, which I had to virtually infer in this way since figures given are for SL conditions).

Using that as baseline, noting that the Shuttle-C proposed releases the nominal 70 tonne payload to finalize its orbit on its own, which suggests it needs some 260 m/sec delta V, I infer in Silverbird trying to match the payloads that the dry mass of the tank-boattail-fairing-payload mount structure all up is about 69 tonnes. About 28 or so of that is the tank itself, guessing that about 9 more will mount the payload internally and 23 is the fairing, that leaves 15 tonnes for 3 SSMEs. If we delete two SSMEs, leaving just one, the nominal pre-orbit payload drops to 61 tonnes--that assumes I can delete 10 tonnes of structure as associated with those now gone engines.

Thus, modifying the proposal, we can slash back the cost of such a launch at a cost of 9 tonnes...which compared to a remainder over 60 seems like a small price to pay.

Do we get any benefit from making the thing heavier? Well, if we were to strap on a third SRB, much of that 69 tonne dry mass must be increased to handle the greater thrust--not the fairing I would think, but the 9 tonnes for payload support might need 3 more added, and parts of the tank will need extra reinforcement, call it 20 tonnes, making the dry core structure 90 tonnes. We come out ahead just 5 extra tonnes, and that is versus the ultralight single SSME version; we actually have less payload than with 2 SRBs and 3 SSMEs! Clearly we should not be adding a whole third booster.

What about going from 4 to 5 segments? Now the 21 tonnes I added to handle 50 percent SRB thrust increase only needs to be say 11 tonnes; the SRB dry mass will rise incrementally but considering nose and nozzle-tail sections are quite similar, not by as much as we might think, maybe 20 more tonnes per booster dry mass, and of course 125 more in propellant.

That does increase the released mass payload considerably, from 70 to 86.5 tonnes, and that is without making the tank any larger, which we could consider doing, but note it will raise the dry mass of the core structure to do that. OTL SLS has arrived at 900 tonnes propellant which is less than 1.25 times as much as the standard Shuttle propellant load was. Adding 20 tonnes to the baseline 70 with 3 SSME as presented (I infer) to the Augustine Commission, for a 90 tonne core, and raising propellant to 900 tonnes in line with the current OTL SLS tank, we get 101 tonnes nominal release payload, which again must boost itself into orbit with 260 m/sec or so delta-V. With just one SSME, I figure we can slash off maybe 12 tonnes from the core structure, but that is going to be really weak thrust after SRB separation, and payload falls to 86 again despite the core mass savings. However with 2 SSME, and an 84 tonne core, we get 98.7 tonnes. I have generally been skipping 2 engine options since the cost and systems integrations savings involved in just having one versus three is a much more dramatic savings than compromising on two, but in this case it seems justified to consider!

I have also looked into making the SRBs smaller rather than larger, but the capacity, even when we slash the tank mass back accordingly, is so large that I think it falls into a gap we would not value much unless our "Orion" turns out to be pretty big!

The straightforward path for NASA mid-2000s then, assuming that we take the concept of "Shuttle derived systems savings" at their word, is to focus on a lightened and cheapened version of this 2009 proposal. Slash SSME use-up rates by three by designing around one engine instead of three. A reasonable "Orion" type vehicle, that is a crewed ship for 3-6 people that can be reasonably economic to use for LEO missions, mainly ISS, and yet is also suitable, perhaps with addition of mission modules, to use on deep space crew missions as well, would be somewhere between 8-30 tonnes in mass, let's think around 15, allowing a TKS/Kliper type thing, where the crew rides up and down from and to Earth in a nose capsule that can separate and survive one Earth orbit reentry, but normally stays attached to the larger ship that has a capacious middle crew section, and through an access tunnel to the tail, a docking port. It normally reenters on its side, as some kind of biconic probably, and is as a whole, assuming no emergencies, many times reusable. It has good shielding against solar radiation for BLEO sorties, with the cramped nose capsule being extra shielded for major solar events that are not too long in duration. Since it seems hopeless to right-size Shuttle derived launch tech to launch just this to LEO, it is designed to normally, and perhaps always, ride to LEO on an EELV.

