Too slow to be proper carriers but I guess they might work as escort carriers?
Too slow to be proper carriers but I guess they might work as escort carriers?
The Commando Carrier HMS Unicorn returning to the UK after the emergency deployment to Kuwait in 1961. Recommissioned as a Commando Carrier in 1957 Unicorn would remain in service until 1970 alongside Albion and Bulwark. Unlike the two Centaurs Unicorn would mostly serve in European waters. She would also conduct trials with the Harrier GR1 which would lead to the conversion of Albion, Bulwark and Hermes into VSTOL Carriers between 1975 and 1979. When she went to the scrap yard in 1971 she didn't owe the British tax payers a penny having more than justified her construction.
They are old and worn out, it would be better to build new ships and probably comparable or cheaper too.
The entire 10,000 ton cruiser was pretty much the British looking for a way to control the size of possible raider ships in the future and at the same time make an economical sized ship the British could build as trade protection. If GB comes out of WW1 with better finances and the USA/Japan had already built Battlecruisers with 10 inch guns on 15,000 tons then the limits would be different. GB really needed to keep the size downto a point where they could build enough ships to protect the convoy routes economically.
So for example the 10,000 ton Cruiser was a success but it was compromised in many ways. Some of the "Treaty" cruisers actually weighed 14,000 tons or more and on the same displacement the British could have had even better ships. The USA suffered from others being dishonest as well. Treaty's are great until the people writing the treaty fail at the checks and balances.
So for example the 10,000 ton Cruiser was a success but it was compromised in many ways. Some of the "Treaty" cruisers actually weighed 14,000 tons or more and on the same displacement the British could have had even better ships. The USA suffered from others being dishonest as well. Treaty's are great until the people writing the treaty fail at the checks and balances.
They were, but that's a much different proposition against 30-knot ships than it is against 25 and 27-knot ships.
I mean, if you are a minor navy in the 1920s one of the newer armored cruisers might not seem that bad of a proposition for purchase. Even the treaty signatories kept armored cruisers in service for quite a bit after the treaty. And they would be enough to ward off most light cruisers of the period. The problem is that once larger numbers of heavy cruisers come into service, and even some of the better light cruisers, an armored cruiser quickly loses its advantages.
I was referring to converting them to carriers, which would result in throwing money into an old, worn out hull when building new would probably not be that much more expensive and would give a more valuable ship.
One of the more fanciful notions in the early 20th century was the idea that ships had clearly defined roles and could somehow keep to them. The clearest example of this is the battle of Coronel in which a technically superior force if you look at paper stats was walloped by a more modern force with better training. The days of slogging it out at short range and the lessons from Tsushima got put together in a fashion that left the Royal Navy with the wrong lessons heading into the most critical part of the early 20th century.
The lessons that should have been learnt regarding observing fall of shot and making shells that could actually penetrate armor and still explode got missed and it was not until after the Battle of Jutland that these lessons got applied as part of the postmortome. The Royal Navy had the ships, it had the guns, it had the sailors but the shells it was shooting failed to perform and it cost the British Several Battleships.
The Royal Navy in the early 20th century made advances in technology repeatedly showed how to use it then failed to translate that into success. I would say the RN was commanded by men who despite being brave, excellent seamen failed to grasp the importance of rigorous testing to ensure the accuracy of the expected results. For example the shells that broke on impact and the magazine explosions made worse by policies of storing powder in a turret to speed up shooting etc. The US Navy and the torpedo scandal is an example of the entire reason Submarines existed being not worth using due to a lack of real world testing. THe Germans did this as well when the Torpedo's tested in a freshwater lake literally failed to be calibrated for Sea Water.
The changes needed to make any of these decisions less damaging are not exactly difficult. I honestly don't know how a World power can call itself that if the weapons with which it plans to defend itself are not tested in all environments or against real world targets at real world ranges. It should be entirely possible to build a full Barbette on land on a range to test the magazine and firing system in combat style conditions against representative ships hulls at the distances planned and then fire off a full magazine load as if in combat and see how long before things go wrong. Yes it would be expensive I just fail to see how it would be cheaper than losing a ship.
