Alternate space shuttles

The problem here, on the other hand, is that a new reusable launch vehicle just isn't going to be cheaper than an ELV (EELV was still twenty years in the future at this point) unless you have a high flight rate, which means that it has to have all of the payloads shunted over to it for it to make economic sense. That's what Randy keeps bringing up. If you have just NASA and commercial payloads, the cost of fixed infrastructure probably eats up any costs savings relative to Titan or similar vehicles.

It's worse than that - the Shuttle could not have made launch costs cheap enough to justify its development costs even if it captured all existing US launches. That's why NASA basically pulled the claim out of the air that if the got to build the shuttle, demand would grow by something like 25% or more and give the shuttle enough payload to fly often enough to pay off its design costs within the program lifetime.

But what we really need is ATL arguments and political/institutional conditions that are different. If I understand you correctly, you are saying NASA got its way much more than their public presentation leads one to believe. What they really wanted would have cost even more and perhaps was not technically possible; by being pinned down with some serious development funding constraints, what they traded off in their compromises with OMB were not technical capabilities but what was hoped to make their desired Orbiter also cost-effective. By observing which things they fought to keep and which to give up, we can see that in truth they didn't prioritize cost-effectiveness in launch very highly. No matter how you glad-hand it and learn to say it in a really over the top William Shatner voice, "We'll put 20 tonnes into orbit for cheaper than any man has before!" does not have the inspiring ring that "we'll put some astronauts on Mars!" does. No one at NASA cared about the goal of making access to space cheaper. They cared about doing it and presumed whether it cost millions, billions or trillions, they'd hit the taxpayer up for it and get it.

I think the decision makers at NASA were really drinking their own coolaid. If even the heavily compromised TAOS shuttle had launched with the envisioned flight rates, it would have paid off.

fasquardon
 
Randy, I appreciate your take on the reality of the "Shuttle Decision" as you perceive it, and persuasively make a case for. It helps reframe the discussion here.

I'm trying, no really, my wife say's I'm VERY trying actually :)
And thank you :)

All of us can put up "sketches" (in my case really numerical tables) of an ATL hardware configuration we might prefer. It is harder to put economic numbers on these projects--how much it would cost to develop and test, how much per launch to deploy. That's harder than making a gallery of hardware descriptions but it is the same kind of thing if one can get the basic data.

But we all know a picture is worth a thousand words, which leads to wondering what the ratio to pictures/words/figures actually is? ;)

But what we really need is ATL arguments and political/institutional conditions that are different. If I understand you correctly, you are saying NASA got its way much more than their public presentation leads one to believe. What they really wanted would have cost even more and perhaps was not technically possible; by being pinned down with some serious development funding constraints, what they traded off in their compromises with OMB were not technical capabilities but what was hoped to make their desired Orbiter also cost-effective. By observing which things they fought to keep and which to give up, we can see that in truth they didn't prioritize cost-effectiveness in launch very highly. No matter how you glad-hand it and learn to say it in a really over the top William Shatner voice, "We'll put 20 tonnes into orbit for cheaper than any man has before!" does not have the inspiring ring that "we'll put some astronauts on Mars!" does. No one at NASA cared about the goal of making access to space cheaper. They cared about doing it and presumed whether it cost millions, billions or trillions, they'd hit the taxpayer up for it and get it.

One of the points I've tried to make in several discussions is that NASA was in fact "not wrong" on the point they'd get the money if they waited for it. Granted it was never "another Apollo" but in a very general sense any time they came up short they simply took it for granted that someone would step in and save things. Along with the 'anything less than -x- means it is a failure' seems to be a couple of forgone conclusions on any project they start. And in the end it seems to have significantly backfired in that a the present time they don't even have either political or internal support for actually keeping manned spaceflight alive which was the point of the whole post-Apollo exercise in the first place...

This is perverse in a way--for if one does want missions to Mars, or Titan, or to set up a growing town on the Moon, it matters how much it costs to launch a tonne into low Earth orbit. Lowering that cost furthers all other goals. They ought to have cared. But they didn't.

"Waste anything but time" is very difficult mode to get out of and at the point in time being discussed there was really no incentive to actually make 'space launch' cheap despite the rhetoric. And maybe the worst issue at the time was that there was an actual public uptick in WANTING cheaper access to space which NASA rode on but had no intention of actually servicing. (Not that Congress was going to let them if they had they actually wanted to...)

Now this makes me wonder if we should mentally turn to the 1971 "Shuttle Decision" era and ask, what sort of conditions would it take so that Nixon, or someone in an impressive position in the chain of command between him and the NASA brass, could have conceived of the problem in terms like this:

"NASA has over the past decade grown up to become an institution with much to lose, and Congress will not fund what they have always done and still hope to do. Meanwhile putting things into space is expensive. NASA we can just shut down but we don't want to because it would make a big stink, but anyway we can tell them how much money to play with. But we still need spy sats, and the Air Force needs money to launch them. We want weather sats and survey sats, and they cost money to put up. Business is discovering they can make money with comsats and paying for those is their problem not the government's, but it sure is useful to the government to have these satellites to use, and the cheaper they can launch them, the bigger business the comsat biz will be. It would be good for the country to have more of it, stronger economy, higher tax revenues, and very good for our party if they credit us for making it possible. Strange to say, the NASA geeks ought to care about a cheaper launch system for themselves but it just does not grab them. They say they care but what they really want is a fancy new spaceship. We, the Nixon administration, have the job of convincing these geeks that what they should be doing for their next big thing is making a cheaper launch system; since they really do not care about that we have to trick them into caring!"

The conditions required is the Administration, (and probably Congress as well if not the public in general) to care as well which is a really, really sell all around. In essence Nixon DID task NASA with making space access cheaper and more accessible but in not allowing NASA a visible and viable 'reason' to actually pursue that goal gave NASA no incentive to actually carry out the task.

I'm thinking along lines of, NASA wants its deep space crewed agenda. The deal is, they get to have some space station funding they can brag will be for going to Mars, and some other funding for the spaceship to carry people there and back (to the station!) if they will buckle down and focus mainly for now on the means of getting up there and getting all their heavy stuff they will need up into space more cheaply.. Part of it is incentives set up--a fixed budget for the station ops and development of deep space capabilities, but set to be very frugal, painfully so, at EELV launch prices--but if they can make a system that launches for significantly cheaper, they can pool the savings from the launch costs into more orbital hardware instead. The incentives are set up to make delivery of an improved launch system, with the metric being cost per launch, sooner better for them. It is made clear that if they do not make serious efforts to make a cost-effective system for putting mass in to orbit, the whole deal is off and the agency will be scaled back drastically, but if they cooperate nicely there will be good will for raising their budget and that any contributions they make toward lowering launch prices will be considered when it is budget time--saving money on DoD and NOAA launches is sort of money they can point to and claim credit for.

Note that NASA continually brought up "Mars" as the "end goal" of almost anything they were planning and made no bones about it despite Congress' steadfast disapproval of any such planning. And that has continued to today in that anytime something has a 'applicability' to Mars Congress will tend to line-item defund the program to prevent NASA from moving forward on that goal. Actually I agree that NASA should have pushed a station AND an economical 'shuttle' to service it as a post-Apollo program but they should have gotten the hint about laying off the Mars talk. Unfortunately they couldn't either institutionally or culturally and that puts any program immediately at loggerheads with Congress.

And also unfortunately in government budgeting, particularly at that time, any 'savings' from ones budget simply was seen as meaning you didn't actually NEED as much money as you were getting and was a clue for Congress to cut that obvious 'fat' from your budget NEXT year. Further NASA had been "trained" during Apollo that the "program of record" got any and all surplus funding while other programs were given what was left and used to supplement the PoR when shortfalls happened. They proved adept over they years in taking any 'funding surplus' and pouring it into the PoR rather than using it to spend on other programs. So if they'd been given such leeway I would assume given the history that they would have made the "Mars/Interplanetary" mission the PoR and short funded both the station and shuttle to pay for it and 'assumed' they would get any shortfalls paid for when they came up since they would take any such 'offers' as validation of the goal of landing men on Mars rather than making access cheaper.

