C H A P T E R 1.1
How a Farmer Ended World War II
From the book, “American Sisyphus: The Trials and Final Triumph of Henry A. Wallace”
.
Presidential historiography places an emphasis when detailing the 33rd President of the United States as the quintessential American dreamer, full of hope and dreams of a better world through American actions. The emphasis of the idealist puts into perspective the two prevailing notions of Henry Agard Wallace depending on who you ask. It was either as a man with ideas too early as often espoused by his supporters or as a naive politician out of his depth when asking his opponents. Either way, his complex legacy has often portrayed him as a not-so-well president, but when one peeks more into his achievements, they are often proved wrong, as we try to reexamine the legacy of the second President from Iowa.
.
In achieving this end, one must first traverse into his early presidency and how it defined him and shaped him as one former staffer who had described him, “He may be listening with his brain, but certainly not with his guts,” into one that can be regarded as a man troubled and humbled into the office, as so many others before him did……
. ==========
….the year 1945, in the opinion of the writer and of many other historians can attest, was a year that would redefine history, as it certainly did for the Vice President of the United States. On April 12th, 1945, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the 32nd President of the United States of America and its longest serving passed away, and in his place stood his confidante and preferred successor, former Republican; former Agriculture Secretary; and Vice President of the United States. Wallace knew that his position was fragile, and so did his allies as often remembered what Eleanor Roosevelt —a personal friend of the now-President—remarked to him moments after they met, “Henry, is there anything we can do for you? For you’re the one in trouble now…”
.
It was trouble indeed as his defeated enemies, leering their heads back into the limelight after the now-President Wallace trounced their doomed nomination the year prior. Opponents of the president—and even many on the fence in regards to his presidency, even if they stayed quiet––feared that the liberal radical from Iowa that they tried to unseat would come back to have his revenge. Early in his presidency, Wallace’s opponents tried to discredit and role down his position of authority through several means, such as in cabinet meetings led by Commerce Secretary Jesse Jones—even as he had resigned in the early days of his presidency—and Postmaster General Frank Walker; through slow turning the bureaucracy in the war process; and even withholding information from the president led by his opponents in the military. This series of events dampened President Wallace’s opinion of his critics and he even entertained the idea of isolating his opponents, and had the grandeur to imagine their own downfall as he proceeded to get payback from them. Nonetheless, he was persuaded by his friends, such as Senator Claude Pepper and now-former First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt—one of the few personal friends he had in Washington––advised him to keep his predecessor’s policies in place and wait until the end of the war for any changes. They also cautioned of the attempts that his opponents had started to move, and that Wallace needed to retaliate, even if he did it in the most uncharacteristic move, which was reconciliation and dialogue. For this, Wallace demurred, even if he was reluctant to agree with them for, he had bold plans and everybody knew it, but his agreement with his friends gives light into his personality and growth into the presidency that many have been reluctant to analyze.
.
If asked what the personality of Henry Agard Wallace was, both his friends and opponents can attest that he was an idealistic intellectual, a man caught up in his dreams that he often forgets the complications of reality. Nevertheless, his personality of being a quiet, but ever-curious man would come into conflict with his position as President of the United States. He saw himself as a man with a grand destiny and tried to forecast himself into the position of being a worthy successor to President Roosevelt. He was a man that was often portrayed as, “The Assistant President,” a man that held sway during his tenure in the cabinet. Critics and even supporters alike agree that Wallace’s tenure as vice president was not successful, in particular, due to his public feud with Commerce Secretary Jesse Jones during his stint as head of the Board of Economic Warfare, and the later infamous “Potemkin Village” incident during his visit to the Soviet Union where he praised labor camps as an efficient way to rebuild the country. Nonetheless, because of these humiliations and subsequent near loss during his re-nomination, President Wallace faced a new reality that was nearly similar to the time that he lost his position in the BAW, that of restless loss and the realization of his own lack of influence.
.
President Wallace knew of the importance that power held, even if had a naive way to control it, thus he heeded the advice his friends had given to him and relented, there would be peace. His seeming idealism and dislike of those who had opposed him would not go far, but as his friend, Claude Pepper remarked about President Wallace’s actions, “There is time for peace, and there is time for vengeance.” Nevertheless, this fear by his opponents of a naive and radical president would still remain as presently seen even in his early days.
.
The fears of President Wallace that would threaten American security and that his naivety would lead to its inevitable clash with the Soviets proved to be false as seen through his first speech to Congress in the days after the death of President Roosevelt. His critics often point to his first speech as the antithesis of everything Roosevelt had tried to leave behind as his legacy, which simply was not true and taken out of context.
