A New Carthaginian Age: Trade, Politics, War and Treachery in the post-Roman World

Well, seems that the Egypt expansion, foreign policy main interests and expansion directions have been settled... while the south or Nubian one would be traditional, but the maritime one and/or the Arabian (both for Egypt own interest and for policing on behalf of the Seleucids) would be new and probably could mean that sooner or later would must to be forced to make sure that can control the accesses / exits (OTL, Bab-el-Mandeb) of the Red Sea...

Finally The Seleucid still controls (even nominally) the Iranian Plateau? How have been affected, if it's been, the Seleucid eastern borders (and beyond) for the past events and the growth of the Seleucid economical and military?, strength.
With this new flow of income... besides of reforge and raises new units for their army and (or to continue to founding new Hellenic settled cities) will try to reunite all the Alexander's Heritage or only his European/Hellenic parts?
 
Well, seems that the Egypt expansion, foreign policy main interests and expansion directions have been settled... while the south or Nubian one would be traditional, but the maritime one and/or the Arabian (both for Egypt own interest and for policing on behalf of the Seleucids) would be new and probably could mean that sooner or later would must to be forced to make sure that can control the accesses / exits (OTL, Bab-el-Mandeb) of the Red Sea...

Finally The Seleucid still controls (even nominally) the Iranian Plateau? How have been affected, if it's been, the Seleucid eastern borders (and beyond) for the past events and the growth of the Seleucid economical and military?, strength.
With this new flow of income... besides of reforge and raises new units for their army and (or to continue to founding new Hellenic settled cities) will try to reunite all the Alexander's Heritage or only his European/Hellenic parts?

Well yes, in OTL Antiochus III launched an invasion of Parthia but failed to actually conquer it. After that he was too preoccupied with Rome and then the treaty of Apamaea pretty much started the end of the Seleucids. ITTL there are three changes. For one, Rome isnt around to defeat him and put a huge tribute on his empire and take Asia Monor. For another, I butterflied the death of Antiochus (his son) who, from what little information I’ve been able to find, had military experience having commanded a cavalry wing in a battle and helped win it. For a third, Antiochus III lives longer ITTL and can focus more on taking back Iran from Parthia and Baktria.

As for Egypt, an invasion of Nubia actually just makes sense. At least Wawat, if he wants to unify Egypt or achieve any other goals, he needs money and Wawat has gold mines. I’m going to cover the Seleucids next time in greater detail and talk more about Antiochus III, IV and Seleucus IV and cover a tiny bit of what exactly Ahmose is up to internally.
 
Chapter XVII: The Greek Wars
Chapter XVII: The Greek Wars

If there was one man ready to take advantage of the collapse of Roman power during Hannibal's war, it was Philip V. His conflict with Rome had begun with a man by the name of Demetrius of Pharos, a former king over much of Illyria who had been deposed by the Romans in 219 BCE and had fled to the court of King Philip V of Macedon. At the time of Hannibal's second major victory (Lake Trasimene), Philip had been involved in a war against the Aetolian League to the South but, at Demetrius' prompting, saw an opportunity whilst the Romans were on the losing side against Hannibal to effectively oust Roman influence from the region once and for all. For Demetrius, the benefits were obvious, primarily a return to his Illyrian kingdom, but for Philip the main advantage was a removal of any and all Roman influence, effectively leaving him free to play hegemon in the Greek peninsula and deal with his enemies by himself. Over the course of winter 217-216 BCE, Philip set about building a fleet which we are told was something the Macedonians had never really done before to this degree. As it was, there is almost certainly no chance that Demetrius had the resources to actually fight a naval war against Rome but, with Hannibal rampaging in Italy, he didn't seemingly need to. Instead, his main focus only needed to be fighting the Roman forces in Greece and Illyria. The treaty between Philip and Hannibal signed in 215 BCE is a landmark moment in the history of Hellenistic Greece, marking the point at which the decline of Roman influence (particularly in Illyria and Epirus) really began. Within under a decade, Roman power would be no more in either Illyria or Greece, broken by Hannibal and Carthage in Italy. From 214 to 206 BCE, Philip would fight a hard fought war in Epirus against the Romans and, in turn, their Greek allies (most notably the Aetolian League who was promised whatever land was taken from Philip) and the Kingdom of Pergamon under the rule of Attalus I. But as the war in Italy grew ever more desperate for Rome, financial and military support for the Greek allies began to dry up and Philip began making advances much more rapidly. Assisted by the Bithynians in the East (who relieved pressure on the Pergamese towards the end of the war) and Demetrius (once he was restored to power in Illyria in 207 BCE), Philip campaigned extensively in Aetolia and the Peloponnese, capturing the sacking Elis in 208 BCE.

The Treaty of Phoenice, signed in 206, was probably prompted by attempts to force peace by a series of trading powers ranging from Egypt to Byzantium, all of them concerned at the effects that the Macedonian War was having on trade. Crucially, it would mark the effective end of Roman power in Greece and Illyria and the return of King Demetrius of Illyria in the North as well as the rising power and fortunes of Philip V. For Philip, Illyria and Epirus were the two biggest gains. His alliance with Demetrius secured his Northern front and his campaigns in Epirus effectively secured the region for Macedon for a while to come. Just as importantly, it would begin a long history of treaties and diplomatic ties (both good and bad) with the Barcid family, hearkening back to the alliance of 215 between Philip and Hannibal. In one war, Philip had been freed from Roman interference, had beaten back the Aetolians and had conquered Epirus and secured influence in Illyria through Demetrius. Bolstered by his victory over the Aetolians and Romans, Philip readily agreed to offers by King Antiochus in 205 BCE to seize the Ptolemaic territories in the Aegean and wasted no time in doing so. Using his rebuilt navy from the Macedonian war, Philip swept down through the Aegean, capturing the Egyptian islands and ravaging the region of Caria in 204 BCE. Within months, however, Philip's actions had served to lead into yet another war with the Greek states. Alarmed by his expansionism, the Rhodians resolved to act to secure their own position in the Aegean and prevent a total Macedonian hegemony in the region that might be detrimental to their trading interests. At the same time, Philip had been looking to break the dominance in the Aegean upon which Rhodes' wealth and power had been built and had had a hand in piracy in the region, seeking to weaken their influence even before the war. No longer able to rely upon Roman influence, the Rhodians turned to a number of other states as Philip began to move against them, allying with Pergamon, Cyzicus and Byzantium. This was where the treaty between Antiochus and Philip began to prove itself invaluable. Seeking to expand his own influence elsewhere, Antiochus saw an ideal opportunity in Philip's war. Under the terms of the Anatolian Treaty in 203 BCE, the two states effectively agreed to split the territories of Philip's rivals. Philip would be accorded Byzantium and a series of regions along the Aegean coast whilst Antiochus would put down Attalus in the North and the Rhodians in the South, bringing the two regions into his own sphere of influence. In effect, Philip would secure for himself the Aegean sea and its vital trade routes, whilst Antiochus would bolster his own position in Anatolia, freeing himself up to campaign in the East against the rebellious Parthians and Baktrians and even into India and in the South against Egypt.

Similarly, Philip fell back on his alliance with Carthage (and the Barcids in particular), asking for naval support against the Rhodians (famed for their navy) in return for trading privileges in Aegean trade should the Macedonians win the war. In turn, Carthage proved willing to send 20 ships to help Philip and the Barcids themselves provided funds to the Macedonians. The Rhodian War proved itself a massive success for the two powers whose resources and naval support proved especially important in overcoming the powerful Rhodian fleet. From 203 to 199 BCE, the war would rage on culminating in the defeat of the Rhodians just off the coast of Caria in July that year. As under the terms of the Anatolian Treaty, Philip set up puppet governments in Byzantium and Cyzicus and, in 197 BCE, would set up the Ionian League, inviting (and compelling) a number of Ionian states including Samos, Chios and Miletus to join and having himself appointed its head and treasurer of the allied funds. Ostensibly, the purpose of this league was protect Aegean trade routes against piracy and the Greek states against foreign domination (the former of which must have rung fairly hollow given Philip's use of piracy against the Rhodians) but it achieved its purpose wonderfully, extending Philip's power through semi-legal means over the Anatolian islands. This contrasts distinctly to the arrangement in Epirus, where Philip's rule was built on direct treaties with the individual states under which they accepted him as king and paid tribute but were given a degree of internal autonomy, so long as the tribute and military support kept flowing. From 197 to 188 BCE, Philip's 'Ionian League' would continue to grow, as he expanded his navy and campaigned throughout the Aegean, forcibly drawing most of the Cyclades into the league and thus expanding the financial and military support upon which he could depend. To the South, however, Philip's actions had made enemies. Primarily amongst them was the Aetolian League, Philip's former enemies who had watched his movements in the Aegean with growing concern. To many, Philip seemed like another Philip II, with his eyes set on conquering all of Greece and that could not be tolerated. The counter-Macedonian movement began early, in 194 BCE the Aetolian League held a conference in Delphi, inviting a number of states from Southern Greece to counter this growing threat. Joined by delegates from much of Southern Greece including Athens, Sparta, Elis and the Achaean League, the Delphi Conference agreed later that year to a defensive alliance between the signatories to the conference against Macedon to the North. At the same time, canvassing for allies abroad, the anti-Macedonian forces reached out to Antiochus III in the East, hoping to convince him to provide naval or military support or even to invade Philip's Thracian territories.

Philip had been busy, however, hiring mercenary naval officers from Carthage to improve his fleet and relying heavily upon the increased income from access to the Aegean trade routes and his new subjects in Ionia and the Aegean Sea to expand and improve his navy. Realising that Philip's control of the sea would severely compromise their ability to counter him in a war, the Delphic Alliance passed an agreement to raise a sum of money (including from treasures stored at Delphi itself) to raise a fleet at Athens and Corinth for use against Philip's fleet in late 193 and two years later would organise a joint Delphic Army, intended to fight the Macedonians by land. War wouldn't officially begin until 190 BCE when the Delphic Alliance, feeling themselves ready to engage Philip and fearing that giving him more time would only lead to a much greater challenge as he pushed through the Aegean, invaded Epirus claiming to be fighting to liberate Greece from Macedonian tyranny. At the same time, their fleet sailed out from Athens into the Aegean, hoping to raise Ionia and the Cyclades in revolt (they seem to have been canvassing for support amongst the Ionians) against Philip. Philip wasted no time, deploying his fleet under the command of a Greek named Aristocratus to counter the alliance in the region and calling upon his allies in Illyria to provide military support. The Battle of Naxos proved indecisive but important. For one, whilst Antiochus was unwilling to invade Philip's lands directly whilst he himself was distracted elsewhere, he did provide naval support in the form of 30 ships (probably of Rhodian origin) and from 187 BCE would provide financial support for the alliance (possibly in return for recognition of his own suzerainty over Caria and Ionia). A limited invasion under the command of his son Antiochus would take place in 186 BCE and would capture much of Caria but fail to make any significant gains in Ionia. Back in Greece itself, Philip's army marched to Dodona in Epirus and from there to Ambracia where he won a significant victory over the Delphic forces before pushing onward into Aetolia itself. At sea, this proved an early instance of the rivalry between Carthage and the Seleucids. As Antiochus provided 30 ships, the Carthaginians had provided officers and, in 189 BCE, 20 ships arrived from Carthage (it is unknown whether they were Carthaginian or Barcid ships however) to provide support to Philip (wanting to secure their favourable trade privileges in the Aegean and access to the routes passing through from the Black Sea, especially of grain).

The Delphic War would drag on for a total of 10 years from 191 BCE to 181 BCE. During this time, Philip would fight mercilessly, seeing both victories and defeats but, with his greater funds and resources from Macedonia, pushing steadily on into central and Southern Greece. It is important to note that the Achaean League at least had fallen a long way from its height, its army no longer as strong as it had once been and its reserves of manpower and resources severely compromised, so too the Aetolian League ruled over relatively poor land and had relied heavily on piracy to bolster their income, which dried up after the conquest of Epirus as Philip sought to expand his domination in the Adriatic Sea trading lanes and fought against the Aetolian pirates. Philip's kingdom was one on the rise and he seemed unstoppable. At sea, his fleet proved itself time and again, bolstered by the expert command of his Carthaginian allies and with growing experience, he gradually took control of the seas from the Delphic Alliance and by the late 180s was launching naval raids against Attica and the Peloponnese. Warfare had changed since the days of Alexander the Great, the Hellenistic Era had seen the rise of a much more flexible form of warfare, one that had been used to great effect by both Rome and Hannibal, involving more complex movements of troops. In Greece, this had seen the rise of Thureos warfare, defined by lighter infantry who took a more skirmish-based role. This didn't displace the Macedonian phalanx by any means but by the time of the Delphic War, armies such as those of the Achaeans typically interspersed both phalanxes and lighter infantry for greater battlefield flexibility. On the field, Philip had devastated the Delphic Alliance, he was no stranger to lighter styles of warfare and had skilled mercenaries at his back as well as a powerful phalanx. This in turn allowed him to campaign as far as Athens and win success after success in Attica. By 183 BCE, the Delphic Alliance was growing thin. The Aetolian League had been disbanded by Philip a year earlier after a defeat at Delphi and the treasury of Delphi had only barely been saved from falling into his hands by being spirited away weeks before his arrival first to Athens and then to Corinth. In place of the Aetolian League, Philip established independent alliances between Macedon and the various states as he had in Epirus, affording some internal authority but maintaining effective puppet governments and controlling foreign policy and extorting both military support and tribute.

From 184 to 182 BCE, Philip invaded as far as Athens, defeating both Thebes and Athens in turn before making his way towards the Peloponnese. Athens was, culturally and politically, a hugely important state. Traditionally a democracy, Philip saw an opportunity in his occupation of Athens. It is important to remember that how a state came across was and is hugely important in foreign policy and the same went for Philip. Hence the use of the Ionian League in the Aegean, it provided him with a semi-legal basis for his domination of the reason as well as an administrative framework for said domination (a similar tactic had been used by his namesake Philip II in Greece only two centuries previously). Thus, after a short campaign in the Northern Peloponnese (with modest results), Philip called for a second council, this time to be held at Athens with the signed treaty to be taken before Apollo at Delphi for divine ratification. In name, the Treaty of Athens signed in summer 181 BCE was very lenient. Under it, Philip agreed to the independence and autonomy of the Peloponnesian and Attican states (including Athens). In turn, the Achaean League and her allies in Southern Greece would recognise the Ionian League and the treaties between Philip and his new 'allies' in Central Greece, as far as Thebes (which had never really recovered from its destruction by Alexander). On top of this, the treasure from Delphi would be returned to the Oracle and the city of Delphi assured autonomy (though this was nominal in truth) and protection by Philip who would take the title a year later of Prostatis tou Theou stous Delphous (often shortened to Prostatis Delphous) or 'Protector of the God at Delphi'. Practically, the Treaty of Athens bought Philip a renewed sense of security in his empire. By returning the treasure to Delphi where it was in easy reach of Philip, the Delphic Alliance effectively offered it up as tribute to Macedon and confirmed Macedon in their rule of Central Greece and the Aegean Sea. Beyond this, it was also a remarkable piece of diplomatic propaganda for Philip. Prior to the conference, Philip ascended to the Acropolis to pray to Athena and, afterwards, commissioned a set of statues of Athena to be carved and set up along the route leading up to the Acropolis where he also built a small private sanctuary for the goddess known as the Philipeion. In doing so, Philip made his mark on Athens. Not only did he show himself as, ostensibly, a pious and just ruler but as a protector of Greek and Hellenic culture in the vein of a new Pericles (who had built the Parthenon in the first place). On his return North, Philip made sure not to be outdone, establishing a new Macedonian treasury at Delphi and storing as many as 100 talents of silver (possibly war booty) there for, nominally, the use of the god. Afterwards, he visited the oracle himself, claiming afterwards that she had confirmed his destiny as a 'new Alexander'.

