AHC: Prevent the Fall of France in 1940

Radios, planes and oil as lend lease was all that was needed. Just seeing the stuff coming off American ships into Bordeaux and Cherbourg would have boosted French morale and SHATTERED German morale. It would have helped in 1939. By 1940, it would be too late.
I refered only to potential US land lease in the case of a prolonged war. Yes, I agree any American involvement would boost French morale. However I doubt German morale would be shattered by this more than by the actual belief in the field.
Germans believed the still almost won WW1 despite America producing that many arms and ammo for the entente. Only encountering American en masse as in the latter part of 1918 would have that effect.
 
A short list of possible PODs

- 1934, February: the King of Belgium doesn't fall to his death climbing a mountain, no Leopold, more cooperation with the french

- 1934, October 9, Marseille: Louis Barthou does not die, and French diplomacy against Hitler is handled much more strongly

- March 7, 1936: France send even minimal troops to the Rhineland. German soldiers on bicycles run away, Hitler sh*t his pants.

- Munich: Vuillemin unmask the LW potemkine airshow in August 1938. In turn, he is slightly less negative with Daladier. Daladier tells Chamberlain to go screw himself and decides to provide some limited military gear to the Czechs, that's the best he could do, but he encourage them to fight.
In turn, this convince the Czech to fight, even if the odds are against them. The war bogs down, the Germans win but takes large losses and, most importantly, the Czechs either burn the Skoda works to the ground or, alternatively, pass some advanced armor stuff to the French. Examining OTL Panzer III (that crushed France OTL ) somebody has a lightbulb moment "look ! their tanks have two-man turrets and radios !"

- spring 1939 Deputy Pierre Taittinger and 9th Army commander André George Corap manage to get Gamelin fired when the pathetic state of Corap's Meuse defensive lines hit newspaper headlines. Plus Gamelin initial answer to Corap asking for reinforcements "Corap, I don't care about the Meuse" "La Meuse, Corap, ça ne m'intéresse pas" - triggers a major scandal. Alphonse George replaces Gamelin and, while no genius, he is no Cadorna either. Plus he has no spyhillis. End result: only minimal changes can get massive butterflies 18 months later, since the Germans were so damn lucky and Gamelin was so stupid.

- post September 1939 there are so many possible PODs, until May 19, 1940...

- The Escault > Dyle > Breda disastrous paradigm shift never happens.

a) Extremely important, because it mirrored Manstein very own shift of swapping "Schlieffen 2.0" for "the Ardennes sickle cut. "

b) The French not only decides NOT to go to Breda for the Netherlands, but to defend themselves on the Escault, France, rather than on the Dyle - middle of Belgium.

c) Most importantly, Giraud 7th Army stick in reserve in Reims, rather than that foolish ride to Breda 300 miles north. End result: when the 7 panzer divisions speed out of the Ardennes on May 14, 1940, Giraud is right there - south of the "panzer corridor" - to try and stop them before they hit the coast at Abbeville and close the "northern France death trap".

d) - Manstein versus Breda is very much like two boxers facing on the ring: one French, one German.
The French boxer throw a punch aimed at the German in front of him.
The german boxer seemingly brace for the coming very strong punch in his face and then... just as the French throws his weight forward, the German boxer suddenly flex his knees.
The French punch goes above his adversary head... and the German throw his fist upward and violently punch his adversary in the stomach or - dare I say - in the testicles.
The French boxer growls, recoils, tries to react - and then collapse in pain, down for the count. German boxer win by surprise and K.O.
In contrast, "Escault versus Schlieffen 2.0 " is like the two boxers punching themselves in the face or in the jaw, bam bam bam.

More on this later
 
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Let me illustrates this XCKD style - that's the best I can do with my disastrous drawing skills - so please, be nice...

It's a bit like a freakkin' Dragon Ball styled fight. Imagine Frieza trying to punch Goku in the face with a supercharged fist. Then the smarter Goku flex his knees, dodge the punch which goes above his head, into the void; he then throws his weight forward, and punch and breaks Frieza right in the testicles, causing him to break down in pain, then fall down - down for the count.
Goku win. Not loyal by any mean, but so damn efficient.

Also works for facing a stronger adversary in the street or in a school playing ground (think Nelson Muns in a bad day). Let him charges ahead first, dodge, and then send your foot punching his balls, full strength. It's radical: the guy will break down in pain, down for the count.

That's very much what happened to France in 1940. Stricken by surprise, at a very vulnerable... juncture.
 