.
President Wallace, in his first speech to Congress, iterated the legacy of President Roosevelt and the New Deal, his desire to win the war, and the hopes of President Roosevelt that he hoped to be the Second New Deal after the war’s end. President Wallace called for, “A nation that shall work and fight for the dreams of our fallen President!” and, “We shall continue the wishes of my friend, President Roosevelt, and demand prosperity through lasting peace as we welcome the Century of the Common Man!” His demand for peace was also demonstrated, “If wars in the future are to be prevented the nations must be united in their determination to keep the peace under law, something that can only be achieved through mutual cooperation.”
.
President Wallace’s aggressive tones on his idea of the future world order and demand for change as he harkened back to his speech of 1943 that would become his signature phrase for years to come certainly impacted both sides of the aisles, both his critics and supporters alike inflamed by his rhetoric. Conservatives and Republicans alike mock the President for ruining a day of unity for the sake of his ambition, while his allies paraded his desire for change and a continuation of Roosevelt’s policies. Nevertheless, lightning had struck and it became a fire as even in war, Wallace was bombarded. It would be that for years to come, highlighting the divisiveness of the president.
.
The sheer response that his speech garnered became a source of contention and division for years to come, but he nevertheless outlined his ideas and wants for a future world order, that of a peaceful cohabitation of powerful nations. Achieving this would be hard, and his first test would come in the form of the Potsdam Conference, a test that President Wallace would have to face to determine the place of America in a post-fascist world…
.
From the book, “A Guide to American Cold War Foreign Policy:
Chapter: President Wallace and the Wallace Doctrine”
.
The Presidency of Henry A. Wallace marked the beginning of the Cold War even as the president himself abhorred the term. Even before the Cold War, distrust amongst American policymakers about the dangers of Communism and the Soviet Union was something that was obvious, but the war itself brought differing opinions to the forefront in asking about the future of their relationship with the Soviet Union. Some were skeptics of positive Soviet-American relations, men such as Ambassadors W. Averell Harriman and George F. Kennan argued that Stalin’s deliberate and active role in reshaping Eastern Europe had forced America’s hand to be more active in foreign affairs, especially the need to defend democracy from Soviet threats. Their ideas were countered by those who advocate maintaining a friendly relationship with the Soviets in the hope that they could divide their own spheres of influence, and by the end, prevent another war between them. A peaceful resolution was something that President Wallace was sympathetic towards and backed by more senior members of the State Department, such as Secretary Edward Stettinius Jr. and Undersecretary Dean Acheson.
.
The two schools of thought would be debated throughout the early years of the Wallace Presidency with the president being swayed one way and the other depending on the sound arguments that they had made during the time. Nevertheless, President Wallace was more convinced of the need for a friendly relationship with the Soviets. His thesis, and subsequently, the battle of the thoughts would be first fought in the Potsdam Conference, which would become one of the more impressive legacies that President Wallace would leave behind, even when remembering the utter shocks that would occur surrounding it.
.
The divide between members of the administration and their plans for the upcoming conference wasn’t helped by the news that two weeks after the death of President Roosevelt, Joseph Stalin was pronounced dead of a stroke and so was Soviet stability as infighting started between the leadership. The leadership of Stalin had left little in between his power, but there were some people who held significance within the former leader’s circle, such as Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov; Stalin’s number two, Andrei Zhdanov; and head of the NKVD, Lavrentiy Beria among others. In the end, these three would subsequently come into an uneasy peace even as backroom politics still raged as they came into a sort of collective leadership. The dysfunctional Troika and their conflicting interests would be instrumental in the strong-armed negotiations that would occur in Potsdam.
.
The Potsdam Conference would be the first conference to which none of the original big three were still either in power or alive—British leadership changed as Clement Attlee became Prime Minister a week into the conference––as they were now represented by a new crop of leadership. The negotiations between the new “Big Three” would inevitably reshape what they wanted for a post-war world as some, if not most, had differing ideas on their ideas for their own worlds.
.
President Wallace would be accompanied by several members of his administration, some of whom were regarded as close allies, while others were experts who did not necessarily agree with the president and vice versa. Nonetheless, they all agreed on one thing, ensuring a peaceful coexistence with the Soviets in Europe and their guarantee of a declaration of war against Japan. In this, President Wallace was comfortable to do as he was often made to be President Roosevelt’s delegate to other countries and he had often negotiated on his behalf. He had sensed, alongside members of the administration, that the new Soviet delegation would be divided and he hoped that they would be more willing to reconcile their differences through the conference.
