AHC: Best possible German performance in the Battle of the Atlantic

BlondieBC

Banned
That's weird since this sight reports .....9 HSK conducted 12 cruises accumulating 3769 days at sea or an average of 314 days per cruise. Where does "90 day expected life" come from?

http://www.bismarck-class.dk/hilfskreuzer/hilfskreuzer_introduction.html

The prewar value placed on HSK was clearly derived from WW-I experiences.

https://archive.org/stream/ReviewOfGermanCruiserWarfare19141918#page/n1/mode/2up

according to the above site each warship raider averaged 10 kills and took 10-11 enemy warships [mostly CL] to hunt them down, while the HSK raiders averaged 9-10 kills and required ~ 10 warships although many were AMC & DD.

If the numbers in WW-II were to bare similar fruit , 20 HSK could have required a fleet of 200 AMC/DD to hunt them down after the HSK sank 200 enemy vessel's. That would be a worth while investment. I gather that the historical WW-II HSK missions accumulated 142 enemy vessels sunk or captured [& turned into other suede HSK] . That part looks better than WW-I record.

The WW1 data. Been a while, but seems like 90 days is about right.

I am not arguing against AMC, I just think that the mass usage of AMC will result in a life span closer to 3 months than 9 months. And isn't the WW2 data inflated by things like ships sailing to Japan via the Arctic Ocean and then operating in a Pacific region largely devoid of British warships due to the Med campaign. Start spamming out AMCs, and you move them to the better but more dangerous operations zones in the Atlantic. And if we assume the Germans choose zones of operations wisely, each additional AMC will tend to operate in a less safe area.

Edit: I probably also did not count in days traveling to or from the kill zones when not actively hunting such as the trip via the arctic. And seems to get this number, I started counting from first kill or attempted kill. So I am saying 90 days survival after first kill. Our numbers are probably not that far off since these ships could easily take a month or two to get to the operation grounds and back.
 
Yes but the key is not survival after the first kill, but how long it took the Wallies to hunt them down in the first place and how many warships had to be diverted to sink them. If its 200 vessels minus the 50 AMC that's still 150 CL/DD , that the WALLIES can't really spare.

It was pointed out last year that if Bismarck escaped back to Norway after the HOOD, then most of the RN cruisers- used to hunt down the supply net - would instead have to patrol the GIUK to handle the next break out attempt. In other words the network would have escape.That was no more than couple dozen cruisers difference. If those couple dozen cruisers are already diverted to the southern hemisphere in the first place- few would be available to hunt the Bismarck and subsequent break out attempts.
 
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There seems to be a lot of assumptions that a 'few easy, simple changes' will revolutionise German capability.
The changes considered are neither few, simple or easy.

Lets consider a few.

(1) The obvious one, more U-boats. How, exactly? The German military machine was maxed our before the war, due both to available effort and raw materials, so much so that disruptive and damaging reductions had to be made in the orders for the Army and LW. So where exactly do additional U-boats come from? Something has to be given up. What?

There is also the issue of when these new U-boats will be started. The Anglo-German naval treaty is in place until 1938. Breaking this is an immediate red button in the Admiralty, and on this issue the government will provide money as needed. This case is one the British simply cant sit back and let develop. So more escorts, more aircraft. Bear in mind that in any 1930's naval race with Britain Germany loses.

So, we cut back on the rest of the surface ships. Not as easy as it sounds, First, if you don't build them, Britain simply builds more escorts (as they don't need so many large ships). Second, this assumption that yard skills and effort are easily interchangeable simply isn't the case. Equipment and skills are different.

OK, we say, lets just up the rate of building in 1938. Again, how exactly? The lack of resources still hits us. Only worse, we also have the problem of insufficient trained crews which cant be hand-waved away.
The KM did indeed put a lot of resources into U-boats (apart from ships already under construction, it was pretty much all they were building), and it still took 2 years to get significant improvement in numbers. This problem cant just be handwaved away.

