Saphroneth
Banned
One way you might get Japan on-side is if the Russians agree to some kind of concession somewhere (Manchuria?) contingent on the success of the operation.
Just a thought, mind you!
Just a thought, mind you!
AHC: Make Gallipoli an Entente Victory
- Thread starter Autocrat
- Start date
The strategical approach was flawed: there was no way that a purely naval operation might be successful, and there was no way that experienced land troops might be released from the western front to participate in a sideshow.
The idea that opening the straits would have decisively changed the game on the western front was a pie in the sky. As others have already pointed out, the big problem of Russia was infrastructures. There might be a lot of supplies accumulating in Odessa, but this would not mean that they could be transported to the front
As far as Kitchener is concerned, he was not opposing the Dardanelles or the Alexandretta option or any operation against the Ottomans provided that no troops were taken away from the western front. The invasion of Mesopotamia, for example, was carried out with troops from India. He also did not allow any operation in Palestine before the Ottoman offensive against the Suez canal had fizzled out (January-February 1915). Maybe he was not gifted with enough imagination, but it is a bit difficult to fault his priorities.
By the same token the abortive shelling of the outer forts in early November 1914 saw a lucky hit which gave a big boost to British optimism.
However the troops in Thrace were always there, given the presence of Bulgarian troops on the border. The upgrading of the land defenses on the Gallipoli peninsula was mostly carried out in February 1915, when everyone knew that there would be an attempt to force the straits, and the Germans were also able to send large amount of ammunition for the guns of the forts in the same period (by train via Bulgaria)
Wooing Bulgaria should have been a pre-condition to any attempt on the Dardanelles, but no special effort was made other than usual diplomatic pourparlers.
It is probably true that a successful forcing of the straits would have convinced Bulgaria to declare for the Entente, but it is even more true that without Bulgaria a failure was much more likely.
If the Entente had been able to convince Greece. it would have been even more sensible to try and link with Serbia, landing in Thessaloniki and marching north (which would also be helpful to make Bulgaria see the reason).
The title itself tells a lot, doesn't it? However the author does not pull anything out of his hat, but rather references a lot of official documents which back his "pet theory"
In colonial wars. The rules of the game in WW1 were a bit more restrictive, at least early on. The Ottoman government might have moved to Bursa, declaring Constantinople an open city for example. Certainly theEntente wasnot in the position tooccupy a city of that size with itsnon-existent troops.
No troops at all, since no troops (excepting a single marine brigade)was sent from Europe.
Very inventive. Also borderline ASB at the very least.
What if Greece joined the war on the allies side, a coup happens earlier and then when Bulgaria joins the CP Greeks attack overland with allied reinforcements?
As repeatedly pointed out in this thread, Gallipoli is a loser.
The one way for the Entente to do better in Gallipoli is to not to have Gallipoli occur at all.
The best way for Gallpoli not to occur is to have Churchill hanged in 1914. Were Churchill to have been hanged--or otherwise killed in an appropriate fashion--in 1914, the UK avoidsthe disaster of Gallipoli, and so can do more on the Western front. Even, possibly, the CP don't last as long on the Western Front, the Great War ends earlier, and hundreds of thousands of lives are saved.
Further, with Churchill dead in 1914, the UK may not have to suffer so severely after the Great War, as the disastrous ideas that Churchill championed at the end of the war and into the 1920s may not take hold. Perhaps, without Churchill leading the red baiters, the UK avoids the petulance and poor judgment towards the Soviet Union. Perhaps the UK has more rational economic policies without Churchill as the worst Chancellor of the Exchequer of modern time.
Perhaps, without Churchill's bad influence after 1914, the UK and Europe are strong and calm enough to avoid WW II. Perhaps dissolution of the Empire is somewhat more rational and less painful--particularly to the millions whom the Empire subjugated with little mercy and whom Churchill repeatedly held in contempt. And, as a bonus, the world avoids being exposed to lots of bad writing* and even worse painting by Churchill.
Kill Churchill--and you get rid of Gallipoli, and perhaps a lot more. The UK benefits and so does the world. I call it a win-win.
*And by bad I mean dogmatic, inaccurate, misleading, and self-aggrandizing writing.
The one way for the Entente to do better in Gallipoli is to not to have Gallipoli occur at all.
The best way for Gallpoli not to occur is to have Churchill hanged in 1914. Were Churchill to have been hanged--or otherwise killed in an appropriate fashion--in 1914, the UK avoidsthe disaster of Gallipoli, and so can do more on the Western front. Even, possibly, the CP don't last as long on the Western Front, the Great War ends earlier, and hundreds of thousands of lives are saved.
Further, with Churchill dead in 1914, the UK may not have to suffer so severely after the Great War, as the disastrous ideas that Churchill championed at the end of the war and into the 1920s may not take hold. Perhaps, without Churchill leading the red baiters, the UK avoids the petulance and poor judgment towards the Soviet Union. Perhaps the UK has more rational economic policies without Churchill as the worst Chancellor of the Exchequer of modern time.