For heavy launch missions, the immediate Mark 1 Standard is to develop the single RS-25 class engine, 2 four segment SRB, launcher with payload riding sidemounted. This comes in two generations--quickest to develop having the single hydrogen burning engine mounted sidemount too, to lift the entire 60 tonne payload plus extra thrust lifting one side of the tank, just as the two SRBs lift two other sides. In a later development, we restress the 730 tonne standard Shuttle sized fuel tank to leave the sidemount load hanging all through boost, at variable G stresses of course. We don't go for end mounting the load because of clearance limits in the VAB.

Meanwhile in parallel, on the back burner, are projects to develop 5 segment boosters, hopefully with DoD bearing much of that cost since it is really military applications ATK is interested in and most likely to get serious revenue from, and pending progress on that front, an expanded 900 tonne propellant tank (I assume that is near the upper limit of what is possible at Michoud or in transporting it to Canaveral. That might allow upgrading from 60 to 100 tonne to LEO launches, but note that this modest increment comes at a cost of
1) developing more powerful SRBs
2) making a bigger tank, with needs for upgrades all down the path from Michoud to the launch pad
3) going from 1 to two RS-25 class engines. The whole program depends on one-use cheaper engines of this type being made, but the less reliance there is on two-engine launches, the more margin NASA has to accomplish things before running out of the legacy builds.

Considering how costly all these developments proved to be OTL, and how delayed, it seems only prudent to plan, for the first decade or two out, conservatively on the 60 tonne standard, and just design missions to accept that launch numbers depend on that, with the 100 tonne alternative being tentatively penciled in as a future option.

Naturally, what is a bug from the point of view of delay and total taxpayer cost is a feature to the contractors and Congress! It is the ambitious schemes to develop new engine types, bigger and not smaller solid module stacks, the gold-plated Orion with features planned for deep space missions that this porkbarrel Moloch will burn up all the funding for.

But if the people who touted Constellation were serious about doing space more cost-effectively I think this is what they would have aimed for in the first place, and in 2009, this is what SLS should have become.
 
Note: This post was drafted several hours ago, but I don't feel like redrafting it in response to the most recent round of posts.

@JEF_300

Interesting idea. I'm going to have to go with @e of pi on some of this. I think if you get an Ares I flying in 2013/4, and Orion in 2014/5, then there is a good case to be made that the rocket will be the primary US crew vehicle, and CCDev funding is likely to be slashed. After all, we have a man-rated rocket, and we can buy seats from the Russians if we need to do so. The problem as noted however is launch cadence. The post-Challenger maximum flight rate for the shuttle was often stated as 14 missions per year (this is based partially on orbiter processing flows, and partly on stacking ops in the VAB). Because there is no orbiter, and the number of lifts is reduced (instead of eight SRB segment lifts, plus the ET, plus the orbiter, you have five SRB segment lifts plus the second stage plus the Orion), VAB operations will go smoother, but there will still be bottlenecks. You will however be allowed to have as many as three Ares I stacks in the VAB at at time, just not stacking all three at a time - The VAB maximum was, IIRC, 16 segments with contingency to 24 if needed for something like a hurricane.

The catch is that your flight rate is not likely to be the 14 max, but instead more like 10-12. If you need three flights per year for ISS, then you've got 7-9 to support a lunar return. That' great if you want one flight per year that lands four guys for a few days, but any more than that needs more capability, which drives things like Delta IV Heavies - which if you add just two of them to the manifest per year, you've doubled Delta IV core production, which actually doesn't require any new tooling or people in the 2005-2015 time frame. You literally just have to pay for the materials. This helps reduce the total load on the Ares I missions. Heck, make the Europeans deliver fuel to get seats on the lunar return, and cut the load on Ares I even more.