(2) Fix the torpedo problem. Ah, a lovely simple problem to solve, right? No it wasn't. All countries had torpedo problems in the first half of WW2, and it took all of them years (with wartime levels of resources) to fix them. If it was easy or simple, everyone would have had good torpedoes - or at least one country would. they didn't, because it was HARD.

(3) More LRMP aircraft. Again, at the expense of which LW planes? They will also stretch your design department, and are expensive to build. Which planes don't get the powerful engines these planes require?
They aren't that effective without radar (are we to handwave early german ASV in as well??), and if such planes are being built the british have obvious counters - a long range fighter until the Germans take France, then shipborne fighters (basically as happened in OTL). Many more LRMP planes aren't that great a multiplier as there are a limited number of convoys anyway.

(4) Better codes. Why? what's the driver? The existing system was considered uncrackable (and if the Germans had actually adhered to procedures, would have been far more difficult to crack). You don't just toss away what is seen as the best code machines in the world and go for more complex ones just for the fun of it.

(5) More surface raiders. This one is probably achievable, as its just a few more merchant ships to be converted. But your forgetting the big problem with raiders. They are very poor warships. They depend on not being discovered. If they are, they are sunk. Now more raiders will sink more ships, but more raiders mean more get found and sunk. Its not a viable long term solution.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Yes but the key is not survival after the first kill, but how long it took the Wallies to hunt them down in the first place and how many warships had to be diverted to sink them. If its 200 vessels minus the 50 AMC that's still 150 CL/DD , that the WALLIES can't really spare. It was pointed out last year that if Bismarck escaped back to Norway after the HOOD, then most of the RN cruisers- used to hunt down the supply net - would instead have to patrol the GIUK to handle the next break out attempt. That was no more than couple dozen cruisers difference. If those are already diverted to the southern hemisphere in the first place- few would be available to hunt the Bismarck and subsequent break out attempts.

I think the British response will be a bit different. The British under utilized submarines in my opinion, so quite a few of these CL duties can be done by British subs be it pick lines, anti-submarine patrols or hunting down AMC. AMC generally are not super fast, since they may well lack the engines to go fast and excessive speed could give away the ship. IMO, the effectiveness of anti-AMC efforts will improve for the British over time for the same reason it did in subs. The AMC crews will be lost to death or capture while the British anti-AMC efforts will improve. Also, since you don't have to hide the British AMC being warships, the British can create upgunned AMC that can handle German AMCs in a one to one fight. Plus their is land based naval aviation at the many British ports around the world. If it gets bad enough, bomber command can lose planes to the effort.

And based on British patterns, the British will keep their focus on regular surface warships for too long. They will not pull the cruisers from the line to stop the Bismarck, instead, they will use less valuable forces to deal with the AMC issue.
 
There seems to be a lot of assumptions that a 'few easy, simple changes' will revolutionise German capability.
The changes considered are neither few, simple or easy.

Lets consider a few.

(1) The obvious one, more U-boats. How, exactly? The German military machine was maxed our before the war, due both to available effort and raw materials, so much so that disruptive and damaging reductions had to be made in the orders for the Army and LW. So where exactly do additional U-boats come from? Something has to be given up. What?

There is also the issue of when these new U-boats will be started. The Anglo-German naval treaty is in place until 1938. Breaking this is an immediate red button in the Admiralty, and on this issue the government will provide money as needed. This case is one the British simply cant sit back and let develop. So more escorts, more aircraft. Bear in mind that in any 1930's naval race with Britain Germany loses.

So, we cut back on the rest of the surface ships. Not as easy as it sounds, First, if you don't build them, Britain simply builds more escorts (as they don't need so many large ships). Second, this assumption that yard skills and effort are easily interchangeable simply isn't the case. Equipment and skills are different.

OK, we say, lets just up the rate of building in 1938. Again, how exactly? The lack of resources still hits us. Only worse, we also have the problem of insufficient trained crews which cant be hand-waved away.
The KM did indeed put a lot of resources into U-boats (apart from ships already under construction, it was pretty much all they were building), and it still took 2 years to get significant improvement in numbers. This problem cant just be handwaved away.

