Anaxagoras
Banned
Maybe as a tool against French ambitions in America?
That doesn't make much sense. Prussia would love it if France got more deeply involved in the Americas.
Maybe as a tool against French ambitions in America?
Geopolitics is not like neighbors loaning one another their lawnmowers.
Are there any wunderwaffe Prussia could share with the Union?![]()
The C/61 field gun comes for the time surprisingly close. Though the C/64 successor is much improved, the C/61 is one of the first well working rifled breech loaders. In theory it could be offered as license or in limited numbers directly from Krupp, but that happening would stretch credibility.Are there any wunderwaffe Prussia could share with the Union?![]()
The C/61 field gun comes for the time surprisingly close. Though the C/64 successor is much improved, the C/61 is one of the first well working rifled breech loaders. In theory it could be offered as license or in limited numbers directly from Krupp, but that happening would stretch credibility.
How to get those officers an at least semi-official standing from the Prussian side and thus making the Prussians at home actually listen to the experiences of the ACW is where I struggle. And that is what is important to me, since I have some ideas how those experiences could colour future German considerations.
Can´t really see it happening either. Licensing or even an investment by Krupp might be marginally more possible, but then again the union army was not all that keen to get breech loaders anyway'In limited numbers' being key. Prussia cannot supply large numbers of weapons across the Atlantic, and is unlikely to want to; any prospect of future support from the United States pales compared to the importance of needing all the weapons it can possibly get right now, in Europe, where wars are breaking out every few years (various things in Austria, Italy and Denmark) and the Prussian leadership has a dangerous tendency to start them deliberately. In fact, at this point the Prussians had only a few breech-loading cannons—the Austrians, their rivals and soon-to-be enemies, had the technological advantage over them in that regard—so they're unlikely to give any of those that they have away to the Union.
Well, having men with Pickelhauben storming Petersburg would be cool, but I did not really think anybody could pull that off credibly.Ah, so that's the reasoning behind this. I apologise, then, for my false assumption that you were trying to get Prussia to somehow intervene in the American Civil War; this is much more intelligent and I must have come across as somewhat patronising.
Actually recognizing the danger of trench warfare was but one of the lessons I wanted Prussia to take from the ACW and a minor one at that. I was not even sure whether I´d let Prussia grasp that reality at all. Some more immediate lesson I had in mind were for example:I presume that this is intended, then, to make the German Army better-prepared for trench warfare in the First World War? In all other major conflicts before then, the Royal Prussian Army/German Army won resoundingly IOTL, so it can't be to improve their performance in those… unless you're adding new conflicts in between.
The easiest way to make Prussia eager to gain new military knowledge might well be to remove some of its previous successes. If the Royal Prussian Army gets unlucky in the Second Schleswig War between the German Confederation (the whole thing) and Denmark, thus embarrassing Prussia and increasing Austria's influence in the German Confederation at Prussia's expense, the Prussians might be motivated to improve their army, especially with men like Moltke the Elder and Roon at the head.
In turn, to do that, political changes in Denmark might lead to more competent politicians, ready to recognise that their initial plan was unworkable against a foe as numerically superior as the German Confederation and to take further back positions. That might permit the Danes, if they plan intelligently, to make the first German attack take heavy casualties. It won't be enough to change the outcome of the war, but if there's an initial Prussian attack that fails and then an Austrian attack, having heard what's ahead and had time to prepare, that succeeds, Prussia might be sufficiently humiliated to look for further experience by trying to learn from the then-ongoing American Civil War.
If this is the catalyst, by the time Prussian advisers get there there'll be only a few months left for the American Civil War to continue, so it's far from a perfect scenario. If anyone has any better ideas, which I'm sure someone will, be welcome to them.
For one there were Prussian observers otl, but their accounts were distanced from such aspects and more concerned with the ability of the leadership, the training of the men and the tactics used. Few of those were favourable. Being really involved would change the nature of their reports.What you are looking for, I think, is less an advistory group and more an observeration group.
Think of something like a reverse of the US Delafield Commission to Europe in the 1850s, and you may have your model.
Obviously, points if you choose your Prussian observers carefully...Moltke the younger, etc.
The other opportunity would be a Prussia that promotes amnesty for the '48ers who were military professionals and had useful experience in the American Civil War to come and teach at the Kriegsakademie or what-have-you; von Willich, von Steinwehr, and Osterhaus come to mind. Add AV Kautz for the "American born" perspective, and von Borcke for the "Confederate" perspective, and you actually have a pretty decent little faculty group right there.
Best,
For one there were Prussian observers otl, but their accounts were distanced from such aspects and more concerned with the ability of the leadership, the training of the men and the tactics used. Few of those were favourable. Being really involved would change the nature of their reports. Furthermore I have some plans beside the effects a closer look has in Prussia. I don´t want to reveal to much, but some of those, especially culturally, depend upon active participation by Prussia and need them clearly taking side for the Union. Or being at least perceived as taking a clear stance afterwards.
'In limited numbers' being key. Prussia cannot supply large numbers of weapons across the Atlantic, and is unlikely to want to; any prospect of future support from the United States pales compared to the importance of needing all the weapons it can possibly get right now, in Europe, where wars are breaking out every few years (various things in Austria, Italy and Denmark) and the Prussian leadership has a dangerous tendency to start them deliberately. In fact, at this point the Prussians had only a few breech-loading cannons—the Austrians, their rivals and soon-to-be enemies, had the technological advantage over them in that regard—so they're unlikely to give any of those that they have away to the Union.