How could Nazi Germany have the best possible performance in the Battle of the Atlantic?
AHC: Best possible German performance in the Battle of the Atlantic
- Thread starter Captain Homicide
- Start date
Make more submarines. Test the magnetic fuses much better than per OTL, and make necessary fixes. Until that is sorted out, use contact fuses only. Make proper 4-engined military aircraft for LR marine patrol duties, convered transports will barely cut it. Or, make much more Fw 200s and Ju 89s for KM needs. A six engined land-based design, powered by diesel engines. A proper LR fighter to harrass RAF LR A/C and carrier A/C. More 'milk cows' earlier. Invest in sensors, like radars etc. Don't believe that enemy will be unable to read your mail (a 1st suggestion possibly). Make more auxiliary cruisers. Don't send your big ships around in penny pockets.
This is the key factor - more boats on station earlier. If Donitz had had his 100 operational boats available during the autumn of 1940, or if he'd been able to maintain double-digit numbers of Type XIs off the US coast for Operation Drumbeat, he would probably have been able to knock the UK out of the war. In the latter case he might even have been able to knock the US out of the war, as the US government considered possible OTL.
Rather difficult when "penny packet" is a good description of the entire German surface fleet.
Toraach
Banned
Not wasting Bismarck in a gloriois failure raid. Hood wasnt worth it.
But combine Bismarck and Tirpitz and the Twins in a fleet in Norway which would bond even more british warships in watching them and convoys at the arctic route even more difficult. That's the fleet in being plus of course obvious things like making more and better subs.
But combine Bismarck and Tirpitz and the Twins in a fleet in Norway which would bond even more british warships in watching them and convoys at the arctic route even more difficult. That's the fleet in being plus of course obvious things like making more and better subs.
Doubtful. The Germany fleet could certainly have done better, as the OP asks, but how much better? Even if shipping losses are say 10-20% higher that's not by itself going to force the Churchill government to give in. And the idea is subject to the same problems that turn up in Sealion threads when people propose a bigger German surface fleet.
1. Where do the resources come from to build all these extra vessels? U-boats are small but they still require steel and rubber (the latter particularly scarce). Do they cut back on production of aircraft or vehicles to allow extra U-boats? What does that do to the France campaign or the Blitz?
2. When London notices all these extra U-boats being built in a great hurry (and they will notice) what does that do to their calculations? Does the Munich Agreement still happen if Germany is visibly preparing for a sea war on a bigger scale than OTL? Does the Admiralty shift its resources to building more escorts? Does the RAF become more amenable to allocating aircraft to Coastal Command? Does the US act more quickly to pass Lend-Lease?
Quite so, but that fact reflects something fundamental about Germany's strategic situation (in both world wars in fact) - the Navy was a solution in search of a problem. It could never be big enough when it was always the lower-priority service.
Building more U-boats before the end of 1938 is a non-starter because the Anglo-German Naval Agreement was in force and Germany built all the U-boats allowed by the agreement IOTL.
However, there is the possibility of building more U-boats using the time and energy (that was with hindsight) squandered on the H-class battleships and O-class battlecruisers. I appreciate that the 82,435 tons of material ordered, delivered or in work at the slips on Battleships H, J and K doesn't translate into about 100 extra Type VII U-boats under construction on 1st September 1939, but if it only allowed 50 extra U-boats to be in hand at that time it would still be a significant improvement.
Such an increase in U-boat production in the last 6 months of peace wouldn't automatically lead to an acceleration of ASW vessel production by the British. This is because they had ordered 100 ASW vessels over the same period IOTL. That is 4 Black Swan class sloops, the first 20 Hunt class destroyers, the first 20 Bangor class fleet minesweepers and the first 56 Flower class corvettes.
However, there is the possibility of building more U-boats using the time and energy (that was with hindsight) squandered on the H-class battleships and O-class battlecruisers. I appreciate that the 82,435 tons of material ordered, delivered or in work at the slips on Battleships H, J and K doesn't translate into about 100 extra Type VII U-boats under construction on 1st September 1939, but if it only allowed 50 extra U-boats to be in hand at that time it would still be a significant improvement.
Such an increase in U-boat production in the last 6 months of peace wouldn't automatically lead to an acceleration of ASW vessel production by the British. This is because they had ordered 100 ASW vessels over the same period IOTL. That is 4 Black Swan class sloops, the first 20 Hunt class destroyers, the first 20 Bangor class fleet minesweepers and the first 56 Flower class corvettes.
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Admiral Halsey
Banned
Given how many near misses the Germans had OTL due to duds from the trips just getting the fuses fixed would improve the Atlantic battle a lot especially early war. Thing is no matter how well they do they won't sink enough. IIRC only 3 or so months in the entire war did they sink more tommage then was produced in the allied shipyards. Plus once the US enters the war Kaiser and his shipyards mean it's basically over within a year.
Finish Graf Zeppelin and Peter Strasser. Don't build Bismarck and Tirpitz - you could probably build three Scharnhorsts for the money and they were ideal commerce destroyers. Create task forces around the heavy ships and at least one carrier for each. Wrest naval aviation from Goering, create something like a German RNAS. Create an effective operational research organization. Don't wait until spring '43 to figure out that the Type VII is obsolete.
