Reading up on Arizona, both hypotheses rely on a black powder explosion setting off her propellant, which is pretty Golden BB itself. Further, Arizona is the only American ship of that era to explode in such a fashion - notably Boise took a direct magazine hit and her propellant failed to explode long enough for flooding to put out the resulting fire, whereas I expect with a British ship such a hit would’ve blown it apart.
So no, I don’t think Lexington would have the same odds of exploding. The shell hit placement may have been a Golden BB, but Hood exploding was a known flaw of British ships - see Barham, too. Arizona exploding was, based on other experience, a fluke.
Don't disagree on it being a fluke since thats generally what a golden BB is, the 20 role. Note I agree on the volatility of british cordite, especially in WW1. I wouldn't want to be on any battlecruisers running at an enemy line of battlecruisers in a theoretical 'interwar war' of the 20s or 30s unless I was in a G3, which is a fast BB by most metrics but the 'BC' parallel of the N3 line. And by the time they are built aircraft carriers should be doing the scouting.
Barham was a gonner, she was on her side before she exploded and that was within five minutes. She was sinking rapidly explosion or not. If it was a fire as Admiralty suggested and started because of or immediately after that was burning for 3-5 minutes. Survivors account of sinking
The ship had been hit amidships by torpedoes on the port side. It was steaming at about twenty knots at the time, and immediately began to list to port at an alarming rate. All electric motors had stopped, all power had gone ‘off the Board’, there was an ominous creaking of Bridge work and Rigging, the ship was ‘dead’ and it was clear to all of us that it was every man for himself while the going was good. The torpedoes seemed to hit the ship amidships just abaft the funnel, judging by the waterspout in that general area, of which I had a ringside view from the Admiral’s Bridge
Ship immediately judged as good as dead and efforts made to abandon ship as a priority.
I scram
bled over the barbette and onto the heavily barnacle encrusted ship’s bottom and over the bilge keel, it was probably only about four minutes since the ship had been hit. I estimate she then had a list of about sixty degrees.
I'm looking for more on Barham but at any rate my point is she was going down rapidly, having taken 3 torpedoes in the same place, and has begun a roll over. Nothing was done to flood the magazines or similar because she was a write off and everyone was getting the hell out of there. If there had been a fire in and of itself (without the ship also rapidly capsizing) and DC was in effect magazines may have been flooded in time. All hypothetical because I am assuming the fire started shortly after torpedo hit.
Wouldn't it be a better use of a minor power's limited naval budget for the reasons you said? If I'm, say, Country A (we'll say Argentina) and Country B (we'll say Brazil) has two battleships, instead of buying two matching BBs I could get two BCs and with the savings I could get a few torpedo boats, coastal submarines, etc. (to reduce the risk to my BC in the unlikely event they have to fight an enemy BB), get closer toward buying another cruiser, do much-needed ship maintenance and gunnery drills, etc. The BCs will run away from the BBs but demolish everything else and are just as effective at doing hit and run raids to shell coastal establishments.
In contrast, what would my rival have to gain by purchasing two BBs over my BCs?
Battlecruisers (unless they are like a gen behind) are more expensive. Ninjaed.
The RN pre-war plan for battlecruisers was that around 1915 the existing BCS would be broken up, and new cruiser squadrons would be formed consisting of a pair of battlecruisers and four of the new light cruiser designs. There was no intention they would form part of the line of battle. Even early in the war the battlecruisers were sent out to finish off Germany's armoured & light cruisers in colonial waters, or to man-mark (not very successfully) one of their own kind in the Med. But when the HSF formed the 1st Scouting Group the RN had to respond with the BCF or their own eyes of the Fleet would have been swept from the seas. Beatty also saw his own role as vanguard for the GF in battle, something we all agree the first-generation RN battlecruisers were patently unsuited for.
On Japan, their desire for battlecruisers was not to ape the RN, but from their own recent experiences at Tsushima. Forced by the lose of two pre-deadnoughts off Port Arthur, the Japanese topped up their battle line with several of the most modern armoured cruisers, which stood up well against Russian battleships. In addition, Togo's tactical use of his faster fleet drove home to the IJN how important a speed advantage was.
A lot of effort placing front line (close to brand new, Princess Royal) capital ships out hunting raiders. Use convoys and escort them instead with cruisers, if necessary pre dreadnoughts/older dreadnoughts (more for ww2 or late ww1) and use your capital ships where they are supposed to be used.
I don't disagree regarding Beatty's ego (thoroughly dislike his historical personna) but Tsushima did show how important having a speed advantage over the enemy's battle fleet was, and every admiral alive would regard crossing the enemy's T as the holy grail. Should also note (God, I hate being fair to the man) that one of the few things Beatty got right at Jutland was using his speed to force the remnants of SG1 away from the deploying Grand Fleet by threatening to cross Hipper's T. The Big Cats may have managed it, with less German main armament to bear on them while they can fire full broadsides, so not as silly as it appears with hindsight. Of course, the Invincibles & Indefatigables should not be allowed anywhere near a German BC, and perhaps not even the Blucher.
As an aside the RN dreadnoughts all outpaced the first German class of dreadnoughts, let alone Mauve's pre-dreadnoughts along for the ride. Jellicoe too understood the importance of speed, and for a while pestered the Admiralty for more fast ships, before deciding upon more heavily-armed (in calibre terms) battleships.
Jellicoe
did cross the German T and with some of the finest command and coordination seen effectively zigzagging the fleet into encircling the Germans in an arc of fire. I'll return to what I said a while ago (and quote myself like an dickhead) Tsushima showed the importance of coordination, communication and discipline in utilising your fleet as a unit. Beatty hadn't a clue, he was the kind of officer you wanted lobbying for more funding and off on some station where he couldn't lose 25% of British capital ships.
Speed is pretty relative, you need a fast enough battle line to get where you want, do battle and be fast and agile enough (as a battle line or later divisions) so the enemy doesn't get away.
The important part here is as a whole or as a fleet. You have a 'van' of battlecruisers you just end up separating a squadron of capital ships from your battleline. Jellicoe (and Togo) has shown if you utilise your
fleet speed advantage as a unit, not that of scouting forces ahead or a van of your fleet, and can utilise that speed (communication and coordination) and win. Scheer handicapped himself with pre dreadnoughts, meaning he could either utilise his dreadnoughts speed advantage and split his forces or hand the
fleet speed advantage to the British.