AHC: Make Gallipoli an Entente Victory

[Onkel Willie]

Or no naval campaign so when the troops hit the beach they do so with surprise on their side. Of course both going in at the same time has the best chance of success.

Or feeding the forces into other fronts would probably be more productive as the Gallipoli campaign was a complete waste of lives and resources.

I wouldn't call it a waste. If it had succeeded and if the Entente had knocked out the Ottomans by the end of 1915 it would have provided the Russians with some much needed breathing room.

 

[jahenders]

Dardanelles again?
It was aptly named Churchill's Folly, and the way it was planned and executed it could only end into a disaster. It did, in spades.

The problems with the Gallipoli is that it was not properly planned. Everything started with Grand-duke Nicholas' request for a naval demonstration against the Dardanelles forts in early January 1915. Please note that the Russians were just asking for a "demonstration" and nothing more.
However Churchill - who had gotten a few black eyes in the first 6 months of the war (Goeben, Antwerp, Coronel) - picked up the ball and started running, against the advice of both Fisher and Kitchener.

There were a number of major issues that were never properly assessed, much less solved:

• The defenses of the Dardanelles were very well thought and layered. First there were the forts; then the multiple minefields, protected by dedicated gun batteries; finally there were a large number of howitzers in protected emplacements along the narrows. The forts could be silenced by the guns of capital ships, but this required spotters on the Gallipoli peninsula. The howitzers had to be silenced by land troops. The key issue were the minefields, which could be cleared by minesweepers: the problem was that the current is from the Black sea to the Egean, and the converted fisher boats used toclear the minefieldscould not move faster than 2 knots. They were both too slow and easily hammered by land batteries. There were fast minesweepers in the North sea and the Channel, but neither the British nor the French accepted to release them
• The assessment of the Admiralty was that forcing the straits by naval forces only would have resulted in losses ranging between 65 and 80%. The colliers to bring coal andammunitionsto the sea of Marmara would have been hammered even worse, being slower and less protected.
• It is quite obvious that a pure naval campaign was not a sane option. OTOH the army command did not accept to shift troops from the Wester Front to Gallipoli (and Kitchener was very much relieved when Churchill insisted that a purely naval operation was perfectly feasible)
• To compound the folly, the operation was announced on the press in late January, loosing the vital element of surprise and allowing the Ottoman to reinforce the defenses of the Gallipoli peninsula.

How to make the operation successful is pretty easy: solve all of the issues listed above. It was pretty hard, though, since it would require a complete shift of strategic focus by the Allied army and navy supreme commands.

Certainly, the way it was planned and carried out was a disaster in the making, but that doesn't mean the idea didn't have merit.

I believe it could have been made to work, or at least have a good probability of success if either:
1) They plan and commit to the pure naval attack, but it's properly equipped, staffed, and led. As you note, they need fast minesweepers, not slow trawlers MANNED BY CIVILIANS, to move against enemy fire. They also need to try to push as fast as they can. They'll take some mine hits (which they did anyway), but speed is life when you're under enemy guns and can't take them all out.

2) The amphibious assault is better planned, coordinated, and led. Every officer, at every level, needs to have clear instructions that you land and then you move, and then you keep moving until you reach point X or meet resistance that you can't possibly deal with. Again, the idea that "speed is life" must be beaten into the heads of the ground officers AND the naval landing forces.

3) The best plan, of course, would be to do both secretly and simultaneously. Aside from the press discussion you mention, the allies assembled the naval force rather sloppily and then the naval attacks gave LOTS of notice of a potential amphibious assault. If they'd practiced good operational security, hit the beaches about the same time the ships were entering the strait, and then both forces moved fast, they'd have had a good chance.

 

[TRH]

I wouldn't call it a waste. If it had succeeded and if the Entente had knocked out the Ottomans by the end of 1915 it would have provided the Russians with some much needed breathing room.

The Ottomans needed breathing room from the Russians, not the other way around.

 

[Kage Acheron]

I found a TL that has a British victory at the Dardanelles, where they continued the naval attack instead of falling back as a POD. Just starting to read it, seems interesting so far.

https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=30473

 

[LordKalvan]

Certainly, the way it was planned and carried out was a disaster in the making, but that doesn't mean the idea didn't have merit.