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McPherson

Banned
I referred only to potential US land lease in the case of a prolonged war. Yes, I agree any American involvement would boost French morale. However I doubt German morale would be shattered by this more than by the actual belief in the field.
The Americans cannot build aeroplanes. They are very good at refrigerators and razor blades.

Hermann Goring

Why did Goering say 'You can call me Meyer'?

Germans believed the still almost won WW1 despite America producing that many arms and ammo for the entente. Only encountering American en masse as in the latter part of 1918 would have that effect.
It matters very little to the scared German civilian or soldier on the ground underneath it, if the A-20 Havoc (DB-7) or the LeO 451 is flown by French AdA crews or American "AVG" volunteers.

As for radios and oil...

The French armor (chars d’assaut) needed reliable radios and good petroleum supplies. There was nothing much wrong with French crews or training at the regiment level or below as Hannut proved as to how to locally move and shoot against the aggressors. There was a LOT wrong with tactical radio nets at the division and above level that was not just operational incompetence/ignorance of how it should be done, (doctrine and command method; that is look, report, communicate and act on new information at the operational level.) but was due to "technical lack" of means. I include good POL products as part of the problem because a lot of the reason for breakdowns in road marches, besides a lack of spare parts, shortages of mechanics, and transporters, was that often the fuel and lubricants available was substandard or not present at all forcing French crews to abandon their machines in situ.

"You fight with what you have and not what you want."

Donald Rumsfield

"Vous pouvez résoudre les petits problèmes avec une certaine attention aux détails avant qu’ils ne deviennent trop grands pour être ignorés en cas de crise."

or "You can fix the little problems with some attention to details before they become too large to ignore in a crisis."

A lot of little problems can be fixed in 9 months of phony war. During the "sitzkrieg" (phony war) that preceded the first Gulf War, the allies found out how to maneuver in the Iraqi desert, how to clear Iraqi obstacles and how to fuse disparate doctrines and command methods into a unified purpose. A lot of that was trivia was the "radios and how to use them" problems ironed out in equivalent late 20th century terms as to what the French AND THE BRITISH faced in May 1940.

Just getting people to look, report, and act on new information (the OODA loop.) would have solved 90% of the French op-art shortfalls, but to do it, first one has to have reliable RADIOS and practice with them, and has to be able to move. Those were two "technicals" that hobbled the French army. Germans come up against French who are faster off the mark and get inside the German decision cycle speeds and German morale will be shattered. THAT and a lot of American built planes dumping bombs on them (The "Meyer") is what will shatter German morale.
 
For Sedan alone, there are three PODs that could have changed the outcome

- the Taittinger parliamentary report - done with André Corap support from March 1940, as he was all too aware the IXth army defense on the Meuse were too poor. But Gamelin... well, you know. The report was ignored.

- the French reconnaissance saw the Panzer colossal traffic jam in the Ardennes right from May 11, and renewed its report over the next day. They were ignored

- the giant panzer traffic jam in the Ardennes lasted two complete days... yet nobody ever bombed it. Many years later, german soldiers acknowledged they literally wet their pants thinking about the damage even a handful of bombers could have done.

Finally, some words about Huntziger... commander of the other army in the Ardennes ( next to Corap Ninth) the 2nd Army. Huntziger was a "Gamelin in the making". Despite the Taittinger report and the 1870 war, he said, TWICE, in APRIL and on MAY, 7th 1940
"Nah, the Germans will never attack near Sedan".
What a brilliant foresight, really. But Huntziger (who ended in Vichy, what a surprise !) was a political darling, just like Gamelin. Note that Huntziger, before dying in a plane crash late 1941, had no qualms about making Corap, not him, the Sedan scapegoat. And it worked well - for him.
 
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Have Marshal Petain die no later than Feb 1934

At that time, provisdoal funds had been voted for extension of the Maginot Line; but Petain intervened against it, because many French indusreial areas were too near the Belgian frontier for sn extended ML to protctt hem, so the only option was to advance across the borrder before the Germans got there, His prestige carried the day.

Had the extension gone ahead, the breakthrough at Sedan would probably have been impossible.
 
Somewhat remarquably, the German breakthrough point was merely 30 km from the extreme northern tip of the Maginot line, on the border with Luxembourg (which, unlike Belgium, did not cared about the Maginot line on its borders)
This very one - La Ferté.

So La Ferté is the Maginot Line extreme tip : where Luxembourg stops and Belgium neutrality starts. The thing is, La Ferté guns could shoot up to 15 km north, somewhat virtually extending the Maginot line there.

