AHC/WI: US Joins the Central Powers

[Meshakhad]

What would it take for the US to enter World War I on the side of Germany and against Britain? And what would the consequences be?

The first ingredient, I imagine, would be a more active and assertive US foreign policy. One crazy idea (which could be its own AHC/WI) is the US seizing some of Spain's African territories after the Spanish-American War, thus bringing the US into African colonial politics. More broadly, an assertive US could easily find itself coming into conflict with Britain for influence in the Western Hemisphere.

Another idea/ingredient would be more pro-German sentiment. Would it be plausible to have a President of German descent who sympathizes with Germany? That would be a mark against him in a election, but not one that couldn't be overcome. We might also need a serious buildup of the US Navy to be able to challenge the Royal Navy.

As for consequences, the obvious one is that Canada gets overrun. As attractive as it is, I don't think it would be plausible for the US to simply annex Canada. More likely, we'd get a Republic of Canada, possibly missing Quebec and/or Newfoundland, maybe even missing British Columbia. The US probably also would seize most or all of Britain's Caribbean holdings and Bermuda. Some, like Jamaica and British Guyana, would probably become independent nations, while others would be territories similar to the US Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico.

The Pacific would be more complex. I don't know enough about Japan's involvement, but I believe that they would be a serious opponent... provided they did get involved. If the US is onboard with Germany, maybe Japan could be persuaded to switch sides. Japan could be offered Eastern Siberia, Hong Kong, even Indochina. Japan + America + Germany is probably enough to win the Pacific theater against Britain, France, and Russia. Low chance that Australia and/or New Zealand cut ties with Britain, either voluntarily or against their will.

I honestly don't see Britain and France winning the war if the US joins the Central Powers. I doubt it would end with total victory, though. More likely, it ends with Britain and France forced to make major colonial concessions, but perhaps not losing everything. Or maybe I'm underestimating the importance of Canada and the Far East.

Is this at all plausible? I've never seen a "US joins the Central Powers" timeline outside of Turtledove's TL-191 (and that had the Confederacy supporting the Entente).

 

[Darksider166]

I'm no expert on this, but I think we'd need to butterfly the Anglo-American rapprochment that occurred near the end of the 19th Century and even the Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt who was anti-German if I recall. The US Economy was heavily intertwined with the British and many Americans still had ties to Britain culturally so joining the Central Powers against the UK seems unlikely unless the Americans are more adamant on neutrality in WW1 and demand the British end their blockade on Germany for humanitarian reasons and attempt to push through for trade with Germany and the British accidentally sink a few ships in the North Sea could see the United States pursue military action on the British.

 

[Tovarishch]

I feel that the most likely idea is a President from the German part of the Midwest. This would lead to at least a reluctance to join the war on the side of the Entente, and a more friendly policy with the Central Powers. However, even then I don't think that the United States would join the war. France and the United States were still rather friendly with each other, and Japan didn't actually do much in the war outside of just sieging Qingdao and taking what they could after the war. Nonetheless, if the United States does join the war (be it a vastly pro-German and militaristic President), the United States would be more likely to just take the UK's West Indies Colonies. The United States was bound by a treaty to not take anything above the 49th Parallel from the UK. Therefore, the United States would likely just take the colonial possessions in the West Indies, perhaps Belize and Guyana, but other than that it would likely be reparations.

 

[FillyofDelphi]

I'm no expert on this, but I think we'd need to butterfly the Anglo-American rapprochment that occurred near the end of the 19th Century and even the Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt who was anti-German if I recall. The US Economy was heavily intertwined with the British and many Americans still had ties to Britain culturally so joining the Central Powers against the UK seems unlikely unless the Americans are more adamant on neutrality in WW1 and demand the British end their blockade on Germany for humanitarian reasons and attempt to push through for trade with Germany and the British accidentally sink a few ships in the North Sea could see the United States pursue military action on the British.

Teddy wasen't so much anti-German as he was very bellicose/defensive of American interests (Particularly enforcing the Monroe Doctrine), during a period where Germany was constantly trying to squeeze itself between the established powers in order to get its "place in the sun" in terms of prestige and influence and ended up bumping against a lot of those interests (In Samoa, the Carribean, ect.). Perhaps the Venezula Crisis going hot, greater British insistance on using "gunboat diplomacy" to collect on debts from Latin American nations, deeper involvement in Mexico to secure petrolium concessions, ect. over the early 1900's would be enough to get Washington to perceive Britain as the more "bothersome" power as she adopts a generally more arrogant policy towards America's right to have a "no-touchy zone". In that case, the US might insist on strict enforcement of its non-belligerency rights (and those Latin American nations) to trade in non-war material under the blockade laws Britain itself wrote, especially when the "rationing" and inspection of ships bound for neutrals (Scandinavia, the Neatherlands, ect.) takes place.