.
They were swiftly met with stiff resistance from the Soviets who were forceful in their demands, especially in regards to Eastern Europe. Led by Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov and NKVD officer Boris Rodos—who was essentially put there as a leash against Molotov as the representative of Beria—, the Soviet delegation demanded that in return for their cooperation against Japan and agreeing to lessen the demands put on Germany, they would be allowed to have control over Eastern Europe and maintained their military size. For the allies, in particular, the United States was appalled by their demands. Their subsequent renegotiations with Molotov and their lack of cooperation quickly soured President Wallace and some of the more optimistic members of his administration.
.
It was also in the midst of negotiations with the Soviets that President Wallace was informed about Los Alamos and the Manhattan Project’s success. He was never an active participant in its progress, but due to his relationship with President Roosevelt, he was kept in the loop and the news of a bomb did not surprise him. The issue was, how to inform America’s allies about the bomb, in particular the Soviets. His administration was divided, akin to the divisions between the schools of thought as Secretary of State Stettinius preferred to be open with the Soviets, while Ambassador Harriman preferred to be cryptic and combative with the Soviets. President Wallace, on the other hand, was more open to discussion with the Soviets and preferred that the weapon posed benefits for both countries and the thought that it was inevitable that the Soviets would procure it sooner than later. President Wallace, in his own mind, viewed that the Atomic Bomb could be used in diplomacy and also as leverage against the Soviets. This provided the Americans with better bargaining chips against the Soviets which would be utilized as the cracks within the Soviet delegation started to be seen.
.
For the Soviet Union, their goal of securing their own sphere was near, but the changing of the guard led to a shift in their goals. They still wanted a sphere, but the shape was differing now that the Troika was in charge. Lavrentiy Beria in particular wanted re-approachment with the West and essentially tried to kill the Cold War before it began. His goal was to liberalize and open the Soviet Union to Western ideas, something loathed by most of the establishment, but his position and leverage over the Soviet delegation in Potsdam, in particular, due to Foreign Minister Molotov’s wife being held in NKVD custody. Beria utilized his own desire and negotiated a better offer with the Americans in regard to their control over Eastern Europe.
.
Initially, the Soviet intelligence leader offered a limited, if not lucrative deal that would allow Germany to bypass the Oder-Neisse line––except for East Prussia and Upper Silesia—that would eventually lead to a neutral Germany and limited Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, especially in the Balkans. The offer that the Soviets offered was very much short of what the Americans wanted and the Soviets knew it, purposefully coming short to encourage a sense of strength that was badly needed in a post-Stalin USSR as later described by Foreign Minister Molotov in 1955. Countering this—and with great reluctance from the more anti-Soviet members of the delegations—President Wallace offered and subsequently revealed the secret of the Atomic Bomb and that his government was willing to cooperate with the Soviets to regulate, and even reveal its findings to them. This major concession did not go well with the American military, especially Generals Eisenhower and Marshall, and the President’s plans would be criticized even as he presented them to the Soviets. Fortunately for the military, the plans for nuclear exchange would be postponed until a later date.
.
The American demand was in exchange for de-intensifying the Red Army and lessening Soviet plans in Eastern Europe, especially in regard to a planned creation of a neutral Germany and Austria. Under the advice of Ambassador Harriman, President Wallace also stressed the need for free and democratic elections in Poland which would be observed by both the Americans and Soviets.
.
The Soviet response was quick, where Beria through Rodos and Molotov would agree, even as the Soviet military would harshly oppose the treaty. The lack of action by the military and the tight grip control that Lavrentiy Beria had had made it impossible for even Georgy Zhukov to respond.
.
The deal with the Soviets did not end the Potsdam Conference as there were other deals that were made surrounding the drama that happened between the American and Soviet delegations. The negotiations between President Wallace and Prime Minister Atlee, two figures of the left, were also something that became of note. Their discussion………
===========
….the consequences of the Potsdam Conference were beneficial mostly to the Western Allied Powers even as they shelved some of the most important parts of the Yalta Conference, such as the Atlantic Charter; the fall of Eastern Europe to Soviet hands; and many others. Nonetheless, President Wallace and his administration gained several victories over the Soviets, such as the. Even as the Potsdam Conference also marked the first of many breakdowns that would occur within the Wallace Administration as they try to comprehend the new post-war situation within Europe and in their homes. On the other hand, the Potsdam Conference became one of the first of many clashes that would occur within the Troika as they also tried to comprehend their policies across their new spheres of influence.