The lessons that should have been learnt regarding observing fall of shot and making shells that could actually penetrate armor and still explode got missed and it was not until after the Battle of Jutland that these lessons got applied as part of the postmortome. The Royal Navy had the ships, it had the guns, it had the sailors but the shells it was shooting failed to perform and it cost the British Several Battleships.
The Royal Navy in the early 20th century made advances in technology repeatedly showed how to use it then failed to translate that into success. I would say the RN was commanded by men who despite being brave, excellent seamen failed to grasp the importance of rigorous testing to ensure the accuracy of the expected results. For example the shells that broke on impact and the magazine explosions made worse by policies of storing powder in a turret to speed up shooting etc. The US Navy and the torpedo scandal is an example of the entire reason Submarines existed being not worth using due to a lack of real world testing. THe Germans did this as well when the Torpedo's tested in a freshwater lake literally failed to be calibrated for Sea Water.
The changes needed to make any of these decisions less damaging are not exactly difficult. I honestly don't know how a World power can call itself that if the weapons with which it plans to defend itself are not tested in all environments or against real world targets at real world ranges. It should be entirely possible to build a full Barbette on land on a range to test the magazine and firing system in combat style conditions against representative ships hulls at the distances planned and then fire off a full magazine load as if in combat and see how long before things go wrong. Yes it would be expensive I just fail to see how it would be cheaper than losing a ship.
Good delay fuzes are hard, for one. The combination of "explodes reliably" and "explodes with a delay after a large impact shock" is a pretty contradictory set of requirements, and in fact the Germans, who were the only major naval power of WW1 to have delay fuzes going in, suffered pretty significant dud rates.
The torpedo problem is in large part down to egos - it's a constant, unavoidable problem with any human organization, that people will defend the indefensible and cause problems for everyone else to protect their fragile egos.
It's also worth noting that the Royal Navy as an organization, heading into WW1, was barely a generation removed from the absolute nadir of their post-Trafalgar history. In the 1890s, they didn't have the guns, the ships, or the men. It's honestly a minor miracle the Royal Navy was able to drag itself out of that morass in time, to which tremendous credit has to go to Jackie Fisher, William White, and all the men under them.
But part of that process was that the Royal Navy was being pulled in a thousand directions at once. There was just so much to fix that things inevitably fell through the cracks, or didn't get the political backing needed to be rammed through. A lot of fire control technique and tech was left on the table due to the latter; the former is probably responsible for the shell problem.
And at the end of the day, there are just some things you don't find out until you go to sea and actually try them, land-based testing or no. The North Carolina-class' vibration problems come to mind for that.
The torpedo problem is in large part down to egos - it's a constant, unavoidable problem with any human organization, that people will defend the indefensible and cause problems for everyone else to protect their fragile egos.
It's also worth noting that the Royal Navy as an organization, heading into WW1, was barely a generation removed from the absolute nadir of their post-Trafalgar history. In the 1890s, they didn't have the guns, the ships, or the men. It's honestly a minor miracle the Royal Navy was able to drag itself out of that morass in time, to which tremendous credit has to go to Jackie Fisher, William White, and all the men under them.
But part of that process was that the Royal Navy was being pulled in a thousand directions at once. There was just so much to fix that things inevitably fell through the cracks, or didn't get the political backing needed to be rammed through. A lot of fire control technique and tech was left on the table due to the latter; the former is probably responsible for the shell problem.
And at the end of the day, there are just some things you don't find out until you go to sea and actually try them, land-based testing or no. The North Carolina-class' vibration problems come to mind for that.
Plus, there were men who knew and tried to fix issues.
Jellicoe knew about the shell problem before he was admiral and pressured the Ammo department to get their shit together.
They didn't and blew off Jellicoe who was under the impression the issue was fixed and then got the nasty surprise in 1917 that the Germans had learned the issues and was speaking about them openly in parties at ambassador balls!
Plus, whoever let Beatty remain and get promoted <Lloyd George you biatch> deserves 10 rounds to the chest
Jellicoe knew about the shell problem before he was admiral and pressured the Ammo department to get their shit together.
