AHC: Prevent the Fall of France in 1940

[Cryhavoc101]

The AGNA talks break down in June 1935 and Britain without the perceived arms limitations agreed by Germany and fears that Germany would go down the Kreuzerkrieg (Cruiser war) fleet route starts to 'far more seriously' rearm

Emboldened somewhat by Britain's harder stance towards Hitler the attempted remilitarisation of the Rhineland in April 1937 (Hitler delays over OTL as he was not as confident as OTL) is opposed by the French Army and Hitler (who was effectively 'bluffing') backs down when France threatens to call up her reserves (this later turns out to be a bluff on Frances part also as the government of the day balked at the financial cost of it).

This action on Frances part is partially helped by a better than OTL appreciation of the true strength of the German military by the Deuxième Bureau (OTL they massively over claimed German soldier numbers - nearly 300,000 - 100x the true number of actual German soldiers)

However a limited call up was conducted allowing for increased forces in the region with a limited French military presence intended to ensure that the Treaty of Locarno was not violated.

The real benefit for France Historians agree was how the successful 'bloodless defeat' of 'The Fascists' was perceived by the French peoples and this gave the failing Popular Front Government under Leon Blum, whose failed worker reforms looked like they would result in a collapse of the three way coalition, a serious boost and what had looked like a collapse of the Popular front allowed it to continue to try and make improvements and stay in power.

The other important thing was that the event built trust between the French Government and the Military which had not existed before and the Blum government responded by increasing the Military budget even while they were having to devalue the Franc.

Britain, understanding that had Hitler instead called Frances bluff, then there had been very little that they could have done had the will been to oppose it militarily in support of France, introduces limited conscription into the TA from May 1937 with a view to ensuring that all 13 TA Divisions can be brought up to full strength and makes increased funding and planning to bring their tables of equipment up to regular army standards.

Importantly the HMG gives both the RAF and Army notice that they will need to have the capability to support a continental force that will be required to serve on the continent potentially any time in the next 10 years.

Hitler fearing loss of face and potential leadership challenges presses on with his plans to bring Austria into the fold and troops march into Austria in June 1938

Sept 38 sees the major powers agree on an ending of the treaty of Locarno and allowing the remilitarisation of the Rhineland - From British and French POV this was to placate Hitler as they had feared that the earlier attempted occupation might have led to war and had been very disturbed by the Auschluss and saw the removal of French troops from the Rhineland and ending the Locarno limitations as the removal of any casus belli in the future

The the plebiscite unsurprisingly results in the Rhineland returning to German control and the French presence being removed.

This again played well to the French public who saw the actions of Blum's government as handling the situation very skilfully.

I am going to have a think about where to go from here as its back of a cigarette pack stuff at the moment - but basically I am trying to introduce some greater stability to the French government of the day allowing for subtle changes to how events are handled and how better ready for war France would become as the basic answer to the OP

I will return

 

[Palantir]

Just stop / reverse the lay off of 1000s officers and NCOs in the French army in 32 to 34. It was a big reason for the bad standing in 1940.

 

[Bougnas]

Just stop / reverse the lay off of 1000s officers and NCOs in the French army in 32 to 34. It was a big reason for the bad standing in 1940.

Do you know their average age?

 

[UnaiB]

A blunted sickle?

And your current TL?

 

[allanpcameron]

And your current TL?

No, too small a butterfly. Now the Bristol group coming back in time...

 

[marathag]

Unlikely to work.

Very expensive. The soil near the channel is bad for that type of Fort. Fails to funnel the enemy.

sink pilings to bedrock. Apply concrete. And then more concrete. Remove caissons once above the water level

Above is much harder and expensive than just planting a Fort in some Poulder close to the channel

It's an engineering problem solved in the 19th Century

 

[Hörnla]

Have the French Military accept the fact that the French Air Force spotted a German Army traffic jam in the Ardennes Forest and send more planes to harass them while the French Army redeploys to meet them.

It IS that simple. Manstein's concept was a daring gamble that works on the roll of a 5 or 6. Similar to the Schlieffen plan in 1914, the Wehrmacht went with it not because it was that good - but because all other options led nowhere.

I very much refer to Frieser's book "Blitzkrieg-Legende" where he deconstructs the idea that what happened in 1940 was planned confidently and what happened would h ave been exactly the way the German planners foresaw it.