OtOH no nonsense about being given a monopoly on launches. For now, until they deliver a real system that saves serious money versus EELV, the Air Force will get all the Titans they ask for because nothing more cost effective exists at the moment. Their goal is to beat the Titan price by a high margin. There is no promise the Air Force will be forced to use their new system--but if it is a lot cheaper they'll look bad if they don't, and in the interest of doing more with less of the taxpayer's dollars, they ought to jump at the chance to use a cheaper launch system. So it is up to NASA to make it cheap, make it better, make it attractive--and make it soon.

As noted the whole economic reasoning rests on having a high flight rate which you can't get without a mandated monopoly, it was the whole underpinning of the concept. And the Air Force was shocked to find out that is what they were actually supporting by 'agreeing' to the Shuttle and why they never fully supported the program. Titan was 'cheaper' by OMB accounting but even so it rested on a flight rate that at the time was being reduced and frankly the Titan-III was getting more expensive as the flight rate went down. (Titan-IV was expensive from the start because it had such a low flight rate AND had to swallow the Titan assembly line re-start costs as well) And the Air Force was never in the business of or habit of using or buying 'cheap' anything since they were driven by operations and access not cost. In theory they could (and would in many cases) the most cost effective transportation available but the main driver is always the ability to launch WHEN they need it rather than cost which is why they quickly got permission to switch to the Titan-IV, (and later EELV) after Challenger.

And as Workable Goblin points out there has never been an incentive for any level of government to actually work on cheaper access to space. Access is needed but cost is not, and has not been an issue despite it being SAID it was on more than one occasion.

Randy
 
I think a better PoD for a "better" post-Apollo (that is, '70s and beyond) space program is to go back in time and fiddle around in the early days. Once upon a time I might have advocated for an "America goes first" PoD where for some reason or another Sputnik is launched after Vanguard, so the space race is aborted before it begins. Then, obviously, there's not the distortion of the Apollo program and the submerged belief that all NASA needs to do is wait for the right President to come along and give an amazing speech and they'll have all the money they need to do anything they want. However, I'm not so sure about that now, because it will tend to not lead to NASA existing and therefore space will be largely in the hands of relatively disinterested generals (I still disagree with Randy about the actual influence of the space people in the Air Force; most of "their" proposals haven't actually gone anywhere, after all), as in Kolyma's Shadow. That strikes me as a situation where you're even more likely to get a stagnation than IOTL, with little force on either the governmental or private sides to really do very much in space. Interesting, in its way, but not really exciting.

Right now, I'm instead interested in a PoD where Shepard goes up before Gagarin, which takes some of the air out of the Space Race; there's no big "We have to go to the Moon" speech because, after all, an American did go into space (not orbit, but we'll ignore that little detail) first, and so the whole thing just peters out over the course of the 1960s as the "easy" firsts are consumed, with no one ultimately bothering to do even a circumlunar flight, much less a moon landing. Instead, the competition ends up being more topsy-turvy over things like "first multi-crew capsule" and "first crewed docking" and "first space station (even if it's really not)". Thus, even though there's no Apollo distortion (though there is an Apollo), there's still an independent civilian space agency that is going to want to go out and explore space. And without Apollo, they're more likely to believe in limited but stable budgets, therefore there's more internal demand for low-cost launch even if it doesn't mean people are onboard. Combine that and the growing commercial interest, at the time, in space, and there will probably be some interest by the 1970s in building a cheaper launch vehicle. Thus, Shuttle. And spaceplanes and reusability are an eternal siren in the quest for cheap launch...

Shepard's flight is actually an easy and plausible PoD since it was only Von Braun's concerns about anomalies on Ham's flight that pushed Shepard's launch back. Eisenhower's 'ploy' to allow the Soviet's to go first is pretty firmly established even if the actual 'evidence' is lacking so accelerating Vanguard, (or the less plausible giving Von Braun the go-ahead for Project Orbiter) is difficult at best. (Unless you replace Eisenhower or fundamentally change the nature of the American rocket program which takes a FAR earlier PoD) And as noted without the "Sputnik panic" NASA is far less likely to exist. Arguably a better and more evenly managed ARPA might accomplish the job but arguably, (as you do :) ) not as well.

On the gripping hand of course once you have 'some' sort of space activity, especially manned activity fairly early on there is an internal pressure to keep things going even in the face of some 'obviously' superior automation. For example if you have a 'space station' of any relevance and/or a space tug moving satellites around then the actual 'leap' to manned operations in Cis-Lunar space are actually a lot more cost effective than one would think. (Again the Apollo program has skewed a lot of the perspective here) And said manned operations would tend to have more effect as incentive towards low cost access as well. While there are a whole host of other factors, (the Vietnam war for example) that are not directly related but have carry over effects to the space program in general once started I believe it does in fact have pressure. If not the 'inevitable new frontier' we space fans might like to assume :)

Randy
 

Archibald

Banned
It's worse than that - the Shuttle could not have made launch costs cheap enough to justify its development costs even if it captured all existing US launches. That's why NASA basically pulled the claim out of the air that if the got to build the shuttle, demand would grow by something like 25% or more and give the shuttle enough payload to fly often enough to pay off its design costs within the program lifetime.

I think the decision makers at NASA were really drinking their own coolaid. If even the heavily compromised TAOS shuttle had launched with the envisioned flight rates, it would have paid off.

fasquardon

at some point around 1980 or so NASA cut the flight rate to 24 launches annually. which was still far too much for the TAOS (OTL 1996: 8 launches. That was the real flight rate). By 1985 they were charging ahead. 1987 or 1988 flight rates was to get near 24.

they managed to launch 11 times in 1984-85. according to astronaut Mike Mullane, shortage of spares, manpower were glaring.

https://books.google.fr/books?id=Rp...&q="riding rockets""smell of alcohol"&f=false
 
Shepard's flight is actually an easy and plausible PoD since it was only Von Braun's concerns about anomalies on Ham's flight that pushed Shepard's launch back.
Oh yeah, obviously. That's why I chose it! Just have MR-2 go smoothly, von Braun signs off on Shepard going up on the next one, and bang, Alan Shepard is the first man in space, three weeks before Yuri Gagarin.

Eisenhower's 'ploy' to allow the Soviet's to go first is pretty firmly established even if the actual 'evidence' is lacking so accelerating Vanguard, (or the less plausible giving Von Braun the go-ahead for Project Orbiter) is difficult at best.
Well, my thinking for a "Vanguard-goes-first" scenario is to slow down the Soviet side rather than accelerating the Americans. Basically, have them (even) less interested in launching satellites, considering it a distraction from building ICBMs, so there's just not really any competition for Vanguard. Even with as little support as they had IOTL, the NRL is going to figure out how to launch a satellite into orbit eventually, after all. Eisenhower can only do so much...

On the gripping hand of course once you have 'some' sort of space activity, especially manned activity fairly early on there is an internal pressure to keep things going even in the face of some 'obviously' superior automation.
Well, yeah, that's sort of the point. First country to launch a man into space can't give up crewed spaceflight after all! ;)

For example if you have a 'space station' of any relevance and/or a space tug moving satellites around then the actual 'leap' to manned operations in Cis-Lunar space are actually a lot more cost effective than one would think.
Maybe, but I would still guesstimate hundreds of millions to maybe 1-2 billion dollars in "start-up costs," whether that's for building a modified capsule for the circumlunar mission (a la Zond) or creating a refueling facility for upper stages or what not. I find it quite plausible that in the late 1960s environment both the Soviets and the United States will decide that they're just not that interested in spending that money when they could be spending money on more immediate, pressing needs. Basically the victory of the Mondales and the Proxmires, in both countries.