I'm afraid I cannot agree: it was quite an amateurish idea, which would not have become a game changer even if the Entente fleet had been able to force the straits. Putting ships in the sea of Marmara would not guarantee that the Ottomans would sue for peace (what would they do? turn Constantinople into rubble? De Roebeck pointed out these issues, adding that without troops there could be no occupation), and even the best possible outcome (opening communications with Russia) might not change the trajectory of the war on the Eastern front.

OTOH, diverting substantial resources from the Western front (at least three divisions of seasoned troops in addition to the Anzac forces) and the North sea (fast minesweepers at least, but almost certainly additional naval assets to cover both the naval thrust and the land campaign) might have risked the final outcome of the war.

In the mind of the Entente supreme command, the war would be won or lost in France and in the North sea: all the other theatres of the war were more or less side shows, and the Ottoman theatre was the least important of all. Even if the resources to be sent to Gallipoli were somehow limited, the risk was not commensurable to the possible gains. Both Kitchener and Fischer (as well as the French) were in agreement on this, and it's why Churchill always trumpeted his idea of a purely naval operation (and also why he directly micromanaged the naval operations, cutting out the Naval Board and communicating directly with Canden first and De Roebeck later). Amateur hour.


IMHO this means that Gallipoli was not professionally planned, could never receive the necessary resources and would not work out.

 

[TheBrunswickian]

Maybe don't send British and French naval ships into the Straits, and alert the Turkish to the possibility of an Allied invasion so they bring in German tech to slaughter the Entente troops.

Maybe that might work.

 

[Jalipa]

The problems with the Gallipoli is that it was not properly planned.
.

I'd agree with that.
But the failures were tactical, not strategic.

Everything started with Grand-duke Nicholas' request for a naval demonstration against the Dardanelles forts in early January 1915. .

That is not quite true.

'Everything' began because the direct links to Russia were cut and because Kitchener became convinced by January 1915 that the Western Front had 'become unbreakable siege lines' (Quote)


Kitchener became convinced that attacking where CP were weaker was the way forward.

But he originally preferred to land at Alexandretta and break down the Turks piecemeal - rather than the Dardanelles.

There were a number of major issues that were never properly assessed, much less solved:

• The defenses of the Dardanelles were very well thought and layered. First there were the forts; then the multiple minefields, protected by dedicated gun batteries; finally there were a large number of howitzers in protected emplacements along the narrows. The forts could be silenced by the guns of capital ships, but this required spotters on the Gallipoli peninsula. The howitzers had to be silenced by land troops. The key issue were the minefields, which could be cleared by minesweepers: the problem was that the current is from the Black sea to the Egean, and the converted fisher boats used toclear the minefieldscould not move faster than 2 knots. They were both too slow and easily hammered by land batteries. There were fast minesweepers in the North sea and the Channel, but neither the British nor the French accepted to release them

This true.

But the defences were improved between the first abortive Naval operation and the landings.

Hence the argument that if the first Naval operation was omitted and we move straight to the landings -- they would have been successful.

The same is true of the 250K Ottoman Troops.

All of this shows that a direct attack to the Dardanelles was not the best tactic. But

Convincing Bulgaria to join the Entente would have certainly helped, but it is less than clear what might be an enticing enough bribe: Adrianople and western Thrace was not enough, Constantinople would have been but the Russians would not have accepted, and I doubt that Serbia might be convinced to offer a piece of Macedonia.
.

Very True.
Getting Bulgaria on the entente side was key.
Or at least keeping them neutral.

That said 'Foxy Ferdinand' kept out until September 1915 - Only when he became convinced that the Entente had lost at Gallipoli.

Had he thought that the Entente would win - he would have accepted Thrace without Constantinople (he said as much in his memoires). But he thought he would gain Macedonia and potentially an outlet to the Adriatic.

Had the entente managed to replace King Constantine of Greece in early 1915 and brought Greece into the war - that might also have persuaded Bulgaria not to risk entering the war.

Don't take my word: check "The Grand Deception: Churchill and the Dardanelles" by Tom Curran. It is a well researched and thoughtful book, and reads well too.