Of course, put the POD too major and too early and you run the risk of butterflies blowing away WW I as we know it.

 

[David T]

Three words: Ship Purchase Bill


Four accounts of the struggle over Woodrow Wilson's (actually William McAdoo's) Ship Purchase Bill in 1915, raising the question of whether the bill could have led to a US clash with the UK and France:

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(1) "In his annual message, Wilson set off an even more bitter political fight with his legislation that the United States purchase German ships that had been caught in American harbors at the beginning of the war and could not return home without being intercepted by the British navy. The money would be paid to the German government and the ship would be added to the merchant marine. The initiative outraged Republican senators and an intense battle ensued in the upper house in the winter of 1915. More than any other single event of Wilson's first term, the ship purchase controversy foreshadowed the ideological struggle the 1916 election would become.

"There was much in the bill to provoke Republican opposition. The money would go to Germany, an unneutral act. *The scheme could bring on a confrontation with Britain and France if those countries treated the purchased ships as belligerent vessels.* [my emphasis--DT] The greatest ideological objection was to the very character of what Wilson and McAdoo sought to do. 'It means a departure on the lines of government more important and more fateful in its results than any act passed by this Congress since I became a member,' said Elihu Root." A British observer found Republican opposition fascinating. 'Isn't it astonishing that the two great po-litical parties in America exchange positions? Root who is a great leader of the party of protection and paternalism is now the leader of the opposition to state socialism, while Wilson, the successor of Jefferson and Cleveland, both as President and leader of the party of individualism, has become the champion of a state owned merchant marine.'...

Lewis L. Gould, *The First Modern Clash Over Federal Power: Wilson Versus Hughes in the Presidential Election of 1916,* p. 32.

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(2) "The administration's most important effort to meet the economic needs created by the war situation was its vigorous, almost frantic campaign to obtain passage of a bill to provide $30 million for the purchase of a governmentally owned and operated shipping line. The author of the ship purchase bill introduced in August, 1914, was McAdoo, who brought the President to his side and led the fight for its adoption. As the bill provided for the purchase, not for the construction, of ships, the question of what ships would be purchased immediately arose. Obviously, the only vessels available in quantity were the German ships, totaling half a million tons, lying in American harbors. Wilson was reluctant to take the step, but McAdoo convinced him there was no other way to get the ships quickly. Moreover, as McAdoo pointed out, the government 'would not ... be confined to the purchase of German ships only.'

"Wilson's insistence on pushing the measure provoked a bitter fight in Congress. The Republicans, led by Henry Cabot Lodge and Elihu Root, opposed the bill because it would project the government into the business field. They opposed it, also, because they suspected the administration planned to buy the German ships and operate them in the Atlantic trade; and this, they asserted, would inevitably involve the United States in a serious and entirely needless dispute with the British government. Administration spokesmen were not frank with Congress and refused to affirm or deny the charge that they contemplated purchasing the German ships. Like most other leaders, Bryan saw the issue clearly and begged the President to come out frankly and tell the American people and the Allies that he had no intention of buying the disputed vessels. But Wilson would not surrender. On the contrary, he grew sullen and bitter and privately charged Lodge and Root with lack of conscience and with using 'insincere and contemptible methods of fighting.' After the defeat of the bill in early March, 1915, moreover, he wrote a long and bitter indictment of the Republican senators and the seven Democrats who had joined them in defeating the measure. Someone must have persuaded him to withhold the statement, for it was never published....

"Lodge's and Root's fear was well grounded, as was evidenced by the bitter protest of the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, against the ship purchase bill (Grey to Spring Rice, Jan. 22, 1915, House Papers). It is certain the British would not have acknowledged the legality of the American government's purchase of the German vessels. Moreover, the British would probably have seized the ships if the government shipping corporation had tried to use them in the Atlantic trade. This action, in turn, would have compelled the United States either to abandon its shipping venture or else to resort to strong diplomacy or force to maintain its illegal position..."