Nor did Philip have no reason to boast (even if his acts resembled more closely maybe his namesake Philip II), he had campaigned extensively and was a talented and seasoned general who had indeed brought most of Greece under Macedonian rule. Over the course of 179 to 177 BCE, Philip would set about securing his new dominions, touring central Greece extensively before returning to Pella. There, he made heavy use of his increased income, bolstered by trade in the Aegean and the Adriatic, to set about beautifying his capital city, commissioning a series of lavish temples throughout the city to Zeus, Athena, Apollo and Poseidon, which would take up much of the rest of his life. Now in his early 60s, Philip's health was beginning to fail and he was unable to go on campaign any more and settled in for his last years in Pella. He would die in 167 BCE at the age of 64 and was succeeded in turn by his son Perseus (now in his late 40s). Perseus was a man his father's footsteps and, as his father has been compared to Antiochus III, he too has compared to Antiochus IV. Like his Seleucid counterpart, he took the throne later in life and wouldn't reign for an exceptionally long period and, like his namesake, he was a decent general and would spend much of his reign building on what his father had built. Perseus would die after only a decade on the throne in 157 BCE, succeeded by his son Antigonus IV (at the age of 36. Perseus' biggest addition to his predecessor's achievements came only two years into his reign on 165 BCE. Demetrius had died and the alliance between Macedon and Illyria had cooled significantly since the days of the Delphic War. In 165 BCE, continued Illyrian piracy in the Adriatic had grown too much for the Macedonians and Perseus led a campaign into Illyria to defeat them and secure the region. He would spend a period of 5 years in Illyria, seeing modest success and securing the Southern regions but proving ultimately unable to defeat the Illyrians once and for all.

Under his heir, Antigonus, Philip's project would be continued and largely finished. In 154 BCE, Antigonus' fleet sailed into the Adriatic and raided the Illyrian coast, sacking city after city and returning with gold, silver and other treasures which were promptly split between Pella and Delphi, with grand offerings made to Apollo at the latter. For the next few years, Antigonus would turn his attention North, campaigning extensively in Thrace, especially along the Black Sea coast towards the city of Odessa. By 148 BCE, Antigonus could claim to have subjugated the Thracian tribes (although he likely only held actual influence over the Black Sea coast and some internal areas North of his own kingdom). But Antigonus' biggest success came from 147-144 BCE. After Philip, Macedon had made a number of allies down in the Peloponnese including Athens (which had been compelled to accept Macedon as an ally after the end of the Delphic War). Meanwhile, the Achaean League had taken pains to expand its power, seeing a unified Peloponnese as the only viable way to oppose Macedonian hegemony. Thus, by 149 BCE, much of the Peloponnese was part of the Achaean League and they were moving to forcibly integrate the rest of the peninsula to prevent Macedonian footholds in the region. This, in turn, effectively stepped on Antigonus' toes in the region and he was not about to have it. In 147 BCE, claiming to be fighting for the protection of his allies in the Peloponnese, Antigonus invaded the Peloponnese, marching South through Attica and meeting up with allies in the region before moving on towards Corinth. His army may have been as large as 30,000 men, made up of Macedonian soldiers, Greek levies and mercenaries as he advanced from Attica into the Peloponnese and marched on Corinth. Supported by his navy in the Gulf of Corinth and the Saronic Gulf, Antigonus swept past the defences at the entrance to the Peloponnese and made his way straight to Corinth where the league had amassed most of its forces. Bolstered by local allies (including maybe 5000 Athenians), Antigonus outnumbered the Achaean army and smashed them at the Battle of Corinth, besieging the city and (with his naval support) capturing and sacking it. The fall of Corinth in 146 BCE was followed by a rapid campaign of conquest as Antigonus swept through the Peloponnese to Elis and then on to Mantinea and even advancing on Sparta. That isn't to say that Antigonus' campaign was a total success, in the rough mountainous regions of the Peloponnese the Achaeans turned to hit and run warfare in some cases. In 145 BCE a force of 2000 Macedonians was ambushed and destroyed near Elis and only two months later a further 3000 Athenians and Epirotians were defeated only a few miles away. Officially, the Achaean War ended in 144 BCE with the submission of the Achaean League which, rather than being disbanded, was reformed as the Second Peloponnesian League with Macedon at its head and soon incorporated all of the Peloponnese.

In truth, the Peloponnesian League proved unstable. Perseus had already been plagued by problems in Ionia with revolts in 165, 162 and 159 BCE (possibly funded by the Seleucids) and now Antigonus had opened up resistance down South in the Peloponnese as well. Antigonus would die only two years later in 142 BCE at the age of 50, succeeded by his second son (at 28), Philip VI. Philip was by no means a great conqueror, his biggest challenge would prove to be maintaining Macedon as it was. Both the Ionian and Peloponnesian Leagues proved rebellious and hard to deal with, bolstered by other problematic states including (notably) Athens which revolted no fewer than three times over the course of Philip's reign. Where Philip did excel was in his astute diplomacy and an appreciation for art and culture. For the 33 years of Philip's rule (until his death at 61 in 109 BCE), he would take steps to steadily secure Macedon's hold over her kingdom, especially in regards to the most rebellious of states. Following in his namesake's footsteps, Philip made large donations to the oracle at Delphi and throughout his reign travelled extensively throughout Macedon's territories, encouraging the arts where he could. Benefiting from a flourishing trade network in the Aegean, Philip funded huge building projects all throughout Greece, rebuilding the damaged areas of the acropolis in Corinth and expanding the Macedonian treasury at Delphi. In addition, he lavished gifts on other religious sites throughout Greece including a brand new temple at Olympia and ordered grand and beautiful statues made for a new palace he had built in Pella. Diplomatically, Philip made huge strides for Macedon. In 141 BCE he ended the long held Barcid privileges in the Aegean and Adriatic, taxing their merchants once again and only a year later he firmly came down on the side of the Seleucids when he married his sister to King Seleucus IV and sent a significant dowry and a recognition of Seleucid rule in Caria. This proved crucial, any Seleucid support for the Ionian or Peloponnesian Leagues was now expected to end, thus allowing Philip to set about securing his empire once and for all. With the collapse of the Barcids, Philip now found himself lacking any serious enemies in the region and began a serious reform of the system of governance within Macedon. In 137 BCE he disbanded the Peloponnesian League, opting instead for direct alliances and treaties between the Peloponnesian states and Macedon. Only two years later he would do the same with the Ionian League. The thinking was probably that a series of direct individual alliances between Macedon and their subjects were a better alternative to a larger league that would put the states in constant contact with one another and risk them joining in a larger scale revolt.

Philip proved himself conciliatory, to Athens he gave significant autonomy and made no attempts to end or destroy the democracy existing within the city. It was a huge and important step forward, by not directly threatening the city, Philip could hope to win over the populace and his donations and building projects in Athens surely had this as a goal. But this was diplomacy backed up by steel, Philip expanded his military networks throughout Greece, settling Macedonian settlers in towns and cities all across the Peninsula, particularly Epirus, Ionia and Central Greece. Not only did this help to create a more generally loyal populace by interspersing Macedonians amongst subject Greeks but it also provided local garrisons for Philip should there be revolts. The biggest problem was that these communities tended to earn the ire of local states, who felt their land was being stripped away by a tyrannical Macedonian government. To this too, Philip had an answer. Philip II had spent much of his early career not just expanding Macedon but more directly integrating local regions into her kingdom, using foreign policy elsewhere in the forms Philip, Perseus, Antigonus and Philip had already used. It was from this that Philip VI took much of his inspiration. He couldn't do so with Ionia or the Peloponnese, they were too disconnected from Macedon itself, but in 133 BCE he gave rights of isopolity (shared citizen rights) to much of Epirus, integrating the region into Macedon more directly and appointing (often local) magistrates for governance. So too, he would follow this with much of central Greece over the period of 120-110 BCE and by the time Philip died in 109 BCE, the regions that could be considered 'Macedon' and not just subject allies, extended as far as Delphi. Ionia and the Peloponnese would never follow, nor would Attica or Delphi itself but under Philip's successor Alexander VI, the policy would continue and embrace most of Thessaly, regions of Boeotia and as far the Gulf of Corinth in some areas. In turn, this reduced the pressure on the diplomatic resources of Macedon, allowing Philip and Alexander to focus on maintaining control in the more rebellious regions. The establishment of Macedonian communities and colonies bolstered the manpower of the state and provided local areas from which to strike out against rebels.

More generally, Greece and Macedon had thrived during this period, reaching a fever pitch under Philip VI and Alexander VI. As elsewhere, trade flowed through the Aegean and Adriatic, bolstered in the latter by the steady flow of Barcid goods through Italy. Antigonus and Perseus' campaigns in Illyria and later naval campaigns under Antigonus, Philip and Alexander had led to a drastic decline in piracy in the two seas and the more stable diplomatic situation between Macedon and the Seleucids during Philip and Alexander's reigns allowed for a flourishing trade network between the two. In particular, Athens and Pella boomed in Greece, vast amounts of trade flowing through them to the East and entering Greece through them from the East. Further West, Apollonia and Corinth also grew apace, forming an important entrepot en route to Italy through which various Eastern goods passed from dyes to silks and even spices. Corcyra, lying on the Adriatic trade routes boomed from ships passing up and down the trade lanes, protected by Macedonian ships. Macedon benefited from its location, as trade came from the East, it passed through Greece and often on to Italy with the major population centres of Greece also forming major markets. As such, by the end of the century one could easily find silks and spices and dyes, timber and iron, copper and bronze, gold and silver and a plethora of other goods in any of the major markets of Macedon. Much of Macedon's prosperity also lay in the North. Their control of Byzantium and Philip's influence on the other side of the Chersonese (confirmed by the Anatolian Treaty under Philip V) allowed for the taxing of shipping from the Black Sea, especially of the vital grain transports from the Crimea to Greece. In the East, trade passed often through Chios and Samos if coming from Anatolia whilst ties to Egypt (after 139 BCE) brought trade through the Cyclades en route to either Pella or Athens. In turn, this funded the cultural boom of Philip VI's reign. Beginning in 129 BCE, he began work on his most famous monument, the towering Antigonid Mausoleum (built to directly imitate the Mausoleum of Halicarnassus in Anatolia). Whilst not as impressive as its counterpart in Asia, it stood out dramatically on the hillsides near Pella and would come to house all future kings of Macedon (its oldest inhabitant was probably only Philip V). Built in limestone and stuccoed to make it look like marble, the Mausoleum rose a massive 120 feet into the air and was made up of a series of chambers, each housing the body of a different king starting with Philip V, laden probably with grave goods. Around the edges stood gleaming marble and bronze statues of the gods and (supposedly) of the Macedonian kings themselves. Work on the Mausoleum would continue until the end of Philip's life, finished in 107 under Alexander VI.

The second great monument of Philip's life was began 3 years earlier in 132 BCE on the edges of Pella. Inspired by the famous cult centres at Delphi, Athens and Olympia, Philip set about creating his own grand temple complex. At its centre lay a vast temple to Zeus built in a Doric style and beautifully decorated, around this were a series of smaller temples to other members of the Greek pantheon with Athena and Apollo given particular prominence. Within the complex also lay a number of other buildings, including theatres, stoa and a treasury for the gods into which the Macedonians would pay every year under both Philip and Alexander (though they likely called upon the wealth themselves whenever needed). These building projects, in turn, cost a fortune and were probably bankrolled primarily by the trade flowing through Macedon at the time and encouraged dramatically by Philip during his time as king. Thus, even as the West began to fragment, the East began to unify. By the end of the century, the Seleucids had absorbed Egypt and Greece had been mostly unified under the Macedonians by Philip V and his successors. But this left two major diadochi, the Seleucids and the Macedonians. Both laid claim to the succession of Alexander, both sought to hold their empires together and both eyes the rich lands of the other, realising that there was now an opportunity for a potential reunification of the once great empire. The Ptolemies were gone, Greece was unified. Then there were two.

 
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Well, I binge-read this for a while, and I must applaud it. I really enjoyed this as an ancient recounting of what could've been. BTW, you forgot to threadmark several updates.
 
Chapter XVIII: Golden Age of the Seleucids
Chapter XVIII: Golden Age of the Seleucids

Above all, there are two reasons why the Seleucids boomed during the 2nd and 1st Centuries AD, more so than pretty much anyone else. The first is a series of decent/strong kings from Antiochus III right through to the middle of the 1st Century. Their personal and political strength, talent in military or administrative matters and oftentimes quick thinking helped fuse the Seleucid Empire together, preventing civil war and rebellion and maintaining a powerful empire. The second was money. Before, I mentioned that the Seleucids prospered primarily from trade with the East. Already by the 130s, spices were flowing in by sea from India to dock wither in Southern Egypt, the Sinai Desert or Mesopotamia, then working their way up from there to Antioch or Alexandria. Silks had also been traded but on a much smaller scale. Until the official 'formation' of the Silk Road in 119 BCE (when the Han Dynasty seized control of the Gansu corridor allowing Chinese merchants to travel further West towards Baktria along the Northern routes), silk was traded on a generally small scale and available only to the king himself. From 119 BCE that changed. The formation of the Silk Road brought a much increased trade in silk and other goods from China to Baktria and from there West through Persia to Antioch. As such, these two trade routes in the Indian Ocean and along Persia, formed the backbone of the Seleucid economy and wherever the trade routes passed, the economy boomed. By the middle of the 1st Century BCE, major towns had cropped up around Myos Hormos in Egypt, the Sinai Peninsula and cities such as Babylon, Seleukeia and Susa were booming from the spices passing up the Euphrates and Tigris and directly through their cities. In particular, Mesopotamia boomed as not only a fertile region suited for the growing of a significant agricultural surplus but also as the crossroads between the Silk Road and much of the spice trade from the East. This period, after 119 BCE, was the Golden Age of the Seleucid Empire, but it was preceded by decades of warfare and diplomacy that would set the stage for its success at the end of the 2nd Century.

This begins, in turn, with Antiochus 'the Great'. A talented military commander, Antiochus is in many ways the Seleucid counterpart to Philip V in Macedonia, a man set on expanding his rule and a man compared by many to Alexander himself. Following his defeat in 217 BCE at the Battle of Raphia, Antiochus had campaigned non-stop for the next 12 years in Anatolia, Armenia, Parthia, Baktria and eventually India. Afterwards, he turned his attention back to the Egyptians, signing a treaty with Philip V in 205 BCE to split the Egyptian territories between them, which had in inspired Philip's expansion into the Aegean Sea. Antiochus would campaign for a while in Syria but in 203 BCE, took advantage of the Anatolian Treaty between him and Philip to secure his position in the North, invading Asia Minor and ravaging the Egyptian lands before advancing on Pergamon in the North. There he confronted and defeated Attalus I at the Battle of Pergamon before joining with the Bithynians and signing an alliance under which Pergamon would be divided between the two kings. In the North, the Bithynians were granted a stretch of land along the Northern coast of Anatolia whilst Antiochus forced Attalus to accept a status of vassal for the rest of his kingdom, terms under which Attalus would be expected to pay tribute to Antiochus and provide military support but would otherwise be given a degree of autonomy. At sea, his navy fought extensively against the Rhodians, attempting to gain enough of a control of the sea to allow Antiochus' army passage over to the island. Supported by the Macedonians and Carthaginian naval support, they were finally able to defeat the Rhodians at sea and in 200 BCE, Antiochus' army landed near Rhodes. After the hard-fought Battle of Rhodes, the Rhodians retreated into the city in which they were besieged, the joint naval forces blockading the city by sea. The siege would continue for another 2 years before Rhodes surrendered and agreed to dismantle its walls and the remainder of its fleet and accept a tributary position to Antiochus, providing both money and military support and accepting Antiochus as King of Rhodes. One of the most important things to remember about Antiochus is that most of his rule was spent campaigning. After Rhodes, he swept South and finished the conquest of Syria and Judaea, only returning North for a second campaign in Anatolia to put down a Ptolemaic revolt in Anatolia. From 217 right through until the defeat of the Anatolian rebels in 193 BCE, Antiochus was almost permanently on campaign. But his campaigns had had the desired effect. Baktria and Parthia had accepted vassalage once again (although they would continue to prove problems for future kings), Pergamon had been defeated and so had Rhodes, thus securing his position in Anatolia and the Mediterranean trade routes from Antioch and the Ptolemies had been driven out of both Anatolia and their territories in Syria and Judaea. By the end of the 190s, Antiochus' son (Antiochus) had pushed the Egyptians as far as the Sinai, stopping when a truce was signed between the Ptolemies and the Seleucids.