Well, the Germans simply considered this very fact, added a "safety margin" (20 - 25 km) and went no further to establish the southern flanks of the "panzer corridor" with the 7 armored divisions.

Takes Google maps, put Ouvrage La Ferté, and weep.


Note how close La Ferté is from Sedan, but also from Stonne and Le Mont Dieu... where the French actually resisted for a month ! IT is a crying shame, with these places so close from each other, that no counter attack could be launched. (Flavigny, you idiot... !)
 

McPherson

Banned
For Sedan alone, there are three PODs that could have changed the outcome

- the Taittinger parliamentary report - done with André Corap support from March 1940, as he was all too aware the IXth army defense on the Meuse were too poor. But Gamelin... well, you know. The report was ignored.

- the French reconnaissance saw the Panzer colossal traffic jam in the Ardennes right from May 11, and renewed its report over the next day. They were ignored

- the giant panzer traffic jam in the Ardennes lasted two complete days... yet nobody ever bombed it. Many years later, german soldiers acknowledged they literally wet their pants thinking about the damage even a handful of bombers could have done.

Finally, some words about Huntziger... commander of the other army in the Ardennes ( next to Corap Ninth) the 2nd Army. Huntziger was a "Gamelin in the making". Despite the Taittinger report and the 1870 war, he said, TWICE, in APRIL and on MAY, 7th 1940
"Nah, the Germans will never attack near Sedan".
What a brilliant foresight, really. But Huntziger (who ended in Vichy, what a surprise !) was a political darling, just like Gamelin. Note that Huntziger, before dying in a plane crash late 1941, had no qualms about making Corap, not him, the Sedan scapegoat. And it worked well - for him.
This reminds me so much of Pearl Harbor... but the topic here is what could the French do? Realistically what could they do?

We have to assume that they have no time, little money and few capital and labor resources to fix the problems they know and ...

1606913069939.png


Belgians should have heard of anti-paratrooper methods (aka barrage balloons and planted telephone poles with sharp pointy tips planted in the open fields around the fort.) Or even infantry with BAYONETS on their rifles...

World War Two Daily: May 11, 1940: Eben Emael Surrenders

Somewhat remarquably, the German breakthrough point was merely 30 km from the extreme northern tip of the Maginot line, on the border with Luxembourg (which, unlike Belgium, did not cared about the Maginot line on its borders)
This very one - La Ferté.

So La Ferté is the Maginot Line extreme tip : where Luxembourg stops and Belgium neutrality starts. The thing is, La Ferté guns could shoot up to 15 km north, somewhat virtually extending the Maginot line there.

Well, the Germans simply considered this very fact, added a "safety margin" (20 - 25 km) and went no further to establish the southern flanks of the "panzer corridor" with the 7 armored divisions.

Takes Google maps, put Ouvrage La Ferté, and weep.


Note how close La Ferté is from Sedan, but also from Stonne and Le Mont Dieu... where the French actually resisted for a month ! IT is a crying shame, with these places so close from each other, that no counter attack could be launched. (Flavigny, you idiot... !)
1606913643157.png

For the French?
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Found a WW2 anti-tank mine, it went BOOM! - YouTube

Even low grade infantry can plant them and COVER them with infantry weapons so Panzer grenadiers cannot lift them. Buy time. Only need about 100 hours to disrupt Mannstein's gamble and put the Germans on the back foot. We've covered these details in other threads. Even with fools like Huntziger and Gamelin, the French only needed 100 hundred stinking hours to reorient and win around Sedan. 4 days!
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
No Mechelen incident. Germans follow the original plan for FALL GELB, which bogs down in central Belgium (after capturing Brussels) in head-on attacks against quality French troops and the BEF. In September, the Germans launch a second offensive southward through Luxembourg, which turns the flank of the Maginot Line. After two months of heavy fighting, the French fall back from northern Lorraine. However, British and Belgian troops recapture Brussels. Fighting shuts down for the winter. In April 1941, Germans attack west from Luxembourg, breaking through toward the Channel. Simultaneously, Italy and Spain enter the war, attacking France from the SE and SW. France collapses, being completely occupied by June, except for bridgeheads at Cherbourg and Brest.

Please play this one out in terms of what happens in 1941, 1942, and 1943. Meanwhile, what's been happening with Italy, the Soviet Union, the Americas, and Asia-Pacific?