The French made so many mistakes around Sedan that it amounts to a Germanwank that really happened. Putting a very weak division into a place which is the left flank of the Maginot line. Not mining anything. Strategically confusing the Ardennes with the Himalayas. Then the Germans had a few strokes of luck on that days, e.g. a false rumour of German advances further west which gave the French the impression that the battle was lost before it even began in earnest. This incited a panic within the French troops which went out of control and a day later persuaded the French commanders to stop a massive counterattack which was already underway [in fact, it just followed a contingency plan EXPECTING a possible German strike in Sedan, so reserves actually were nearby]. This let the German panzers getting away on to their run to the Channel. And by the way, that was Guderian acting completely against the order of the OKW which said that the Sedan bridgehead had to be secured and consolidated first + against Hitler's command that it was his decision what to do once the Maas had been crossed. However, initiative was a German strong point thus it would be more realistic to reduce the number of French mistakes.

Apart from that, you could give the Germans a very hard time if the French had (like de Gaulle had proposed) formed a few more tank divisions instead of squandering their superior models spread thin alongside the poilus. With improved tactics, they'd rip the Panzer I and Panzer II apart. The only Germans seeing the Channel would be POWs. By the way, this would only have cost the French a bit of brainpower and for good measure a few radios as the French didn't have less tanks than the Wehrmacht.

Or the French could have actually used their air force against those lame Stukas and in order to pay some visits on the Panzers instead of keeping many of their planes in reserve for the years of attritional warfare to come.

All of that is however easier than to butterfly away the Maginot line which came from a deep French desire to deter war and if necessary wage it in the safest surroundings imaginable and the unwillingness to go to war / on the offensive in 1936, 1938, 1939 or early 1940 which stems from the very same mentality.

BUT if you don't have the Germans run over the French as they did OTL, then with each day the French stay in the fight without experiencing a similar utter defeat, time runs against the Nazis fast. Germany was not geared for total war, not even for protracted campaigns. Once the French start to survive brushes against the Germans without falling into disarray, they can start to work on their tactical deficits.
Britain would mobilize more by the day (and well they have Churchill, why not retake Norway while the French seem to do OK, however that idea ends). Italy would sit on its hands. Stalin would start to get nasty once he realizes Hitler needs his mercy more than the other way round. Meanwhile, in Belgium and Northern France, each day in which everything feels like a re-run of 14/18 gives both sides the conception that this will have a similar outcome. And then there is FDR across the ocean, determined to support France earlier and more decisively than Wilson did in WW1.

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

BUT if you don't have the Germans run over the French as they did OTL, then with each day the French stay in the fight without experiencing a similar utter defeat, time runs against the Nazis fast. Germany was not geared for total war, not even for protracted campaigns. Once the French start to survive brushes against the Germans without falling into disarray, they can start to work on their tactical deficits.
Britain would mobilize more by the day (and well they have Churchill, why not retake Norway while the French seem to do OK, however that idea ends). Italy would sit on its hands. Stalin would start to get nasty once he realizes Hitler needs his mercy more than the other way round. Meanwhile, in Belgium and Northern France, each day in which everything feels like a re-run of 14/18 gives both sides the conception that this will have a similar outcome. And then there is FDR across the ocean, determined to support France earlier and more decisively than Wilson did in WW1.

If France holds then there's no danger of Germany invading Britain and much less of a threat to the sea lanes so Britain wouldn't evacuate Norway. They'd won the battle in northern Norway and the line was stabilising in Central Norway.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

It IS that simple. Manstein's concept was a daring gamble that works on the roll of a 5 or 6. Similar to the Schlieffen plan in 1914, the Wehrmacht went with it not because it was that good - but because all other options led nowhere.

I very much refer to Frieser's book "Blitzkrieg-Legende" where he deconstructs the idea that what happened in 1940 was planned confidently and what happened would h ave been exactly the way the German planners foresaw it.

Mays 'Strange Victory' is another. He looks in more detail at the planning, the role of map and field exercises, & Halders actions during the October-March preparation. Like Dreiser & others have written. They went with the Sicklecut plan because every other plan tested had failed to deliver any decisive strategic result. The army commanders expected a massive infantry artillery battle after the tanks and aircraft failed. Goerings staff had prepared plans for using the Netherlands airfields to attack the UK. They had no confidence the coastal airfields of Flanders and Normandy would be in their hands.

 

[RedSword12]

This isn't really a challenge, to be honest. The Allies had to make a lot of mistakes for France to fall, and 1933 is so early that even the slightest change could change everything in the Allies' favour.

 

[RedSword12]

All of that is however easier than to butterfly away the Maginot line which came from a deep French desire to deter war and if necessary wage it in the safest surroundings imaginable and the unwillingness to go to war / on the offensive in 1936, 1938, 1939 or early 1940 which stems from the very same mentality.