I've read it -- it is readable but that author had a pet theory to promote (Churchill's Fault) and everything is spun to support that.


Frankly I think that basic strategy of attacking the CP's weakest power - Turkey was sound.

Far better attacking there, than slaughter on the Western Front.

But I think that campaign was mishandled.

Kitchener originally sponsored a piecemeal approach to Turkey.

He wanted Landings at Alexandretta - which had a large Christian population. And where there were few Turkish troops. Then a link up with the Russians in the Caucasus. Cutting the Turks in half.

It is understandable that campaign occurred. Hindsight is wonderful. But at the time you don't have it!

In April 1915 - the Turks had been defeated in the Caucasus.

And the Mesopotamian Campaign was going well - Kut had not happened - though Kitchener was concerned that a push towards Baghdad was probably not tenable - he didn't stop it.


THERE - that's an answer to the OP's question - the most successful way to Make Gallipoli an Entente Victory (with a PoD as early as Jan 1915)

Attack Alexandretta in April 1915 (iso Gallipoli) - cut the railway to Mesopotamia. Try and link up with the Russians in the Caucasus.

• Troops get withdrawn from Mesopotamia & the Dardanelles.
• The Turks in Mesopotamia are caught between two forces.
• As are those facing the The Russians in the Caucasus
• A lot of fighting
• Landings at Gallipoli April 1916.

 

[Tallil2long]

I'm afraid I cannot agree: it was quite an amateurish idea, which would not have become a game changer even if the Entente fleet had been able to force the straits. Putting ships in the sea of Marmara would not guarantee that the Ottomans would sue for peace (what would they do? turn Constantinople into rubble?

Would it have been the first time the British or French militaries had bombarded civilians? Or even the last? I can't see them balking under those circumstances.

 

[TFSmith121]

The British Army and RN need to be planning

What was needed to make Gallipoli an Entente Victory with a POD as early as January 1st 1915. And by victory that entails not just breaking out of the peninsula, but taking Constantinople and the Straits.

The British Army, RN, and RM need to be planning, training, and exercising with the goal of executing amphibious assaults by corps-sized expeditionary forces against fortified opposition in 1912-14, at least.

In addition, a decade or more of study, planning, and exercises at the brigade and divisional level needs to come before that ... the British also need to be designing and building landing craft during the same period.

Developing some way to control naval gunfire from the air would be good, as well.

Those who tried to plan Tanga and the Dardanelles were, as Bernard Fergusson wrote, guilty of every mistake one can make when it comes to amphibious operations.

The Dardanelles operation would have been difficult with the full panoply of Allied amphibious experience, techniques, and equipment in 1943-44; and even if successful, only gives the Allies control of the north side of the Strait...

The'd have to fight a second campaign for the southern side, and then drive inland ... over country that resembles central Italy more than (say) northwestern France. Maybe they'd get to Istanbul by 1917...

Best,

 

[zert]

If the Entenete had been successful in knocking out Turkey, just how many troops might they have been able to commit to the Western Front? Might they have been used instead to next make a landing against A-H to divert troops away from the Italians? Might this have a cascade effect to bring A-H to the negotiating table?

 

[TRH]

If the Entenete had been successful in knocking out Turkey, just how many troops might they have been able to commit to the Western Front? Might they have been used instead to next make a landing against A-H to divert troops away from the Italians? Might this have a cascade effect to bring A-H to the negotiating table?

Fewer troops than they could have used had they skipped the sideshow. The Turks were no threat to Russia, so engaging them was pointless. Better to attack on the Western Front immediately and take out the real danger to Russia.

 

[Jukra]

I'm afraid I cannot agree: it was quite an amateurish idea, which would not have become a game changer even if the Entente fleet had been able to force the straits. Putting ships in the sea of Marmara would not guarantee that the Ottomans would sue for peace (what would they do? turn Constantinople into rubble? De Roebeck pointed out these issues, adding that without troops there could be no occupation), and even the best possible outcome (opening communications with Russia) might not change the trajectory of the war on the Eastern front.