(2) Fix the torpedo problem. Ah, a lovely simple problem to solve, right? No it wasn't. All countries had torpedo problems in the first half of WW2, and it took all of them years (with wartime levels of resources) to fix them. If it was easy or simple, everyone would have had good torpedoes - or at least one country would. they didn't, because it was HARD.

(3) More LRMP aircraft. Again, at the expense of which LW planes? They will also stretch your design department, and are expensive to build. Which planes don't get the powerful engines these planes require?
They aren't that effective without radar (are we to handwave early german ASV in as well??), and if such planes are being built the british have obvious counters - a long range fighter until the Germans take France, then shipborne fighters (basically as happened in OTL). Many more LRMP planes aren't that great a multiplier as there are a limited number of convoys anyway.

(4) Better codes. Why? what's the driver? The existing system was considered uncrackable (and if the Germans had actually adhered to procedures, would have been far more difficult to crack). You don't just toss away what is seen as the best code machines in the world and go for more complex ones just for the fun of it.

(5) More surface raiders. This one is probably achievable, as its just a few more merchant ships to be converted. But your forgetting the big problem with raiders. They are very poor warships. They depend on not being discovered. If they are, they are sunk. Now more raiders will sink more ships, but more raiders mean more get found and sunk. Its not a viable long term solution.


Very well said.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
There seems to be a lot of assumptions that a 'few easy, simple changes' will revolutionise German capability.
The changes considered are neither few, simple or easy.

Lets consider a few.

(1) The obvious one, more U-boats. How, exactly? The German military machine was maxed our before the war, due both to available effort and raw materials, so much so that disruptive and damaging reductions had to be made in the orders for the Army and LW. So where exactly do additional U-boats come from? Something has to be given up. What?

There is also the issue of when these new U-boats will be started. The Anglo-German naval treaty is in place until 1938. Breaking this is an immediate red button in the Admiralty, and on this issue the government will provide money as needed. This case is one the British simply cant sit back and let develop. So more escorts, more aircraft. Bear in mind that in any 1930's naval race with Britain Germany loses.

So, we cut back on the rest of the surface ships. Not as easy as it sounds, First, if you don't build them, Britain simply builds more escorts (as they don't need so many large ships). Second, this assumption that yard skills and effort are easily interchangeable simply isn't the case. Equipment and skills are different.

OK, we say, lets just up the rate of building in 1938. Again, how exactly? The lack of resources still hits us. Only worse, we also have the problem of insufficient trained crews which cant be hand-waved away.
The KM did indeed put a lot of resources into U-boats (apart from ships already under construction, it was pretty much all they were building), and it still took 2 years to get significant improvement in numbers. This problem cant just be handwaved away.

(2) Fix the torpedo problem. Ah, a lovely simple problem to solve, right? No it wasn't. All countries had torpedo problems in the first half of WW2, and it took all of them years (with wartime levels of resources) to fix them. If it was easy or simple, everyone would have had good torpedoes - or at least one country would. they didn't, because it was HARD.

(3) More LRMP aircraft. Again, at the expense of which LW planes? They will also stretch your design department, and are expensive to build. Which planes don't get the powerful engines these planes require?
They aren't that effective without radar (are we to handwave early german ASV in as well??), and if such planes are being built the british have obvious counters - a long range fighter until the Germans take France, then shipborne fighters (basically as happened in OTL). Many more LRMP planes aren't that great a multiplier as there are a limited number of convoys anyway.

(4) Better codes. Why? what's the driver? The existing system was considered uncrackable (and if the Germans had actually adhered to procedures, would have been far more difficult to crack). You don't just toss away what is seen as the best code machines in the world and go for more complex ones just for the fun of it.

(5) More surface raiders. This one is probably achievable, as its just a few more merchant ships to be converted. But your forgetting the big problem with raiders. They are very poor warships. They depend on not being discovered. If they are, they are sunk. Now more raiders will sink more ships, but more raiders mean more get found and sunk. Its not a viable long term solution.