The effect, in the 180s, was suitably massive. Antioch prospered from the trade routes passing through it. No longer threatened at sea by the Rhodians, Seleucid trade networks boomed in the Mediterranean, taking agricultural produce, spices and a number of other goods out from the empire to Pella, Athens, Italy and beyond. Tribute missions served a similar purpose, not only did they bring wealth to Antiochus, but they often supported trade missions, merchants travelling with the tribute sent to Antioch for easy protection and selling their wares on in the markets of the city. Antiochus had commissioned already expansions to the city but, in the vein of most Hellenistic rulers, he took advantage of the growing wealth of the Seleucid Empire to beautify it ever further. Bear in mind that, as I said, reputation and foreign policy went hand in hand. As Philip had tried to appear as a pious ruler looking after the autonomy of Greece, Antiochus wanted to appear himself as a new Alexander, setting off to reunify the Macedonian Empire and restore it to glory. Hence why, on his campaign in Pergamon in the 200s, Antiochus had followed in Alexander's footsteps and visited what was believed to be the site of Troy. In the same vein, Seleucus IV in the 130s would visit the Temple of Amun in Siwa, just as Alexander had once done after the conquest of Egypt. When Antiochus held a grand festival to celebrate his successes on his return to Antioch in 191 BCE, he paraded captives and elephants, horses and camels and all sorts of booty and tribute collected from his many enemies. Within his parade were Parthians and Baktrians, Pergamese and Rhodians and a number of Egyptians. Only a year later, Antiochus commissioned a whole series of new coins presenting his own head on one side (as was typical) and that of Alexander on the other. Upon his second invasion of Egypt in the 170s, Antiochus would take the title 'King of the Egyptians' which he would be marked as (amongst a number of other epithets) for the rest of his life. Whilst later known as 'the Great' he also tended to prefer the time 'Soter' meaning saviour, presenting himself as a champion of Hellenism and peoples across the world. Hence why, after his parade in Antioch in 191 BCE, he would resettle the Greek captives across his empire whilst feeling free to enslave the Egyptians and Parthians.

In 186 BCE, Antiochus raised a fresh army and set off for the East once again. It is likely this was more of a political than a military mission. Antiochus held a massive empire and he had no desire to see any of it break off in revolt and so a military campaign to remind people of his might seemed a generally good idea. His 'campaign' of 186-183 BCE was aimed mostly at those areas we might think were most needed to keep in line, advancing through Parthia he stayed as the guest of the Parthian king, leaving with gifts and tribute aplenty before moving on to Baktria where he commissioned a grand new temple to Zeus before leading some incursions into India against the Mauryans. These campaigns met with probably little success nor failure, ending with a gift of 40 elephants by the Mauryan kings and some plunder brought home. En route home, Antiochus moved by the Indian Ocean route, meeting with a number of Arabian kings and extorting tribute from them and declarations of fealty. In short, this was a political campaign. It served to bind his empire a bit more closely together, whilst amassing more tribute and plunder. He barely fought and saw no major battles save what amounted to a small skirmish on the Indian frontier. Finally, in 183 BCE, he returned to Antioch. Antiochus was getting old, he was in his 50s and had reigned for a long time, securing his empire and having almost defeated the Egyptians once and for all. Determined to finish what he had started, Antiochus invaded Egypt again four years later beginning in 179 BCE and continuing until 177 BCE when he was defeated by the Egyptians at the Battle of the Sinai with the help of the Barcids. In the North, Antiochus had had troubled relations with the Macedonians for about a decade now. In 187 he had provided 30 ships to support the Delphic League, probably looking at a general invasion of Caria and Ionia and only a year later his son, Antiochus invaded the Macedonian regions of Caria. Representing his father, Antiochus took much of his father's propaganda with him. As he advanced through Caria, he presented himself as a saviour of the Ionians and the independent Greeks against Macedonian domination. Over the course of 186-185 he was able to advance through most of Caria (securing the regions held by the Macedonians) and incited a number of revolts in Ionia (the most prominent being Samos), but his success in the latter proved mixed. He gained a few islands but a Macedonian counterattack defeated the Samian revolt and inflicted a series of minor defeats on Antiochus' army in the islands before driving him back to mainland Anatolia. After a second, failed campaign against the islands, a treaty was finally reached. Under the terms of the Treaty of Chios, Philip agreed to abandon the Anatolian mainland, accepting Caria as Seleucid territory on the condition that Antiochus drop any claims to the Ionian islands. Nominally, the two went a step further to agree on terms of non-aggression and general recognition. A similar treaty, two years later, confirmed Seleucid recognition of Macedonian preeminence in Greece in return for a recognition that Antiochus III was the rightful 'King of Persia,f Rhodes and Pergamon, of Parthia and Baktria, King of the Indus and Saviour of the Greeks' (Antiochus would take a number of other titles before the end of his reign).

By the time Antiochus III died in 174 BCE, he had ruled for 48 years (222-174 BCE) and was succeeded in turn by the 47 year old Antiochus IV, an experienced general and elderly king but one with a suitable succession given that he already had a 7 year old son Seleucus. Antiochus would only reign for 11 years, dying in 163 BCE at the age of 58 and succeeded in turn by his son Seleucus at the age of 18. Like his father before him, Antiochus would spend most of that time on campaign. His father's death and his own accession had seen revolts in regions of the empire with Pergamon under Eumenes II and Parthia under Phriapatius declaring themselves independent kingdoms and espousing Seleucid rule. Antiochus moved quickly, invading Pergamon in early 173 BCE and defeating Eumenes in battle (bearing in mind that the Seleucids had much more in the way of resources than Pergamon did) before turning around and invading Parthia in an imitation of his father. Given the distances and the rough terrain of the Iranian Plateau, the Parthian campaign proved more difficult and would last from 173 to 168 BCE before Antiochus defeated Phraates I (Phriapatius' son) and executed both him and his brother Mithridates who Antiochus recognised as both ambitious and a talented general who would pose a threat to Seleucid stability. In turn, he handed over Parthia to Phraates' weaker son Arsaces. Determined to maintain the Parthians as a weaker subject, Antiochus also in turn handed over a stretch of their land to a nearby people known as the Armadians who inhabited a region bordering on that of Parthia and extorted treaties of fealty from them. A subsequent Baktrian revolt prompted another campaign with mixed success but culminating in the Baktrian king accepting a treaty of fealty with the Seleucids again in 165 BCE. On his way back to Antioch, however, Antiochus grew ill in early 164 BCE and died somewhere in the Iranian Plateau. News of his death reverberated quickly. Taking his son, Seleucus, to be weak, the Baktrians rose up in revolt for a third time. Seleucus was a better commander than his father and determined to prove himself another strong king and the Baktrian revolt of 164 BCE prompted a brutally quick response. Leaving Antioch with only 2000 soldiers, Seleucus met with his father's army at Seleukeia, taking command and marching East once again with them. But Seleucus was fighting an uphill battle. Away from the capital, his uncle (another Seleucus) was promptly declared (or declared himself) king by a cabal of Greek ministers and seized the capital, raising an army and sending out messengers to Pergamon, Bithynia and Rhodes for military support. Back in Iran, meanwhile, Seleucus found himself distrusted by his army. He was unproven, young and maybe not fit to lead the army. Compared to Antiochus who was already a veteran general. As news reached Seleucus of the coup back home, he realised he had no choice but to turn around and march on Antioch or risk losing his kingdom forever. Fearing that his army might turn on him, Seleucus left his men at Seleukeia under the command of a trusted general before rushing back with his original 2000 soldiers towards Antioch. Further west, Pergamon and Rhodes had risen in revolt against the Seleucid Empire, taking the civil war as an opportunity to exert their own independence and the elder Seleucus and his ministers had begun to march against them just as Seleucus moved on Antioch. Informed, as he approached, that the rebel king was gone, Seleucus set up camp a few miles outside the walls and sent messengers to sneak into the city and mobilise loyalists within its walls.

Primarily, they found the support of a number of ministers and aristocrats who hadn't joined the coup and, promising them rewards if they helped Seleucus, mobilised their support to retake the city. That night, the gates were opened from the inside and Seleucus' men flooded in, killing the guards and easily fighting their way back up to the citadel. Over 20 rebel ministers were captured and executed, their heads left on pikes to rot outside the city walls. But Seleucus wasn't done, sending messengers to his army in Seleukeia, he called them back to fight at his side against the rebels. Elsewhere, as news arrived of the fall of Antioch, the elder Seleucus promptly turned face, offering Pergamon and Rhodes independence and tribute should they help him retake the empire. Supported, in turn, by an army of maybe 10,000 Seleucid soldiers and about 5000 Rhodians and 2000 Pergamese, Seleucus advanced on the city of Antioch. But their army was limited, they hadn't had the time to mobilise a major force before Seleucus retook the city and as his army returned from Seleukeia, they found themselves badly outnumbered. The Battle of Antioch proved more of a slaughter than anything as Seleucus' 40,000 soldiers massacred the meagre 17,000 rebels, capturing Seleucus and sentencing him and the other rebel ministers to death for treason. Thus, by the end of 164 BCE, Seleucus IV had established himself as king at the age of only 18. But the fight wasn't over, between Pergamon and Rhodes in the West and Baktria in the East, Seleucus was faced with more and more of his empire falling into insurrection. In early 163 BCE, a revolt broke out in Persia and another in Judaea later that year. But Seleucus was on the march. Having shown himself a capable commander and secured his position as king, he swept West into Anatolia, advancing on Pergamon and defeating the rebels there before storming the city and razing it to the ground. From there, he marched South in early 162 BCE, crossing over into Rhodes (after a Seleucid naval victory at the Battle of Side) and crushing their army on the field of Rhodes, taking the city and once again razing it to the ground. In the East, his generals had by no means been idle. That trusted lieutenant from the civil war, a man named Demetrius, led an army of 10,000 soldiers East, defeating the Persian rebels at Susa and extorting military help and tribute from Parthia before leading an incursion into Baktria where he would remain until 158 BCE. Seleucus, meanwhile, returned to the mainland, crushing the Judaean rebels in battle and making preparations to move against Egypt.

Enter Ptolemy VI. If you remember, Ptolemy VI was the last real hope for the Egyptians. Like his rival, Seleucus, Ptolemy was a brilliant general and a skilled politician to boot. In many ways, the two contrast. Both would see internal dissent and rebellion, both would attempt expansions of their empire and both would or had dealt with rivals to the throne. But while Seleucus survived and thrived, having been out the capital when the civil war began, Ptolemy was murdered, whilst the Seleucids would thrive, the Ptolemies continued their descent. The difference was that Ptolemy was fighting with a much harder position at his back, a kingdom descending into foreign dominance and internal wars, plagued by rebels and nearly bankrupt whilst Seleucus was keeping an empire together, he was wealthy, he had a large army and his enemies were generally weaker than he was. Yet Ptolemy would buck the trend of Seleucus' string of victories. Sensing that Seleucus was planning another invasion, Ptolemy raised 50,000 soldiers with Barcid help and in 161 BCE went on the offensive. Sweeping quickly through the Sinai, he ravaged his way as he marched onward through Judaea. After a series of small battles, Seleucus fell back to Tyre where he planned to finally meet Ptolemy once and for all. Many of the details of the Battle of Tyre are unfortunately lost. Seleucus had maybe 32,000 men (many of them having been killed over three years of campaigning) but his forces were relatively experienced, having fought a number of rebellions. Ptolemy, however, was fighting with 50,000 soldiers, less experienced save for the 20,000 Barcid mercenary core. Primarily made up of mercenaries, these were experienced soldiers, having fought in Iberia and Sicily on behalf of the Barcids and now lent out to the Ptolemies. In makeup, they were African, with one source placing them as 17,000 Libyan infantry and 3000 Numidian cavalry. Going back to the times of Hannibal, it had been these two groups that had played a crucial role in his crushing victories at Cannae, Trasimeme, Trebia and so on and they were still brutally effective. As Seleucus' pikemen confronted those of Ptolemy, he began to take the advantage, driving them back slowly with weight of numbers (in pikemen Ptolemy was outnumbered in this case). But as he did so, his Persian and Cappadocian cavalry engaged in brutal fighting with the Numidians before being driven off the field opening the way for the Libyan infantry. These were more flexible infantry and, now, Ptolemy made good use of them. He had been mostly keeping them in reserve, sending pockets of men to support the front lines where they seemed about to break but with the Seleucid cavalry off the field, the way was open for an intervention. Bringing his Libyans around on the flanks, he had them form up and begin to envelop Seleucus' lines. Desperately, Seleucus sent in his own reserves to counter the Libyans but they proved no match for the heavy, battle hardened veterans. More problematically, Ptolemy's cavalry now had free reign of the field and promptly began to flank Seleucus' reserves, routing huge swathes of the army and freeing up the Libyans to surround the phalanx. Realising that the annihilation of his army was imminent, Seleucus swallowed his pride and began negotiations with Ptolemy. It had been a crippling defeat and now Ptolemy took his opportunity.

The Treaty of Tyre could have marked the beginning of a Ptolemaic Renaissance. Instead, it would mark a bump in the road of their defeat. Under it, Seleucus returned Judaea and paid a massive war indemnity in return for the freeing of his army and a peace treaty with Ptolemy. In truth, Ptolemy was probably looking more for a political victory than a significant territorial one. Judaea could be properly secured later but the victory at Tyre promised a route to taking full and total control of the country in his own right, sidelining the ministers seeking to control him and proving himself a league apart from his predecessors. It wouldn't prove to be so. Only a year later he would be poisoned at a banquet and died, his death marking the passing of the Ptolemies' hopes for survival. For Seleucus, Tyre had been a disaster. His grandfather's gains in Judaea had been undone and his political position weakened at a time when he needed to appear as a strong, powerful king, not a 20 year old boy being crushed by an Egyptian upstart. Returning to Antioch, he began rebuilding his army, planning to set off for the East to crush the Baktrians and restore his image in the minds of the rest of the empire. Messengers were sent out to his satraps across the empire, Pergamon and Rhodes particularly demanding soldiers and tribute and a massive building project in Antioch was begun, expanding the palace as a show of strength after a military disaster. Seleucus would stay in Antioch for two years, building his army and rebuilding his treasury, even as Demetrius campaigned in Baktria. Seleucus was still reeling, these two years were spent securing his power across the empire, removing governors and officials whose loyalty seemed suspect and enforcing his decisions in political matters. At the same time, the captives from Pergamon and Rhodes were resettled across the empire, especially in cities in Persia and the Eastern reaches of the empire, with Seleucus seeking to build a Greek power base across the region, encourage Hellenisation and ensure a source of soldiers to put down rebels in the area. In 159 BCE, Seleucus finally left Antioch at the head of 35,000 soldiers and advanced East towards Baktria, joining Demetrius and finishing the campaign against them over the course of the next year. In 158 BCE, the Baktrians finally surrendered the Baktrian 'king's' dynasty was imprisoned before being brought back to Antioch where the Baktrian king was executed for treason. In turn, however, Seleucus was content to let the rest live, settling them in Antioch in luxurious accommodation near the palace where he could keep a close eye on them. In the meantime, he broke up the Baktrian kingdom, establishing a new series of strategoi across the area to which he appointed loyal magistrates and officials, one of whom was none other than Demetrius.

Over the next 6 years, Seleucus was concerned mostly with administration. His reforms effectively followed on from those of Antiochus III who had modernised the system of Persian governance adopted by Alexander to remove a system in which power was wielded by both the military and political arms of the state which led to rivalries and could paralyse the administration. As in Baktria, Seleucus brought Pergamona and Rhodes under the governance of Seleucid strategoi appointed directly by the king. Deliberately keeping his touch light to prevent revolt, Seleucus slowed down the policy of Hellenisation, having realised that he was risking revolts (especially in Judaea) should he try to push Hellenic culture too openly. Rather, he began pushing the empire the other way, seeking to spread Hellenic culture but also adopt other cultural and ethnic groups more closely into the empire itself. By doing so, Seleucus would open the administration up to a wider base of peoples from Persia to India, thus being able to draw on a larger base of manpower in both military and political matters. This was pragmatic more than anything. Seleucus was aware that by opening up the administration and military more to others, he might have a chance of more directly binding the empire together. In the meantime, he continued to encourage immigration from Greece as well as colonisation. Hellenisation hadn't halted but by pushing it he was only too aware that he risked revolt and opposition. Thus from the 150s onward, we begin to see the rise of Persian bureaucrats in the Seleucid administration (amongst others), mostly in lower administrative levels. In truth, the aristocracy and high bureaucracy remained Greek and the core of the army would remain Greek as well. Colonisation and the slow spread of Greek culture, language and ideals never halted either, in fact Seleucus would himself found a number of cities in Mesopotamia and along the Iranian Plateau, but in the lower areas of the administration, there began a slow spread of Persian influence and bureaucrats. By opening up the administration, Seleucus diverted revolts into politics, ambitious Persians or Parthians, Indians or Arabs now had a new route to power and influence rather than revolt, involvement in the bureaucracy. Seleucus was probably taking hints from the Ptolemies, he had noticed that by keeping the government in mostly Greek hands right up until Raphia, they had turned the native Egyptian populace against them, leading to brutal revolts time and again and he no intention of following the Ptolemies into a slow decline.