NASA at this point is used to working on a fixed budget, but they do still want to go to the Moon and Mars--they've got aerospace engineers, after all. So they see that they're going to need to get costs down in order to actually do any of that, and so turn towards reusability. Their ultimate goal is still a TSTO hydrolox spaceplane, just because in my reading is that this was sort of the zeitgeist of the era, but they realize, thanks to their fixed budget and wide range of responsibilities (carrying out orbital missions, launching Spacelab space stations, launching lunar probes, exploring the planets, etc.) that they can't afford to go there directly. So they come up with a phased plan: first they're going to build a reusable first stage to replace the S-IB on the Saturn IB (their main LV, I would guess, since they don't have the Saturn V and the Air Force is probably pretty jealous of their Titans), then they're going to build a reusable spaceplane to replace Apollo and gain experience with spaceplane operations, then they're going to develop a hydrolox version of the first stage, and finally they're going to develop the reusable upper stage and get to their goal. All very nice on paper, so they get support from Congress...

From there, I guess it would probably end up looking a lot like Right Side Up, but with a smaller first stage and so less payload overall. Perhaps 10 tons to LEO instead of 30? Obviously I haven't run the numbers, you might (probably) would end up needing to make quite a few adjustments to make everything work properly.
 
Hi all!

Over on this thread, as I have on several others while this one existed, I have posted some stuff that to an extent arguably belongs more here than there, since it is about the general philosophy of the debate between the expendable versus reusable schools of thought. I have been reacting to the argument that reusables face recurring costs of the kind that are fixed costs that must be amortized by frequent launches and are therefore at a disadvantage to expendables. To turn this around with equivalent meaning--Expendables do not have the fixed costs that must be amortized by reusable systems.

This to me seems like a lapse in logic. It is plain to me that reuse does bring with it additional costs, some of which involve fixed annual costs that must be amortized. Well and good, in that sense the difference does exist. But the argument overlooks that expendables too share many of the fixed costs that reusables must face, but the case is only made verbally that the reusable system must pay them off cheaply or not at all, while the expendable operators simply collect however much they need to keep operating--people pay their amortization at whatever rate the launch providers demand and do not complain about it.

Below I quote the relevant generalities in my last post there, without quote format because they are after all my own words, and I think they belong here as well as there:

The real genesis{of a sketch of a Shuttle pressure fed LRB of ridiculously high dry mass) is in trying to answer the challenge that says, hur hur, you can't have reusable work because the volume of demand to amortize the fixed costs (which are assumed, in a hiatus of logic, to be essentially much higher than those of an expendable) will not be there! So the idea is to lower the cost of refurbishment with ultra simple and durable items that do not require tremendous fixed costs.

Also there is a tendency to attribute costs to a reusable system that either should not be charged to its launches or if they should, should be charged to and inflate the launch prices of the expendables.

I mean look, three families come to mind first when naming American expendables, especially of the period between Shuttle Decision and 1990 or so when apparently the will to make Shuttle a step forward had largely evaporated. Titan, Atlas, Delta. Every single one of them was not only derived in design from the military ICBM--Delta being a development of the interim Thor IRBM--but a very large percentage of the actual launch items had previously been in military inventory as a weapon! I don't know just at what point Deltas for instance stopped using legacy Thor stages they had been given as surplus by the Air Force. I know that when Martin or whatever corporate incarnation had inherited the Titans by then ran out of old Air Force ICBMs for their launchers, they took out a clean sheet of paper and at last designed a core first stage directly for the launcher mission, and used ker-lox to fuel it again. I suppose by then Delta had done the same, and Atlas, which abandoned the old balloon tank concept.

Each one of these "economical" boosters then enjoyed a tremendous degree of taxpayer subsidy, in terms of hardware itself, in terms of design, in terms of developing the whole American rocket industry. How can we make reasonable economic comparisons, and then draw sage and final conclusions about what is and is not economical?

What we need is a parallel universe where the entire launch industry grew up from commercial concerns with no military and no national science bureaucracy to backstop them, where the first satellite up had a revenue-earning intention, if only to assure investors that the next satellites after the early test articles would be feasible and would have such value.

Then we could examine what they did and draw conclusions about what is and is not economical.
 
This to me seems like a lapse in logic. It is plain to me that reuse does bring with it additional costs, some of which involve fixed annual costs that must be amortized. Well and good, in that sense the difference does exist. But the argument overlooks that expendables too share many of the fixed costs that reusables must face, but the case is only made verbally that the reusable system must pay them off cheaply or not at all, while the expendable operators simply collect however much they need to keep operating--people pay their amortization at whatever rate the launch providers demand and do not complain about it.
The reason that the reusable system has to "pay off" its costs whereas the expendable systems don't is that in 1970 the expendable systems already exist and the reusable systems don't. This means that using the reusable system is not simply a matter of ordering a flight from SpaceX instead of ULA, it is a matter of spending billions of dollars on developing and operating a new reusable rocket, which everyone agreed was going to be very expensive, versus buying new launches. If the matrix of expected number of flights times per-launch costs doesn't come out low enough for the reusable rocket relative to the expendable rocket, then it makes no financial sense to buy the reusable, because you can launch all of your payloads on expendables for fewer dollars than it would cost to develop and operate the reusable rocket, even if it works out to be cheaper per-flight. You might induce more demand from cheaper launches, true, or you might not, so you can hardly count on that the way NASA actually did.

You could argue differently in, say, 1950, since no launch vehicles of either type existed yet. Then both sides would have required major development and construction expenses. Still, given that the number of payloads that could be expected was also relatively small, and given that everyone agreed that reusable vehicles would be more expensive to develop than expendables, it's not clear whether reusables would make economic sense even then. Of course, expendables would also benefit from "free money" coming from outside any space program, as you point out below, which may make them more sensible when considering the budget of the space program by itself.

EDIT: I might add that in this respect what SpaceX did was rather clever, because it incrementally developed the existing expendable system into being reusable rather than attempting a "big bang" full-scale development of a new reusable system from scratch. This is something that, to my knowledge, had not been proposed before, and it really helps address the above issue because it reduces development costs significantly.

I mean look, three families come to mind first when naming American expendables, especially of the period between Shuttle Decision and 1990 or so when apparently the will to make Shuttle a step forward had largely evaporated. Titan, Atlas, Delta. Every single one of them was not only derived in design from the military ICBM--Delta being a development of the interim Thor IRBM--but a very large percentage of the actual launch items had previously been in military inventory as a weapon! I don't know just at what point Deltas for instance stopped using legacy Thor stages they had been given as surplus by the Air Force. I know that when Martin or whatever corporate incarnation had inherited the Titans by then ran out of old Air Force ICBMs for their launchers, they took out a clean sheet of paper and at last designed a core first stage directly for the launcher mission, and used ker-lox to fuel it again. I suppose by then Delta had done the same, and Atlas, which abandoned the old balloon tank concept.

Each one of these "economical" boosters then enjoyed a tremendous degree of taxpayer subsidy, in terms of hardware itself, in terms of design, in terms of developing the whole American rocket industry. How can we make reasonable economic comparisons, and then draw sage and final conclusions about what is and is not economical?
Quite easily, because those taxpayer subsidies are sunk costs; the costs of development have been paid for by the government, true, but that was in the past, and the question now is what to do going forwards. If the future cost of using the expendables is less than the cost of developing and operating the reusable system, then it doesn't make any financial sense to go reusable. Even if the sunk costs haven't been paid for, if they're going to be paid for regardless of what the space program does then it still is effective free money that doesn't need to be considered in the analysis of what is most economic for the space program to spend its money on. The overall cost may still be lower for just using the expendables than for also developing the reusables, even if the latter is much cheaper, because you still end up spending all the development money on both the expendables and reusables in the latter case, instead of just the reusables.

More relevantly for Shuttle, the taxpayer was going to be paying for the vehicles either way; the question was, as I said, whether to spend billions of taxpayer dollars developing Shuttle, or billions buying existing rockets. It didn't much matter to the OMB, nor should it have, really, whether that expendable money was going towards modifying surplus ICBM/IRBM stages or towards building new stages, only whether it would be cheaper for the taxpayer than building new vehicles.
 
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you can't have reusable work because the volume of demand to amortize the fixed costs (which are assumed, in a hiatus of logic, to be essentially much higher than those of an expendable) will not be there!

But the expendable stages these studies were comparing the Shuttle to were already paid for.