Perhaps, without Churchill's bad influence after 1914, the UK and Europe are strong and calm enough to avoid WW II. Perhaps dissolution of the Empire is somewhat more rational and less painful--particularly to the millions whom the Empire subjugated with little mercy and whom Churchill repeatedly held in contempt. And, as a bonus, the world avoids being exposed to lots of bad writing* and even worse painting by Churchill.
Kill Churchill--and you get rid of Gallipoli, and perhaps a lot more. The UK benefits and so does the world. I call it a win-win.
*And by bad I mean dogmatic, inaccurate, misleading, and self-aggrandizing writing.
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In scale of WW I slaughter Gallipolli was just insignificant sideshow, a risk worth taking. As horrible as it sounds, just some 44000 dead. Older ships not useful in any other theater.
Ottoman State was not Germany, not even Austria or Russia. It was a house which could (maybe) have been brought down by one swift stroke. And then there's the minimum success. OK, Ottomans are still at war, but unable to get any supplies from Germany and thus merely able to survive. Meanwhile, the Allies can send supplies, including rolling stock purchased from USA, to Russia year round easily and can also support whatever allies they are able to get.
Only proper way to force the straits would have been a decisive operation planned from the outset to seize the straits by surprise and by force. No pre-warning of bombardments, just sending subs to recon, the just simply force the straits with older torpedo boats as minesweepers and troop carriers and newer forces acting as distant support. Ottoman defenses would not have been able to stand any decisive effort utilizing speed and surprise.
IJN and IJA could have been the only forces in 1914-1915 to achieve this. RN and MN had not engaged in a peer level fight since Napoleonic times which had made the commanders risk averse rather than risk takers. While perfectly suitable attitude for the North Sea, where stakes were high and mere inaction could bring victory, it was not the attitude to make successes where needed. By 1918 at least RN (I don't know about MN) had been cured of this as shown by Zeebrugge et al.
Going from memory one of the major problems they faced was the minefields that the Ottomans had laid so a decent point of divergence would be to get the Royal Navy to start taking mines seriously a few years earlier. Having someone invent the Paravane/Oropesa sooner would be a decent start, coupled with that would be the building of more dedicated minesweepers. Hopefully fully trained Royal Navy crews would be steadier under fire than our timeline's civilian ones and the better performance of the ships versus trawlers taken up from trade would see them handle the local conditions better. The combination of these and the larger ships able to fit Paravanes as well would hopefully allow them to defeat the minefields or at least pass through them quickly enough.
Because if the Entente are able to ship in supplies they are for some inexplicable reason unable to also ship in rolling stock or more like the main parts of such for assembly in Russia?
I was going to bring this up but you beat me to it. Does anyone happen to know exactly where the two factories were located? The most I've ever seen quoted has been just outside Constantinople. Having the only two ammunition factories in the Empire go boom would certainly put a crimp in the Ottoman army's logistics and future operations.
Perhaps rather than a full-scale land invasion Churchill decides to merely fulfil Grand-Duke Nicholas' request for a naval raid and not any more. A naval taskforce is pushed up through Straits into the Sea of Marmara with orders to lightly shell a few select targets in Constantinople to put the wind up the Ottoman government but their main targets, if they're in range, being the two ammunition factories. Once these have been thoroughly pulverised they then turn about and make their way back to the Aegean Sea. If the factories are destroyed then it's a major aid to the land forces, even if not the raid will likely make the Ottoman government jumpy and possibly get them to reinforce the Gallipoli Peninsula with large numbers of troops and guns, perhaps helped along by an Entente feint or two. The real large-scale landings will happen a little later at Alexandretta once enough forces have been built up in Egypt and the Sinai to take advantage of it.
With decreasing stocks of ammunition, a sizeable landing behind them, and Entente forces pushing up from the Sinai and Palestine the only real option available to the Ottomans would be to retreat their forces back into the Anatolian plateau and take up defensive positions. The Entente take one look at the terrain and decide not to bother trying to chase them into it instead maintaining enough troops to mask them but not take any major offensive actions, the remainder of the troops can be utilised in other theatres. Offer the Ottomans a peace deal broadly similar to our timeline's allowing them to keep what they currently occupy which would be roughly the same as modern-day Turkey, if they turn it down in the hope of Germany still being able to win then the Entente can perhaps look again at a landing on the European side of the Empire or just forget about them for the rest of the war.
The British bombed Mesopotamian villagers from the air in the 1920's, then designed the RAF's bomber force for the same task, in the 1930's. And then carried out the practice in WW2.
There is only so much resistance to be expected against transferring successful tactics from use in colonial wars (ie against "savages") to use in major wars when the stakes are high and they are believed to be needed. Besides, do you REALLY think the British would regard Turks in a much more sympathetic way than Egyptians, Iraqis, Afghanis, or the other folks that they were willing to bomb in colonial actions?
If the RN got to Istanbul and the Turks refused to give up, the RN would not just go home in despair. It would do what was often done, before and since , when British troops were unavailable: bombard the locals hoping to break their morale. Exactly the same as any of the other nations' navies would do in the same situation, including Germany's.