In 152, Seleucus saw an opportunity as Egypt continued its decline and invaded Judaea. Meeting an Egyptian and Barcid army at Meggido, he smashed them and pushed further South, conquering as far as the Sinai before accepting a treaty with the Egyptians, restoring to him Judaea and Gaza and accepting a significant war indemnity. The truce would only last another 7 years, during which time Seleucus would continue to strengthen his administration, incorporating 5000 Persian pikemen into his phalanx for the first time and leading a small campaign to the borders of India for elephants before returning and invading Egypt again. This time, the invasion was designed to actually take him to Egypt itself and, after a series of victories, he occupied the Sinai and invaded the Delta, taking the title 'King of the Egyptians' as his grandfather had done 30 years earlier. Seleucus was already directly involved in Egyptian politics to some degree by now. Reaching as far as Memphis, he began meeting with native Egyptian allies in the region, having inspired and funded native revolts in Egypt to further weaken the Ptolemies and open up the route into Egypt, before he finally turned around and returned to Judaea, his supply lines having grown thin as the Barcid fleet began to threaten them with raids against the Sinai and Judaea.

Seleucus' reign was the height of the Seleucid Empire in many ways. In 139 BCE, he defeated the Ptolemies once and for all, annexing Alexandria and portions of the Delta as well as Cyrenaica. Ahmose' state was little more than a tributary and, in all practicality, Seleucus ruled from Cyrenaica in the South to Anatolia in the North all the way to India in the East. At the age of 42, Seleucus was king over one of the largest kingdoms in the world and he would continue to reign for another 10 years before his death in 129 BCE. His entrance into Alexandria was glorious in its presentation. Entering from the East, he made his way straight to the tomb of Alexander to pay his respects before, decked in purple silk and surrounded by soldiers, resplendent in brand new armour, he made his way up to the Palace of Alexandria to accept the surrender of Ptolemy VIII who, like the Baktrian king's family, would be relocated and settled in an Antiochan estate. After a trip to the Temple of Amun in Siwa (in direct imitation of Alexander), Seleucus returned once more to Alexandria from where he and his soldiers would escort Alexander's body back to Antioch where he would be reburied in a grand new tomb (the old tomb becoming a shrine to Alexander the god).
 
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Chapter XIX: The Road to War
Chapter XIX: The Road to War

The year is 132 BCE. In the distance lies the shattered remains of a once bustling city, its desolated streets littered with corpses and streaming with blood. Fires rage uncontrollably through the city as the last few survivors crawl out from under rubble and wreckage, dragging loved ones, limping and scrambling over crumpled bodies. Northward, thousands of refugees stream onward, great masses of people slowly making their way through the countryside towards the relative safety of Central and Northern Etruria. But none of them will make it. As they keep marching, their cries filling the air with sound, the injured, elderly, sick and wounded slowing them down as they move, there comes a sound echoing over the hills. Horsemen. On they come in their hundreds, no telling whether they're bandits, Etruscan, Roman or some other Italian peoples. Within hours, the ground is thick with corpses and a stream of smoke begins to rise into the sky, meeting its brethren from the city as the killers set upon what goods they can find, searching for anything they can eat or sell. This is Caere in 132 BCE, another casualty on a long and tragic list of names of cities that, from 135 to 110 BCE, would vanish from the map forever. In only twenty years, as many as 200,000 people would be killed and the political, demographic and social makeup of Italy changed forever. At the centre of this lay the end of the Barcid Empire, the metaphorical drowning man that dragged everyone down with it as it went.

In truth, the problem was with Capua. Capua had already been a rich, powerful and influential state in Italy before the Barcids came along and it had been the most notable defector to the Barcids during the Latin War with the inevotable result that it came to be the main representative for the Italian Alliance. What this means is that even in 139 BCE, we shouldn't discount Capua as a state without the alliance. It could field as many as 45,000 soldiers and had a thriving intellectual, commercial and cultural environment, fuelled by its political and economic boom as the head of the Italian Alliance over the last six decades. But the problem was that it was overextended. Between maintaining control over the allied states, maintaining a front against Rome in the North and Kroton in the East and maintaining internal control with the rising democratic movement and a number of slave revolts, Capua was military, administratively and politically stretched throughout the 130s. Frequent wars against Rome and Kroton proved costly and the money and men to wage them (especially as Rome likely had more manpower than Capua) came from a number of sources, the Barcids, thriving trade routes to the rest of the Mediterranean and the ability to lean on their allies for financial and military support. In theory, the bigger the alliance got the more resources it could rely upon. In truth, the bigger the alliance got, the more enemies Capua made as the allies resented their control or even threatened to defect to other powers to fulfil their own ambitions. Below this lay yet another, ideological war. Capua had to crush the democratic movement where they could because a resurgent movement in any allied state would threaten a defection to either the Latins or to Kroton, thus threatening Capua. Then came the collapse of the Barcids. In truth, the real effects were not felt until 137 BCE (the Barcids pulling out of Italy after the Battle of Carthage in 138 BCE). For one, the loss of Barcid support put strain on both the resources and political influence Capua could rely upon. No longer would they receive subsidies from the Barcids or have the support of Barcid mercenaries, nor the international connections or resources to tap into sources of mercenaries across Africa and Iberia. Secondly, the involvement of the democratic movement in the overthrow of the Barcids led to a wave of democratic support throughout Italy with the more radical democratic elements turning to violence, emboldened by the successes in Rome and Carthage. A letter sent from the governor of an outlying Capuan town to the city seems to show us how bad things became in some cases:

'...you must send more soldiers immediately there [have been] three further murders in the last two days [and] violence in the lower areas of the town... There has been looting and general insurrection'
Such democratic stirrings prompted a brutal response from Capua, beginning in 137 BCE. In March, an alliance-wide edict demanded the immediate closing of political parties in any state involved in the alliance and the arrest of anyone involved in a democratic political party. This proved controversial at best. Some states, already facing their own problems with the democratic movement, proved only too happy to crack down on the movement and most of them had already taken such steps at one point or another. But for others, what worried them was not the contents of the demand (they themselves liked the democratic movement no more than Capua did) but the actual nature of it being a demand. To them, this was not a state working for a common goal but Capua once again exercising its political muscles as a hegemonic state rather than a protecting one, seeking to interfere in their internal affairs to its own ends. Amongst the populace, the brutal techniques of the Capuan state proved just as dangerous, however. Rather than being cowed, the democrats became more and more radicalised, seeing violence as the only valid response to violence. The seeming success of violent revolution in Rome and Carthage (despite the fact that an actual 'democratic' revolution would occur under vastly different circumstances 13 years later and that the civil war of 139 BCE was just as much an aristocratic as democratic effort) inspired other would-be revolutionaries to turn their hand to violent techniques. There is no doubt that these groups were in contact with Rome and one report by a Capuan army commander in early 136 BCE records capturing a group of smugglers transporting letters into Latium and having then executed. In effect, the democratic movement began to develop into what might be termed a sort of insurgency, both urban and rural. Lacking either the weapons or training to face the Capuan army directly, the radical democrats formed small bands, attacking groups of Capuan soldiers, assassinating politicians, raiding the countryside but avoiding any up and front battles. In truth, we have to bear in mind that the Southern Italian 'insurgencies' were not armies, they weren't even rebellions. Rome in 174 BCE had been a general uprising, Carthage in 124 BCE would be a mix of guided hit and run warfare and straight up urban warfare, it involved both citizen militias and trained mercenaries. But in Southern Italy, the radical democratic movement took the form of neither an army nor a trained mercenary band, it wasn't even a unified group nor even a broad democratic group. Even at the insurgency's height in 134 BCE, a number of prominent democrats (termed by some as the Philosophical Democratic Movement albeit not being made up of philosophers although there were some prominent philosophers in the movement) railed against the radical democrats, terming them 'bandits and murderers'. This terminology was in many cases rather apt. The insurgency represented dozens of disconnected or loosely affiliated groups fighting against different states in different ways but never strictly at war with them. They raided farms and homesteads, they murdered politicians and aristocrats but never raised an army or fought battles, they were not a unified group but radical political parties throughout Capua and Southern Italy lashing out violently in the name of democracy.

At the same time, Capua's economy was beginning to falter. Social issues were fuelling the radical democratic movement, rampant poverty and the need for land redistribution as the wealth gap grew alienated and angered the general populace, worsening the reaction when repressive techniques were used to crack down on the democrats. Thus, in turn, as trade began to falter over the 140s and decline in the 130s, replaced in turn by trade routes moving North to Pisae, Capua's economy began to slide somewhat. This isn't to say that Capua didn't lie on a valuable trade position, trade passed down the peninsula from Pisae, through Rome and would pass through Capua on into Southern Italy. No to mention, Capua sat upon the route from Kroton to Rome and Pisae along which goods from the East would travel. But the costly wars of the 140s combined with the increasingly dangerous conditions of the early 130s with the democratic movement and an uptake in banditry disrupted and kept such trade at a low level, not nearly enough to make up the shortfall. As such, at a time at which Capua was more extended than ever with a growing democratic movement, angered and resentful allies and threatening neighbours, her economy began to falter and the resources available to her declined sharply. In the North, the situation only served to fuel the growing problems. Pisae was booming, growing rich off the trade routes flowing through the city and her growing political influence within the Etruscan League, Around Pisae there formed a semi-formal 'coalition' of sorts. In truth, this was a network of states that had become ever more economically and politically dependent on Pisae and thus became supporters of Pisae in Etruscan politics, giving her a disproportionate influence within the Etruscan League as a whole. Like the Barcids, Pisae's wealth and power came from trade routes passing through Italy and the Mediterranean. As, increasingly, the main entry point for trade from the Western Mediterranean, Pisae built up a similar political and economic network as had been formed by the Barcids, albeit on a smaller scale. Local communities and, especially, smaller cities became influenced by Pisae as they began to look towards Pisae as their main market and the largest economic centre in the region. Merchants from all across Western Etruria travelled to Pisae for the bustling markets that had sprung up there and with the growing Pisan fleet, those along the Western coast found themselves protected from piracy by the Pisans. In turn, Pisae became an economic powerhouse in Etruria with practical political benefits, other local rulers began to ingratiate themselves with Pisae, looking to access the same wealth and buy Pisan support and, in turn, they became part of the Pisan 'coalition' and would back Pisae in Etruscan politics.

Thus, in turn, Pisae's influence grew ever stronger over the 140s and 130s and the foundation of Pisan colonies increased said influence with their slow but steady formal admission into the Etruscan League only strengthening Pisae's growing stranglehold on power by admitting more states that were politically and economically tied to Pisae. As Pisae boomed, the Etruscan League reached its apex. In 139 BCE, a war between the Etruscan and Latin Leagues was ended with a Pisan victory at Caere which led to the formal 'return' of Caere to the Etruscan League. Part of what made Pisae so powerful was that, not only did she have a large population, her trade networks and international ties gave her access to a much larger basis of foreign mercenaries than either Capua or Rome had and her wealth allowed her to make use of them. Bear in mind, neither Capua nor Rome was unable to access any mercenary support. For one, there were the small but prominent mercenary communities which housed veteran Iberian, African and Greek mercenaries from all across the Mediterranean, but there were also local Italian mercenaries and, from further afield, mercenaries from Sicily. In truth, it was the former that play the most prominent role in military affairs of this age. Both as skilled veteran soldiers as well as as military advisers, the mercenary communities provided something that the Italian or Sicilian mercenaries couldn't to the same degree, military experience. Those mercenaries who settled in the international communities had already fought with the Barcids and built up a sizeable basis of military experience. Such communities had become hubs for mercenaries of all kinds, including the retired but experienced mercenaries (often hired as advisers or generals), the older but still fighting age mercenaries (who formed elite, veteran forces in the armies of all three leagues at various points in the 140s and 130s) and younger mercenary bands looking for fame and fortune in Italy. But what Pisae had was a much larger basis of contacts and mercenary support from across the Mediterranean. Whilst Capua and Rome could access cores of experienced veteran soldiers as well as other mercenary bands, Pisae could take whatever they could get and find more of it. In particular, she gained access to mercenary communities in Massalia, Carthage and even some access (despite her trade routes never fully reaching that far) to the biggest community at Qart Hadasht. This, in turn, allowed Pisae to win time and again in the 140s and early 130s. From 139 to 135 BCE, the Etruscan League would push its boundaries against the Gauls in the North, driving them back towards the North-Eastern corner of the Po Valley and settling Etruscan colonies in the region, thus reducing the population pressure on the league.

Rome, however, had turned South after 139 BCE. With Capua on the decline and a growing democratic movement, Rome began to see an opportunity, especially as its own social problems began to build as their land became more constricted. The violence at the beginning of the century had left a divide in Roman society that had never truly healed. Time and again, the rich Equestrian classes and the poorer Plebeians faced down one another in Roman politics. This wasn't just a political divide, this was personal and deeply social and, like Carthage, it was a permanent threat to Roman society. The Equestrians saw the Plebeians as dangerous, unruly and prone to revolt whilst the Plebeians saw the Equestrians as the enemy. Rich aristocrats benefiting whilst they themselves starved and a natural ally to that permanent yet rarely, if ever, truly tangible spectral threat of the Senate, a boogeyman said to be plotting its return to destroy the democracy and restore aristocratic rule from Southern Italy yet never seeming to ever actually manifest except in times of war with Capua. Just as it did down South, the Southern Italian insurgency divided the Roman populace along already existing political and social fault lines. The Equestrians, having never forgotten the emotional and often physical scars of the 174 revolution saw in the insurgency their fears vindicated, the rise of a violent, radical democratic movement set on destroying the aristocracy once and for all and that, if not stopped, would not only take their land and wealth but also their lives. The Plebeian democrats proved inexorably divided, with some deploring the violent means of the insurgency and others supporting it fully. Part of the problem was that Rome never truly escaped a sense of being at the whims of the tyranny of the masses. All throughout the 2nd Century BCE, the Plebeians had remained distrustful of the Equestrians, fearing coups and plots against them as revenge for what had taken place. This had manifested in political purges, sometimes in extreme prejudice and inward-looking ideals in Rome. At one point in the 140s, the Roman state had championed an entirely 'martial culture' built around arming the Plebeians en masse as an army for democracy and for the state. Twice there had been purges of foreign populaces within the city and the once inclusive social systems had become more and more closed off over the course of the century. This was not so much a failing with democracy but a series of social psychological scars birthed in the flames of brutal civil war, the kind which we don't see in many other cases, not even in the 124 BCE Carthaginian civil war. If you remember, the 174 BCE revolution had involved massacres, bloodshed in the streets and thousands of deaths with parts of the city torched and the Senate making an attempt to forcibly retake power. In turn, this had created a city that, to new generations, was politically at war with itself. How could the Equestrians ever trust a Plebeian class that had once already shown itself willing to massacre the aristocracy, to exile hundreds of them and throw the state into a brutal civil war? How could the Plebeians ever hope to trust the same Equestrians whose lands they had stripped away and who might in turn prove open to a return of the Senate when, already, the Senate had tried to take back the city by force once before?

Naturally, therefore, it was along these weakened fault lines that the fissures began to open in the early 130s as social distrust began to boil over. The key was the democratic insurgency in Southern Italy. In late 136 BCE, one of the many disparate groups sent a letter to Rome asking for help in installing democracies by force in Southern Italy and promising to help them do so. In effect, they were offering a chance for Rome to bring all or most of Southern Italy under their influence and to spread democracy throughout the region and remove their biggest rival in the South, Capua. But what really kicked off issues was how the letter ended, informing Rome that the Senate was once again plotting to return to Rome with Capuan soldiers and retake the city. The fault lines cracked and splintered. Arguments broke out. On one side, the hard line democrats immediately called for the state to arm and invade Southern Italy, on another, the moderate democrats railed against the barbarity of the insurgency, declaring them to be little more than bandits who cared little for democracy and would result in the deaths of thousands of Romans. On the third, the political classes of the Equestrians (a powerful force in politics still as they had more time and ability to dedicate to politics) argued staunchly against the war, worried perhaps that such a war might radicalise the democrats even more. But the line about the Senate was too powerful a motivator for the democrats. Even the moderates couldn't deny that the prospect of the Senate restoring aristocratic rule or, worse, an ambitious aristocrat returning and making himself king instead, couldn't be allowed by any means and the more radical elements used this to attack the Equestrians in turn, claiming that they advocated against a war because of their ties to the Senate. To be fair, to some degree, to the democrats here, there is no doubt that the Equestrians did still have ties to the Senate. A cache of letters unearthed in a villa near Syracuse shows that a number of descendants of previous Senators were in contact with known members of the Equestrian class including a number of prominent politicians. But the thing is, most of the old Senatorial generation was dead and their descendants had often retired to other regions in Italy. Records show that at least one Senatorial family lived in Campania up until the 40s BCE and made money as merchants. The Syracuse Letters mention old Senatorial families in Sicily and one villa, believed to have belonged to the son of a Senator alive in 174 BCE has been found in Sardinia. There, was, however, certainly a group advocating or standing for the return of the Senate active in Capua and probably in contact with some of the Equestrian Classes at the time but many had fanned out and ended up settling elsewhere. In the end, therefore, the war party won out after what we are told was 3 days of debating and an army mobilised the next spring to invade Southern Italy, meet up with the insurgents and destroy Capua once and for all.

