01. Bigger, Better, Faster, Stronger
Introduction
The defence procurement systems of NATO powers are a complicated system of political horse trading and corporate big business. With so many moving parts, a small change can have large consequences.
In the late 80s and early 90s the US Congress had become weary of defence sector extravagance, and the often duplicitous information they got from the Department of Defence. It was only a matter of time until they snapped and pushed back.
01. Bigger, Faster, Better, Stronger
August, 1987- Colonel James G Burton, with the encouragement of fellow officers, releases his report on how the United States Army falsified test results during the procurement of the Bradley armoured fighting vehicle, to the New York Times.
Incensed by the contents of the report, Congress establishes a permanent Procurement Oversight Comission, that will review all military procurement projects.
January, 1989- An officer from the Naval Advanced Tactical Fighter program office testifies to the Commission that despite assurances from several admirals, it is unlikely that either the YF-22 of YF-23 prototypes from the USAF's ATF program can be navalized without essentially building a new aircraft with only very minor commonality in certain systems. The NATF would therefore be far more costly to develop than current projections allow.
May, 1989- In the face of increased pressure from congressional oversight, the United States Navy cancels the Naval Advanced Tactical Fighter Program.
Now bereft of a next generation fighter program, and having earned the ire of Congress, the Navy settles for extending the life of their F-14 Tomcat fleet via a more extensive version of Grumman's Quick Strike upgrade package.
April, 1990- The A-12 program runs into trouble, Congress already suspicious of Navy excuses gives little leeway. By the end of the month this program is also cancelled. With budgets and oversight being tightened the Navy becomes convinced that it will be forced to 'kneck down' the types of aircraft it operates.
Plans for the improved F-14, now referred internally at Grumman as F-14 2000, are accelerated.
September, 1990- Experiance of the rudimentary 'bombcat' upgrade during operation Desert Shield gives the Navy confidence that improved Tomcats can be used as multi-role aircraft.
November, 1990- The F-14 2000 program is successfully presented to congress as an evolutionary upgrade of proven technology to fill several needed roles. Satisfied that the Navy's expectations of needlessly expensive 'cutting edge' equipment has been quashed, Congress authorises a program of rebuild and new production Tomcats to be designated F-14E.
April, 1991- The Lockheed YF-22 is selected as the winner of the Advanced Tactical Fighter competition.
October, 1991- Realizing that it will be unfeasible, within future budgets, to operate an air group exclusively of F-14s the Navy decides to continue the current hi-lo mix composition of carrier air groups. It also starts a long term program for a F-18 replacement. Called the Multirole Light Fighter program.
June, 1992- The USAF and USMC inaugurate the Common Affordable Lightweight Fighter program to develop a next generation light fighter to replace the AV-8B and F-16 series. Plans are to create both conventional and vertical take off versions to accommodate the requirements of both services.
October, 1992- The Isreali government issues a request for information to several US aviation firms for a new long range strike aircraft. McDonnell Douglas offers the F-15E Strike Eagle, Lockheed Martin the F-16C and Grumman the F-14E.
July, 1993- With defence budget being slashed now that the Cold War is over, the DoD conducts a complete review of procurement programs. It is decided that to conserve development costs the CALF and MLF will be merged as the Joint Light Fighter program, to develop a common aircraft for all three services.
The Navy is initially resistant, raising concerns that the inclusion of VTOL will compromise the flight characteristics of all three variants. Privately senior aviation admirals are concerned that a catapult version will be sidelined, and that they will have to settle for VTOL themselves.
October, 1993- After months of argument a compromise is reached, it is agreed that a common platform for USN and USAF aircraft will be developed first, with a separate VTOL aircraft derived from the mature technology to be developed at a later date. In the interim the USMC will make do with a mixture of the new AV-8B and their own F-14E squadrons.
March, 1994- The Eurofighter 2000 prototype undergoes test flights over Bavaria.
April, 1994- The first pre-production F-14E undergoes test flights at Naval Air Station Oceana.
August, 1994- The F-14E enters limited production at the Grumman plant in Calverton, NY.
December, 1994- After a hard fought competition the Isreali Airforce selects the F-14E for their new strike aircraft. A localised version called F-14I is to be developed with local work share and Isreali avionics fit.
The Israelis also express interest in procuring the AIM-54 Phoenix missile as an additional long range air defence capability.
March, 1995- The British MoD approaches the US DoD with an offer to join the JLF program, and to shoulder a considerable amount of the development costs, in return for workshare and BAE being able to bid in he competition. The advanced REPLICA 'stealth' aircraft program is offered up as proof that the British have something to contribute.
The USMC is emboldened by the British entry into the program, and attempts to get the RAF an RN on thier side in pushing for the VTOL variant to be reinstated as an equal part.
However the USN heads this off by offering a significant transfer of carrier technology, an offer that the MoD, which is just now beginning to consider a replacement for the Invincible class VTOL carriers, eagerly agrees to. The RAF, which has become somewhat lukewarm to the VTOL concept agrees, and the British support the status quo.
August, 1995- The RAF publishes its Future Airforce Plan 21. Under this plan the number of aircraft it operates is to be down scaled. The EF-2000 is to replace the Tornado F.3 and remaining Phantoms; The USAF variant JLF will replace the Harrier, Jaguar and Tornado GR.4. Plans are also made to continue with the Nimrod MRA.4, procure a next generation trainer, a new tactical airlifter and a dedicated AWACS aircraft with NATO commonality.