@Shevek23 , you get way, way, off topic here, but I'd like to address a few of your points somewhat in order from a technical rather than programatic point of view.

1. Your STS-C/Not-STS-C was studied a lot, and resembles the High Confidence Shuttle Derived Heavy Lift Launch System. Doing sub-orbital staging radically increases the possible payload of a shuttle-derived vehicle over pushing the ET/cargo carrier to LEO (or near-LEO).

2. We actually have a number for what a disposable RSRM buys you in terms of payload - 2730 lbm. This is sourced from AIAA-94-4599 Shuttle Performance Upgrades for International Space Station Alpha. For reference, the same document notes that 106% SSMEs buy you 2000 lbm and 107% SSMEs buy you an extra 1000 lbm over 106%. These numbers are likely to directly apply to any sidemount shuttle derived vehicle directly. Jenkins notes that the total recovery and processing costs on the SRBs was likely close to the amount saved by refurbishing the units after every mission.

3. By the early 2000s, SLC-6 is not going to be able to be reactivated for shuttle-derived payloads. The Boeing lease to use SLC-6 for Delta IV ops was signed in September of 1999. Ergo, any time after 1998 is not viable. At this point, launching from anywhere other than the Cape is a non-starter.

4. Any number of SRB segments greater than 10 or 11 (two 5.5 seg boosters) would require significant changes to the ground support equipment at KSC including new ML/MLPs and new crawlers to take the weight of the rockets. Furthermore, any changes that add an extra SRB would mean an all new series of validation tests, which get stupid expensive stupid quick.

5. Your sidemount is back to the Not-Shuttle-C that was proposed as a part of the Augustine II work. They did look at a stretched ET, four engine boat-tail, and 5 seg boosters as a possible growth option, but noted that it would have very high costs.
 
How far back can we take the POD?

Because Shuttle-C given the go ahead in 1990 or so seems pretty perfect for your eventual result.
 
I suppose it would be too much to ask for congress to support the Ares-I AND to pay for building LC-39C & LC-39D?
Probably. :) The pads are only half the struggle, though--High Bays are as much of a bottleneck ,given that the rear two High Bays aren't on the crawlerways anymore. I'd estimate it's feasible to get an Ares I off at least every 30 days or so. Maybe two in 30 days if you "salvo" things off both pads, but you'd need the time to ready two launchers beforehand and afterwards before you could do it again.

Perhaps, after a lot of pressure from launch providers and the public, the missions architecture is modified so that the fuel is launched commercially. NASA has a "Commercial Propellant Tanker Program" or something similar, based off commercial cargo. You end up with a mission architecture that looks something like this:

1. A hypergolic stage for braking into LLO (Orion needs one) is launched first on Ares-I. The Ares-I upper stage is modified so that it can be refueled, and will serve as the EDS.
2. Over the next 1-3 months, there's a slew of commercial launches to refuel the EDS.
3. The Lander is Launched on an Ares-I and docked to the braking stage.
4. Then the crew launch on Orion on an Ares-I, dock to the top of the lander on the EDS.
5. The whole stack is pushed TLI.

From a very quick delta-V calculation, looks like the Ares-I upper stage probably needs to be about 4/5ths refilled to push 75 tons through TLI (1 Ares-I launch = 25 tons, we have three Ares-1 launches worth of payload in the lunar stack), which means there's some room for growth which intrigues me. NASA could, say, choose to launch one more Commercial Tanker so they could send the stack into lunar polar orbit, things like that.

Pushing refueling off onto commercial providers should help keep program costs down, but will mean the Ares-I launch costs will stay pretty high, unless they decide to push for 2 missions a year.
I don't know if you need a separate Orion braking stage--you can just size the lander to do that, as historically envisioned. The problems as far as limiting hardware (the largest of the chunks) is probably the lander, and really the volume is probably a bigger issue than the mass. If you can refill the lander in orbit, then the dry mass of a reasonably large lander (something on Altair scale) is only 13 metric tons or so, but you need a fairing diameter I'm not sure Ares I can support for most of the Constellation lander studies. The alternative is either a horizontally-oriented lander like ULA's DTAL or the new Dynetics lander, or incorporating a crasher stage to reduce the propellant tank volume for the lander.