Have Marshal Petain die no later than Feb 1934

At that time, provisdoal funds had been voted for extension of the Maginot Line; but Petain intervened against it, because many French indusreial areas were too near the Belgian frontier for sn extended ML to protctt hem, so the only option was to advance across the borrder before the Germans got there, His prestige carried the day.

Had the extension gone ahead, the breakthrough at Sedan would probably have been impossible.
How much further would it have gone.
 
- the French reconnaissance saw the Panzer colossal traffic jam in the Ardennes right from May 11, and renewed its report over the next day. They were ignored

- the giant panzer traffic jam in the Ardennes lasted two complete days... yet nobody ever bombed it. Many years later, german soldiers acknowledged they literally wet their pants thinking about the damage even a handful of bombers could have done.

Actually they were bombed. On the 11th one or more Groupes of the ultra modern LeOrient 45 twin engine bombers made tree top runs on the roads. They could not miss, and neither did the Germans. Records of Guderians 19th Pz Corps were destroyed in 1943 by a fire from a Allied bombing attack so we don't have detailed evidence of losses. Anecdotal records from the German witnesses indicate vehicles were destroyed, men killed & wounded and traffic halted. We just don't know how many. French records are complete & indicate a loss rate of between 40 & 50% of the bomber sorties, counting both machines that did not return & those requiring extensive repair.

On the 12th May Guderians 19th Corps HQ in the Hotel Panorama in Bulson on the Semois River was bombed a little after 12:00 German time. The raid covered the town & bridge with bombs. One 250kg bomb hit the hotel parking lot, wrecking several HQ vehicles. Guderian taking cover in the lobby had a wall decoration, a boars head strike the floor adjacent to him (what if it had incapacitated him?). The corps columns moving through town to the bridge & a ford or ferry crossing took losses in vehicles damaged & men wonder or killed.

On the 14th May the crossing sites at Sedan, two pontoon bridges and two ferries. were attacked by 140+ French bombers and a dozen or so Brits. While neither bridge was struck the ferries were damaged and vehicle/personnel loss occurred along the approaches. One French bomber was described as crashing into the river close enough to endanger the pontoon anchors & cables

The French bomber attacks were effective, but too few and suffered severe losses. They needed a lot more than 200-300 sorties to cause significant delay to the columns. Even in 1940 the German had to make a maximum effort to concentrate 500+ bombers on a battlefield target like that. No other air force had that capability.
 
Very interesting ! I was not aware of this.

I red in a very thrusty source that, on May 10, 1940 on the North-East front, the French had exactly 27 modern bombers. This evenly matches the I/12 and II/12 LeO-451...

Since then I checked, by aircraft types. And that number seems to be true.
- Amiot 351/ 354: only 80 build and in service, none by May 1940
- More LeO-451 ? yes, at the GIABSE... in southern france, a transformation and training bombing center. Training pilots to modern aircraft, after the antiquated 143
- Douglas DB-7 : Casablanca, then Evreux, in Normandie... first blood on May 18, too late
- Martin 167: one group in... the Alps (don't ask me why !)
- Breguet 693: too few (less than 50) , attacked in Tongres and Gembloux, central Belgium, May 11... and suffered 60% losses in three missions.

Well... we are done. That was French bombardement strength by May 10, 1940.

Near Sedan on 11 - 15 may were (from memory): GB I/12 and II/12 with too few Leo-451 (12, then 5 of them !) there were three groups of Amiot 143 (gasp !) and one group of Farman 224 heavies (at night only) - plus a handful of Breguets survivor of the previous day butchering in Gembloux and Tongres.
And of course the British, who lost a shitload of Battles trying to blast the damn bridges and poontoons.
 
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pierre_Taittinger

Unfortunately the english Wikipedia doesn't mention it, but the French one does. In March 1940, warned by 9th Army (lucid) commander André Georges Corap, that deputy made a vitriolic report on Gamelin and the Meuse defenses: he went examining the exact place where the german broke through three months later.

And he delivered a perfectly visionary warning.
...
Which went nowhere.

Yes, damn it, this is like freakkin' Pearl Harbor and 9-11 altogether.

God damn it, between
- the 1938 war game
- Corap warnings
- the Taittinger report
- the french reconnaissance on the 11 May
- the german traffic jam

There were five missed opportunities to stop the Sedan breakthrough.
 