The realistic start date for extra German U-boats in any quantity compared to OTL is probably October 1939. Someone has to do productions schedules to figure out where they come from.

Japans torpedoes work when the war started. It is a easy POD to do more testing.

On better codes, the Germans strongly suspected their codes were broken in WW1, but did nothing. The Germans could tell by British operation patterns that the British were using codes, and they correctly identified where the code book was lost at. Additional court martials were recommended for this, but not done. So one simply needs to have someone remember this lesson from 1916 or so. And commercial enigma had more rotors than the military one. So you simply down grade the machine less than was done IOTL.

And yes, the raiders are a short term solution but the use otherwise idle merchant shipping and older guns with frankly second or third class sailors.

Now to the POD, it is actually quite simple. Several Germans army officers did heroic work maintaining the competence of the Germany army in the 1920's and early 1930's. All you need for this PoD is for a handful of naval officers to do the same. There is a quality report done in 1919, 'Study of the failures of the German Navy in WW1'. A small cadre of officers work to maintain this knowledge. When the expansion starts in earnest in the 1930's, the German Navy has a good understanding of the immediate needs and has consider the possibility of fighting the British again. One easily ends up with much better codes, more more discipline communication procedures, functional torpedoes even if just contact fuses, good air dropped torpedoes, and better plans to build U-boats. It is not a hard PoD, it is just a long, long write to get to the WW2 time frame.
 
There seems to be a lot of assumptions that a 'few easy, simple changes' will revolutionise German capability.
The changes considered are neither few, simple or easy.

Lets consider a few.

(1) The obvious one, more U-boats. How, exactly? The German military machine was maxed our before the war, due both to available effort and raw materials, so much so that disruptive and damaging reductions had to be made in the orders for the Army and LW. So where exactly do additional U-boats come from? Something has to be given up. What?

There is also the issue of when these new U-boats will be started. The Anglo-German naval treaty is in place until 1938. Breaking this is an immediate red button in the Admiralty, and on this issue the government will provide money as needed. This case is one the British simply cant sit back and let develop. So more escorts, more aircraft. Bear in mind that in any 1930's naval race with Britain Germany loses.

So, we cut back on the rest of the surface ships. Not as easy as it sounds, First, if you don't build them, Britain simply builds more escorts (as they don't need so many large ships). Second, this assumption that yard skills and effort are easily interchangeable simply isn't the case. Equipment and skills are different.

OK, we say, lets just up the rate of building in 1938. Again, how exactly? The lack of resources still hits us. Only worse, we also have the problem of insufficient trained crews which cant be hand-waved away.
The KM did indeed put a lot of resources into U-boats (apart from ships already under construction, it was pretty much all they were building), and it still took 2 years to get significant improvement in numbers. This problem cant just be hand wave
In the first place 16 U-Boats were planned in 1932 naval plan- even though they were illegal...but Hitler dragged his feet. Ship Replacement programme 1934 authorised U-Boat numbers to expand to about 76, this was to be done at the expense of some of the 44 GTB [Gross Torpedo boot = destroyers] already ordered. This historically came from reducing the number other warships planned. Hitler didn't want naval expansion since he planned to avoid war with UK, so he used the Anglo-German naval treaty to put Raeder in his place demanding only coastal defence fleet with limited raiding into the North Sea/Baltic etc.

Raeder buckled and revised the fleet numbers reducing U-Boat plans to 50-60 U-Boats per year and building all warships as 'anti French' models to please Hitler. So the 44 GTB changed from 1800 ton 35 knots into 3000 tons Zerstroers @ 39 knots. These were to counter the French VAUQUELIN LE FANTASQUE & MOGADOR Destroyers - that were fast - heavy -short range DL [3000-4000 tons ,36-39 knots with 139mm guns, but range only 3-4000@ 14-15 knots].

Naval plan 1932
AIRCRAFT CARRIER > 20,000 tons
3 PBS [14-15-16K]
6 improved PBS >18,500 tons
6 + 6 CL [larger than Nuremberg?]
44 GTB [1600 tons light]
16 U-BOATS [250ton class]
hundreds of other vessels.