They didn't and blew off Jellicoe who was under the impression the issue was fixed and then got the nasty surprise in 1917 that the Germans had learned the issues and was speaking about them openly in parties at ambassador balls!
Plus, whoever let Beatty remain and get promoted <Lloyd George you biatch> deserves 10 rounds to the chest
The sale of old warships was contrary to the treaties. You couldn't go and boost a client state's navy on the cheap by selling used warships.
I mean, Beatty was a good political/administrative Admiral.
The problem was that he had seagoing command at wartime.
He did decently in the naval treaties.
My main issues there is how much did he take credit for other people like he did with Jutland? The man was corrupt and a backstabber.
Look how he and his wife treated each other or how he backstabbed Jellicoe
I made some modifications
USS Iowa (BB-3), American Semi-dreadnought battleship laid down 1895 (Engine 1905)
Displacement:
12,331 t light; 13,013 t standard; 13,596 t normal; 14,062 t full load
Dimensions: Length (overall / waterline) x beam x draught (normal/deep)
(391.00 ft / 390.00 ft) x 74.00 ft x (24.50 / 25.22 ft)
(119.18 m / 118.87 m) x 22.56 m x (7.47 / 7.69 m)
Armament:
6 - 12.00" / 305 mm 35.0 cal guns - 870.01lbs / 394.63kg shells, 80 per gun
Breech loading guns in turret on barbette mounts, 1896 Model
3 x 2-gun mounts on centreline ends, majority aft
1 raised mount aft - superfiring
6 - 8.00" / 203 mm 35.0 cal guns - 259.99lbs / 117.93kg shells, 125 per gun
Breech loading guns in turret on barbette mounts, 1889 Model
1 x Twin mount on centreline, forward deck forward
1 raised mount - superfiring
2 x Twin mounts on sides amidships
10 - 4.00" / 102 mm 40.0 cal guns - 33.00lbs / 14.97kg shells, 250 per gun
Quick firing guns in casemate mounts, 1892 Model
10 x Single mounts on sides, evenly spread
8 hull mounts in casemates- Limited use in all but light seas
8 - 0.31" / 7.8 mm 90.9 cal guns - 0.03lbs / 0.01kg shells, 1,500 per gun
Machine guns in deck mounts, 1895 Model
8 x Single mounts on sides, evenly spread
2 raised mounts
16 - 2.24" / 57.0 mm 40.0 cal guns - 6.04lbs / 2.74kg shells, 450 per gun
Quick firing guns in deck mounts, 1884 Model
16 x Single mounts on sides, evenly spread
6 raised mounts
Weight of broadside 7,207 lbs / 3,269 kg
Main Torpedoes
8 - 18.0" / 457 mm, 11.67 ft / 3.56 m torpedoes - 0.363 t each, 2.901 t total
submerged side tubes
2nd Torpedoes
24 - 18.0" / 457 mm, 11.67 ft / 3.56 m torpedoes - 0.363 t each, 8.703 t total
below water reloads
Armour:
- Belts: Width (max) Length (avg) Height (avg)
Main: 13.0" / 330 mm 253.50 ft / 77.27 m 12.00 ft / 3.66 m
Ends: 4.00" / 102 mm 136.48 ft / 41.60 m 12.00 ft / 3.66 m
Upper: 4.00" / 102 mm 253.50 ft / 77.27 m 8.00 ft / 2.44 m
Main Belt covers 100 % of normal length
- Torpedo Bulkhead - Strengthened structural bulkheads:
1.00" / 25 mm 253.50 ft / 77.27 m 22.49 ft / 6.85 m
Beam between torpedo bulkheads 70.00 ft / 21.34 m
- Gun armour: Face (max) Other gunhouse (avg) Barbette/hoist (max)
Main: 17.0" / 432 mm 5.00" / 127 mm 12.5" / 318 mm
2nd: 6.00" / 152 mm 3.00" / 76 mm 9.00" / 229 mm
3rd: 3.00" / 76 mm - -
- Armoured deck - multiple decks:
For and Aft decks: 2.10" / 53 mm
Forecastle: 2.10" / 53 mm Quarter deck: 2.10" / 53 mm
- Conning towers: Forward 10.00" / 254 mm, Aft 10.00" / 254 mm
Machinery:
Oil fired boilers, complex reciprocating steam engines,