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IT is a crying shame, with these places so close from each other, that no counter attack could be launched. (Flavigny, you idiot... !)
Flavigny disobeying Huntzingers orders to counter attack on the 14th is definitely a lost opportunity. Most writers focus on the difficulties of the 3rd Div Char in getting ready for the counter attack. Fuel was late, one of the four tank battalions never showed up that day. The other battalions were late getting to position. Conversely the crack 3rd Motor Inf Div. was ready on time & moral of that unit remained excellent. Perhaps news of the failure of the counter attack of the 10th Corps reserve unhinged Flavirgny? Still he had a very well trained infantry division, a half dozen battalions of artillery ready & four tank battalions remaining, including some of the most powerful tanks on the planet, and the German crossing at Sdan was still under attack by crashing French and British bombers. Instead late afternoon he directly disobeyed Huntzingers orders, canceling the attack, & ordered his corps (20th Corps) dispersed into a defense.

Another lost opportunity covered the afternoon of the 12May, the evening & morning of the 13th. The French 10th Corps defending the Sedan area possessed 174 cannon of assorted calibers, including medium and heavy. Most were in range of the crossing site. The 10th Corps had been responsible for this sector for months and the artillery had built up multiple fire plans for the defense, rehearsed them, surveyed target reference points, & done ranging shoots into the fields. Observation posts had their sectors memorized and walked the dead ground to eliminate its use to the enemy. When the German 19th Corps started occupying its attack position along the river on the evening of the 12th May the Corps artillery commander recommended only minor harassing fires. The 10th Corps commander & 2d Army staff had assured him the Germans would not be ready to attack across the river until the 20th May. It would take them that long to bring up their infantry, artillery, river assault equipment and ammunition. The corps artillery commander recommended saving the ammunition & keeping the guns concealed until the main battle. The Corps commander concurred & the artillery sat silent while the last French aircrew died attacking the German columns crossing the Semois river.

Guderians corps had plenty of difficulty on its own assembling for the river crossing. They were not ready until the late afternoon of the 13th. How much more difficult it would have been with French interdiction fires across the roads and fields all night we will never know.
 
Thanks for these details. They tragically illustrate
a) how the French were taken by surprise, too fast and
b) how they missed a young, smart, responsive commander to bring the powerful but scattered pieces of the puzzle together, and kick the German asses.

And had Flavigny not disobeyed, Huntziger might have become a hero. And that would be one hell of a sickening injustice, really. Because Huntziger was one hell of an arrogant prick.
As for Flavigny, he was really the wrong man at the wrong place, unfortunately.
Made Corap a scapegoat, then went to Vichy, helped writting the laws screwing the jews. Before (conveniently) dying in a plane crash late 1941.
 
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- Martin 167: one group in... the Alps (don't ask me why !)
They may have been just delivered to a transitioning unit. Or perhaps enroute from the assembly plant in Algeria. During the winter Martin Aircraft (a US company) had installed a final assembly plant, in Morocco. Disassembled airframes were shipped there from the US for finishing. There was a parts depot, and a ground crew training school there as well. The assembly site had been operating since April. Douglas had just completed a similar facility in Algeria.

Note how near a third of the French operating groups had ben withdrawn to the south in April, then stood down for transition to new machines. Some 30% of French air strength was out of reach 10 May
 
There is a simple reason for that. In 1938 when trying to rearm with an industry crippled by 20 years in hell since 1918, the french government made the most stupid sacrifice, ever.
They said exactly this
"a) Fighter are defensive weapons
"b) If France bombed Germany, we would be agressors
"c) And the Germans would bomb Paris and kills thousands of civilians
Thus...
"d) Let's rebuild the fighter force as our top priority. Bombers ? meh. See you later."
The bombers programs carried on, make no mistake - but top priority was given to fighter production.
(facepalm)
...end result: while the fighter squadrons had more or less 400 - 500 modern aircraft by 1939, the bomber squadrons were hopeless.

More generally, there were not enough engines and money for both, so fighters were given priority. While Great Britain could afford that because The Channel would stop panzers (and it did) France doesn't seem to have considered there was no Channel between the border and Belgium.
 
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Doughty 'The Breaking Point' is a good English language description of the strengths & weaknesses of the French 10th Corps and German 19th Corps. , and how those played out in the battle.
 
...end result: while the fighter squadrons had more or less 400 - 500 modern aircraft by 1939, the bomber squadrons were hopeless.

I guess thats one bright spot. People cross checking Germans records of aircraft losses against Dutch, Belgian, Brit, and French claims credit the French interceptors with approx 560 of the German aircraft lost.
 
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