.
For American policymakers and foreign policy experts, the Potsdam Conference became the groundwork to frame their future foreign policies in regard to the Soviet Union. The consequences brought by President Wallace’s actions during the conference and his subsequent actions with the Soviets have become the framework that would later be called “The Wallace Doctrine”. The President’s actions and the divide between the two schools of thought would come to be reconciled with one and the other as the Soviet's apathetic response to President Wallace’s actions led the President and many in his cabinet to try to segregate themselves from the Soviets, something that both schools had implicitly thought of, but which would be formalized as policy later on.
.
The Potsdam Conference did not end the shift of American foreign policy in 1945, but rather it was…..
.
From the book, “What Comes After Peace?
Chapter: The End of the War”
.
The Pacific War was nearing its end which everyone knew would come, but for President Wallace and his new administration, the path to which peace would come came to be a deliberation on the world's future. President Wallace had known about the atomic bomb for quite some time, in part due to his role in the Top Policy Group which led to the creation of the Manhattan Project. Even as President Wallace was kept out of the loop during his tenure as Vice President, he had been given information in regard to the progress of the project which led to its eventual success in 1945 which would be shared with the Soviets during the Potsdam Conference.
The issue of the Atomic Bomb was something that had never truly left the minds of policymakers, especially in regard to its use. In the beginning, it was supposed to be a deterrent against approaching Nazi Germany’s research on the Atomic Bomb, but the defeat of Germany and subsequent discovery left its use up in the air. This was the case until the option to use it on the Japanese came into the picture.
.
The plan to invade Japan which would be dubbed “Operation Downfall” was planned for November 1945 and was regarded by many war planners as one of the deadliest operations in American history if it was launched. This was hypothesized primarily because of the reasoning that the Japanese will not surrender unless there was something credible that would compel them to surrender. This was backed up by the reality that Japanese geography meant that the Americans and the other Allied countries would be forced to combat harsh conditions through successive islands to control each of them. Military planners and even civilian politicians regarded this as a hassle and costly, thus did not want to sacrifice a large number of their troops for a prolonged conflict.
.
The Atomic Bomb thus became a credible option for the Americans as it assessed the various options left to capitulate Japan, arguably the last of the Axis Powers. This was done even as the Americans had guaranteed Soviet intervention in the war against Japan which would inevitably lead to its demise sooner rather than later. This was compounded even as the Allied Powers, after the Potsdam Conference issued the Potsdam Declaration that gave the Japanese the ultimatum to surrender, which was clearly balked at the following days by the Japanese government. In the end, there was no other option but to end the war on America's own terms.
.
The issue next to be discussed would be which city would it be used. The scientists and President Wallace themselves argued for minimal use of the weapon as it was feared that there would be consequences in regards to the radiation. This, in turn, led the military, and in particular, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, to pick and choose the locations that would be bombed. There would be a minimum of two bombs to be used and some in the military even suggested dropping relentlessly until the Japanese surrendered, but the scientists of Los Alamos and even President Wallace himself suggested minimum use, which would be capped at three, but realistically it was only twice used. Amongst the choices readily available, President Wallace and Secretary Stimson rejected the bombing of Kyoto as it was perceived as too culturally valuable, to the detriment of General Leslie Groves, the commanding officer of the Manhattan Project. In the end, Hiroshima and Kokura would be the choices, conducted on the 6th and 9th of August.
.
The bombings of Hiroshima and Kokura certainly did much to end the war, but it left in its wake a different world, one that would be peaceful, but a peace that can only be maintained through arms…..
=======
…..a day after the Hiroshima bombings, The Soviet Union would keep its end of the deal and declared war against the Japanese. By the weeks ahead, the Soviets had practically occupied most of Manchuria and had set foot in Korea. By the time the Japanese surrender was completed, the Soviets were pushing inward to Korea, even as the Americans tried to do the same. It was surprising that Korea would become one of the first battlegrounds between the ideologies of the Democratic United States and Soviet Russia.
.
For Japan, the two bombs capitulated any desire for war, in particular for Emperor Hirohito, who subsequently tried to compel the surrender of Japan even as plotters tried to overturn his decision. Nevertheless, the Japanese government complied with the Potsdam Declaration and surrendered unconditionally on August 15th, 1945, thus ending the Pacific War and the last theater of World War II.