The cost of developing an entirely new expendable rocket in the same class of the Titan IV and Shuttle would have been almost as technologically risky and almost as expensive as the Shuttle. No surprise then that even the Atlas V and Delta IV drew heavily on previous designs.

Each one of these "economical" boosters then enjoyed a tremendous degree of taxpayer subsidy, in terms of hardware itself, in terms of design, in terms of developing the whole American rocket industry. How can we make reasonable economic comparisons, and then draw sage and final conclusions about what is and is not economical?

What we need is a parallel universe where the entire launch industry grew up from commercial concerns with no military and no national science bureaucracy to backstop them, where the first satellite up had a revenue-earning intention, if only to assure investors that the next satellites after the early test articles would be feasible and would have such value.

Then we could examine what they did and draw conclusions about what is and is not economical.

The taxpayer paid for Atlas, Titan and Thor (as well as Centaur - originally intended to be a stand-off missile for bombers, the solid stages for the Scout LV and pretty much every solid rocket booster save the Shuttle SRBs and the Titan IV GEMs) because the US government wanted weapons delivery systems. The companies involved in building and developing these machines were actually being paid for services rendered, while one can argue the efficiency and whether some of these weapons were really necessary, I don't think it is correct to call the spending a "subsidy" (which, speaking with my economist hat on, gets overused to refer to "spending I don't like" far too often). Those delivery systems happened to be very close to what was needed for space launch and only needed relatively modest tweaks to make LVs out of them. In such a case, I don't see how either side of the rocket business (the weapon and non-weapon side) made poor economic decisions.

And in this parallel universe, I suspect that the first LV would have looked like the OTRAG rocket, so payloads would have been small and the rockets would have been relatively simple and cheap.

EDIT: I might add that in this respect what SpaceX did was rather clever, because it incrementally developed the existing expendable system into being reusable rather than attempting a "big bang" full-scale development of a new reusable system from scratch. This is something that, to my knowledge, had not been proposed before, and it really helps address the above issue because it reduces development costs significantly.

The Soviets intended to do the same thing with Zenit and Energia and there was at least a little discussion of doing the same sort of thing with the next generations of the Saturn IC.

at some point around 1980 or so NASA cut the flight rate to 24 launches annually. which was still far too much for the TAOS (OTL 1996: 8 launches. That was the real flight rate). By 1985 they were charging ahead. 1987 or 1988 flight rates was to get near 24.

they managed to launch 11 times in 1984-85. according to astronaut Mike Mullane, shortage of spares, manpower were glaring.

Right. And NASA was envisioning something around 60 launches a year (at a conservative estimate). In 1970, the US was actually making something like 40 launches a year (most on smaller rockets like the Scout and the Delta) and this has mostly fallen since. 2016 was a busy year for the US and there were 21 launches of all types - in 2012 the US made only 13 launches.

And it is amazing looking at the difference that even managing 12 launches/year would have had on the Shuttle's economics. It would have required another orbiter (and thus more money spent overall) to do safely, but NASA's fixed costs would have been used far more effectively in such a scenario. In a situation where the US is launching more into space, the Shuttle's investment pays off more. Of course, the problem is to imagine a scenario where the US would want to launch so much more into orbit. Perhaps if the US got into a race building big space stations with a surviving Soviet Union? Or maybe a situation where the US decides to build a test SPS in orbit.

____

So here's a question for you guys:

If the Shuttle had been seen as a "scientific vehicle" rather than a commercial truck and then a failure, would there have been more support for trying incremental improvements to the Shuttle system? IMO this depends on Congress being convinced to fund tests and improvements to the Shuttle, and I am curious if a change in branding would have helped in this regard.

fasquardon
 
Workable Goblin wrote;
Oh yeah, obviously. That's why I chose it! Just have MR-2 go smoothly, von Braun signs off on Shepard going up on the next one, and bang, Alan Shepard is the first man in space, three weeks before Yuri Gagarin.

And as you noted despite it being only a 'sub-orbital' flight that won't stop the US from crowing about their 'first' long and loud :) Unfortunately we're still 'stuck' with the shortcomings, (and there are a LOT of them) of the Mercury spacecraft and the short-sighted nature of the program itself.

Well, my thinking for a "Vanguard-goes-first" scenario is to slow down the Soviet side rather than accelerating the Americans. Basically, have them (even) less interested in launching satellites, considering it a distraction from building ICBMs, so there's just not really any competition for Vanguard. Even with as little support as they had IOTL, the NRL is going to figure out how to launch a satellite into orbit eventually, after all. Eisenhower can only do so much...

The issue would be that the military/politburo had directly promised Korolev he could launch a satellite, (it was obvious the R-7 could do so and the military WAS interested in the possibility of spy sats if not manned observation) the minute the R7 went "operationally" on-line. So you'd have to delay THAT which brings up its own issues...

One of the main reasons Eisenhower choose Vanguard was specifically because it could in no way be used as a 'weapon' where as Von Braun's "Project Orbiter" was obviously based on a modified military missile. It was a surprise to everyone, (including NRL!) that in fact the more advanced and 'easier' Army proposal was not chosen. The Jupiter-C was already flying with everything needed to send up a satellite being used to test reentry nose cones but the OTHER reason Ike didn't want the Army project was the fact Von Braun was in charge. Add in the Air Force had the ear of the SoD (who was trying to kill the Army missile program anyway) and was proclaiming that it was ITS job to launch any satellites anyway...

There is almost 5 months between OTL Sputnik-1 and Vanguard-1 so it's possible that given a sufficient delay to Sputnik Vanguard could get there first but I would wonder if being 'beaten' in an unannounced 'race' would not lead the Soviets to simply go to their 'default' mode of "we weren't racing in the first place" as they did for the Moon? And frankly if the US DOES get there first there would be little notice, (we fully expected to be first which is why Sputnik and then Gagarin was so much of a panic) and frankly little support for an expanded program from that point. ARPA came about because of Sputnik and very rapidly due to Eisenhower's dislike of the idea of a "military" Space Race, (and Johnson's need to make political hay AND siphon some funding towards the South and Texas in particular) NASA followed in order to 'address' that shame/panic. If the US goes first it is very likely one or either of those 'responses' don't come about.

Maybe, but I would still guesstimate hundreds of millions to maybe 1-2 billion dollars in "start-up costs," whether that's for building a modified capsule for the circumlunar mission (a la Zond) or creating a refueling facility for upper stages or what not. I find it quite plausible that in the late 1960s environment both the Soviets and the United States will decide that they're just not that interested in spending that money when they could be spending money on more immediate, pressing needs. Basically the victory of the Mondales and the Proxmires, in both countries.

As you say "maybe" :) It greatly depends on a number of very early decision trees and what is planned and funded. I've argued this many times on NSF that the most 'obvious' way to do things in space is pretty obviously based on how we do things TODAY which is not at all what was thought to be the most direct path at the start of the space age. And a lot of what we do today is directly based on getting to certain goals quickly with no regard to cost or resources involved.

You 'guesstimate' a couple of billion dollars to move manned operations from LEO to Cis-Lunar space but really the very conservative original concept of Apollo, (without the Kennedy less-than-a-decade deadline and budget) was to meet both LEO and Cis-Lunar goals with only 'some' modification within a budget of about that amount. And then there's the early planning for a 'space tug' to move satellites around that would be reusable and would be refurbished on-orbit. Currently a significant amount of money is spent on satellites to ensure backup and redundant systems since once on-orbit it can't be serviced or repaired. Early planning assumed that servicing and repair would be a requirement and while vacuum tubes gave way to solid state electronics which reduced the need if the requirement had been built into the overall system itself...

NASA at this point is used to working on a fixed budget, but they do still want to go to the Moon and Mars--they've got aerospace engineers, after all.

Note that Von Braun in 1952 and again in 1955 was accused of being "wildly optimistic" to expect men on the Moon in the 70s and Mars by the next century! Most assumed it would take much longer than that to happen :) RHH really had it right when he noted that getting to orbit is "half way to anywhere" and the main question is how you get from orbit to the destination. Early on they didn't see any way but nuclear energy but it soon became apparent that there were in fact other ways but the all-important factor is how you planned it from where you are NOW to where you want to be...