As far as cost, you have the base load of station crew for Ares I, that'd have to be its main task regardless of if commercial crew exists or not. With a base load of station flights, the launch rate of Ares I might be enough to have the costs be merely bad, not shockingly awful. I'm imagining you end up with some kind of "maximum effort global launch salvo" to support lunar missions, the kind of thing Sean O'Keefe would love. In the early 2010s, that's probably envisioned as the crew on Orion/Ares I, the EDS on Ares I, the lander on Ares I, an Ares I prop tanker for show, and then the remainder flown as one Delta IV H, one Atlas 551, an Ariane V, and probably a Falcon. That gets the better part of 168 metric tons of hardware and prop into orbit. That's in the realm of initial LEO mass that buys four crew on the lunar surface for 2-4 weeks depending on how closely you sharpen your pencil. By the 2016 period, there's probably a lot of talking of making the Falcon a Heavy and cutting out an Ares I or the Delta IV with it.

It probably kills commercial crew, and it's questionable if getting NASA to give a big hug to prop depots and Falcon Heavy makes up for that, but the big problem still remains getting anyone to love Ares I/Orion as an end in itself enough to make this orbital assembly nightmare the best case for Congress and lobbyists over pursuing an HLV.
 
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I'm sorry, but I can't answer that question, because I don't think that Ares I was a good design.
Aha. But can you see how someone who just reads your first post would have the impression you think it is actually good?

I dislike solid boosted designs, and Ares 1 relies on them exclusively for its first stage burn. It would be a rough ride for the astronauts; SRBs suffer resonances comparable to POGO but offer fewer good ways to mitigate them, aside from such issues as being unable to stop the burn once you start it and not being able to escape it if it leaks. (The leaks that blew up Challenger would perhaps have merely been a nuisance if it were on an Ares 1 layout, without the plume impinging on the central propellant tank, but a serious nuisance--they sap the propellant supply and thrust (worse than linearly, if you drop the effective nozzle feed pressure near sea level, the specific impulse falls too, as it would not in vacuum) so the boost probably does not close to a mission acceptable orbit, and they create cross thrusts that have to be corrected, further degrading useful thrust, and might just possibly between the mechanical weakness they create and worsen and those cross stresses, break the stage in half.

Solids are good because one can get really tremendous thrusts relatively cheaply. They are generally robust and generally store well, for modest periods if one avoids extremes such as winter deep cold snaps or major lightning strikes anyway. If there were a plant on site right at Cape Canaveral or a short barge ride up the Intracoastal Waterway nearby, capable of casting monolithic boosters of the necessary size--well, there are yet more problems, such as bubbles forming unobserved in the grain, to worry about. And actually the seal fix applied after Challenger seems to have been good.

Which is why TLs like this tend to be unrealistic one way or the other. The good technical solution tends to be bypassed in favor of something more institutionally favored. The story of the first generation SRB failures is classic of that type, because prior to selecting the design that failed on Challenger's last flight, NASA had before them the alternative of choosing the intersegment seal design that was ultimately adopted after Challenger was lost, which worked fine through the rest of the program--or a simpler, lighter, cheaper to implement method that was chosen, because the better method cost more and cost a tonne or two of payload up mass. The studies clearly indicated risks of the type that did destroy an Orbiter with all hands, and they chose the riskier method anyway. Then, beginning with the first launch of Columbia and continuing in most flights from that to the fatal last flight of '86, the solids proceeded to exhibit the leaking plumes for real. That is the point where management should have said, OK, we'll use up all the segments already made for the wrong design, since the risk seems low, but we can't keep expecting to avoid rolling snake eyes, so immediately our subsequent orders will be for the more elaborate seal. But no, they didn't.