The point of the Maginot Line wasn't supposed to be 100% impenetrable, rather it was to slow the German advance until France could mobilize its vast resources for the war effort. They didn't want a repeat of 1870.

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

• France doesn't make a defense guarantee to Poland and remains neutral.
• Poland decides that they can't fight Germany and the USSR, and that the Franco-British guarantee is worthless, so they submit to Hitler's ultimatum.
• Elser's bomb kills Hitler. Goering makes peace.
• No Mechelen incident. Germans follow the original plan for FALL GELB, which bogs down in central Belgium in head-on attacks against quality French troops and the BEF. The Schwarz Kapelle overthrows Hitler and makes peace in October 1940.
• The Allies break into Enigma in early February 1940; are warned of and crush the German invasion of Norway. FALL GELB is delayed a month. The Allies are warned of SICHELSCHNITT; with a month to prepare, they stop the Germans in the Ardennes cold and also stop the German drive into the Netherlands and Belgium. The SK overthrows Hitler and makes peace.
• No Mechelen incident. Germans follow the original plan for FALL GELB, which bogs down in central Belgium (after capturing Brussels) in head-on attacks against quality French troops and the BEF. In September, the Germans launch a second offensive southward through Luxembourg, which turns the flank of the Maginot Line. After two months of heavy fighting, the French fall back from northern Lorraine. However, British and Belgian troops recapture Brussels. Fighting shuts down for the winter. In April 1941, Germans attack west from Luxembourg, breaking through toward the Channel. Simultaneously, Italy and Spain enter the war, attacking France from the SE and SW. France collapses, being completely occupied by June, except for bridgeheads at Cherbourg and Brest.
• The 1937 Panay incident between the US and Japan escalates toward war, but the US has to back down because the Army is too small. FDR launches army expansion and re-armament as an unemployment remedy. By 1939, the US Army has over 1M under arms, including a full-strength armored corps. German actions in Spain and Poland justify US declaration of war in December, with the restriction that there will be no conscription and only volunteeers for overseas service. By April, the American Volunteer Expeditionary Force (VEF) is in France with 100,000 men, including two armored divisions, two motorized divisions. and six squadrons of fighter planes. The VEF is deployed near Reims as the Allied central reserve. The VEF counterattacks the German breakthrough at Sedan, and smashes the German spearheads; US fighters shred the Stukas. The German offensive stalls; fighting continues. An anti-Hitler coup by the Schwarz Kapelle fails in September, leading to Hitler purging the Army and elevating SS officers to all high command positions (notably loyal Wehrmacht generals transfer to the SS). This disruption semi-paralyzes German forces through December 1940. In spring 1941, German forces attack again, and are repulsed (SS generals are not very competent). German morale is now quite depressed, but with the Schwarz Kapelle wiped out and the Army subordinated to the SS, Hitler's control is unshakeable. In September 1941, Soviet forces surprise attack Germany, overrunning Prussia (except fortress Konigsberg), Poland, Silesia, and Pomerania and reaching Berlin. (With huge casualties: even with SS generals, the Germans are way better than 1941 Soviets.) "Allied" (UK+Commonwealth+Empire, US, Belgian, French) forces advance in the west, closing to the Rhine in November. Romania cuts off oil to Germany under Soviet pressure. In 1942, the Allies and Soviets batter Germany into submission.

That's seven different scenarios.

 

[Johnrankins]