So here we are on the eve of the War of the Three Leagues. In the North lay Pisae, an ambitious and powerful state on the rise, its eyes turning Southwards towards the two flagging leagues of Latium and Campania, sensing opportunities for expansion and advancement in the discord growing there. For Rome and Capua, the issues were not so clear cut. This was not so much a war between leagues but a boiling kettle about to explode, social tensions, grudges and hatred had built up over decades all across Central and Southern Italy and now they were about to explode. Rather than being a simple war between Rome and Capua, this was to be a war of ideologies, of personal hatreds and distrust, a war in which Romans fought Romans and Capuans fought Capuans, in which the radicalised democratic ideologies came head to head with reactive, repressive and dangerously desperate aristocratic and monarchical systems and, below it all, the ambitions and desires of the states began to rumble as Capua's allies began to circle what seemed to be an increasingly wounded animal like vultures, just looking for the perfect moment to strike. In the end, this was going to be a war of slaughter upon slaughter, of atrocities and thousands of deaths. By the time the war was over, entire cities would no longer be left standing, tens of thousands would be dead and much of Italy left a smouldering ruin with neither the political unity nor the power left in anyone but the Etruscan League to face another threat when at last it would come knocking.
 
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Chapter XX: The War of the Three Leagues
Chapter XX: The War of the Three Leagues

Strictly speaking, it is sometimes easier to understand the 'War of the Three Leagues' if we view it, not as one war, but as a series of different conflicts drawn into a larger narrative by later historians but all certainly interconnected to some degree whilst not entirely being unified. Case in point, if we look at the main three belligerents of the war (Pisae, Rome and Capua and their respective leagues), they were all fighting for a mixture of reasons. In Rome, there was an ongoing debate about democracy, one being paralleled throughout the democratic movement all across Italy, the degree to which democracy should be a radical political movement. In Rome, it had certainly taken an increasingly hard-line approach, driven in part by fear and paranoia of the equestrians and aristocracy, edging more and more to a radical almost fundamentalist democratic approach. This doesn't mean for one minute that Rome ever considered universal suffrage, far from it, rather it meant a growing advocacy for violent overthrow of aristocracies, for butcher and slaughter with extensive land redistribution as the only way to protect democracy. In effect, annihilation. But the rise of the democratic insurgency in Campania had flared up disputes and disagreements in Rome between the radicals and the moderates over the nature of this democracy. Thus, for Rome, the war took a largely ideological slant in the relations and makeup of the democratic movement in Latium and how it was perceived and related to the same movement elsewhere. In Capua, Rome was existential threat. The selfsame move towards radicalism threatened the aristocracies and oligarchies of Campania and the South, worsened by the existence of other (albeit much more moderate) democracies to the East in the region near Kroton. Rome's very existence subverted the aristocracy in Capua and threatened their internal stability and control whilst the continued conflicts and economic exhaustion of wars with Rome threatened their influence abroad. For Pisae, the war was decidedly less ideological or as desperate. Much of the Etruscan League was very much monarchical in system but hadn't faced the same desperate and protracted struggles with Rome that Capua had and rivalries and disputes were far less bitter and entrenched. In turn, the monarchical systems of Etruria proved surprisingly less hostile to the democratic movement and Pisae continued to maintain good relations with democratic states all across the Mediterranean. Rome and Capua fought one another bitterly, for survival and ideology as well as for growing economic and practical concerns whilst Pisae looked on more as an expansionist state. Kroton to the South, meanwhile, fought Capua as well as another democratic state seeking to expand its influence but never truly aligned itself with or even supported the radical democrats in Rome who they increasingly came to see as a threat in their own right to Kroton's growing influence in Campania as Capua's power waned and collapsed.

By the time Capua's power collapsed in 132 BCE, she was fighting what amounted to three separate conflicts with groups never truly aligned or sometimes explicitly hostile to one another. For instance, Kroton was a growing power in Campania and thus a natural ally of the rebelling Greek states in the region as their moderate democracy proved a much more favourable compromise than the radical Romans to the North, thus setting Kroton and the Italian Alliance against Rome in the last year of the war. In the South, Syracuse formed in turn both an enemy of Capua and Kroton, using the weakness of the former to step in to politics in Eastern Sicily and Southern Italy but never aligned itself truly with Rome despite being a democratic state. As such, Syracuse's numerous other conflicts from 135 to 131 (and in some histories on to 127 BCE) have become subsumed into the War of the Three Leagues. In the North, Pisae's conflicts with the Gauls until 135 BCE and again in 133-131 BCE have similarly become subsumed into the war to the South even if, in truth, they were by no means actually connected. When we break it down, we might even disagree with the idea of the involvement of the Samnites in the war as a belligerent (though they certainly fought on both sides), rather viewing their involvement as the beginning of an expansionist period that coincided with the war at large and became tangled into political events elsewhere. That doesn't mean that these were entirely disconnected conflicts, however. Rather, they were tied together but not so simple as one conflict with two sides fighting against one another. If we view it in that way, we then have to account for cities changing sides or even being on both sides at once (ala Syracuse who moved very fluidly from 'war' against Capua to 'war' against Kroton, but avoided ever seriously fighting either). Alliances and treaties abounded but came, in many cases, to mean little and the war quickly descended into bloodbaths and chaos everywhere.

News of the invasion of Campania in 135 BCE reached Pisae quickly and, in turn, they proved themselves just as quick to react to changing circumstances. Fearful of the outcome should Rome dispatch with their Southern rival and, with the resources of Campania at their back, turn North, Pisae called for an immediate meeting of the Etruscan League right there in Pisae. But even as the delegates were sent out to the cities, the Pisans set to work, outfitting their fleet to sail to Corsica and Sardinia and from there to Africa and Sicily for mercenaries and raising their own army for quick deployment to invade Latium from the North and crush the Romans between two enemies. It seems likely that the Pisans worked out many of the details before the Etruscan League convened in late April 135 BCE because our sources tend to agree that, once it was gathered, the league was quickly taken over by Pisan delegates and the wider Pisan coalition, not only calling for war but advocating a quick and decisive battle strategy. Simply put, the idea was to raise two armies, one to invade Latium from the North in conjunction with the Pisan fleet and the other to advance with the help of the Umbrians and Sabines through the Apennines to invade Latium from the West. In turn, the Romans would be forced to call off their invasion of Campania in the South to protect Rome. This would effectively force the Romans onto the defensive, reacting against attacks on three fronts as the Etruscans and Italian Alliance boxed the Romans in, starving them of food and trade and eventually forcing their capitulation. In the words of one source, a Pisan delegate described it as follows*:

'Like catching an animal, we must first set the net and then close the trap'
And it might have worked. There proved to be two Achilles Heels in the plan, Capua and the Samnites. In theory, the Etruscans would either beat the Romans in battle or hold them until the Capuans arrived from the South, taking the advantage of the Roman retreat and Etruscan invasion of Latium to launch their own counterattack and crush the Romans early. At first, things went well. The Romans had actually stationed a force of about 10,000 soldiers in the Northern border to guard against any Etruscan raids but an invasion of 40,000 Etruscan soldiers in June 135 BCE was not what they were prepared for with the main (60,000 strong) army invading Campania. In a quick, but bloody, battle North of Ostia, the Roman army was defeated but held its ground long enough for messengers to be sent to Rome, warning them of the advance of the Etruscan army. In a panicked turn, further messengers were sent South to the army in Campania. instantly recalling them to fight the Etruscans whilst calling back their own soldiers to defend the city itself. News of another Etruscan army advancing through Umbria arrived only a few days later and only increased the growing panic in the city as the inflated numbers (some claimed at the time as many as 200,000 Etruscans were invading) drove the city into overtime, seeking to fortify itself against any and all threats. Anyone who could hold arms was raised and brought to the city to help defend it, Ostia, Alba and Tarracina were called on for immediate aid and as many as 50,000 men may have been hurriedly brought to Rome in June and July alone. But this is where things went very, drastically wrong. For one, the Etruscans didn't have the men to face the impromptu army raised in Rome and the 60,000 soldiers returning from the South unless their own reinforcements arrived soon. Those reinforcements, in turn, became very quickly bogged down advancing through the Apennines. In a case of unfortunate timing, a Samnite king died in April 135 BCE leading to the beginning of a short but bloody conflict between rivals for the throne of a powerful Samnite kingdom. A series of defeats at the hands of one young and ambitious Samnite king (known only as King Gaius to the historical record) led his rival to seeking the help of the advancing Etruscan army in June and promising the assistance of as many as 10,000 Samnite warriors and easy passage to Latium. Sensing a possibly ideal opportunity, the Etruscan commanders made the ultimately fatal decision to delay their advance to Rome and turn South to assist their new allies against Gaius. From June to August 135 BCE, the Etruscan army campaigned through the Apennines, crushing Gaius and executing him before (bolstered by only 3000 men), they made their en route towards Latium. But events had changed there, the arrival of the Latin army in July and with the arrival of reinforcements seemingly not coming, the Etruscan army had been forced to abandon Ostia and pull back North to Etruria.

Believing that the much closer and seemingly more powerful Latins were a better bet, the Etruscan king now began sending messengers to Rome, offering to betray the Etruscans in return for a military alliance and offering them whatever soldiers he could spare to help fight against their enemies. It's also possible he hoped to effectively use such an alliance to gain military and political support back home, allowing him the expanded resources to overcome his own rivals in the region and expand his power, even further North against the Sabines and Umbrians. Seeing an opportunity, the Romans (for all their talk of radical democracy) proved only too willing to side with the Samnites for practicality's sake and on the king's prompting sent 5000 soldiers on to the Futa Pass where they set up an ambush. At the same time, the Samnites drew the Etruscans onward towards the pass, informing them it was the quickest and safest route through to Latium. In truth, the Samnite king had been filtering more soldiers to the Romans over the past few weeks and the ambush had grown by early September to 8000 soldiers. As the Etruscan army advanced through the Futa Pass, the Samnites took the vanguard, leading the army ever further onward towards Latium and closer to the ambush. By around midday, the Etruscan army had been stretched out somewhat but kept marching onward, unaware of the danger until, at last, the trap was sprung. At this crucial moment, the Samnites wheeled around, bows in hand and began unleashing volleys of arrows against their unsuspecting escorts sounding the alarm for the general attack and then, 8000 strong, the ambushing force swept down on the Etruscans. Despite outnumbering the Latins and Samnites 4 to 1, the Etruscans were caught entirely unawares and the battle quickly turned into a massacre. For hours, the slaughter continued unabated until a desperate rearguard allowed the surviving 10,000 Etruscan soldiers to cut their way out of the pass and flee East into Samnium. But the ordeal wasn't over. As the Etruscans continued their retreat, the Samnites began launching attacks on their lines, day and night. Supplies began to run low and in more than one occasion, the Etruscans were forced to divert their army to raid local settlements for food and water. In turn, the months began to drag on well past the end of the campaigning season into winter. From October to December, the Etruscan army continued to crawl onward, often up to their waists in snow in the Apennines, men freezing to death in the night. Whenever they attempted to descend to the lowlands on either side of the Apennines, they became subject to raids and attacks and died all the quicker. Finally, in January 134 BCE, a meagre 2000 Etruscan soldiers crossed back into Etruria after a gruelling few months. The commander, who had survived the entire ordeal himself, was promptly executed for his incompetence.

But 135 BCE had seen very few actual gains for anyone. Capua was unable politically or economically to muster a force to invade Latium and the increasingly discontented allies were by no means willing to commit to yet another costly invasion of Latium, agreeing only to raise forces to defend Campania itself in the event of a Roman attack. Pisae had captured Ostia but been forced to retreat, unable to take Rome itself, and had suffered a humiliating defeat at the Futa Pass resulting in as many as 38,000 deaths. The only one who had made any solid gains was the Samnite king who had secured the alliance he so desired and a growing political influence in Samnium that he may have hoped to turn into influence over the entire Eastern coastline. Alas, it was not to be. Having already spurned a treaty with the Etruscans and helped destroy their army, this Samnite king was by no means popular with the radically democratic Rome and the military alliance quickly turned sour. One source records an instance when he visited Rome and tried to exercise his kingly prerogatives, only to be scorned in the streets by the Romans and treated with barely veiled hostility. Angered at being snubbed by the Romans, he returned East to Samnium and would never return to Rome itself. The final break came in early 134 BCE when a conflict broke out between him and another local Samnite kingdom. Calling for aid to Rome, he found very little support in Roman politics and no help ultimately came. But Pisae had played the game of Samnite politics well and now threw their economic and political might behind another competitor for control of the region by the name of Gaius Marinius. Marinius was ambitious, a skilled military commander and, more importantly, sat in ideal position to support the Etruscans, lying on the border regions between Samnium and the Sabines to the North but closer to the Eastern coast. Thus, beginning in March 134 BCE, an Etruscan army of 5000 men entered Samnium and met up with 2000 soldiers under the command of Marinius himself. In turn, the Romans threw their weight behind yet another competitor whose name has. unfortunately, been lost to history but was likely a king along the border with Latium and a local rival to the Samnite king from the Futa Pass. From March through to September 134 BCE, the Samnite kings would fight back and forth throughout Samnium, gradually drawing in ever greater commitments by both Etruria and Rome. By the end of the year, when the respective forces settled in for winter, there were as many as 10,000 Etruscan soldiers in Samnium and possibly between 8-10,000 Roman soldiers also in the region. Deprived of support and allies, the Samnite king was killed in July 134 BCE, bringing the battle for control of Samnium down to two players, the Roman-backed candidate and Marinius. It is important to note that there were a number of different Samnite kings, all vying for influence and power within the region, but with support from external powers it was Marinius and his rival that seemed to be competing for something higher than any individual kingship, rather they were fighting for an overall dominance of the region of Samnium itself. For Etruria and Rome, the prize was the Apennine passes. By controlling the passes, they had control of what amounted to a secondary route through to their enemies, allowing them to potentially bypass and outflank enemy armies. Furthermore, control of Samnium would in effect allow them access to local levies and reinforcements against their respective enemies.

The Samnite civil war would continue on into 133 BCE, seeing the rise of no fewer than 2 other rivals from March to August, both of whom were eventually defeated. The civil war wouldn't conclude, in turn, until September 133 BCE when Marinius finally triumphed and took for himself the 'King of the Samnites'. This, in turn, prompted a series of small rebellions over the course of 132 BCE that, with the help of Etruscan forces, were crushed in turn. To the West, the war between Etruria and Rome had turned bloody and brutal, meanwhile. Buoyed by their success in 135 BCE, the Romans launched a massive incursion into Southern Etruria in early 134 BCE, advancing quickly as far as Caere and capturing and sacking the city in turn before marching North towards Tarquinii. But Pisae had been busy, recruiting foreign mercenaries and building up another army and swept South to meet the Romans at Tarquinii in May 134 BCE. With a much larger and more disciplined mercenary core than the Romans could muster (20,000 mercenaries estimated supported by 10,000 levied troops compared to only 6000 mercenaries but 32,000 levied troops), the Pisans triumphed at the Battle of Tarquinii and drove the Romans south to Caere where they came out on top once again, recapturing the city after a short but bloody battle and launching a counterattack into Latium. This would become, in many ways, the standard for much of the rest of the war between Pisae and Rome. Without significant Capuan assistance and a lot more men, Pisae had no hope of actually taking the well fortified city of Rome by force. Instead, their focus remained on winning battles where possible and starving the Romans' trade and food sources, especially by capturing Ostia. Thus in 134 BCE, Ostia was their first port of call when they launched the counter-attack and quickly taken and rubble from houses thrown into the harbour to try and stop any ships from docking there. Then, from July to September 134 BCE, the Etruscans raided and plundered the Roman countryside, burning farms and stealing crops but never attempting to assault the city itself before retreating to Pisae. In turn, this had a much bigger effect than Rome had hoped. Feeding the city was a big enough problem as it was but with their crops being ravaged and their ability to actually import food severely compromised, starvation ran rampant. What saved the city, in turn, was their ability to protect fields South of Rome and, from 134 to 133 BCE, supplement their food with trade through Samnium to Kroton. But the problems still remained. Distributing food started to become a matter of debate and politics, should they focus on feeding the army? Or the non-armed citizenry?