Roughly 352,000tons

SHIP REPLACEMENT PROGRAM 1934-35
3 PBS [14-15-16K]
3 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 23,000t
6-8 PANZERSCHIFFE [6 X 29,000T OR 8 X 25,000t]
6 + 6 CL [larger than Nuremberg?]
48 GTB 1600t
76 U-Boats 250-1000t
300 auxiliary vessels & 400 aircraft.

Roughly 532,000tons


HISTORICAL 1940-40
3 PBS [14-15-16K]
3 CA [18.4 K]
2 BC [38.5 K]
2 BB [51.5 K]
6 CL [7-9K]
28 DL[3.0-3.5K]
20 TB [1]
10 FB [1]
120 U-B [ 0.76 ]
plus hundreds of auxiliary vessels.

ROUGHLY 525,000tons basically the same as the 1935 SHIP REPLACEMENT program.

So as the decade advances the number of small vessels is increased at the expense of fewer numbers of larger torpedo ships. By the end of 1939 about 200 small vessels had been laid down in addition to 23 larger vessels. But by that same token the 9-11 surface raiders in the 25 KT range of the SHIP REPLACEMENT PROGRAM - were replaced for 4 heavier Battleships and several heavy cruisers.

Telling them what they can and cannot build is ridicules and trying to predicting and projecting a WALLIE counter to such sweeping changes above would be equally impossible.
 
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NoMommsen

Donor
The request to increase the size of the german Submarine fleet is an effective declaration of war both sides knew it.
Do you have any sources/references evidencing that such 'knowledge' as you claim was actually present in the minds of people high enough on the power-ladder to be seen as 'deciders' and if this 'knowledge' played any role in actual 'decisions' on leading govermental as well as naval levels in the UK as well as in Nazi Germany of that time (between 1935 and 1938) ?

Unfortunatly I did not come across any beside similar unevidenced statements by hindsighters. But I'm eager to learn different.

Reality was that they did not build above 45% whatever the wording was.
Fully prepared to agree with you ... regarding OTL.

But ... we're talking here about an ATL ... a raher bad to not at all defined ATL regarding further circumstances of a request of the germans calling on point (f) of the AGNA as I mentioned in post #28.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
... CL duties can be done by British subs be it pick lines, anti-submarine patrols or hunting down AMC. AMC generally are not super fast ...
Might have been the reason for the 16 kn criterium for the german AMCs as mentioned by PSL ? ... to outpace at least such subs ?
 
I think the British response will be a bit different. The British under utilized submarines in my opinion, so quite a few of these CL duties can be done by British subs be it pick lines, anti-submarine patrols or hunting down AMC.

You can't see anything from a submarine. You are too close to water level.

Cruisers and AMCs offer big stable hulls that are livable and workable in a variety of environmental conditions. Often a lot of cruiser work away from hot spots like the North Atlantic is mostly just being there. Look at the history HMAS Adelaide or Georgios Averof as examples the sort of work done.
 

perfectgeneral

Donor
Monthly Donor
(1) The obvious one, more U-boats. How, exactly? The German military machine was maxed our before the war, due both to available effort and raw materials, so much so that disruptive and damaging reductions had to be made in the orders for the Army and LW. So where exactly do additional U-boats come from? Something has to be given up. What?
Make only training, short range, coastal boats, suited to the Baltic until 1938. Long range Atlantic boats in kit form waiting to serve notice to the RN at the least helpful time. The small Type II can fit more boats into the peacetime allowance. More officers training up. Greater training capability later too. Materials from the aircraft carrier and battleship vanity projects. Two battleships is enough for a fleet in being to tie up RN capital ships.

The LW had too many bombers. All those Pencils and Stukas. Condors use four engines each, but focus on the battle that can win the war. The Condors only used the equivalent of the Jupiter/Mercury engine. Maybe bring out the Me261 or some other long range recce aircraft (Ju88) to patrol at greater speed and altitude.