• France doesn't make a defense guarantee to Poland and remains neutral.
• Poland decides that they can't fight Germany and the USSR, and that the Franco-British guarantee is worthless, so they submit to Hitler's ultimatum.
• Elser's bomb kills Hitler. Goering makes peace.
• No Mechelen incident. Germans follow the original plan for FALL GELB, which bogs down in central Belgium in head-on attacks against quality French troops and the BEF. The Schwarz Kapelle overthrows Hitler and makes peace in October 1940.
• The Allies break into Enigma in early February 1940; are warned of and crush the German invasion of Norway. FALL GELB is delayed a month. The Allies are warned of SICHELSCHNITT; with a month to prepare, they stop the Germans in the Ardennes cold and also stop the German drive into the Netherlands and Belgium. The SK overthrows Hitler and makes peace.
• No Mechelen incident. Germans follow the original plan for FALL GELB, which bogs down in central Belgium (after capturing Brussels) in head-on attacks against quality French troops and the BEF. In September, the Germans launch a second offensive southward through Luxembourg, which turns the flank of the Maginot Line. After two months of heavy fighting, the French fall back from northern Lorraine. However, British and Belgian troops recapture Brussels. Fighting shuts down for the winter. In April 1941, Germans attack west from Luxembourg, breaking through toward the Channel. Simultaneously, Italy and Spain enter the war, attacking France from the SE and SW. France collapses, being completely occupied by June, except for bridgeheads at Cherbourg and Brest.
• The 1937 Panay incident between the US and Japan escalates toward war, but the US has to back down because the Army is too small. FDR launches army expansion and re-armament as an unemployment remedy. By 1939, the US Army has over 1M under arms, including a full-strength armored corps. German actions in Spain and Poland justify US declaration of war in December, with the restriction that there will be no conscription and only volunteeers for overseas service. By April, the American Volunteer Expeditionary Force (VEF) is in France with 100,000 men, including two armored divisions, two motorized divisions. and six squadrons of fighter planes. The VEF is deployed near Reims as the Allied central reserve. The VEF counterattacks the German breakthrough at Sedan, and smashes the German spearheads; US fighters shred the Stukas. The German offensive stalls; fighting continues. An anti-Hitler coup by the Schwarz Kapelle fails in September, leading to Hitler purging the Army and elevating SS officers to all high command positions (notably loyal Wehrmacht generals transfer to the SS). This disruption semi-paralyzes German forces through December 1940. In spring 1941, German forces attack again, and are repulsed (SS generals are not very competent). German morale is now quite depressed, but with the Schwarz Kapelle wiped out and the Army subordinated to the SS, Hitler's control is unshakeable. In September 1941, Soviet forces surprise attack Germany, overrunning Prussia (except fortress Konigsberg), Poland, Silesia, and Pomerania and reaching Berlin. (With huge casualties: even with SS generals, the Germans are way better than 1941 Soviets.) "Allied" (UK+Commonwealth+Empire, US, Belgian, French) forces advance in the west, closing to the Rhine in November. Romania cuts off oil to Germany under Soviet pressure. In 1942, the Allies and Soviets batter Germany into submission.

That's seven different scenarios.

Well though out and there are others. The Conquest of France was far from a sure thing.

 

[GeographyDude]

Have the French Military accept the fact that the French Air Force spotted a German Army traffic jam in the Ardennes Forest and send more planes to harass them while the French Army redeploys to meet them.

. . . Strategically confusing the Ardennes with the Himalayas. Then the Germans had a few strokes of luck on that days, e.g. a false rumour of German advances further west which gave the French the impression that the battle was lost before it even began in earnest. This incited a panic within the French troops which went out of control and a day later persuaded the French commanders to stop a massive counterattack which was already underway [in fact, it just followed a contingency plan EXPECTING a possible German strike in Sedan, so reserves actually were nearby]. This let the German panzers getting away on to their run to the Channel. . .

I think the belief that the Ardennes Forest was “impenetrable” or even with the qualifier “largely impenetrable” is one of these things which sounds Oh so reasonable, and turns out just not to be true.

An analogy might be with the Bay of Pigs in 1961 in which it was believed that invading Cuban soldiers could escape to the hills if things went badly. When actually the hills were a long distance away.

It sounds reasonable. So, it’s not looked at too closely.

The Fall of France | Air & Space Forces Magazine

Miscalculations led the superior force to a stunning defeat in less than six weeks.

www.airforcemag.com

 

[groundhogday666]

There are so many butterflies there, all the way from January 30 1933 to May 19, 1940 - the day Abbeville fell and the future Dunkirk pocket was closed - northern France becoming a huge trap.

One example from the top of my head. October 9, 1934, Marseille. The King of Yugoslavia was shot, BUT Louis Barthou died and Alphonse George was badly crippled.
Now, guess who succeeded Louis Barthou, getting his break in politics ? Pierre Laval, Pétain future damned soul that was shot in 1945 for betrayal.
And guess who was picked up as Generalissime of the French Army, instead of the wounded and weakened George ? Maurice Gamelin, the very one who sunk France 5 years later (he was Daladier favorite, and Daladier was everywhere in the late 30's)

It has been medically and scientifically (and by his family, too) acknowledged that Gamelin brain was actively being destroyed by advanced syphillis. I kid you not.

Take a deep breath, and read the above sentence again: France military leader in 1940 was half brain dead, of syphillis.

Butterfly the 1934 terrorist attack, and 1940 campaign has no Gamelin. France chance of collapsing as per OTL have just diminished by 10000%. The man was as dumb as a washing machine. If you think Luigi Cadorna was a bad general, because Caporetto, well, Gamelin was Cadorna, CUBED. THAT kind of dumb. Except worse.

If France still lose and Pétain prevails, he will have no Laval. This will bring massive changes to Vichy, if Vichy ever happens.