In the real world, there is a layer of risk due to cost-effectiveness, but there is another and worse one due to this kind of institutional optimism. Management has spoken and they must be infallible or the universe collapses.

So as a general thing we can look toward engineering tradeoffs, but they can be and often are overridden by institutional ones of this type.

I think the world would be a better place if the lesson taken from Challenger were more along the lines of "we really need liquid fuel boosters for a craft of this type." That would favor economical reuse too I think, though I am thinking in terms of an engineering tradeoff that might never have been favored--making the booster units heavy and robust in aid of durability while splashing down in the ocean, and continuing to fish them out of the water. Such boosters would be easy to refurbish; check the engines, examine the body for broken seals and so forth, and if it passes, fill it up with propellant and fly it again. That ought to offset possible higher original cost in a way that the charade of reusing solid elements did not. Trying to make them fly back is the more popular concept of course. And nowadays with SLS that is something that can be done if the SRBs are replaced with Falcons.
I will admit that I'm very fond of the Ares I; when I see an image of Ares I, I think about waking up at 6-am back in 2006, spending the morning watching NASA TV with my Dad, and learning about how we were gonna go back to the Moon. So yes, I quite like Ares I, but my nostalgic feelings for the Ares I are totally separate from my thoughts on it's technical merits.
I'm not sure just what age you are alluding to here, but when I was in elementary school--preschool to second grade or so I mean--Apollo was the thing, and it was fully operational. I don't actually remember watching Apollo 11 on TV (I do remember other things that happened in the year before though) but I used to get up real early, put my Cub Scout uniform on, and watch the last lunar Apollo missions with the Moon Rover.

But meanwhile there was a lot of science fiction around to pay attention to, such as the movie 2001, or Gerry Anderson's UFO, and by the time I was in 3rd grade, reading Clarke's 2001 book, the real space program was doing Skylab, and I was watching Star Trek (Animated series in its original airing and TOS in syndication) I was looking forward to an ever advancing space future, and while the Shuttle's development was slow, I had the notion that it would be leading straight to the futurism of the TV shows and routine space travel I could read about in Asimov and Heinlein stories (by the time I was in 4th grade and Apollo-Soyuz was the last hurrah of US HSF until Columbia went up). Already in high school, when Columbia was launched, I had the notion that the Shuttle was just an interim thing and we'd be moving on past it pretty quick, in part thanks to a bit of contrarianism on my part--I was following O'Neill and other advocates of extensive space colonization, and they were illustrating much heavier lifters, whereas the NASA party line in the late '70s and early '80s was--"Oh, the Shuttle will put up everything we want as cheaply as we'd like, we shouldn't be thinking about other ways of putting stuff into LEO, Believe In The Shuttle!"

By the time that bubble burst, I had already been admitted to Caltech, spent several years falling apart to be kicked out, first doing an internship at JPL; my first girlfriend worked on Galileo and was terrified the whole probe would be scrubbed because it was designed to go up on Shuttle-Centaur. I met her there at JPL.

As for Constellation/Orion, I first heard of it listening to Rachel Maddow's old radio show in the wee hours on Air America radio--I had a job that involved me being up on the graveyard shift and things going slow around the time her show came on, so it was convenient for me to listen to her, and I loved her. (Always had a weakness for being smitten by smart lesbians). She professed to like it, so I looked at it on line with some sympathy. But I never liked Ares 1. It looked goofy and things got worse from there.

Nor did I realize that the much ballyhooed "going beyond Earth orbit" focus of the program, which seemed like progress, was meant to be a tradeoff--that the idea was to do a few Apollo like sorties and plant flags in new and interesting places, a few times, instead of maintaining a constant presence in space. I assumed the idea was to do both, as I figured was the rightful legacy of humanity--don't abandon the space stations, expand them! Go back to the Moon to go bigger, stay longer, and build the damn Moonbase already.