As they fought the Etruscans in the North, the Romans were also fighting campaigns in the South. At the same time as their incursion towards Caere, a large Latin force marched South to Tarracina and from there invaded Campania once again. Riven by growing internal disputes, the Italian Alliance proved barely able to mount a defence and a meagre 10,000 soldiers were raised to face the approximately 20,000 Latin soldiers sent to face them. (In March 134 BCE, the Latin League was thus fielding around 58,000 soldiers, possibly even more). Capua had descended into a mess of internal Italian politics. Not only was it trying to keep the Italian city states from fighting one another, it was trying to maintain its own influence over them as well in the face of threats from both Rome and Kroton. The existential threat of Roman democracy proved itself somewhat of a binding force, preventing things from entirely collapsing but it wasn't enough. The Italian allies were tired of costly wars against Rome and saw Capua as just as much an enemy as the democratic states. With Kroton's growing power, an opportunity was now arising for a third option. Kroton had taken a much more moderate democratic approach, in stark contrast to Rome, and looked upon the Campanian insurgency very critically as little more than a chaotic mob. Like Pisae, it sat upon important trade routes and benefited from its associations with Macedon (having a close monarchical ally probably helped keep Kroton more moderate) in political, military and economic support. Thus, like Pisae, by 135 BCE Kroton sat upon a series of trade routes running through the Adriatic Sea and had built economic ties to Macedon, Greece and Illyria. This wealth, in turn, translated into political and military power. When Kroton declared war on Capua in early 134 BCE, it did so with a powerful army and a strong influence over its allies throughout Southern Italy. Kroton's influence had grown from Lokroi Epizypheroi in the South to Barium in the North, secured through strong alliances that established significant influence for Kroton across the region. Its allies/subject states provided primarily financial tribute rather than soldiers, enabling Kroton in turn to support a larger army for use against Capua.

Thus, in March 134 BCE, Kroton took its opportunity with Capua faced with internal and external crises to invade the Italian Alliance and from March onward would campaign in Southern Italy against Rhegion, Hipponion and Terrina, establishing democracies in turn in each and diplomatic ties with Syracuse in Sicily (fresh out of a civil war under a new democracy and seeking to extend its own influence) for a joint expedition against the Capuan territories in Northern Sicily with the promise that Syracuse in turn would be granted control over them. As such, from August to October and again in March to June 133 BCE, Kroton and Syracuse stormed across North-Eastern Sicily conquering states both allied to Capua and independent and establishing a series of pro-Syracusan and Kroton democracies in each. Kroton was a power on the rise when it, officially, signed a peace treaty with Capua in August 133 BCE confirming its control over Southern Italy in return for an assurance not to provide any support to rebellious states or to Rome. But the ease with which Kroton had swept aside the Italian Alliance seemed to mark a real turning point in Capua's power. Fighting Rome in the North, Capua didn't have the men to spare to deal with Kroton in the South and from August onward, the states began looking to the moderate Kroton as a better alternative to either Capua or Rome. Their thinking was likely based on the idea that, as a more moderate democracy, Kroton was less likely to turn to brutality or mass executions but, as a more distant power, would never exert the same control that either Capua or Rome might. As such, when the rebellion began in January 132 BCE, it was not predicated so much on secession from the Italian Alliance but, rather, handing control over to Kroton as its nominal liege. As events progressed in the South, the war raged brutally in the North. Roman armies ravaged as far South as Kyme, capturing the city in July 134 BCE and attacking Neapolis before being repelled by an Italian army with Kyme recaptured in September, much of it having already been gutted by fire and evacuations.

Socially, politically and economically the Roman invasions of Campania in 134, 133 and 132 BCE proved catastrophic. Though Capua (by itself a powerful city state) would successfully repel the Romans in the first two instances and, with Kroton's help, the third instance, the invasions crippled Capua. For one, they were incredibly hazardous to a weakened economy, destroying vast amounts of arable land and and drying up much of the remaining trade to a standstill. For another, the raids and battles and the sacking of cities such as Kyme (134, 133 and 132), Neapolis (133) and Pompeii (132), created a social problem in Italy of vast numbers of refugees slowly but steadily making their way South. This was a situation echoed in the North where much of Caere was abandoned when it was captured by Rome in 134 BCE and would, likewise, be abandoned after its destruction by Rome in 132 BCE. As refugees moved across the country, they became prime targets for bandits and marauders or even roaming armies by one state or another. In one instance, refugees from Kyme in the 133 sack were captured by Rome and forcibly deported back to Latium. That same year, the few remaining citizens of Ostia were captured and forcibly marched North and settled throughout Etruria. Just as problematically, these bands of refugees worsened social and political problems elsewhere, putting further strain on tight resources or complicating delicate political situations. In one instance in 131 BCE, a war broke out between a band of refugees from Campania and a Sicule city state leading to the destruction of the city state and the founding of another city by the name of Kyme. In the North, many Latin settlers were forcibly settled in the Po Valley where they found common ground with the Po Cultures (who, as mentioned, had been somewhat Latinised already). In the decades after the war, the Latin settlements of the Po Valley and the Po Cultures would become closely tied together. Meanwhile, in the regions most affected by the war, the ability for states to impose any sort of political or social control began to break down. By the end of the war, it has been posited that a broad band from Tarquinii in the North to as far South as Hyele might have fallen into chaos and turmoil. In Latium and Campania this was particularly prevalent. Bandits and raiders roamed the countryside, often simply hungry peasants driven off their land or out into the countryside desperate to eat or avoid being drawn into one of the many armies. In turn, they soon became semi-independent authorities unto their own whilst doubling as impromptu mercenaries for cash-strapped city states. One such Campanian bandit gang would fight against the Campanian insurgency from 134 to 131 BCE and would retain a semi-independent authority over a series of small villages in Southern Campania until 127 BCE. Lucius Gallus (the Roman pirate) was hired by the Romans to fight the Pisan fleet and would actually outlast the war until his defeat and death in 122 BCE. When Kroton invaded Campania in 132 BCE, meanwhile, they hired bandit gangs as guides en route to Campania.

As central political control began to break down, the turmoil began to spiral out of control. The Campanian insurgency, for instance, reached its height in early 132 BCE at which point it controlled a small band of territory in Northern Campania and looked set to spread through more of Campania, only halted in turn by Kroton's intervention and the coup in Capua. But by this point, the insurgency had moved beyond just ideology. Its numbers had swelled to the thousands, many of them simply hungry and looking for security in an Italy riven by military and social chaos. By 132 BCE, all of Campania was at war, most of Latium had been ravaged for two years without an end and nearly everybody was bankrupt. Starvation was all too common and a deadly outbreak of plague in the summer of that year proved the last straw for many, killing thousands in Capua before ravaging most of Campania and Latium. Meanwhile the echoes were spreading. In Sicily, the pro-Syracusan governments began to show a sense of inherent weakness in how quickly they had been installed as counter-coups toppled democracies in favour of oligarchies or even dictatorships, prompting a series of campaigns in 132 BCE by Syracuse. But, when the few remaining democracies began to side more with Kroton than with Syracuse (the former seeming to be a stronger and better bet than their Sicilian counterpart after their success in Campania), the relationship between the two democracies became soured and by 131 BCE, Syracuse had invaded a number of pro-Kroton democracies, prompting a declaration of war and a conflict that would last on and off for years. Syracuse' involvement in the war, in turn, drew in its own neighbours. In late 132, a deposed former tyrant of Syracuse living in Gela declared his support for Kroton when the war broke out and, with the help of Gela, launched an invasion of Syracuse. But just as much, the growing social turmoil was spreading outwards. As trade routes fell to pieces in Italy, economic and social conditions grew harsher all across the board in Sicily and Northern Italy. In the former, the fragile political situation (which had been riven by coups and civil wars after the Barcids) was shattered again, prompting another flurry of interstate or civil violence. For many, the war in Italy amplified social dissent and ideologies. For radical democrats, the conflict between Rome and the oligarchic Capua and monarchical Pisae was an ideological war, one that they felt they should echo back home. Radical democratic coups became versed in the war at large, claiming themselves to be natural allies of Rome and declaring outward hostility to the enemies of democracy (sometimes explicitly mentioning Capua and Pisae). In truth, they had very little practical involvement in what was going on between Rome, Pisae and Capua but their coups and regimes, democracies and oligarchies, became steeped in a language based around an idea of what the war was.

In many ways this 'literary war' that has developed is actually one of the most important legacies of the War of the Three Leagues. In truth, the war was one of more than ideology even if it was a major influence. There were pragmatic and social concerns, real dissent and actual political problems, local ambitions and betrayals, all of them feeding in to creating a brutal war. There were cultural and political hostilities going back almost a century by this point (many in Rome still viewed Capua with hatred for betraying them back in the Latin Wars) beyond just the ideological hatreds and distrust. Hence why, at the end of the day, the Romans sided with multiple kings and dictators (the Samnites for instance) and cities such as Kyme sided with democratic Kroton as democratic Syracuse and democratic Rome attacked them. But the legacy of the war in Italian and Sicilian cultures became largely one of a catastrophic conflict between democracy and oligarchy and monarchy for dominance of Italy. The nascent democratic regime in the 120s in Carthage would adopt some such language. But in Sicily and Italy it was ever more prevalent and much more fierce. The war politicised and divided people, members of the democratic movement became ever more radicalised as they adopted the ideology, symbolism and language of a war against oligarchy and monarchy, thus deepening the same social divisions that had created the war in the first place. In turn, regimes across the board became ever more reactive and brutal, whether they were monarchic, tyrannic, oligarchic or democratic, each seeking to stomp out the other to retain their power because the cultural view of the war at large made it clear that there could only be one winner and this was nothing less than a battle to decide the political future of Italy forever, thus making such political battles nothing less than existential conflict. Part of the problem was that these ideas had grown up in the heartland of the conflict where the war was an existential and brutal reality for many. For many in Kyme, what would democracy have appeared as other than the brutal political regime that burnt their city to the ground three times? In such realities, the truth of the systems became obscured in personal hatreds and dissent. Thus, when these men and women fled their lands and moved outwards from the source of the conflict, they brought those same political and cultural hatred with them.

An unintended consequence of all this is that it would inspire a cultural and literary golden age in Italy in the decades after the war. Fuelled by Pisan and Kroton trade with the world beyond and the literary and cultural heritage of a 'pan-Italian' war for the nature of the state (despite this being far from the reality of the matter), theatre and literature boomed. In Syracuse, for instance, two great playwrights known as Andronicus and Ptolemy would write famous and brilliant new plays (tragedies and comedies respectively), steeped in the ideologies and hatreds of the time. One of Ptolemy's most famous comedies 'Democrats' features a comedic meeting between a democrat, a monarch and an oligarch as their arguments begin to descend into personal insults and repeating doctrine, delivered with Ptolemy's characteristic acidic wit and humour. Andronicus (fittingly enough the son of a Campanian refugee) would become famous for his take on older Greek plays, re-imagining the stories of Antigone (this time with Antigone a brash young democrat and Cleon representing an older oligarchic ideal), Agamemnon (where Clytemnestra decries the monarchy after the murder of the eponymous character, claiming it turns men to monsters) and even some of the Homeric stories amongst others.

A second and, politically, just as critical development as a result of the war was the creation of intense disunity and political weakness running in a band from Southern Etruria to Campania. Ravaged by constant warfare and with their populations depleted by warfare and refugee movements, the economies and political unity of these regions collapsed from 135 onward, opening the route for more external powers to fill the gap. In Campania, it was originally Kroton whilst Pisae continued her dominance of Southern Etruria and even Northern Latium. But so too, the Samnites became relatively stronger as Marinius' kingdom brought greater political unity and began stretching its own muscles at the expense of Capua and Rome. In turn, a general movement of peoples began from the rougher lands of the Apennines into the richer farmlands of Latium and Campania, especially of Samnites and Sabines but also Umbrians. In time, the ravages of the war would open the door for the Northern migrations of the end of the 2nd Century BCE with the Etruscans the only league left standing to oppose the movements from the North. It would also begin the process of enriching Southern Italy and Sicily at the expense of Central and, in time, Northern Italy. The mass movement of refugees brought in thousands of skilled workmen or potential citizens for city states in Sicily and the South. After the destruction of Pisae in the 110s, the Pisan fleet (with its talented naval officers and commanders) would end up splitting and settling (with their ships) across Sicily and in North Africa, for instance. Between the War of the Three Leagues and the later migrations, the devastation to the economy and trade routes of Central and Northern Italy would take decades, even centuries, to fully heal.

The real turning point in the war came in 132 BCE. The Italian Allies, tired of Capuan dominance and sensing that they were unable to actually protect them, convened their leaders in November or December 133 BCE and there, called for an immediate change of leadership in the Alliance from Capua to Kroton. Despite the recent truce between Capua and Kroton, this was an opportunity too good to pass up. In the same way King Philip V had used the Ionian League as legal cover to justify his control of Ionia, Kroton could use the Italian Alliance as an administrative and legal justification of sorts of its own control over Campania and a gift-wrapped opportunity to conquer the region. Politically, this was tantamount to the beginning of hostilities between Rome and Kroton, despite fighting the same enemy. For the Democratic Movement, Kroton's siding with the revolting Campanian states seemed a declaration of moderation (despite Rome's affiliation with dictators and monarchs in the past) but, for the Campanian Insurgency, was a more dangerous declaration to protect the oligarchs and monarchs of Campania against what they felt was their rightful shot at revenge. In truth, this was not yet a declaration of war but it was the stage upon which Rome and Kroton would fight one another. Beyond this, for Rome, it represented a real risk that they might end up losing their attempt to control the farmlands of Campania forever, should it fall under the now more powerful Kroton. With control over much of Southern Italy save for the heartland of the Italian Alliance, Kroton began amassing an army. Thus, in January 132 BCE, a group of Italisn Alliance members declared Kroton as the new leader of the alliance, deposing Capua as a 'tyrant state'. Capua now found any war effort against Rome severely jeopardised by what now presented itself as a two-pronged and much more local threat from rebelling allies in the West, North and South and Kroton in the East and South. That wasn't to mention Rome itself. Thus, when the campaigning season began again that year, Campania became home to no fewer than 5 different armies, two rebel state armies marching from the West and South, one Capuan army, sweeping to meet the latter, a Roman army and an army from Kroton sweeping up from the East. They would be joined by a sixth in July when Kroton amassed 10,000 soldiers from her allies and invaded from the South and a 7th in August when Marinius launched incursions into Northern Campania. What saved Capua at first was, ironically, that her enemies seemed just as concerned with fighting one another as they were with fighting Capua. The first rebel state army met the Romans at Kyme in May 132 BCE and was defeated whilst the second met them again that same month at Neapolis and suffered a second defeat. Tired from two battles and distracted in the North, the Roman army was then defeated by the Capuans who ravaged the Western Coastline, sacking Kyme and Pompeii and then marching towards Hyele where it was defeated in July 132 BCE. But time was against Capua. Kroton's armies were sweeping all opposition before them and crushed a Capuan force sent to stop them that same month only 50 miles from Capua itself with the first army marching on to besiege the city itself in early August. The army invading from the South, meanwhile, met the rebels at Hyele and began marching North in response to Rome's attacks on the rebels (as nominal head of the Italian Alliance, Kroton was now directly at war with Rome in support of its duty to protect the other allies). Besieged, the entire alliance in revolt and with the population beginning to starve, Capua descended into an urban civil war (of much the same stripe as Carthage's in the 120s) that lasted only three weeks between the oligarchs, the radical democrats and their more moderate counterparts before the oligarchs were defeated by the radicals who had them executed and then opened the city to Kroton who, in turn, deposed the radical faction and installed the new, moderate, faction with their own brand of democracy, exiling the surviving oligarchs and the supporters of the insurgency (many of whom simply went and joined the insurgency in turn). The new Capuan government, in turn, quickly ratified Kroton as the leader of the Italian Alliance and lent out 5000 soldiers to join Kroton's army in an incursion North against the insurgency and their Roman allies.