 

[Bougnas]

There are so many butterflies there, all the way from January 30 1933 to May 19, 1940 - the day Abbeville fell and the future Dunkirk pocket was closed - northern France becoming a huge trap.

One example from the top of my head. October 9, 1934, Marseille. The King of Yugoslavia was shot, BUT Louis Barthou died and Alphonse George was badly crippled.
Now, guess who succeeded Louis Barthou, getting his break in politics ? Pierre Laval, Pétain future damned soul that was shot in 1945 for betrayal.
And guess who was picked up as Generalissime of the French Army, instead of the wounded and weakened George ? Maurice Gamelin, the very one who sunk France 5 years later (he was Daladier favorite, and Daladier was everywhere in the late 30's)

It has been medically and scientifically (and by his family, too) acknowledged that Gamelin brain was actively being destroyed by advanced syphillis. I kid you not.

Take a deep breath, and read the above sentence again: France military leader in 1940 was half brain dead, of syphillis.

Butterfly the 1934 terrorist attack, and 1940 campaign has no Gamelin. France chance of collapsing as per OTL have just diminished by 10000%. The man was as dumb as a washing machine. If you think Luigi Cadorna was a bad general, because Caporetto, well, Gamelin was Cadorna, CUBED. THAT kind of dumb. Except worse.

If France still lose and Pétain prevails, he will have no Laval. This will bring massive changes to Vichy, if Vichy ever happens.

Laval was an important and successful French politician long before 1934, so he would still be there. You need to avoid his radicalisation.

Regarding the Ardennes, it says a lot that France made wargames to defend it as early as 1933, and once again in 1934, 1935 and 1938. In all of those wargames, the result was clear: Germany could indeed cross the Ardennes all the way to the Meuse within 24-60 hours thanks to the good road network, overwhelm French defenses in the area within 24 hours, and quote "seriously compromise our situation". The French estimated they could react within 2 weeks, but finding a way to keep the Germans at bay long enough to do this was a really difficult equation to solve.
Not much was done about this under Weygand from 33-35, likely because budgets of the time simply didn't allow adequate reinforcements. He questioned the actual speed of the Germans, but nonetheless was worried. The exercise from 1938 (and possibly the earlier ones) recommended that at least a full armored division be available in the area at all times to stop the Germans.

Gamelin didn't believe the leading officer in charge of 1938's exercise, Prételat, and held a grudge against him for this. In 1940, command of the forces in the sector of Sedan was left to Billotte who was busy also leading the French forces going to Belgium, while Prételat was underutilized commanding the units to the right of that sector even though the Maginot Line was calm. The armored unit intended to protect Sedan, France's strong 7th Army, was instead wasted in a battle of encounter in the doomed Netherlands.
Georges maybe wasn't as worried as the Ardennes sector commanders, but had he been commander in chief he would certainly have maintained a minimal coherent defense with Prételat having the 7th Army and the Ardennes sector units. Was it enough to stop the Germans? Maybe not but it was better than the joke of a defense that was OTL Ardennes.

 

[Garrison]

It IS that simple. Manstein's concept was a daring gamble that works on the roll of a 5 or 6. Similar to the Schlieffen plan in 1914, the Wehrmacht went with it not because it was that good - but because all other options led nowhere.

I very much refer to Frieser's book "Blitzkrieg-Legende" where he deconstructs the idea that what happened in 1940 was planned confidently and what happened would h ave been exactly the way the German planners foresaw it.

Tooze's 'Wages of Destruction' also supports this, pointing out that Germany military spending in the period after the fall of Poland was focused on artillery and ammo, suggesting they expected to fight a battle more like those of 1918 than what actually played out in 1940.

 

[Garrison]

If WWII were a video game the Germans succeeding in 1940 would probably have the player base complaining the game was rigging the Allied NPC's to be too stupid.

 

[McPherson]

And then there is FDR across the ocean, determined to support France earlier and more decisively than Wilson did in WW1.

Radios, planes and oil as lend lease was all that was needed. Just seeing the stuff coming off American ships into Bordeaux and Cherbourg would have boosted French morale and SHATTERED German morale. It would have helped in 1939. By 1940, it would be too late.

 

[HelloThere]

The Soviet-German agreement somehow fails so Germany has to invade Poland all alone. Poland thus puts up a tougher fight and the French invasion of the Saar area is not as pathetic as OTL. In the end, the Germans still win and the French still put out, but Germany is so weakened, that in 1940 Hitler either doesn't push for an invasion of France or gets couped while trying to force the Wehrmacht to do it.