I honestly think if we had to make a choice, building ISS and sustaining it was the better one. Mind, since I also think we should of course go on outward from there, I am upset we did not study medium gravity in a big centrifugal facility of some kind. Before we design a long term Moonbase we should know a lot more than we do about the effects on Terran organisms of living in 1/6 G, and we should definitely know more about 1/3 G before sending people to Mars. Learning stuff like that is a major thing LEO space stations should be studying.

For the time it was proposed in, Ares I was clearly a bad design (it would've been quite good in the 80s).
Now I have less of a bead on your thinking than ever. How come it would be OK in the '80s but not later? In the '80s features it relied on, such as SRB units made from linear segments, were not yet much tested or debugged, and by golly, for avoidable reasons to be sure, NASA went and got zapped by a great big bug.

The damn solids are a major part of what was wrong with STS--whereas the zeitgeist among space fans in the early 2000s was that it was the attempt at reusability that was the mistake. As a broad concept, I can't dismiss the general idea of making LEO and beyond launchers that lift largely, or even entirely, on solid first stages; there are ways of doing it, on various scales, that sidestep specific problems the 5-segment stack of Ares 1 stepped right into. But I don't have to like them. As cheap and dirty ways of lobbing infrastructural mass we can afford to lose every now and then, they might have their place, but they suck as a human launch system.

This is true in any epoch I think; they might be preferred as the only solution in some, or as cost effective in others, but never as elegant. In my subjective opinion anyway. It is bad enough having solid boosters on the side to assist launch; relying exclusively on them, yikes.

I would make an exception for something like the Soviet Gnom missile system, but what was nifty about that was the attempt to make the overall launcher much much lighter by using airbreathing stages! Gnom was weird especially for a Soviet project, the Russians generally avoid solids at all.

But it was basically three stage. A massive thrust from a powerful but short solid booster stage would ram the missile up past sonic speed, then air intakes would blow in and, pressurized by ram effect and heated by that pressurization, the air would burn a solid fuel (this literally fuel, not the oxidant-fuel mix we call "solid fuel," though I bet it had a primer layer with some solid oxidant to facilitate lighting, and perhaps some oxidant mixed in to accelerate the combustion in later phases of ramming) thus achieving great mass savings, climbing on a depressed trajectory to remain in usefully dense air longer, then when this crapped out the third, solid, stage would light to complete the boost. The goal was to achieve intercontinental range for a Soviet warhead (they were consistently heavier than Yankee warheads, or other Western designs) on a missile that would all up be light enough to be hauled around on a mobile carrier/launcher; instead of relying on hardened silos, the idea was to shift the location of the launchers frequently so the enemy would not be able to target them preemptively.

So that implementation, which might have scaled up to be a launcher maybe, did rely on pure solid boost initially, and even if one went over to a different air-breathing design, using say liquid fuel or hydrogen for fuel, a hard high G rocket start might be required, and if you want high thrust, solids beckon. To be sure, the problem of a fly back zeroth stage that just has to get the air-breathing ramjet is easier than a full first stage booster flyback, and then it might be worthwhile to put on a honking huge liquid engine instead, versus expending a solid block. Another approach is to go air-breathing on launch but that requires a compressor, and is coming close to being tantamount to a turbojet zeroth stage. I looked into the possibility of replacing the SRBs on the Shuttle with an array of turbojet engines instead, taking the models used in 1970s generation military planes like the F-15 and -16, but you'd have to use a whole hell of a lot of them. Thrust/weight ratios for jet engines are far far lower than in rockets, due mainly to the fairly low combustion pressures involved and of course the need to pressurize a really large volume of air. If we could conveniently power the compressors without having to draw the power from the exhaust stream we might do better, but it is still a matter of trading off wonderful economy of propellant with a heavy fixed plant installation.