Meanwhile, Rome was falling on to the defensive. Supported by Marinius, the Etruscan army had swept through Samnium and ravaged Eastern Latium, only being driven back by a Roman army after a brutal encounter not far from the Futa Pass but managing to ambush and decisively defeat a Roman army only two weeks later. Initially, Rome had taken the initiative in the North-West, invading Southern Etruria and winning a clear victory near Caere before razing the city to the ground and ravaging the earth around it. In an act of either war-time barbarity or brutal banditry, the refugees of Caere were ambushed and slaughtered to a man not long after. By this point, the war had become a series of atrocities in many cases. Both Caere and Ostia (so frequently changing hands) had been razed to the ground and no fewer than 100 towns and villages in Northern Latium and Southern Etruria have been identified by modern archaeologists to have been destroyed in this one war alone with an estimated 100-150,000 deaths from these war crimes across the entire war. But, as with Capua, Rome was seemingly bankrupt. Typical Roman determination and the radical nature of their democracy kept them going but archaeological excavations of battlefields from the war show a marked decrease in the quality of equipment and armour wielded by Roman armies. One source tells us that by the end of the war, the armies had decreased to only around 8000 men maximum to make up for the huge losses on both sides and that almost all of the Roman veterans and mercenaries were dead. Pisae, meanwhile, had suffered but not in the same way. As with Rome and Capua, much of her adult male population was gone but she hadn't seen any sieges or sacks personally and still had access to her sea lanes and trade routes which flourished more than ever. As such, Pisae continued to turn to the more skilled mercenaries to bolster her forces (even though her economy had faltered in the costly and brutal warfare) and began to take a sizeable lead in the quality of her armies. As such, the final few months of the war proved little more than a final slogging match between states too tired and bankrupt to really keep going. Pisae could keep fielding mercenaries, for sure, but it was costing them a fortune and no serious territorial gains had been made, nor could they take Rome itself. Rome was exhausted in both manpower and finances and much of Latium ravaged. Plague and starvation killed thousands in Rome, the former spreading through armies to Etruria and Campania. In late 132 BCE, the Etruscans made a final counterattack towards Latium, ravaging the Northern lands before retreating once more.

Finally, as 131 began to dawn and the reality of an invasion by Kroton (one not limited by the campaigning season the previous year) sunk in, Rome began to sue for peace. Realising that another year of war might destroy them both, the Etruscans accepted. Thus, in February 131 BCE, Kroton and Pisae sent delegates to Rome to discuss peace terms. In the, now much more empty, city the three states came to an agreement. In effect, it was mostly a status quo ante bellum in name. Kroton was confirmed as head of the Italian Alliance, Rome as head of the Latin League and the Etruscan League given recognition. Rome agreed to a border slightly further South of where it had been and Kroton secured Campania. Rome agreed to a war indemnity and a confirmation of Marinius as rightful king of Samnium as well as withdrawal of support for the Campanian insurgency whilst Pisae agreed to end any attacks on Roman trade routes and, again in name, transfer authority for Latin communities (mostly in the North) to Rome, thus 'returning' them to Rome from their time as hostages. Pragmatically, little of it would stick. Now freed from Capuan domination, Campania would spend the next four years almost constantly revolting against Kroton, the democratic regime in Capua was overthrown by the returning oligarchs once the insurgency was crushed (officially disbanding in 129 BCE) and Rome, deprived of much of its population and economic and political might, lost control over Tarracina and was left with dominance only as far as the new, much smaller, port of Ostia and slightly South of Alba. Indeed, by 125 BCE, the actual size of inhabited Rome was about half of what it had been in 150 BCE and sections of the walls and a number of grand public buildings were falling into disrepair. It would be a long time before any state at Rome would once again wield the same political influence. There were three real winners of the war. Kroton, now with influence reaching over much of Southern Italy, even if it would never hold Campania. Pisae, who now effectively dominated the North and Central reaches of Italy, its dominance over the Italian and Western Mediterranean trade routes growing in leaps and bounds from 131 onward and Marinius, who now basically ruled almost uncontested over most of Samnium. In the end. Only the Samnites and, arguably Kroton would come out in a good position as the ripples of the bloodbath of the past four years turned into tidal waves.

*Note: It has been suggested by some that this might not have been the strategy the Pisans actually advocated for. Only one source explicitly mentions such a strategy and was written a century afterwards. Whilst it does fit with the movements the Etruscans made and has generally been interpreted as correct, some have thought that what the source tells us was merely an interpretation of what the historian of the source felt the Pisans were planning. In the event, we don't know, many of the Pisan sources from the time were destroyed with the Etruscan League.

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Note from the Author: Hello! So sorry about the delay, I was starting a new job and visiting my sister and basically spending a lot of time with my family which compounded by own difficulties in finding a satisfying way to write this and turned into procrastination and be spending far too much time watching TV and not writing. BUT the update is here and hopefully I should get the next one out in the next few days or so. Sorry again for the wait and any feedback is absolutely appreciated.
 
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Chapter XXI: Kings of Italy
Chapter XXI: Kings of Italy

The War of the Three Leagues (135-131) had devastated huge regions of Italy. But as Rome and Capua fell, Kroton and Pisae rose. It was the latter, primarily, that would come to very much define much of Italian political life for the next decade and a bit whilst the former struggled to maintain its overstretched empire. Pisae was devoid of local rivals. Sure, it faced political opposition within the Etruscan League itself but it had no Rome or Capua to really intervene in its affairs given that Kroton was distracted with its own issues down South. Beyond this, Pisae had already established its position in the Western Mediterranean before the War of the Three Leagues and thus, afterwards, it simply consolidated its already powerful economic and political base. From Pisae stretched the lifeblood of Italy, running along trade routes South through Latium, East to the Apennines and North to the Po Valley. These trade routes were the backbone of Pisae's wealth (just as the trade from the East formed the basis of Kroton's wealth). But unlike Kroton, Pisae's wealth came with a very real hammer to back it up in the form of a strong army and a strong, and increasingly experienced, navy as well. At its height in the 120s, Pisae may have had as many as 150 ships protecting her trade routes and influence abroad. Just as the Barcids had done before them, Pisae's fleet, army and wealth became means of gaining political power which, in turn, translated into more wealth. Of course, they never wielded nearly the same influence as the Barcids had but it was enough influence that one historian has informally titled them the 'Kings of Italy'. Yet, at the centre of Pisan power lay politics just as much as wealth or military force. The Pisan coalition in the Etruscan League reached its height in the late 130s during the War of the Three Leagues and formed effectively the basis through which Pisae managed her growing power and influence. As she grew more powerful and wealthy, more states were drawn in to the coalition (either deliberately or otherwise) and the coalition grew more powerful in turn, granting Pisae more political power in Etruria that could then be translated into more wealth and physical power. Crucial to this was the admission of Pisan colonies, founded mostly in Sardinia and Corsica but with a few popping up elsewhere including Gaul and Northern Iberia. Pisae argued that, as culturally and ethnically Etruscan states, these colonies deserved an equal say in the Etruscan League which, in turn, prompted a continuing dispute. Like all powerful figures or states, such as the Barcids in their time, Pisae's influence drew criticism and jealousy and created new enemies. With the Corsican and Sardinian colonies, they had originally been admitted into the League on just these grounds, but with ever more colonies came the realisation that they were rarely entirely independent of Pisae and were more extensions of Pisae's will being used to expand Pisan influence in the Etruscan League. Nominally they had independent governments but Pisae formed their main political backer and trading partner and claimed numerous religious, economic and social privileges as the founder state of these colonies. Thus, said governments never escaped Pisan influence and power. By admitting more states into the League, Pisae seemed set to expand her political influence in the League at the expense of other Etruscan states.

Murmurs of discontent had been circling for a while, right through the 130s at least, but with the growing push to admission after the War of the Three Leagues, the controversy grew and expanded the opposition to Pisae in turn. By 132 BCE at the latest, the first anti-Pisan political coalition had arisen, albeit being disbanded only a year later upon the conclusion of the war. The biggest opposition came in 127 BCE with the formation of a new political coalition led by the city state of Bononia (at first). Like the Pisan coalition, this was an informal group and not nominally existing but for all practical purposes set directly against Pisan power in the Etruscan League. Such divisions would grow steadily over the course of the 120s, gradually polarising the league between one of the two coalitions. It was effectively a death-knell for a league built around mutual decision-making between the cities, a death-knell that became impossible the stronger Pisae grew. The Bononian Coalition (termed that even when Bononia wasn't the leading state) was formed initially around the very issue of admission of extra states into the Etruscan League. At first, they countered Pisan influence step for step where they could. As the Etruscan League had pushed more into the Po Valley, new culturally Etruscan communities were settled by other states in the region and inducted into the league on the same terms as Pisae's colonies. In theory, this would keep the balance equal between the two coalitions, ensuring that they retained a degree of equal power and influence. But the discontent continued. Pisae was wealthy and powerful and her influence extended on the mainland as well, to a number of nearby states (including Tarquinii and Clusium in the South and a series of small colonies founded by Pisae in Southern Etruria and Northern Latium) and the inclusion of colonies in Gaul and Iberia was considered too much, threatening to open the route for Pisae to become effectively a totally hegemonic state. Added on to this was Pisae's influence outside of the league. By the end of the 120s, Pisae effectively had wrested back control of the Latin-Po Valley communities and used that as a springboard to subjugate the Po Valley peoples in the early 110s. At the same time, she had ties to the growing power of Marinius and his successors in Samnium as well as the Sabines and Umbrians. In turn, Pisae made a fortune out of trading privileges in the Po Valley and along the Apennines.

Things came to a head between the two in 125 BCE when the Bononian Coalition made a push to exclude the non-Italian colonies from membership in the Etruscan League, claiming to be moving to protect the Etruscan League from over-extension and citing that the colonies beyond Italy were often not solely Etruscan communities (those in Gaul might be described as largely Gallo-Etruscan and the few in Iberia were certainly Ibero-Etruscan by the end of the century). After a short political showdown, the Pisan kings finally relented on the condition that the Corsican colonies (given that Corsica had been under Etruscan rule long before Pisae's colonies) be allowed to remain in the league. Satisfied with the seeming decreasing of Pisan influence within the league, the Bononians accepted and the colonies outside of Corsica were reorganised the next year into a new 'Pisan' League (though it was generally not given such a title at the time). Compared to its Italian counterpart, the Pisan League was effectively the cover for Pisae's influence over her colonies and, ironically, by removing many of them from the Etruscan League itself, she provided a legal basis to further secure her control over them. In 124 BCE, she introduced a league treasury situated in Pisae into which all members of the league must pay in lieu of any military force being provided, effectively extorting tribute from the colonies. Only three years later in 121 BCE, Pisae legally forbid any other states within the Pisan League from making alliances outside of the league as a whole, maintaining that she herself had to do so as a means to protect the states from foreign aggression. Needless to say, this didn't go down well. Growing quickly tired of Pisae's attitude, a series of revolts broke out throughout the 120s and 110s. Mostly in Sardinia. Thus, by the end of the 120s, Pisae was officially head of the Pisan League, one of the most influential figures in the Etruscan League, and a powerful state in Italian politics elsewhere.

As with other powerful states, Pisae's resources were often directed to playing off rivals against one another. In the 120s, for instance, she funded the Campanian states against Kroton in their bid to free themselves from Kroton's influence, only to then use her political influence to turn the Campanian states against one another when an attempt was made to form a Campanian League, thus strangling the attempt in its cradle. It's probable that Pisae was also involved in the overthrow of the Capuan democracy and the return of the oligarchy that same decade and when, under Marinius' successor, the Pisans had a falling out with the Samnites, they began funnelling money and arms to the Umbrians involved in a war against the Samnites until the Samnites agreed to restore trading privileges to Pisae. So too, they were involved on the side of the Senate in the 124 Carthaginian Civil War and helped provide men and arms to the Senatorial forces. In turn, she secured trading privileges or political influence, grateful or newly allied states helping spread Pisae's influence elsewhere. Or, on the other hand, she simply prevented new rivals from coming up to challenge her position of dominance. But as her power grew, it was constantly being challenged on every front. In Iberia, the experiences of the Barcids had soured the Iberian peoples to foreign intervention, leading to intense hostility towards Etruscan settlements. Back home, she was most prominently involved in political disputes with the rest of the Etruscan League and faced dissent in the Pisan League as well.

Domestically, however, Pisae did nothing but thrive in the 20s years after the war. Pisae itself became the centre of Italian trade routes, through which flowed goods from all across both Italy and the Western Mediterranean and this brought with it the booming cultural and architectural movements that defined the Pisan golden age. Most famous, of course, is the Tomb of Teucer who ruled Pisae from 133 to 121 BCE and who, during his lifetime, commissioned a massive tomb built for him and his family a mile from the city. Blending native Italian and foreign Greek stylistic elements (including the new and more decorative Pisan columns), the Tomb of Teucer stood as high as 45 metres when it was first built and was lavishly decorated inside with wall paintings and carvings. Teucer very much ruled over Pisae at its height, under his rule her political influence grew apace, extending her power across Etruria and her colonies and into the Po Valley and along the Apennines. After the war between Samnium and Umbria, Teucer intervened in a short civil war over Marinius' throne, helping to overthrow one potential king in favour of Marinius' nephew. As such, Teucer's influence extended through most of Samnium as he propped up Marinius' nephew's regime. As such, Pisan trade routes flowed almost unimpeded through Etruria, the Western Mediterranean and Latium. Pisan merchants travelled far and wide, bringing goods back in to Pisae where they sold them on in the marketplace (also expanded under Teucer and his successor, Aranthur. In this marketplace, one could find nearly anything from across the Mediterranean. Vast sums of grain passed through from all over Northern Italy, Gaul and even Africa combined with glass and gold, silver and fine works of art as well as copper from the Etruscan mines, salt from Latium and Iberia and, of course, iron. From this flowing trade route came vast amounts of wealth for the Pisan kings, pouring into their coffers through tolls and taxes and even just the state selling on goods itself. It was this wealth that funded Pisan wars and construction projects, that went to buying influence and soldiers and settling colonies. Needless to say, tribute from the Pisan League also formed a large part of Pisae's wealth. Nominally, said tribute was accessed only in defence of the league, but Pisae had a tendency to dip into it for her own ends, especially into the 110s. Her control over the colonies through the Pisan League was barely disguised and she made little attempt to really hide her control.

From Pisae, the trade routes spread outwards, especially to the South and East. As such, the states lying upon these trade routes similarly became much wealthier in turn and, ironically, began to become enemies themselves to Pisae. Towards the end of the 120s, Florentia was starting to rise as a local political rival, taking over the Bononian coalition in about 117 BCE. To the South, Rome benefited from its position as it had always done, lying upon the trade routes passing to the South and building its prosperity and wealth upon them. Politically, Rome had had a troublesome environment after the end of the War of the Three Leagues. Deprived of her influence in Latium and with much of the population dead, Rome faced a series of political upheavals beginning in 128 BCE when a group of Equestrians led a coup in Rome, installing a short-lived 'Second Senate' until a counter-coup saw them deposed and their flight North to Pisae. Though short, this was a harbinger of things to come. Rome was riven by bankruptcy and many of the fighting-age men were dead with the democracy seriously weakened in numbers, potentially opening a route for the Equestrians (though also low in numbers, they held a lot of wealth) to rise to power themselves. Initially, this saw a moderating influence of sorts in Rome. None of the same radicalism we see at the end of the 130s is as apparent in the 120s and 110s as the Equestrians, with their greater wealth, began influencing more of the democracy themselves. As most of the populace set about rebuilding and taking care of a devastated city, the Equestrians took over much of the government, quickly becoming just as influential as the Plebeians. As such, throughout the 120s, the democracy would be riven by a series of political confrontations between the Plebeians and the Equestrians for overall dominance of the Assembly. In the end, neither the Equestrians nor the Plebeians would ever entirely win. Other problems were becoming more apparent. In the political and economic downturn, Rome became vulnerable to ambitious individuals, playing off the democratic divisions to their own ends. Lucius Didius and Quintus Verrucosus became two such individuals in the late 120s and early 110s, competing on either side of the divide but despite that, more or less the same.