So they see that they're going to need to get costs down in order to actually do any of that, and so turn towards reusability. Their ultimate goal is still a TSTO hydrolox spaceplane, just because in my reading is that this was sort of the zeitgeist of the era, but they realize, thanks to their fixed budget and wide range of responsibilities (carrying out orbital missions, launching Spacelab space stations, launching lunar probes, exploring the planets, etc.) that they can't afford to go there directly. So they come up with a phased plan: first they're going to build a reusable first stage to replace the S-IB on the Saturn IB (their main LV, I would guess, since they don't have the Saturn V and the Air Force is probably pretty jealous of their Titans), then they're going to build a reusable spaceplane to replace Apollo and gain experience with spaceplane operations, then they're going to develop a hydrolox version of the first stage, and finally they're going to develop the reusable upper stage and get to their goal. All very nice on paper, so they get support from Congress...

As you say the zeitgeist of the time is compelling, but we have historical evidence that they can change their minds if given the right incentive. Frankly I'm rather surprised that the fixation of 'pure' hydrolox lasted as long as it did. Granted it looked great on paper, (then again so did FLOX and boron compounds for jet engines but I digress :) ) and the mantra "just wait till we have hydrogen engines!" was all the rage but the rather obvious operational issues that everyone was aware of by the mid-60s should have been telling. Then again, at that time money was no issue so...

If the flight rate is higher, (as NASA and the Air Force originally planned it to be) then it makes sense they want to reduce the cost. Or course we already are aware there's two ways to do that; Reusability and/or dirt-cheap rockets and increased flight rates.

The former was assumed to be the obvious path forward but I'll point out that the Air Force had already shown that with any 'realistic' flight rate projection "mass-produced" expendable rockets could be shown to give reusable rockets a run for their money. In fact that 'argument' was in place in the mid-60s as both NASA and the Air Force put the Saturn-1/1B and Titan-III head-to-head in economic terms. Under the assumed circumstances the Saturn-1/1B wouldn't lose so much in comparison as it did OTL because it WOULD be flying more and remain in production but in a very general sense the Titan-III would still have an edge.

It would also depend on if NASA had gotten around to establishing reuse for the Saturn-1/1B as was researched but no implemented OTL. In general it would not be that hard to begin such operations from early on and would allow a more effective argument with obvious evidence which OTL lacked. Under such circumstances the Titan-III economics would look a bit weaker but to be frank the military has always had the National Defense argument to fall back on and they'd use it very specifically in this case. Another point though is by utilizing the Saturn S-1/1B design the way is open to using SRBs for performance enhancement of the basic launch vehicle which the Air Force is already showing the way with the Titan-III and frankly NASA would have to embrace to continue to support future operations.

"Full-reuse" (pretty much flyback with the mindset given) would require a complete reworking/redesign of the S-1 stage so it would be arguable that NASA might simply 'move-on' to the orbiter/orbital stages from this point. An obvious beginning would be a 'reusable' Apollo Command Module which gets into the discussion of which "Apollo" would be chosen in TTL since there is no directly declared Lunar program and budget. NAA pretty much got the contract despite the Martin design being the actual 'winner' and this was due to working directly with Max Faget who had a great deal of influence in NASA.

Faget had driven Mercury and granted it was 'needed' at the time to stay in completion with the Russians but since we're looking at that not being the case TTL this begs the question if he would have as much influence TTL?

We should keep in mind that historically what NASA says it 'wants' as requirements and what it actually 'needs' are often not the same thing. For example the Martin 410 Apollo design was in fact very much addressing what NASAs requirements for "Apollo" were as the NAA design was more geared to its 'wants', or more specifically Faget's "wants". A more modern example was the outcome of the "Orbital Spaceplane Program" of the late 90s where NASA insisted they "wanted" a Spaceplane but examination of their actual "needs" showed that what they were actually looking for was an advanced capsule design. (And again as OTL history showed NASA ended up picking the 'winner' by who they PLANNED on winning rather than the design)

So I would offer that instead of:
From there, I guess it would probably end up looking a lot like Right Side Up, but with a smaller first stage and so less payload overall. Perhaps 10 tons to LEO instead of 30? Obviously I haven't run the numbers, you might (probably) would end up needing to make quite a few adjustments to make everything work properly

... directly, you would see a 'reusable' ocean recovered booster stage with optional SRB enhancement, a 'dirt-cheap' S-IVB-ish hydrolox upper stage and a Martin reusable Command Module as a basis from which to work towards full reusability. The first step would be to work towards S-IVB recover and reuse which Douglas suggested OTL but which would work directly against the 'dirt-cheap' mass produced stage and would be a hard sell to Congress. Still we're talking backed by actual recovery and reuse numbers for the S-1/1B so it might be doable. With this set up your basic TSTO vehicle is actually 'fully' reusable and only expends the Command Module's Service Module section, and that can be 'incorporated' into a combined recoverable vehicle as time goes on. This still leaves the TSTO booster and upper stage for operations with additional upper stages and/or dedicated cargo missions.

It's not "exactly" what was imagined at the time, (but actually it's pretty damn close to the more 'conservative' concepts) and getting their requires some sacrifices and/or compromises to some cherished assumptions but OTL has proven NASA can in fact make compromises when it is required to do so...

Randy
 
Fasquadron wrote:
So here's a question for you guys:

If the Shuttle had been seen as a "scientific vehicle" rather than a commercial truck and then a failure, would there have been more support for trying incremental improvements to the Shuttle system? IMO this depends on Congress being convinced to fund tests and improvements to the Shuttle, and I am curious if a change in branding would have helped in this regard.

"Experimental" vehicle actually :) That was in fact the 'worst-case' (as everyone assume the REAL worst case, the Shuttle being canceled was not going to happen) outcome as noted in the Carter Shuttle article in that the Shuttle would NOT be an "operational" vehicle but a technology and operations demonstrator instead. Most of NASA management would have seen this as a major 'failure' from the start and frankly I get the feeling they would have started immediately lobbying for "Shuttle II" even before this Shuttle flew.

Several obvious outcomes would come immediately to mind;
1) You'd probably have the Orbiter 'fleet' cut deeply, frankly I would see only one orbiter actually 'built' and Enterprise eventually turned into a second 'testbed' orbiter.

2) One thing to keep in mind is that by the late 70s even the DoD was finally 'on-board' with the Shuttle and had issued requirements that all payloads be "Shuttle Optimized" which meant they no longer were being built with the possibility of being launched on a Titan. This followed a similar requirement from the mid-70s where they were designed to be "Shuttle Compatible" which required the design to be EITHER launched on the Shuttle or the Titan and all the expense that implies. (After Challenger the DoD had to not only pay to develop the Titan-34/Titan-IV but to re-design/build the backlogged satellites BACK to capable of being launched on a Titan)

3) Congress by the late 70s was of the mind that the Shuttle was going to be the US's future access to space and their main concern was keeping NASA from going off on a tangent towards Mars the second the Shuttle was available. If the Shuttle is reduced to an "experimental" vehicle there's going to be a lot of name calling, and mudslinging but keep in mind by this point the "program" is pretty much a national thing and no one is going to seriously want to lose the monies and prestige involved. (Very much a "sunk-cost" argument at this point)

4) What follows would depend on what arguments are presented and who's in 'charge' at the time. Reagan would probably 'restore' funding for a couple of more obiters but it's a question if they would be NASA or Air Force. (And if the Air Force would actually pay for them or what as the 'deal' was cheaper Air Force launch costs if they supported the Shuttle but by the time it flew the cost had gone up significantly. Then again the Air Force now has a backlog of satellites that are actually DESIGNED to launch on the Shuttle so...) There would be Congressional pressure to use the 'Shuttle legacy' components, (same as OTL actually) and whereas an 'inline' system would be preferred it might behoove NASA to consider going to engine pods and a Shuttle-C-ish design while designing the 'next generation' Orbiter. The drawback here is that it is going to be hugely over-capacity for what NASA and the DoD actually need at the time and have little or no commercial application. Which throws the flight rate out the window and leaves the door open for the 'competition'. Which btw, will probably NOT be Titan as the Air Force had already shut down Titan production except for the Titan-34D which was specifically limited to meet the original Shuttle short-fall. IF the Air Force does an about face at this point they will have to eat all the starting costs of a new Titan production which they only did OTL after Challenger and with great difficulty. TTL they MAY do so anyway but at this point and time they were actually invested in the Shuttle enough to consider a Shuttle-derived-vehicle. But...