Direct drive, 2 shafts, 11,249 ihp / 8,392 Kw = 17.01 kts
Range 5,000nm at 10.00 kts
Bunker at max displacement = 1,049 tons
Complement:
629 - 818
Cost:
£1.114 million / $4.454 million
Distribution of weights at normal displacement:
Armament: 1,156 tons, 8.5 %
- Guns: 1,140 tons, 8.4 %
- Weapons: 17 tons, 0.1 %
Armour: 5,342 tons, 39.3 %
- Belts: 2,413 tons, 17.8 %
- Torpedo bulkhead: 211 tons, 1.6 %
- Armament: 1,588 tons, 11.7 %
- Armour Deck: 884 tons, 6.5 %
- Conning Towers: 245 tons, 1.8 %
Machinery: 1,482 tons, 10.9 %
Hull, fittings & equipment: 4,190 tons, 30.8 %
Fuel, ammunition & stores: 1,265 tons, 9.3 %
Miscellaneous weights: 160 tons, 1.2 %
- Above deck: 160 tons
Overall survivability and seakeeping ability:
Survivability (Non-critical penetrating hits needed to sink ship):
17,349 lbs / 7,870 Kg = 20.1 x 12.0 " / 305 mm shells or 11.9 torpedoes
Stability (Unstable if below 1.00): 1.12
Metacentric height 3.9 ft / 1.2 m
Roll period: 15.7 seconds
Steadiness - As gun platform (Average = 50 %): 68 %
- Recoil effect (Restricted arc if above 1.00): 0.78
Seaboat quality (Average = 1.00): 1.36
Hull form characteristics:
Hull has low quarterdeck ,
a normal bow and a round stern
Block coefficient (normal/deep): 0.673 / 0.676
Length to Beam Ratio: 5.27 : 1
'Natural speed' for length: 19.75 kts
Power going to wave formation at top speed: 48 %
Trim (Max stability = 0, Max steadiness = 100): 50
Bow angle (Positive = bow angles forward): -10.00 degrees
Stern overhang: 1.00 ft / 0.30 m
Freeboard (% = length of deck as a percentage of waterline length):
Fore end, Aft end
- Forecastle: 20.00 %, 20.87 ft / 6.36 m, 15.00 ft / 4.57 m
- Forward deck: 35.00 %, 15.00 ft / 4.57 m, 14.00 ft / 4.27 m
- Aft deck: 30.00 %, 14.00 ft / 4.27 m, 14.00 ft / 4.27 m
- Quarter deck: 15.00 %, 10.00 ft / 3.05 m, 12.00 ft / 3.66 m
- Average freeboard: 14.39 ft / 4.39 m
Ship tends to be wet forward
Ship space, strength and comments:
Space - Hull below water (magazines/engines, low = better): 73.3 %
- Above water (accommodation/working, high = better): 97.6 %
Waterplane Area: 22,577 Square feet or 2,097 Square metres
Displacement factor (Displacement / loading): 105 %
Structure weight / hull surface area: 160 lbs/sq ft or 783 Kg/sq metre
Hull strength (Relative):
- Cross-sectional: 0.92
- Longitudinal: 2.18
- Overall: 1.00
Excellent machinery, storage, compartmentation space
Adequate accommodation and workspace room
Good seaboat, rides out heavy weather easily
Displacement:
12,331 t light; 13,013 t standard; 13,596 t normal; 14,062 t full load
Dimensions: Length (overall / waterline) x beam x draught (normal/deep)
(391.00 ft / 390.00 ft) x 74.00 ft x (24.50 / 25.22 ft)
(119.18 m / 118.87 m) x 22.56 m x (7.47 / 7.69 m)
Armament:
6 - 12.00" / 305 mm 35.0 cal guns - 870.01lbs / 394.63kg shells, 80 per gun
Breech loading guns in turret on barbette mounts, 1896 Model
3 x 2-gun mounts on centreline ends, majority aft
1 raised mount aft - superfiring
6 - 8.00" / 203 mm 35.0 cal guns - 259.99lbs / 117.93kg shells, 125 per gun
Breech loading guns in turret on barbette mounts, 1889 Model
1 x Twin mount on centreline, forward deck forward
1 raised mount - superfiring
2 x Twin mounts on sides amidships
10 - 4.00" / 102 mm 40.0 cal guns - 33.00lbs / 14.97kg shells, 250 per gun
Quick firing guns in casemate mounts, 1892 Model
10 x Single mounts on sides, evenly spread