The only sense in which Ares 1 was "Shuttle derived" was in using the SRB stack, and since that stack had to be five segments and not four to get the performance desired, it hardly qualifies. Dealing with the most objectionable aspect of it means it is not Shuttle derived at all, but a clean sheet medium orbital rocket--and then we are back to considering EELVs off the shelf. For a reasonable sized Orion, several would be available. Ares 1 then was practically the mascot of everything misconceived about Constellation, using the worst Shuttle derived element in the least Shuttle derived way for no really useful purpose whatsoever. Save playing a political shell game with the public.
Shuttle-C, in my opinion, is quite clearly the best possible Shuttle-derived launch vehicle, and what NASA should have started working on in 2010 (or, even better, in 2005).
The Space Launch System, on the other hand, I would say is the worst possible Shuttle-derived launch vehicle (in particular, expending 4 RS-25s every flight is just offensive).

And that get's to the heart of why I'm interested in this timeline; I like the Ares I, and while it's not a great vehicle, I think it could still be better than the SLS has been.
Also, it's a fun challenge making the Ares I work for 2010 NASA, both technically and politically.
I went with what you are saying soberly was the best approach, and I hope you like it at least a little.

Mind I am not sure I should be confident that a single SSME class engine can give such good results, nor did real world designers ever consider such a frugal approach to my knowledge. At SRB drop-off, with a full sized Shuttle tank (having been depleted at just 1/3 the rate of standard STS launches, it would still have 710 tonnes of oxygen and hydrogen in the tank after two minutes burn!) the single engine would be putting out only 220 tonnes thrust, whereas the stack mass all up would be 830 tonnes or so. It is not unusual for upper stages to start burning at lower thrust than the dead weight of the stages they are trying to push, but I think it is unusual to say the least to have just a quarter the thrust, and the weight of the propellant tank would not be coming down fast, it would take five or six seconds to get rid of each tonne! Perhaps Silverbird deceives me because it is basically a glorified slide rule based on empirical data from real world designs, and choosing such a goofy approach puts it far out of its comfort zone of reliability. I found the idea of only having to use one core engine exciting as it stretches out that legacy supply of inherited RS-25.

I would be very confident though that just two of them will work fine; many Shuttle-C designs were proposed relying on just two.
 
Probably. :) The pads are only half the struggle, though--High Bays are as much of a bottleneck ,given that the rear two High Bays aren't on the crawlerways anymore. I'd estimate it's feasible to get an Ares I off at least every 30 days or so. Maybe two in 30 days if you "salvo" things off both pads, but you'd need the time to ready two launchers beforehand and afterwards before you could do it again.

I didn't realize the rear two High Bays aren't on the crawlerways now. When did that happen?

I don't know if you need a separate Orion braking stage--you can just size the lander to do that, as historically envisioned. The problems as far as limiting hardware (the largest of the chunks) is probably the lander, and really the volume is probably a bigger issue than the mass. If you can refill the lander in orbit, then the dry mass of a reasonably large lander (something on Altair scale) is only 13 metric tons or so, but you need a fairing diameter I'm not sure Ares I can support for most of the Constellation lander studies. The alternative is either a horizontally-oriented lander like ULA's DTAL or the new Dynetics lander, or incorporating a crasher stage to reduce the propellant tank volume for the lander.

I hadn't considered launching the lander empty. My brain just sort of decided, 'we only have a 5m fairing, so the lander must be small, so it must be hypergolic, and won't have much delta-V', and I hadn't really questioned it. A hydrolox lander launched empty and refueled with the EDS would be a much cleaner architecture.

Actually, ULA's DTAL seems like the perfect lander in many ways; it's thin enough for the Ares I, it's hydrolox, it should be relatively cheap to develop, and a quick google search confirms that the concept was around under that name at least as early as 2009, so the idea would be available for NASA to appropriate.

It probably kills commercial crew, and it's questionable if getting NASA to give a big hug to prop depots and Falcon Heavy makes up for that, but the big problem still remains getting anyone to love Ares I/Orion as an end in itself enough to make this orbital assembly nightmare the best case for Congress and lobbyists over pursuing an HLV.