The defence procurement systems of NATO powers are a complicated system of political horse trading and corporate big business. With so many moving parts, a small change can have large consequences.
In the late 80s and early 90s the US Congress had become weary of defence sector extravagance, and the often duplicitous information they got from the Department of Defence. It was only a matter of time until they snapped and pushed back.
01. Bigger, Faster, Better, Stronger
August, 1987- Colonel James G Burton, with the encouragement of fellow officers, releases his report on how the United States Army falsified test results during the procurement of the Bradley armoured fighting vehicle, to the New York Times.
Incensed by the contents of the report, Congress establishes a permanent Procurement Oversight Comission, that will review all military procurement projects.
January, 1989- An officer from the Naval Advanced Tactical Fighter program office testifies to the Commission that despite assurances from several admirals, it is unlikely that either the YF-22 of YF-23 prototypes from the USAF's ATF program can be navalized without essentially building a new aircraft with only very minor commonality in certain systems. The NATF would therefore be far more costly to develop than current projections allow.
May, 1989- In the face of increased pressure from congressional oversight, the United States Navy cancels the Naval Advanced Tactical Fighter Program.
Now bereft of a next generation fighter program, and having earned the ire of Congress, the Navy settles for extending the life of their F-14 Tomcat fleet via a more extensive version of Grumman's Quick Strike upgrade package.
April, 1990- The A-12 program runs into trouble, Congress already suspicious of Navy excuses gives little leeway. By the end of the month this program is also cancelled. With budgets and oversight being tightened the Navy becomes convinced that it will be forced to 'kneck down' the types of aircraft it operates.
Plans for the improved F-14, now referred internally at Grumman as F-14 2000, are accelerated.
September, 1990- Experiance of the rudimentary 'bombcat' upgrade during operation Desert Shield gives the Navy confidence that improved Tomcats can be used as multi-role aircraft.
November, 1990- The F-14 2000 program is successfully presented to congress as an evolutionary upgrade of proven technology to fill several needed roles. Satisfied that the Navy's expectations of needlessly expensive 'cutting edge' equipment has been quashed, Congress authorises a program of rebuild and new production Tomcats to be designated F-14E.
April, 1991- The Lockheed YF-22 is selected as the winner of the Advanced Tactical Fighter competition.
October, 1991- Realizing that it will be unfeasible, within future budgets, to operate an air group exclusively of F-14s the Navy decides to continue the current hi-lo mix composition of carrier air groups. It also starts a long term program for a F-18 replacement. Called the Multirole Light Fighter program.
June, 1992- The USAF and USMC inaugurate the Common Affordable Lightweight Fighter program to develop a next generation light fighter to replace the AV-8B and F-16 series. Plans are to create both conventional and vertical take off versions to accommodate the requirements of both services.
October, 1992- The Isreali government issues a request for information to several US aviation firms for a new long range strike aircraft. McDonnell Douglas offers the F-15E Strike Eagle, Lockheed Martin the F-16C and Grumman the F-14E.
July, 1993- With defence budget being slashed now that the Cold War is over, the DoD conducts a complete review of procurement programs. It is decided that to conserve development costs the CALF and MLF will be merged as the Joint Light Fighter program, to develop a common aircraft for all three services.
The Navy is initially resistant, raising concerns that the inclusion of VTOL will compromise the flight characteristics of all three variants. Privately senior aviation admirals are concerned that a catapult version will be sidelined, and that they will have to settle for VTOL themselves.
October, 1993- After months of argument a compromise is reached, it is agreed that a common platform for USN and USAF aircraft will be developed first, with a separate VTOL aircraft derived from the mature technology to be developed at a later date. In the interim the USMC will make do with a mixture of the new AV-8B and their own F-14E squadrons.
March, 1994- The Eurofighter 2000 prototype undergoes test flights over Bavaria.
April, 1994- The first pre-production F-14E undergoes test flights at Naval Air Station Oceana.
August, 1994- The F-14E enters limited production at the Grumman plant in Calverton, NY.
December, 1994- After a hard fought competition the Isreali Airforce selects the F-14E for their new strike aircraft. A localised version called F-14I is to be developed with local work share and Isreali avionics fit.
The Israelis also express interest in procuring the AIM-54 Phoenix missile as an additional long range air defence capability.
March, 1995- The British MoD approaches the US DoD with an offer to join the JLF program, and to shoulder a considerable amount of the development costs, in return for workshare and BAE being able to bid in he competition. The advanced REPLICA 'stealth' aircraft program is offered up as proof that the British have something to contribute.
The USMC is emboldened by the British entry into the program, and attempts to get the RAF an RN on thier side in pushing for the VTOL variant to be reinstated as an equal part.
However the USN heads this off by offering a significant transfer of carrier technology, an offer that the MoD, which is just now beginning to consider a replacement for the Invincible class VTOL carriers, eagerly agrees to. The RAF, which has become somewhat lukewarm to the VTOL concept agrees, and the British support the status quo.
August, 1995- The RAF publishes its Future Airforce Plan 21. Under this plan the number of aircraft it operates is to be down scaled. The EF-2000 is to replace the Tornado F.3 and remaining Phantoms; The USAF variant JLF will replace the Harrier, Jaguar and Tornado GR.4. Plans are also made to continue with the Nimrod MRA.4, procure a next generation trainer, a new tactical airlifter and a dedicated AWACS aircraft with NATO commonality.
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