8 hull mounts in casemates- Limited use in all but light seas
8 - 0.31" / 7.8 mm 90.9 cal guns - 0.03lbs / 0.01kg shells, 1,500 per gun
Machine guns in deck mounts, 1895 Model
8 x Single mounts on sides, evenly spread
2 raised mounts
16 - 2.24" / 57.0 mm 40.0 cal guns - 6.04lbs / 2.74kg shells, 450 per gun
Quick firing guns in deck mounts, 1884 Model
16 x Single mounts on sides, evenly spread
6 raised mounts
Weight of broadside 7,207 lbs / 3,269 kg
Main Torpedoes
8 - 18.0" / 457 mm, 11.67 ft / 3.56 m torpedoes - 0.363 t each, 2.901 t total
submerged side tubes
2nd Torpedoes
24 - 18.0" / 457 mm, 11.67 ft / 3.56 m torpedoes - 0.363 t each, 8.703 t total
below water reloads
Armour:
- Belts: Width (max) Length (avg) Height (avg)
Main: 13.0" / 330 mm 253.50 ft / 77.27 m 12.00 ft / 3.66 m
Ends: 4.00" / 102 mm 136.48 ft / 41.60 m 12.00 ft / 3.66 m
Upper: 4.00" / 102 mm 253.50 ft / 77.27 m 8.00 ft / 2.44 m
Main Belt covers 100 % of normal length
- Torpedo Bulkhead - Strengthened structural bulkheads:
1.00" / 25 mm 253.50 ft / 77.27 m 22.49 ft / 6.85 m
Beam between torpedo bulkheads 70.00 ft / 21.34 m
- Gun armour: Face (max) Other gunhouse (avg) Barbette/hoist (max)
Main: 17.0" / 432 mm 5.00" / 127 mm 12.5" / 318 mm
2nd: 6.00" / 152 mm 3.00" / 76 mm 9.00" / 229 mm
3rd: 3.00" / 76 mm - -
- Armoured deck - multiple decks:
For and Aft decks: 2.10" / 53 mm
Forecastle: 2.10" / 53 mm Quarter deck: 2.10" / 53 mm
- Conning towers: Forward 10.00" / 254 mm, Aft 10.00" / 254 mm
Machinery:
Oil fired boilers, complex reciprocating steam engines,
Direct drive, 2 shafts, 11,249 ihp / 8,392 Kw = 17.01 kts
Range 5,000nm at 10.00 kts
Bunker at max displacement = 1,049 tons
Complement:
629 - 818
Cost:
£1.114 million / $4.454 million
Distribution of weights at normal displacement:
Armament: 1,156 tons, 8.5 %
- Guns: 1,140 tons, 8.4 %
- Weapons: 17 tons, 0.1 %
Armour: 5,342 tons, 39.3 %
- Belts: 2,413 tons, 17.8 %
- Torpedo bulkhead: 211 tons, 1.6 %
- Armament: 1,588 tons, 11.7 %
- Armour Deck: 884 tons, 6.5 %
- Conning Towers: 245 tons, 1.8 %
Machinery: 1,482 tons, 10.9 %
Hull, fittings & equipment: 4,190 tons, 30.8 %
Fuel, ammunition & stores: 1,265 tons, 9.3 %
Miscellaneous weights: 160 tons, 1.2 %
- Above deck: 160 tons
Overall survivability and seakeeping ability:
Survivability (Non-critical penetrating hits needed to sink ship):
17,349 lbs / 7,870 Kg = 20.1 x 12.0 " / 305 mm shells or 11.9 torpedoes
Stability (Unstable if below 1.00): 1.12
Metacentric height 3.9 ft / 1.2 m
Roll period: 15.7 seconds
Steadiness - As gun platform (Average = 50 %): 68 %
- Recoil effect (Restricted arc if above 1.00): 0.78
Seaboat quality (Average = 1.00): 1.36
Hull form characteristics:
Hull has low quarterdeck ,
a normal bow and a round stern
Block coefficient (normal/deep): 0.673 / 0.676
Length to Beam Ratio: 5.27 : 1
'Natural speed' for length: 19.75 kts
Power going to wave formation at top speed: 48 %
Trim (Max stability = 0, Max steadiness = 100): 50
Bow angle (Positive = bow angles forward): -10.00 degrees
Stern overhang: 1.00 ft / 0.30 m
Freeboard (% = length of deck as a percentage of waterline length):
Fore end, Aft end
- Forecastle: 20.00 %, 20.87 ft / 6.36 m, 15.00 ft / 4.57 m
- Forward deck: 35.00 %, 15.00 ft / 4.57 m, 14.00 ft / 4.27 m
- Aft deck: 30.00 %, 14.00 ft / 4.27 m, 14.00 ft / 4.27 m
- Quarter deck: 15.00 %, 10.00 ft / 3.05 m, 12.00 ft / 3.66 m