5) Also at this point it will be glaringly obvious that the Shuttle will never meet its economic let alone flight goals and therefore "something" will need to be done about the situation but what? There is Congressional 'support' for the Shuttle, (centered around voter/economic concerns but NASA was following the Apollo "spread-the-wealth" method for a reason after all) and general public support, (though if you think the OTL "shuttle disappointment" was strong imagine what it's like TTL) so there is actually a fair chance at getting something useful as a follow on if it's played right.

Randy
 
There is almost 5 months between OTL Sputnik-1 and Vanguard-1 so it's possible that given a sufficient delay to Sputnik Vanguard could get there first but I would wonder if being 'beaten' in an unannounced 'race' would not lead the Soviets to simply go to their 'default' mode of "we weren't racing in the first place" as they did for the Moon? And frankly if the US DOES get there first there would be little notice, (we fully expected to be first which is why Sputnik and then Gagarin was so much of a panic) and frankly little support for an expanded program from that point. ARPA came about because of Sputnik and very rapidly due to Eisenhower's dislike of the idea of a "military" Space Race, (and Johnson's need to make political hay AND siphon some funding towards the South and Texas in particular) NASA followed in order to 'address' that shame/panic. If the US goes first it is very likely one or either of those 'responses' don't come about.
Well, that would be the point. The whole idea of a Vanguard-first scenario is to pop the bubble of the Space Race before it even began, so things just go...boring. But honestly nixonshead's already done it perfectly well with Kolyma's Shadow, so I'm not too inclined to try this scenario.

You 'guesstimate' a couple of billion dollars to move manned operations from LEO to Cis-Lunar space but really the very conservative original concept of Apollo, (without the Kennedy less-than-a-decade deadline and budget) was to meet both LEO and Cis-Lunar goals with only 'some' modification within a budget of about that amount.
No, I guesstimate that it will be between several hundred million and a few billion dollars (in 1960s money) to do that. Sure, the projections might have been that it would cost a lot less than that, but the projections always say that it will cost a lot less than it actually ends up doing. Even with a cut down SM so that the CSM doesn't weigh as much, the Saturn IB just doesn't have the oomph to kick a CSM around the Moon--it could only put around 4-5 tonnes on a trans-lunar trajectory, which is less than the CM by itself. Sure, there might be a lighter CM, but 4-5 tonnes is really marginal for a crewed spacecraft and not really likely for any alternate Apollo design. You're gonna need to do something expensive to go from there to cislunar flights: New launch vehicle, modifying the Saturn IB for boosters, on-orbit refueling capability. I just don't see Congress ponying up the money for that if the Space Race is perceived to have been won, just the same way that Congress has been cool on all proposals for space exploration beyond Earth orbit since Apollo IOTL.

And then there's the early planning for a 'space tug' to move satellites around that would be reusable and would be refurbished on-orbit. Currently a significant amount of money is spent on satellites to ensure backup and redundant systems since once on-orbit it can't be serviced or repaired. Early planning assumed that servicing and repair would be a requirement and while vacuum tubes gave way to solid state electronics which reduced the need if the requirement had been built into the overall system itself...
I think this is a very hard thing to get around, because you're not, realistically, going to have a space tug available until well after people have started going to high-cost engineering to keep satellites alive. Early launch vehicles aren't going to be capable of launching something like that, and by the time you get later launch vehicles satellite builders are already focused on reliability, not easy repair. Not to mention that a reusable space tug probably doesn't make all that much sense without a reusable launch vehicle to make servicing it cheaper than buying a new stage. It's notable that already in 1970-1971 NASA's proposals that satellites be redesigned for cost instead of reliability attracted almost no attention from anyone actually building satellites. Not to mention that JPL and Ames, at least, are going to have to be spending tons of money on payloads anyway; you can't get space probes back from the Moon, let alone Mars or Jupiter...

If the flight rate is higher, (as NASA and the Air Force originally planned it to be) then it makes sense they want to reduce the cost. Or course we already are aware there's two ways to do that; Reusability and/or dirt-cheap rockets and increased flight rates.
It's more the other way around: The Saturn IB/Apollo combination, and Saturn IB in general, is so fantastically expensive that they need to find ways to get the cost down to enable the flight rates that they want.

The former was assumed to be the obvious path forward but I'll point out that the Air Force had already shown that with any 'realistic' flight rate projection "mass-produced" expendable rockets could be shown to give reusable rockets a run for their money. In fact that 'argument' was in place in the mid-60s as both NASA and the Air Force put the Saturn-1/1B and Titan-III head-to-head in economic terms. Under the assumed circumstances the Saturn-1/1B wouldn't lose so much in comparison as it did OTL because it WOULD be flying more and remain in production but in a very general sense the Titan-III would still have an edge.
Why do you assume that the Saturn I/IB would be flying so much more than IOTL? NASA has a much smaller budget without the Apollo program (of OTL), so they're not launching more missions...more robot missions, sure, but those are mostly going up on Atlas-Centaur, not Saturn IB.

And frankly...despite all the arguments in favor of cheap expendables...the idea of reuse being the way forward is so baked in to the assumptions of everyone involved (literally predating the first orbital rockets!) that I don't think they're going to give up on it until they're forced to, as they were IOTL (first with the failure of the Phase B Shuttle to get approved, then the failure of Shuttle itself to be economical).

It would also depend on if NASA had gotten around to establishing reuse for the Saturn-1/1B as was researched but no implemented OTL. In general it would not be that hard to begin such operations from early on and would allow a more effective argument with obvious evidence which OTL lacked. Under such circumstances the Titan-III economics would look a bit weaker but to be frank the military has always had the National Defense argument to fall back on and they'd use it very specifically in this case. Another point though is by utilizing the Saturn S-1/1B design the way is open to using SRBs for performance enhancement of the basic launch vehicle which the Air Force is already showing the way with the Titan-III and frankly NASA would have to embrace to continue to support future operations.
I'm highly skeptical that the S-IB reuse plans would have succeeded. The evidence of later attempts to try to reuse stages through parachute recovery is pretty poor. I'm not saying that the H-1s would have melted in the sea water, but rather that they'd probably have problems with parachute deployment, stage tip-over on water impact, things of that sort. Solvable, perhaps, but the kind of problems that add up and add up until you start wondering why you don't just go for the flyback stage and get something that will be better, anyway.

"Full-reuse" (pretty much flyback with the mindset given) would require a complete reworking/redesign of the S-1 stage so it would be arguable that NASA might simply 'move-on' to the orbiter/orbital stages from this point.
Yes, I'm aware of that. The idea is that they build a reusable first stage since that saves as much, if not more, cost as a reusable upper stage while being much easier (i.e. cheaper) to build: it doesn't need an elaborate TPS because it never reaches orbital velocities, the weight doesn't impact payload performance as much, it's much easier to test, etc. etc. So they can afford to do that first, then, in theory, use those savings to pay for the reusable second stage/orbiter vehicle, or at least justify the second stage/orbiter budget to Congress.

We should keep in mind that historically what NASA says it 'wants' as requirements and what it actually 'needs' are often not the same thing. For example the Martin 410 Apollo design was in fact very much addressing what NASAs requirements for "Apollo" were as the NAA design was more geared to its 'wants', or more specifically Faget's "wants". A more modern example was the outcome of the "Orbital Spaceplane Program" of the late 90s where NASA insisted they "wanted" a Spaceplane but examination of their actual "needs" showed that what they were actually looking for was an advanced capsule design. (And again as OTL history showed NASA ended up picking the 'winner' by who they PLANNED on winning rather than the design)
The Martin 410 was essentially the same as the Apollo that actually flew. The only significant difference was that it had a lifting CM instead of a capsule CM, which makes no difference in terms of the feasibility of reuse. Indeed, the CM design it was using wasn't actually capable of runway landings anyway, and needed parachutes and a retrorocket for land landings. It would have been just as feasible to reuse the actual Apollo CM as one of these capsules, a la Dragon, if anyone had cared to do so.

