November 1938, Saigon
Commandant Michalak slowed his breathing and mentally rehearsed his speech as he waited to commence his briefing. He reviewed the large scale maps of western Cambodia and the Indochinese border with China focusing on the contrasting coloured pins indicating French, Siamese, Chinese and Japanese military dispositions. He noticed the new Commander of the French military in Indochina nod his head, Lamaison cleared his throat and started his briefing.
‘Good morning Gentlemen, I am here to outline the current strategic situation confronting our forces within Indochina, and the Deuxieme Bureau’s projections. The recent skirmish between Siam and our forces have forced us to review our previous assumptions regarding their military effectiveness. Siam under the government of General Phot Phahonyothin has modernised their economy and military. This economic improvement has focused on improving their agricultural sector, which accounts for 60% of their GDP. To distract attention from the social cost of economic reform, the Siamese government has increased their bellicosity over the provinces ceded in 1893.’
‘Their army has a strength of 50,000 with a reserve of 20,000 available after fourteen days. Our entire Indochinese force comprises 15,000 regular French soldiers and a colonial militia of 30,000. Consequently we are at a numerical disadvantage of close to 2 to 1, IF we are able to utilise our full force against the Siamese. This would be a reckless decision as it would leave our remaining borders exposed to further aggression and restrict our ability to control our internal lines of communication. The armoured force consists of 100 Vickers 6 ton tanks, representing a full generation ahead of our 20 FT – 17 tanks. This qualitative advantage continues with their air force having recently ordered 50 Curtis Hawks, a modern monoplane fighter, which is superior to our Potez 25 biplanes. This disadvantage will be ameliorated upon delivery of 30 Morane 406. Our Naval forces remain at parity, however our qualitative edge in training is expected to remain in the short term. Despite their local military advantages, the Siamese will be unlikely to attack if France is not engaged in a European conflict. If relations continue to deteriorate in Europe leading to war with Germany, then that assessment is raised to possible and probable if we are at war with another power in Asia.’
‘The most likely power in East Asia is the Empire of Japan. During our recent skirmish captured intelligence documents combined with Signals Intelligence indicated the presence of Japanese advisers. Their level of involvement remains unknown, however the ability of the Siamese to transport 60 Vickers Tanks whilst maintaining strategic surprise would suggest that the advisers were located at the brigade level.'
'Following the Marco Polo Incident in July last year, the IJA has occupied Beiping, Shanghai and the remaining coastal industrial enclaves. Consequently they have isolated the Nationalist Chinese from maritime arms shipments, forcing them to rely on overland routes including from Haiphong harbour. The Japanese method appears to be incremental in nature and not to be a result of a coherent strategic plan. Within their military we are aware of two factions that are driving their strategy, with a ‘Strike North’ and Strike South faction. At this stage it is impossible to determine which faction will emerge triumphant.’
‘Our expectation is that the Nationalist Revolutionary Army will trade space for time and attempt to wage a war of attrition against the Japanese. The success of the IJA advance has forced the Nationalist government to relocate their capital to Chungking. Although unlikely it is possible that Haiphong may be blockaded to prevent further arms shipments from reaching the Nationalist Revolutionary Army. If the Empire of Japan attacked with our current strength, we would be unable to prevent the Japanese from occupying Indochina. However this course of action in the short term is rated as unlikely due to the likelihood of Japan then fighting two major powers in ourselves and the British Empire. That concludes my presentation, are there any questions?’
The General walked over to the maps and faced the auditorium. ‘Gentlemen, I want our war plans for Siam and Japan to be reviewed. The Siamese plan is to be based under the assumption that we will not receive any assistance from France. The Japanese plan is to focus on a war in Tonkin with two variations including if the Nationalist China or the British Emprie are able to provide assistance. The third plan is for a two front war with Siam and Japan, it is also to include a sub section entitled the Lettow-Vorbeck option. For those of you that are not familiar with General von Lettow-Vorbeck then I suggest you read up on him. It is also apparent that with the present difficulty in Europe that any assistance we receive will be minimal. Therefore we must expand the indigenous military component and industrial capacity to redress that inferiority. That is all gentlemen.’ With that the remainder of the auditorium stood up, as General Paul Legintilhomme strode out.