On the other hand, if commercial crew is killed before it can even begin, then Ares I becomes the only way to do American launched crew rotation, and therefore an unfortunate necessity. Surely there are people around in 2010 who are uneasy about entities other than the government launching crew. Perhaps they could be the mechanism I'm looking for.

That' great if you want one flight per year that lands four guys for a few days, but any more than that needs more capability, which drives things like Delta IV Heavies - which if you add just two of them to the manifest per year, you've doubled Delta IV core production, which actually doesn't require any new tooling or people in the 2005-2015 time frame. You literally just have to pay for the materials.

First of all, there was a lot of great information in your post, so thank you. Most of it I don't have a direct response to, but this caught my attention, for mostly off topic reasons.
deltaiv_comparison_1.jpg
. . .
One day, in a different thread, I will circle back to this.

And speaking of off topic, I'm curious if there's not a better place for discussing Shuttle-C. If there isn't, I'll make another thread for it, since it's absolutely worth discussing.
 
I didn't realize the rear two High Bays aren't on the crawlerways now. When did that happen?
High Bay 4 was, as far as I know, simply never activated as a primary integration facility. It was never used in Saturn days, and you can see to this day the crawlerway to it was never built:

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At one point, the crawlerway to high bay 2 was also replaced with parking lot as the rear high bays were only used for SRB and ET handling and bays 1 and 3 had better access. This was restored in 2000 as part of providing a safe harbor for a third shuttle stack in the event of a hurricane occurring with one shuttle on the pad and two others built up in the other two high bays. I should have recalled High Bay 2 was active--it's where they've been doing some of the crawler work. However, it's active as a refuge of last resort, not as an active stacking/checkout cell. (EDIT: It looks like High Bay 2 was cut off by 1977 for the Shuttle era, as it looks like it's been partially dug up here: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d2/VAB_aerial_1977.jpg. This would be in line with the Shuttle program only converting the front two bays for Shuttle integration operations, with the back two left for ET checkout and SRB pre-stack preparations.)

I hadn't considered launching the lander empty. My brain just sort of decided, 'we only have a 5m fairing, so the lander must be small, so it must be hypergolic, and won't have much delta-V', and I hadn't really questioned it. A hydrolox lander launched empty and refueled with the EDS would be a much cleaner architecture.

Actually, ULA's DTAL seems like the perfect lander in many ways; it's thin enough for the Ares I, it's hydrolox, it should be relatively cheap to develop, and a quick google search confirms that the concept was around under that name at least as early as 2009, so the idea would be available for NASA to appropriate.
Yeah, this is the math of the biggest-smallest piece. If you have two launches for a lunar mission, it's the EDS by mass. If you have three launches, then you're probably using a tanker, so it's the mission hardware (capsule/lander) by mass and volume. If you have more than three, it starts being individual hardware by mass and volume, then being just the dry-mass of particular hardware and the volume dominating. DTAL's a fun way around it, as is ULA's prop depot advocacy in general.

On the other hand, if commercial crew is killed before it can even begin, then Ares I becomes the only way to do American launched crew rotation, and therefore an unfortunate necessity. Surely there are people around in 2010 who are uneasy about entities other than the government launching crew. Perhaps they could be the mechanism I'm looking for.
They might be. It's worth noting much of how Orion survived as the MPCV was in theory as a "backup" for commercial crew access to ISS. Giving it a NASA-approved launcher to go with that would be arguably just another part of ensuring a successful, "low-program-risk" alternative.

And speaking of off topic, I'm curious if there's not a better place for discussing Shuttle-C. If there isn't, I'll make another thread for it, since it's absolutely worth discussing.
I don't know if there's another thread where we've kicked Shuttle-derived around lately. It's probably about time for one, but I'm not up to making the one I have in mind yet.
 
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