Besides, in 1961-1962 understanding of lifting bodies and similar lifting designs was in its infancy, whereas blunt-body capsules were pretty well understood thanks to Mercury and the military ICBM programs. Thus, for the purpose of exploring how to live and work in space (which I imagine is going to be Apollo's mission sans Moon target; figuring out what useful tasks astronauts might do in space and how they might do them, the way that Mercury showed that astronauts could live in space) a capsule design makes more sense while NASA researches lifting bodies and lifting reentries (via X-15), with any lifting design (i.e., in the minds of engineers at the time, any reusable designs) deferred until the post-Apollo program.
 
"Experimental" vehicle actually :) That was in fact the 'worst-case' (as everyone assume the REAL worst case, the Shuttle being canceled was not going to happen) outcome as noted in the Carter Shuttle article in that the Shuttle would NOT be an "operational" vehicle but a technology and operations demonstrator instead. Most of NASA management would have seen this as a major 'failure' from the start and frankly I get the feeling they would have started immediately lobbying for "Shuttle II" even before this Shuttle flew.

Several obvious outcomes would come immediately to mind;
1) You'd probably have the Orbiter 'fleet' cut deeply, frankly I would see only one orbiter actually 'built' and Enterprise eventually turned into a second 'testbed' orbiter.

2) One thing to keep in mind is that by the late 70s even the DoD was finally 'on-board' with the Shuttle and had issued requirements that all payloads be "Shuttle Optimized" which meant they no longer were being built with the possibility of being launched on a Titan. This followed a similar requirement from the mid-70s where they were designed to be "Shuttle Compatible" which required the design to be EITHER launched on the Shuttle or the Titan and all the expense that implies. (After Challenger the DoD had to not only pay to develop the Titan-34/Titan-IV but to re-design/build the backlogged satellites BACK to capable of being launched on a Titan)

3) Congress by the late 70s was of the mind that the Shuttle was going to be the US's future access to space and their main concern was keeping NASA from going off on a tangent towards Mars the second the Shuttle was available. If the Shuttle is reduced to an "experimental" vehicle there's going to be a lot of name calling, and mudslinging but keep in mind by this point the "program" is pretty much a national thing and no one is going to seriously want to lose the monies and prestige involved. (Very much a "sunk-cost" argument at this point)

4) What follows would depend on what arguments are presented and who's in 'charge' at the time. Reagan would probably 'restore' funding for a couple of more obiters but it's a question if they would be NASA or Air Force. (And if the Air Force would actually pay for them or what as the 'deal' was cheaper Air Force launch costs if they supported the Shuttle but by the time it flew the cost had gone up significantly. Then again the Air Force now has a backlog of satellites that are actually DESIGNED to launch on the Shuttle so...) There would be Congressional pressure to use the 'Shuttle legacy' components, (same as OTL actually) and whereas an 'inline' system would be preferred it might behoove NASA to consider going to engine pods and a Shuttle-C-ish design while designing the 'next generation' Orbiter. The drawback here is that it is going to be hugely over-capacity for what NASA and the DoD actually need at the time and have little or no commercial application. Which throws the flight rate out the window and leaves the door open for the 'competition'. Which btw, will probably NOT be Titan as the Air Force had already shut down Titan production except for the Titan-34D which was specifically limited to meet the original Shuttle short-fall. IF the Air Force does an about face at this point they will have to eat all the starting costs of a new Titan production which they only did OTL after Challenger and with great difficulty. TTL they MAY do so anyway but at this point and time they were actually invested in the Shuttle enough to consider a Shuttle-derived-vehicle. But...

5) Also at this point it will be glaringly obvious that the Shuttle will never meet its economic let alone flight goals and therefore "something" will need to be done about the situation but what? There is Congressional 'support' for the Shuttle, (centered around voter/economic concerns but NASA was following the Apollo "spread-the-wealth" method for a reason after all) and general public support, (though if you think the OTL "shuttle disappointment" was strong imagine what it's like TTL) so there is actually a fair chance at getting something useful as a follow on if it's played right.

Ahh, I thought "scientific" vehicle didn't sound quite right. Now, onto your points.

From your answers, I think you are imagining a later PoD? I am imagining a PoD in 1971 or 1972.

1) I am not sure that the fleet would be cut relative to OTL - after all, the real world shuttle was in practical terms treated as an experimental vehicle (and was much lower than the originally envisaged shuttle fleet), people were just trying to dress it up as something it wasn't. I think NASA will build as many vehicles as Congress gives them the money for, just as OTL - I would expect that would add up to about as many orbiters as OTL and possibly even one or two more (I can't see the NASA budget being much higher or much lower than it was OTL in the 70s.

2) I am imagining that NASA either never seeks the DoD's involvement or abandons the DoD when Rice wins the debate on what the Shuttle should look like, so this is a design that would be built around space station servicing from the start.

3) I'm not sure that Congress would be so upset to have an "experimental vehicle" picked as the design in 1971. For Congress, NASA has come from the heady (and insanely expensive Apollo) program with an ambitious program for making access to space routine that gets whittled down to "conservative, economical, slow and steady" experimental program that should enable the US to build the REAL shuttle in the 90s. Indeed, with a program that promised less at the outset, I could imagine the shuttle (and the shuttles to come after it) being seen in a more positive light.

4) Having read more about how Reagan actually treated the space program, I can't imagine him funding more mini-shuttles. They wouldn't be useful to the USAF. The best I could see is that the mini-shuttle experimental program looks promising enough that a militarized "full shuttle" is funded as part of Star Wars. Of course, since the "experimental shuttle" wouldn't have ever competed with the Titan III, the Titan family would also be a bigger competitor to put star wars hardware in orbit.

5) I am not so sure that an experimental shuttle would make people think the shuttle concept was a uneconomic. The thing won't be so oversized, so NASA won't be paying for capacity it isn't using and if there is political support for funding continued upgrades to the "experimental shuttle", they'll be able to get a taste of some very promising technologies they could use to "do it right".

It's more the other way around: The Saturn IB/Apollo combination, and Saturn IB in general, is so fantastically expensive that they need to find ways to get the cost down to enable the flight rates that they want.

They were discussing ways to make the Saturn IVB stage cheaper. Though I do wonder if it would be possible to put together a ker/lox upper stage based on a shortened and un-insulated Saturn IVB. That seems far, far more economical if the main purpose is doing things in LEO. Maybe powered by some LR105-7 engines (the Atlas sustainer engine) or maybe a higher ISP variant of the RS-27/H-1.

I suspect that being launched more often would bring down the cost of the first stage - though I have no idea where the $55 million/launch (or $315 million/launch in modern money) comes from. If it doesn't include R&D costs then launching more often wouldn't have such a big impact, but it would still have some impact.

fasquardon
 
They were discussing ways to make the Saturn IVB stage cheaper. Though I do wonder if it would be possible to put together a ker/lox upper stage based on a shortened and un-insulated Saturn IVB. That seems far, far more economical if the main purpose is doing things in LEO. Maybe powered by some LR105-7 engines (the Atlas sustainer engine) or maybe a higher ISP variant of the RS-27/H-1.
Going kerolox really kills your payload, Saturn IB needs the S-IVB to work well. Otherwise you have a dramatically oversized rocket with a comically small payload. The trouble is that the ISP of current kerolox engines is too small, basically. Maybe with SRBs...but at that point you're really adding complexity (ergo cost) back on, and you might as well have stuck with the S-IVB. I'll note that best estimates said that they could get the price of a Saturn IB launch down to $20 million, which is still rather more than a contemporary Titan III, so it's not exactly winning efficiency awards either way.
 