Bringing in the IJN and IJA would be the only way to win. They would have the daring to force the straits in one effort instead of piecemeal slapstick comedy, the skill and experience with naval landings and reducing fortressess, and finally, the ability to plan the operation as a one swift stroke.

As for Constantinopole, I think people are fixated on what happened in Berlin 1945, Moscow 1941 or Paris in 1914. I'm rather sure there would have been swift rearrangements in Ottoman leadership if Allied warships entered Marmara. And if not, an Allied force could land in the city and occupy it. Enough troops were on hand. As long as they don't bring in Greeks, there might not be major problems.

Finally, occupuying or at least threatening Constantinopole might have beneficial effect on Allied prestige around the world.

 

[zert]

The use of the Japanese might prove interesting, though I do not think that the government would be willing to send that many troops to Europe. It might also prove confrontational if the Russians squawk with Japanese having prestige near the Black Sea.

 

[Autocrat]

The use of the Japanese might prove interesting, though I do not think that the government would be willing to send that many troops to Europe. It might also prove confrontational if the Russians squawk with Japanese having prestige near the Black Sea.

This would be a great TL, Japan saves Russia by taking Constantinople alongside the Bulgarians and Greeks.

 

[TFSmith121]

One swift stroke?

Bringing in the IJN and IJA would be the only way to win. They would have the daring to force the straits in one effort instead of piecemeal slapstick comedy, the skill and experience with naval landings and reducing fortressess, and finally, the ability to plan the operation as a one swift stroke.

As for Constantinopole, I think people are fixated on what happened in Berlin 1945, Moscow 1941 or Paris in 1914. I'm rather sure there would have been swift rearrangements in Ottoman leadership if Allied warships entered Marmara. And if not, an Allied force could land in the city and occupy it. Enough troops were on hand. As long as they don't bring in Greeks, there might not be major problems.

Finally, occupuying or at least threatening Constantinopole might have beneficial effect on Allied prestige around the world.

One swift stroke?

You may want to look into how long it took the Japanese to force the surrender of Port Arthur...

Best,

 

[zert]

This would be a great TL, Japan saves Russia by taking Constantinople alongside the Bulgarians and Greeks.

Well it would certainly put some serious egg on a few Russian Faces.

 

[yulzari]

Maybe if you could wean the Navy off forcing the Dardanelles and land the troops on the coast beyond the peninsula to the north where they could move towards Constantinople over a wider area. If they move fast and don't advertise their intentions then they will be well inland before the Ottomans could bring their reserves forward and would not be presenting the defending Ottomans with a limited front to hold as IOTL.
This is very much the ground where both the Russians and Bulgarians had recently defeated the Ottomans and reached the walls of Constantinople. That had brought an end to those wars and would likely do the same and bring in Bulgaria on the Entente side. Releasing Russian forces from the Caucasus and presenting a new front for the Austro Hungarians to meet. Throw in the Italians and the Austro Hungarians might well seek a negotiated peace.

 

[FelOnyx]

Well it would certainly put some serious egg on a few Russian Faces.

Amusing as that would be, what would be Japan's motive? I don't think they would have much intrest in throwing forces at Constantinople of all places.

 

[Alternate History]

Amusing as that would be, what would be Japan's motive? I don't think they would have much intrest in throwing forces at Constantinople of all places.

An Entente guarantee for some specific post-war gain, I'd guess?

 

[Darkling]

If you achieve nothing else by getting ships into the Sea of Marmara, you achieve putting the only two munitions factories in the Ottoman Empire within gun range.

A salvo later and you just wait for the Ottomans to be reduced to rock throwing and sticks.

In the grander strategic terms the point of the operation is to help the Russians out as they can both buy and sell goods again.
Encourage thus far neutral powers to believe you are going to be the winners - Bulgaria opportunistically joins you, Italy and Romania potentially join sooner and the parties in Greece favouring the allies are buoyed.
One of the three powers against you has to at the very least flee their Capital and have vital infrastructure badly damaged.

If you can put the Ottomans on the back foot and gain new allies in short amount of time you can then put the Austrians under intense pressure.

Of course to achieve the above you need to be willing to take casualties, plan correctly and provision sufficient resources, maybe you can get away with two out of three.