- Average freeboard: 14.39 ft / 4.39 m
Ship tends to be wet forward
Ship space, strength and comments:
Space - Hull below water (magazines/engines, low = better): 73.3 %
- Above water (accommodation/working, high = better): 97.6 %
Waterplane Area: 22,577 Square feet or 2,097 Square metres
Displacement factor (Displacement / loading): 105 %
Structure weight / hull surface area: 160 lbs/sq ft or 783 Kg/sq metre
Hull strength (Relative):
- Cross-sectional: 0.92
- Longitudinal: 2.18
- Overall: 1.00
Excellent machinery, storage, compartmentation space
Adequate accommodation and workspace room
Good seaboat, rides out heavy weather easily
There's also the inclusion of 18" Whitehead-style torpedoes - presumably an American equivalent, given the timeline, and likely using gyroscopic guidance in addition to its onboard air-flask propulsion. The end result would likely be rather terrifying in its own right for European powers - already, America's large ships have demonstrated the ability to hit targets at absurd ranges with their heavy guns, and now their light ships can hit you with torpedoes that might as well draw a straight line to the target while being just as fast with just as long a range as the best British torpedoes.
The torpedo bulkhead is a big "maybe" - and even then, it's more "well, let's just overbuild this a bit" than deliberate protection against torpedoes.
The problem for the RN was that from Trafalgar in 1805 until the USN started building a proper ocean going fleet in the late 1800s/early 1900s they almost literally have no competitors on Earth. They didn't have to try, just the threat of them turning up was enough to make other nations give up. The early USN gave them a few problems in the 1812 era but that was against a few frigates not the whole RN battlefleet and no-one else even bothered to try until the Germans over a century later, Because of that, they had very little real world experience of fighting a naval battle outside of naval exercises where they couldn't find out about problems with shells since they couldn't fire live ammunition at each other.
The problem with building targets on land is that there is absolutely nowhere in the UK where you could build a range for 12''/13.5'/15'' shells with targets on land - the danger area for a standard firing range now with 5.56mm and 7.62mm ammunition with an effective range of 600m is measured in square kilometres, god alone knows what you'd need for a 15'' gun with a range of nearly 30,000 yards and you couldn't have a single building, farmer's field or road between the gun and the target or in the danger area behind the target.
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They have an entire Empire available and Scotland has entire valleys with nothing present beside grass and sheep.
Well, one option which immediately springs to mind would be something akin to a modern SINKEX, ie., expending old ships only good for being towed and scrapping as targets to see what your latest and greatest weapons do to them. Sure, it's not going to give you perfect data, but it will tell you if your shells are liable to shatter on encountering anything resembling serious resistance.
Those sheep belong to someone, who would probably rather their livestock, house, wife and children weren't obliterated by a 15'' shell.
I don't think anyone was doing that before the WW2 era, were they?