Going kerolox really kills your payload, Saturn IB needs the S-IVB to work well. Otherwise you have a dramatically oversized rocket with a comically small payload. The trouble is that the ISP of current kerolox engines is too small, basically. Maybe with SRBs...but at that point you're really adding complexity (ergo cost) back on, and you might as well have stuck with the S-IVB. I'll note that best estimates said that they could get the price of a Saturn IB launch down to $20 million, which is still rather more than a contemporary Titan III, so it's not exactly winning efficiency awards either way.

The calculations I ran showed that a ker/lox second stage didn't impose much payload penalty when paired with a brace of Castor 4A boosters. At least for LEO operations. The lower ISP really kills geostationary and BEO performance of course.

And would a $20 million Saturn IB launch be cheaper than a Titan III in terms of $/kilo to orbit? The Saturn IB had a significantly higher payload than contemporary Titan IIIs.

fasquardn
 
The calculations I ran showed that a ker/lox second stage didn't impose much payload penalty when paired with a brace of Castor 4A boosters. At least for LEO operations. The lower ISP really kills geostationary and BEO performance of course.
And of course that's a good chunk of what NASA would probably want with the rocket, for heavy BEO payloads (Vikings, Voyagers, etc.).

And would a $20 million Saturn IB launch be cheaper than a Titan III in terms of $/kilo to orbit? The Saturn IB had a significantly higher payload than contemporary Titan IIIs.
Not that much higher: about 20 tonnes versus about 13. Which happens to be pretty similar to the difference in costs: $20 million versus something like $14 or 15 million. So the Saturn IB might be cheaper, but only a little, and not at all for the vast majority of payloads that weigh much less than 20 tonnes. Plus, there's always the possibility that they simply don't hit those cost projections, and there's the fact that projections for reusables at the time--even outside of the admittedly biased NASA Shuttle studies--tended to project costs in the single-digit millions per flight, just at a much higher development cost. The question was always whether the savings from the lower operational costs would make up for the higher development costs, not (at the time) whether those savings would exist. So there's still plenty of reason for NASA to be looking beyond Saturn IB even granting those cost reductions.
 
Going kerolox really kills your payload, Saturn IB needs the S-IVB to work well. Otherwise you have a dramatically oversized rocket with a comically small payload. The trouble is that the ISP of current kerolox engines is too small, basically. Maybe with SRBs...but at that point you're really adding complexity (ergo cost) back on, and you might as well have stuck with the S-IVB. I'll note that best estimates said that they could get the price of a Saturn IB launch down to $20 million, which is still rather more than a contemporary Titan III, so it's not exactly winning efficiency awards either way.

My admittedly amateur understanding is that Saturn I was designed to lift for assembly a larger "Moonship" rather than give access to space; was this why it had "excess" lift capability but paltry capacity for lunar orbits? In other words would Saturn I have been feasibly repurposed to a LEO space station oriented vehicle once the moon shot is accomplished or set aside? Or was Saturn I simply the dead end without an assemble in orbit mission? I think Von Braun had a certain vision for how to achieve his dream of getting to the moon and Saturn I was the "realistic" step to the moon until the V is given life. I am always curious how things would have gone had NASA pursued Saturn I as its premier lifter and shaped its missions for the Moon, shuttles and stations without the V. Thanks in advance for your thoughts!
 
My admittedly amateur understanding is that Saturn I was designed to lift for assembly a larger "Moonship" rather than give access to space; was this why it had "excess" lift capability but paltry capacity for lunar orbits?
Not really. The story of the Saturn family is complex, but essentially the Saturn I was developed as a quick-and-easy vehicle for lifting heavy military payloads, the kind of things (spy satellites, communications satellites, etc.) that in fact ended up being launched by Titan. For a variety of reasons it ended up not actually being used in that role, and it quickly became apparent that its upper stage was not powerful enough to lift the Apollo CSM, so it didn't have much of a purpose for NASA, either, hence the replacement of the S-IV with the much more powerful S-IVB and the development of the Saturn IB.

The Saturn I/C-1 configuration was never meant to support a lunar mission except in its actual role of launching test payloads into LEO. Instead, that role was supposed to go to a more powerful booster, even in the EOR days. It would have been smaller than the Saturn V/C-5, but still considerably larger than the I/IB in order to minimize the number of launches needed to lift the necessary payloads.

In other words would Saturn I have been feasibly repurposed to a LEO space station oriented vehicle once the moon shot is accomplished or set aside?
I think you should see the timeline Eyes Turned Skywards for the answer to that question! :)

Realistically, though, the Saturn IB or some development of the Titan were the only available choices to launch crews to a space station if Shuttle isn't around. Titan is cheaper, at least nominally, but requires some degree of cooperation/truce with the Air Force to use and doesn't feather Alabama's nest. So...Saturn IB is possible. Maybe not likely, but possible. There wasn't a lot of favor for it IOTL, but it might have ended up being the eventual belle of the ball, just the same way that TAOS eventually got chosen even though it was no one's first choice.
 
Realistically, though, the Saturn IB or some development of the Titan were the only available choices to launch crews to a space station if Shuttle isn't around. Titan is cheaper, at least nominally, but requires some degree of cooperation/truce with the Air Force to use and doesn't feather Alabama's nest. So...Saturn IB is possible. Maybe not likely, but possible. There wasn't a lot of favor for it IOTL, but it might have ended up being the eventual belle of the ball, just the same way that TAOS eventually got chosen even though it was no one's first choice.

It is possible we might see something else again, like the Saturn IC from ETS (though I think the Saturn IC as proposed would be a more expensive and less capable machine than the Saturn IB it was supposed to succeed, the F1-A just doesn't have the power or the economics to perform well in such a role).

For example, a ker/lox version of the Titan core stage, a LH2/LOX version of the Titan core stage (both with Titan familiar SRMs), a Saturn IB class vehicle made of Delta II parts (say a cluster of 7 long-Thor tankage with with either no special thrust structure or a modified version of the Saturn IB thrust structure, a more powerful LV made with clustered Titan tankage or maybe even the Saturn ID single-stage-to-orbit, a large solid rocket LV or even something descended from the pressure fed booster studies.

Hypergolic Titan derivatives have a big advantage, but their victory isn't completely certain.

fasquardon
 
Not really. The story of the Saturn family is complex, but essentially the Saturn I was developed as a quick-and-easy vehicle for lifting heavy military payloads, the kind of things (spy satellites, communications satellites, etc.) that in fact ended up being launched by Titan. For a variety of reasons it ended up not actually being used in that role, and it quickly became apparent that its upper stage was not powerful enough to lift the Apollo CSM, so it didn't have much of a purpose for NASA, either, hence the replacement of the S-IV with the much more powerful S-IVB and the development of the Saturn IB.

The Saturn I/C-1 configuration was never meant to support a lunar mission except in its actual role of launching test payloads into LEO. Instead, that role was supposed to go to a more powerful booster, even in the EOR days. It would have been smaller than the Saturn V/C-5, but still considerably larger than the I/IB in order to minimize the number of launches needed to lift the necessary payloads.


I think you should see the timeline Eyes Turned Skywards for the answer to that question! :)

Realistically, though, the Saturn IB or some development of the Titan were the only available choices to launch crews to a space station if Shuttle isn't around. Titan is cheaper, at least nominally, but requires some degree of cooperation/truce with the Air Force to use and doesn't feather Alabama's nest. So...Saturn IB is possible. Maybe not likely, but possible. There wasn't a lot of favor for it IOTL, but it might have ended up being the eventual belle of the ball, just the same way that TAOS eventually got chosen even though it was no one's first choice.

Indeed I have read ETS and it set my mind to Saturn I and IB and its possible future. My appreciation for the hardware is more boyish enthusiasm than engineering knowhow. In my mind there is two separate paths, the Atlas and the Saturn, Atlas opened up the ICBM turned lifter and Saturn culminates the A4 evolution through ballistic rocketry hiding the space exploration purpose. I enjoy imagining these two paths staying in opposition, the DOD/USAF using Titan and NASA going Saturn. It lets me ponder the space race in alternatives.
 
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