The codes don't really get cracked before it should be too late for Britain. A properly exploited first happy time blockades Britain to the negotiating table. Well aware that they had starved the German people long after the armistice of the last war.
 
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Make more submarines. Test the magnetic fuses much better than per OTL, and make necessary fixes. Until that is sorted out, use contact fuses only. Make proper 4-engined military aircraft for LR marine patrol duties, convered transports will barely cut it. Or, make much more Fw 200s and Ju 89s for KM needs. A six engined land-based design, powered by diesel engines. A proper LR fighter to harrass RAF LR A/C and carrier A/C. More 'milk cows' earlier. Invest in sensors, like radars etc. Don't believe that enemy will be unable to read your mail (a 1st suggestion possibly). Make more auxiliary cruisers. Don't send your big ships around in penny pockets.
That's pretty much it. Maybe have a 'balanced' fleet purely as cover for subs, AMCs (great for wasting RN resources) and support ships, and as a fleet in being.
Magnetic mines with better self-destruct and anti-handling systems.
If possible establish resupply bases or at least resupply ships.
Be ready for the war rather than expecting it in five years.
 
If possible establish resupply bases or at least resupply ships.
They did:

The Dithmarschen Class supply ships could each carry nearly nine thousand tons of fuel oil and four hundred tons of lubricating oil, as well as ammunition, spare parts, provisions, and water. They were equipped with repair shops, hospital facilities, and large boats used to transfer stores. They were also quite well armed, with three 150 mm deck guns, two 37 mm and four 20 mm antiaircraft guns,plus eight ma-chine guns. These extra features reduced the liquid cargo that could be carried but added significantly to the diversity of support that could be provided. The Dithmarschens were the longest and fastest tankers then in service withany navy.
 

hipper

Banned
Do you have any sources/references evidencing that such 'knowledge' as you claim was actually present in the minds of people high enough on the power-ladder to be seen as 'deciders' and if this 'knowledge' played any role in actual 'decisions' on leading govermental as well as naval levels in the UK as well as in Nazi Germany of that time (between 1935 and 1938) ?
Unfortunatly I did not come across any beside similar unevidenced statements by hindsighters. But I'm eager to learn different.

note from the British ambassador to the German Govermrpent.

Indeed, so important is the Naval Agreement to His Majesty's Government that it is difficult to conceive that any general understanding between Great Britain and Germany, such as General Göring is believed to desire, would any longer be possible were the German Government to denounce the Naval Agreement. In fact, a reaffirmation of the latter in all probability have to figure as part of such a general understanding.
 
They did:

The Dithmarschen Class supply ships could each carry nearly nine thousand tons of fuel oil and four hundred tons of lubricating oil, as well as ammunition, spare parts, provisions, and water. They were equipped with repair shops, hospital facilities, and large boats used to transfer stores. They were also quite well armed, with three 150 mm deck guns, two 37 mm and four 20 mm antiaircraft guns,plus eight ma-chine guns. These extra features reduced the liquid cargo that could be carried but added significantly to the diversity of support that could be provided. The Dithmarschens were the longest and fastest tankers then in service withany navy.
True but the they need a proper supply network, not just a few ships. More ships and the ability of those ships to resupply without travelling home to Germany, either by operating under false flags or accessing clandestine caches in suitable bits of coastline.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
note from the British ambassador to the German Govermrpent.
Indeed, so important is the Naval Agreement to His Majesty's Government that it is difficult to conceive that any general understanding between Great Britain and Germany, such as General Göring is believed to desire, would any longer be possible were the German Government to denounce the Naval Agreement. In fact, a reaffirmation of the latter in all probability have to figure as part of such a general understanding.
Well, THX, but ... this doesn't really adress the question in question
The request to increase the size of the german Submarine fleet is an effective declaration of war both sides knew it.
Do you have any sources/references evidencing that such 'knowledge' as you claim was actually present in the minds of people high enough on the power-ladder to be seen as 'deciders' and if this 'knowledge' played any role in actual 'decisions' on leading govermental as well as naval levels in the UK as well as in Nazi Germany of that time (between 1935 and 1938) ?
Unfortunatly I did not come across any beside similar unevidenced statements by hindsighters. But I'm eager to learn different.
, which was about a legal, by the AGNA covered request of Germany increasing their tonnage of subs up to the 100 % agreed upon in the same AGNA (see post #28 or : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-German_Naval_Agreement#Text ).
Your citation doesn't even,mention the question of subs. ... only a as such recognized bluff-threat of Göring to build a complete fleet up to 100 % of the complete fleet of Britain/the Commenwealth, aired by him in April 1938, after the decision to increase the KM (esp. the surface KM) beyond the AGNA had already been made.