IMHO GZ and PS wouldn't be operational until early 1942 at the earliest and wouldn't be very effective warships and that is if enough oil could be scraped together for operations. OTOH as a fleet in being they might tie down several British and American aircraft carriers at Scapa Flow and if they did it did would make life easier for the Axis in the Mediterranean and Far East in 1942. However, Germany would still loose the war.
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But what if Doenitz had 50 extra boats by late 1940? Didn't he say, in the OTL, that if he had had twice as many boats then he would've won?
Don't build useless battleships like Tirpitz.
If Germany appears potentially more dangerous, it might make Britain even less willing to go to war in '38. Given the attitude of Chamberlain in the OTL, I wouldn't worry too much.
No the OP wants to improve German performance in the battle of the Atlantic
Seriously though German Navy carrier aviation is a non starter - it takes too many years to develop the know how to even start being effective and the US and British ...hell even the French are decades ahead.
Build far more very long range Patrol Aircraft capable of bombing a merchant man - so try to get the Amerika Bombers that were actually built into service earlier as LRMPA and build more of them.
More U-Boats is an issue because building more U-Boats beyond the 45% parity allowed by the Anglo German Naval Agreement (AGNA) sets of that special alarm in Whitehall because as far as the British are concerned U-Boats have but one job and that is the Blockade of the UK
By starting to build more earlier ie pull out of the AGNA earlier than April 1939 starts Britain down the path of seriously building alliances and greatly expanding her own rearmament efforts earlier than May 1939 - I believe that this would be detrimental to Germany's early war aims
More raiders - build more merchant ships capable of quickly being converted to merchant raiders than OTL in time of war - this is the one thing that can possibly be hidden from the rest of the world and in any case would not in and off itself break the word of any treaty.
Build long range cruisers capable of acting as raiders in time of war - make them good enough to sink shipping - so armed with 5.9s and fast enough to run from anything bigger than them
The British and French Navy's would very likely sweep them from the seas but until they do the Allies would be obliged to maintain a heavy guard on convoys and lose more shipping to both losses and restrictions caused by additional convoys and them swamping port capacities.
Ultimately though whatever the Germans do the Allies would find a response or number of responses to each thing - and the Allies always had the advantage of Geography and advantages in those industries that supported the Battle of the Atlantic.
Germany holding France and Norway only reduced their Geographic disadvantage in this respect and they would only ever be 'raiding' into what is essentially a British and American owned Lake - but winning the BotA (and keeping it won), effectively knocking the UK out of the war is the only way that Germany is realistically going to win the war and that is a massive task and it can only really be started after France is defeated.
thaddeus
Donor
there was nothing to prevent assembly of larger and better equipped auxiliary cruiser fleet, treated as afterthought historically they proved crudely effective.
the S-boats also did not fall under any AGNA limits, but only 18 available at the onset of war. forced into duty as minelayers they needed to be about 50% larger (or some of them) to properly carry out that role. (the immediate post-war Jaguar-class could deploy approx. 2 dozen mines)
my view the FW-200 Condor could have been really enhanced with mooted fifth engine and (earlier) guided munitions (could have used SC-250 bombs which is what first experiments began with rather than oversized Fritz-X )
the S-boats also did not fall under any AGNA limits, but only 18 available at the onset of war. forced into duty as minelayers they needed to be about 50% larger (or some of them) to properly carry out that role. (the immediate post-war Jaguar-class could deploy approx. 2 dozen mines)
my view the FW-200 Condor could have been really enhanced with mooted fifth engine and (earlier) guided munitions (could have used SC-250 bombs which is what first experiments began with rather than oversized Fritz-X )
Britain is not a dictatorship and Chamberlain is not a dictator - he answers to the cabinet and the House
His efforts to keep Britian out of a war do not extend to leaving the nation exposed if Germany renege on the AGNA - when they historically did in April 1939 - this act more than any other pre-Poland spurred the British to pretty much give up on even a pretence of not going to war
An earlier abandonment on the AGNA (that is 35% parity with the Royal Navy on all surface vessels and 45% on U Boat numbers) is an earlier abandonment by Britain on its efforts to maintaining peace in Europe through treaties and agreements etc.
I wish that Hitler had done so earlier - it would have hardened Britain's responses and put them in a better position relative to Germany than was the case.
So the Germans start producing additional U-boats in contravention of the AGNA. The British start their rearmament earlier, harder and faster in response which means they run out of funds sooner than OTL. How does that factor into things?
In addition does building extra U-boats prove to be the straw that broke the camels back for the German economy?
In addition does building extra U-boats prove to be the straw that broke the camels back for the German economy?
The British started running out of funds (gold and US$) because they delayed rearmament and had to throw a lot of money at the problem that until US Lend Lease could only be bought from the USA with US$ or Gold once the war had started
A percentage or 2 increase in the military budget over that of OTL in 1938 is worth many times that in 1939 - the same extra extra money in 1937!!!! - To put it into context in 1938 the Military spending of the UK was just 4% of the Budget and remember that this involved maintaining the world's largest navy.
Basically an earlier modest increase in the military spending in the UK would pay massive dividends to the ability of its war time industries to deliver the necessary items earlier than OTL.
With more time more of the machine tools for example could be built in the UK or bought before the war using normal pre-war foreign exchange methods
Germany was already using dubious accounting methods for its rapid rearmament - I think we are all agreed that without the 'loot' it gained from those nations it conquered / annexed it could not have maintained the scale of rearmament that it did.