Arthur S. Link, *Woodrow WIlson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917,* pp. 152-3 https://archive.org/stream/woodrowwilsonand007665mbp#page/n195

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(3) Bryan had urged Wilson to allay the fears of Root and Lodge by giving assurances that the proposed government shipping company would not buy belligerent ships. But "The President, alas, could not give any such assurances. To begin with, he and McAdoo did intend to purchase German vessels (and British and French ships too, if they could be found) as there simply seemed to be no other way to assemble a merchant fleet quickly. Precisely what Wilson proposed to do with the ships once he got them—that is, whether he intended to use them in the European trade or only in commerce with Latin America-is not at all clear. Wilson would not heed Bryan's suggestion, in the second place, because he believed that the United States had a right in international law to purchase belligerent ships, and it would be unneutral for him publicly to abandon the right." And, as Link notes, the third and most important reason Wilson would not yield on this point is that he was stubborn, saw the bill as a test of his leadership abilities, and would concede nothing to appease Lodge and Root, whom he saw as evil reactionaries. Arthur S. Link, *Wilson, Volume III: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915,* p. 150. https://books.google.com/books?id=dRfWCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA150


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(4) "'The ship purchase bill,' he [Lodge] told Roosevelt, '. . . is one of the most dangerous things internationally--I say nothing of its viciousness economically--which could be imagined. The plan is to buy the German ships. If this is done and the Allies refuse to recognize the transfer of the flag, which France and Russia certainly will do ... we shall find ourselves with Government-owned ships afloat which the Allies regard as German ships and therefore good prize and which are liable to be fired on and sunk. In the case of a private transaction this would not be very dangerous, but when it comes to dealing with Government-owned ships . . . they bring us within measurable distance of war.' He warned his friend that 'this incompetent Administration may flounder into war, just as they blundered and floundered into bloodshed at Vera Cruz..'..." Karl Schriftgiesser, *The Gentleman from Massachusetts: Henry Cabot Lodge,* p. 267. https://archive.org/stream/gentlemanfrommas001537mbp#page/n279

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Even if the Ship Purchase Bill had passed (and without the Lodge Amendment prohibiting the purchase of belligerent ships) I doubt that the US would have gone to war against the Entente, but it's the most plausible path to such a war I can see. (Of course even such a war wouldn't technically mean the US joining the Central Powers--the US could just be a "co-belligerent"...)

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

... and even the Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt who was anti-German if I recall. ...

Anti Kaiser might be a better take. He'd lived there two years in his youth, still had some command of the language, and ties to the 'German' voters. He had little use for the bejewled and feathered military show of the Kaiser's imperial edifice.

 

[History Learner]

Strange Times make for Strange Bedfellows - a Central Powers USA TL

 

[FillyofDelphi]

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Even if the Ship Purchase Bill had passed (and without the Lodge Amendment prohibiting the purchase of belligerent ships) I doubt that the US would have gone to war against the Entente, but it's the most plausible path to such a war I can see. (Of course even such a war wouldn't technically mean the US joining the Central Powers--the US could just be a "co-belligerent"...)

Thank you for highlighting this key point, David. While the US joining the CP itself requires a degree of pro-German sentiment that's borderline ASB given the personalities and culture of the American elite and economic ties, you can get them fighting a parallel war against the Entente just by sufficently tanking relations with GB followed by an exploding powder keg. In all likelihood, though, this would require at least a few years of growing tension between the two English-speaking Great Powers (Possibly in the years immediately preceding the war; I'm partial to the British meddling in the chaos of the Mexican Revolution myself, given the fact they had oil concessions in the area and British nationals were some of the biggest victims of property destruction/banditry), meaning you won't be seeing the war start right away: maybe by early to mid 1917, possibly as early as winter of 1916.

 

[kaizerfox]

I don't think the US even needs to join the CP for them to win, they just have to not enter the war at all. The French army was having a severe morale problem in late 1917 and early 1918 that caused some mutinies and they only reason the French held on was the fact that the French soldiers knew fresh American soldiers were coming. If the US doesn't enter the war the French morale problem and mutinies get worse than OTL to the point of a French military collapse that causes the BEF to retreat to Britain and watch helplessly as German troops march into Paris. Basically no Zimmerman note, US stays out of the war, CP victory.

 

[Grimbald]

No Zimmerman note + no unrestricted submarine warfare = no US Declaration of War = German victory or White Peace

 

[FillyofDelphi]

I don't think the US even needs to join the CP for them to win, they just have to not enter the war at all. The French army was having a severe morale problem in late 1917 and early 1918 that caused some mutinies and they only reason the French held on was the fact that the French soldiers knew fresh American soldiers were coming. If the US doesn't enter the war the French morale problem and mutinies get worse than OTL to the point of a French military collapse that causes the BEF to retreat to Britain and watch helplessly as German troops march into Paris. Basically no Zimmerman note, US stays out of the war, CP victory.

No Zimmerman note + no unrestricted submarine warfare = no US Declaration of War = German victory or White Peace

Except this isen't the question the OP is asking. He's asking about a CP America, or at least a co-belligerent, not a CP victory, neutral USA scenario.