... contrary to a possible ATL.
 
There seems to be a lot of assumptions that a 'few easy, simple changes' will revolutionise German capability.
The changes considered are neither few, simple or easy.

Lets consider a few.

(1) The obvious one, more U-boats. How, exactly? The German military machine was maxed our before the war, due both to available effort and raw materials, so much so that disruptive and damaging reductions had to be made in the orders for the Army and LW. So where exactly do additional U-boats come from? Something has to be given up. What?

There is also the issue of when these new U-boats will be started. The Anglo-German naval treaty is in place until 1938. Breaking this is an immediate red button in the Admiralty, and on this issue the government will provide money as needed. This case is one the British simply cant sit back and let develop. So more escorts, more aircraft. Bear in mind that in any 1930's naval race with Britain Germany loses.

So, we cut back on the rest of the surface ships. Not as easy as it sounds, First, if you don't build them, Britain simply builds more escorts (as they don't need so many large ships). Second, this assumption that yard skills and effort are easily interchangeable simply isn't the case. Equipment and skills are different.

OK, we say, lets just up the rate of building in 1938. Again, how exactly? The lack of resources still hits us. Only worse, we also have the problem of insufficient trained crews which cant be hand-waved away.
The KM did indeed put a lot of resources into U-boats (apart from ships already under construction, it was pretty much all they were building), and it still took 2 years to get significant improvement in numbers. This problem cant just be handwaved away.

(2) Fix the torpedo problem. Ah, a lovely simple problem to solve, right? No it wasn't. All countries had torpedo problems in the first half of WW2, and it took all of them years (with wartime levels of resources) to fix them. If it was easy or simple, everyone would have had good torpedoes - or at least one country would. they didn't, because it was HARD.

(3) More LRMP aircraft. Again, at the expense of which LW planes? They will also stretch your design department, and are expensive to build. Which planes don't get the powerful engines these planes require?
They aren't that effective without radar (are we to handwave early german ASV in as well??), and if such planes are being built the british have obvious counters - a long range fighter until the Germans take France, then shipborne fighters (basically as happened in OTL). Many more LRMP planes aren't that great a multiplier as there are a limited number of convoys anyway.

(4) Better codes. Why? what's the driver? The existing system was considered uncrackable (and if the Germans had actually adhered to procedures, would have been far more difficult to crack). You don't just toss away what is seen as the best code machines in the world and go for more complex ones just for the fun of it.

(5) More surface raiders. This one is probably achievable, as its just a few more merchant ships to be converted. But your forgetting the big problem with raiders. They are very poor warships. They depend on not being discovered. If they are, they are sunk. Now more raiders will sink more ships, but more raiders mean more get found and sunk. Its not a viable long term solution.
Have you talked with Gudestein about this for his TL

https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/the-list-regiment-at-havrincourt.443135/
 
But combine Bismarck and Tirpitz and the Twins in a fleet in Norway.
I like the idea, but doesn't this invite a concentration of a greater RN force? By the time Tirpitz and the Twins (after a hypothetical expedited repair) are active in late summer 1941, the RN will have three KGV class in service, with Hood, Renown and Repulse adding to the fast battle group.

Victorious is active, but IIRC the other two Illustrious class were already under repair by late summer 1941. Ark Royal hasn't been sunk yet, so perhaps that's two or three (Furious?) carriers to back up the fast BB/BC group?
 
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