Such individuals had existed before and had actually become more and more influential in the wave of radical democracy in the 130s, playing on the fears of the people or the Equestrians in turn and the paranoia towards the other side as a basis towards their own power and influence. Now, with Rome facing economic and political trouble, such influential individuals became prominent in their own right. To that end, the 128 BCE coup and counter-coup was an important watermark. For the radical democrats, it seemed to confirm fears of Equestrian plots against the democracy and this allowed a number of individuals but, prominently, Quintus Verrucosus to establish themselves towards the radicals as defenders of democracy against Equestrian plots. Didius' influence, in turn, was built on quite the opposite. Instead, he championed himself as a protected of the aristocracy against the brutal whims of radical democracy, citing frequently the excesses and brutality of the Campanian insurgency at its height. Verrucosus would be the first to come to power. On a wave of democratic support, he was voted into office in 125 BCE and continued his meteoric rise from there. Whilst in office, he set the stage for what was to come, influencing elections and appointments to establish a power base for himself of supporters and fellow radicals in Roman government. But he had no intention of stopping just as tribune. But the democratic movement in Rome was beginning to espouse radicalism, moving more towards the same moderation as Kroton to the South. As such, when Verrucosus set about on a political purge of the Equestrian class in 124 BCE, many of the democrats themselves were appalled and the first embers of resistance began. Verrucosus' true intentions became apparent at the end of the year when, rejecting tradition and the demands of office, Verrucosus refused to step down. Instead, he claimed that the Equestrians continued to pose a threat to the continuation of Roman democracy and that the only way to protect Rome from the dangerous influences of the Equestrians and the economic and social troubles she was facing was to establish himself as dictator until Rome could be secured and her democracy saved. It was a short but brutal regime. Supported by the radical elements of the democratic movement, Verrucosus purged much of the Equestrian class as well as a number of leading moderate democrats who opposed him. In one famous story, he had up to 20 men and women buried alive just outside Rome and stories of him burning, disembowelling and dismembering people abound with some sources even painting him as a cannibal who drank peoples' blood and ate their body parts. Many of these stories are apocryphal but the point still stands that his regime proved brutal in its exercise of power, even though by 123 BCE it was gone. A brutal countercoup led by Didius and the Equestrians toppled Verrucosus in early 123 BCE and establish Didius, in turn, as a new dictator. Didius had grown especially influential in the last two years. To many, his anti-democratic agenda was justified and vindicated by the civil war in Carthage and, especially, the brutality of Verrucosus' 'democratic' regime. Thus, from 125 to 123 BCE, Didius consolidated the Equestrian populace behind him and even courted some moderate democratic support by painting the radical democrats as a very real threat to the stability of Rome and one that would prop up Verrucosus' regime to the end unless they were crushed.

Thus, with much of the populace angered and dissenting against Verrucosus, Didius built himself a new power-base and in 123 BCE, they stormed the Assembly building by force and captured Verrucosus who, in turn, was thrown of the Tarpeian Rock to his death a few days later. In turn, Didius proved himself little better. Purporting to establish a new, less radical system that would please both the moderate democrats and the Equestrians, Didius was voted to be dictator in 123 BCE to restore order after Verrucosus' regime and, like his predecessor, Didius wouldn't resign the office at the end of his 6 months. Instead, Didius set about hiring foreign construction workers to establish a new palace on the edge of the city, a walled compound from which he could rule Rome, protected in a place that couldn't be so easily stormed by the people (he had learnt his lesson from the cycle of civil wars and coups over the last century). The Palace of Lucius Didius still stands today, albeit mostly destroyed as a memory of dictatorship and worn away by centuries of erosion to be little more than a set of ruins. But at its time, this was a palace (paid for by Didius' own fortunes but also money gained from the trade routes that had begun to pick up through Rome once again). While not as grand as some of those elsewhere, its main purpose was very much achieved. Bigger than most other buildings in the city, Didius' palace towered over areas of the city, a constant reminder of the excess and power of the new dictator of Rome but also a practical and defensible fortress should there be any other attempted coups. Like his predecessor, Didius was infamous for many of his purges, trying and executing dozens of prominent radical democrats in 123 BCE and then moving on over time to dissenting moderate democrats and even Equestrians (whose wealth he had a tendency to seize through treason trials). But with him and much of his administrative framework and infrastructure safely ensconced in his fortress-palace outside the city, Didius remained safe from the periodic coups and uprisings in the city, crushing them with brutal force and cultivating relations with Pisae in return for military support to prop up his regime. As such, Didius would continue to rule over Rome for the next decade and a bit until his death in 111 BCE and the short civil war between his sons Gaius Didius and Lucius Didius the Younger, culminating in the brutal assassination of Lucius in 109 BCE and the ascension of Gaius as dictator of Rome. But, seeking to secure himself at home against the constant enemies he faced, Didius turned primarily to foreign powers, especially the Samnites and Pisans, both of whom were close enough to potentially provide him with soldiers and economic support against his many enemies. As such, both states made important gains during his reign and that of Gaius. Pisae gained significant trading privileges up until their destruction as well as political influence in most of Latium and the Samnites continued their encroachments into Latium almost unimpeded, seizing significant portions of Eastern Latium under Marinius' nephew.
 
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Bison

Banned
Excellent timeline, wierd how it doesnt seem more popular. Keep it up - maybe include some pictures, diagrams, or maps to make it less text-heavy.
 
Excellent timeline, wierd how it doesnt seem more popular. Keep it up - maybe include some pictures, diagrams, or maps to make it less text-heavy.

Yah I am surprised that way more people don't follow this

Sorry about the late reply, it has been absolutely hectic around here lately.

Seriously, thank you both for the support. It means a lot and it is always nice to know people enjoy reading what I write. Bison's idea to include more visual ideas is actually one I've considered but is hampered somewhat by my lack of any visual talent, especially for making maps. That said, I have been looking into more maps and such though I had some difficulties last time I tried (I planned to post a map showing the extent of fighting in the War of the Three Leagues) with actually posting images. I will say though, even if the timeline isn't as popular as some others, I am always perfectly happy with the small but consistent readership I do get here and I am always so glad when people seem to be enjoying reading my writing.
 
Looks like the Samnites will be much more scarier than otl.

Historians will probably see "Samnitization" alongside "Romanization" as a term. And iirc, the foreshadowing of the Samnites winning above everyone else from the 3 leagues wars says to me that they'll definitely get their time in the sun.
 
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Chapter XXII: Germans, Migrations and the Fall of Pisae
Chapter XXII: Germans, Migrations and the Fall of Pisae

The tumultuous events of the last decade and a half of the 2nd Century BCE in Italy began relatively inconspicuously from the perspective of Italy. Some accounts from the time suggest that the first real rumours of significant movements to the North began sometime in 114 BCE or early 113 BCE. The real causes of the Cimbrian migration have been hugely debated with some suggesting local climate change or crop failures or even flooding or simply a desire for better land and living conditions or a more powerful local rival. Whatever the cause, sometime in the early 110s, the Cimbri peoples left their home in Northern Germania and began travelling South. En route they were joined by a group known as the Teutones, a cousin tribe to the Cimbri and slowly but steadily picked up extra numbers from defeated tribes such as the Boii and Scordisci peoples. All told, estimates have put the numbers of German migrants as of 110 BCE at as many as 500,000 people. Worse still, they caused what has become known to some as a bow-wave, displacing other local groups as they moved. As they passed through the Alps in 114 BCE, they displaced the Norici people in turn who began moving South themselves into Northern Italy. Such movements were not unknown to the Etruscans and much of the 120s had been filled up with small conflicts with other tribes. But the size and frequency of these conflicts began to drastically increase from around 115 BCE onward, with Gallic, Po and Germanic cultures being driven South through the Eastern portions of the Alps and Po Valley into Northern Italy where they came into conflict with the Etruscans determined to maintain their own control over the region. This coincided perfectly with the internal political struggles between Pisae and cities such as Bononia and Florentia for political dominance, struggles that encouraged expansion and colonisation to engender greater political clout in favour of one side or the other. As such, the Etruscans found themselves ever more challenged for control of the Po Valley just as these tumultuous movements began. This was mirrored in the South with the rise of the Samnites who towards the end of the century were becoming more of a power in Latium and Central Italy as Roman power waned and Kroton remained too far to pose any serious threat. As such, the Etruscan League now found itself more divided at such a time at which its enemies were growing ever more dangerous.

The refugee movements and military conflicts started small, as early as 115 BCE, but grew quickly into a small crisis for which the Etruscans weren't prepared to handle. Conflicts broke out all across the North-Eastern Po Valley, spreading by 113 to the central portions of the Valley by which point news of the approaching Cimbri and Teutones must have reached the Etruscans as far as Pisae. The Cimbri and Teutones wanted one thing; to settle and the rich farmlands of Italy, ruled over by increasingly fractious and disunited kings seemed an ideal place to move in. The problem was that 500,000 people couldn't just be ignored either way by the Etruscans and the prospect of having men seen by Etruria and much of the Mediterranean as pseudo-monstrous barbarians just settle right on their borders was far from appealing. In this atmosphere, the borders of the Etruscan League began to severely withdraw from 115 through to 113 as the conflicts with migrating people spread from the North-East to the Central Regions of the Po Valley and threatened to displace the Etruscan towns and villages in turn. But the real hammer blow was yet to hit. In mid-113 BCE a council of the Etruscan League was held in Pisae to decide what should be done about the approaching Germanic tribes. The already dangerous conflicts with the Germanic, Gallic and Po tribes being pushed South had begun to put a strain on many of the smaller Etruscan cities and some had even failed entirely to defend their land and had either been sacked or had resorted to paying tribute for protection. As it was, the bigger cities and those further South remained effectively untouched but those closest to the population movements and those less able to defend themselves were especially at risk. Here the internal problems became ever more problematic. Pisae saw little direct threat to themselves at the moment, they could fend off most migrating peoples themselves and the Po Valley was mostly inhabited by political rivals. More importantly, however, they were facing increasing opposition amongst the Pisan League and found their resources stretched thin and unable to really effectively dedicate many resources to fighting off the migrating peoples. Now that said, they saw no reason whatsoever to just let the migrations continue. At the very least, maintaining the Etruscan League protected their land borders from hostile invasion such as those same migrating peoples but without the resources to spare putting them down, the Pisans advocated instead for a more diplomatic solution. Offering the Po and Gallic peoples land in the Po Valley in return for soldiers and help against the Cimbri and Teutones. In short, they would hand over portions of the valley in return for a buffer region against any threats to the North. Thus, Pisae would weaken her domestic rivals and secure her foreign position with potential new allies in the North as a counter against enemies back home.

To those closest to the migrating peoples and those in the Po Valley itself, though, that was unacceptable. Nobody was willing to just surrender large swathes of the valley when the Etruscan League could defend it themselves. Instead, all new controversies were opened up. For example, if this was an existential threat then why were the Pisans off on foreign adventures and not sending all their men to protect the League as they swore to do when it was founded? As such, the League became quickly and unstoppable riven by this one division. Pisae advocating for a diplomatic solution and her rivals, in turn, proposing brutal and quick warfare to annihilate the tribes as they approached. But in the meantime, the situation fell out of control. Led by Florentia, the anti-Pisan coalition responded quickly. Campaigns raged from 113 to 111 in the Po Valley but the waves of people moving couldn't be stopped. This was, in many ways, a natural social counter-movement to what the Etruscans themselves had been doing before. To help their colonisation efforts in the Po, they had driven local peoples out of the region themselves and many had fled North into the Alpine region or Southern Germania or the very edges of the Po Valley. Now, the tides had shifted and these peoples poured back into the Po Valley from the North. Cities were sacked and tens of thousands were killed from 115 to 111 BCE, even before the arrival of the Cimbri and Teutones. The Cimbri and Teutones hadn't been idle. They had been in Noricum in the Alpine region by about 113 BCE and had made incursions into Northern Italy through much of 112 BCE, even encountering and fighting some small skirmishes with the Etruscans in the North-East. But their real move South wouldn't begin until the next year. Through 112 BCE, the Cimbri and Teutones had actually asked the Etruscans directly for land, designating a large swathe of the Po that they would happily take off their hands. After what amounted to months of stalling, the Cimbri and Teutones finally grew fed up late in 112 BCE and began moving South, sacking and plundering as they went. In the South, however, the Etruscans had been hard at work desperately defending their Northern frontier but the Cimbri and Teutones posed a unique threat beyond just that. For one, they had a tendency to pick up other migrating peoples, even as the Etruscans had just defeated those self-same peoples. A mass migration of 500,000 people was hard to deny and other groups quickly became swept up in it, joining the Cimbri en route South and sensing an opportunity to break into Italy with them.

United by a common goal and led by a number of kings including Boiorix, Lugius, Claodicus and Caesorix of the Cimbri and Teutobod of the Teutones, the Cimbrian migration continued South through 111 BCE. In turn, the Etruscans moved quickly to oppose them, mobilising a massive 70,000 soldiers from across Etruria and the Southern reaches of the Po Valley (Pisae itself providing a meagre 6,000 soldiers) to stop the Germans in their tracks. It didn't work. As the army marched North, Boiorix fell back, drawing them further into the Po Valley and then, finally, turning around in late 111 BCE and, famously, using the cover of the fog to ambush and almost annihilate the Etruscan army. After wintering in the Northern Po valley, the Cimbri continued South the next Spring. Smashing another army at Mutina before turning South-East and capturing and sacking Bononia later that year. News of the sack of Bononia spread quickly. Pisae, in particular, was alarmed. Two Etruscan armies had been devastated at the hands of the Cimbri and the migration didn't seem set to stop. A number of peoples that had followed in the wake of the Cimbri had begun to flood into the Po Valley, capturing Etruscan cities and settling the land all across the region but the main (now maybe as many as 650,000 strong) migration wasn't stopping. Over the course of winter 110 BCE, the Pisans responded with a Herculean effort to stop the migration in its tracks. Whilst their fellow league members had been fighting off the approaching migration, the Pisans had found themselves beleaguered on all fronts and without the forces to spare to actually help fight. An uprising in Northern Iberia in 112 BCE had continued into 110 and a similar uprising in Corsica also threatened their position. To their credit, the Pisans hadn't been blindly ignoring the events to the North. 6000 men had gone to fight in 111 and a much larger 20,000 Pisans with 10,000 mercenaries paid for by Pisae had joined the army at Mutina. As early as July 110 BCE, the Pisans had been preparing a third army to march North and help the army that would be later defeated at Mutina and sending messages for help to much of the rest of Northern Italy. But with the defeat at Mutina, the Pisans began to pull out all the stops. 30,000 men were drawn back from across the Pisan League and a further 15,000 mercenaries hired and forces drawn from local allies all across Northern and Central Italy with much of the Etruscan League providing soldiers in support and even the Samnites, Sabines, Umbrians and Romans as well. Even about 2000 soldiers came from Campania with 300 of them from Capua.

In all the army raised to fight the Cimbri might have been as large as 100-110,000 soldiers, one of the largest ever seen on Italian soil to that date, if not the largest. For a time, it worked wonders. From 109 through to early 107 BCE, the Cimbri were held in the Northern Apennines and as time passed by some groups began to splinter off and settle in the Central and Southern belts of the Po Valley. Enter: Domestic issues. Pisae's new preoccupation with the Cimbri in the North had not gone unnoticed and their overseas territories became ever more problematic from 109 onward with dissent and minor rebellions in Corsica and Sardinia. In 108 BCE a series of cities in Southern Sardinia formed the short lived 'Sardinian League' and led a revolt against the Pisan League before their defeat later that year. All this, though, cost the Pisans a fortune. Like the Barcids before them, their economy struggled to maintain the constant war effort and their inability to ever really defeat the Cimbri kept the war going on and on. Not to mention, the external threat hadn't removed but papered over their internal issues with the Florentians and a constant power struggle broke out between the Pisan and Florentian leaders in the army with many foreign groups either taking sides or even leaving the army to return home, tired of the constant campaigning. Finally, in April 107 BCE, a particularly brutal power struggle resulted in the assassination of a Pisan general and a deadly retaliation by his men, culminating in a small battle between the Etruscan and allied forces one night. The next morning, a dissenting lower commander finally gave in and defected to the Cimbri, showing them a route past the Pisan fortifications in the Apennines. Leading personally 5000 men, Boiorix flanked the Pisan lines and emerged on their rear, coordinating with an assault to trap the Etruscan army. In the panic and chaos the Etruscans were run down, thousands killed by the hour with as many as 50,000 dead or captured by the end of the day.

As before, the movement of the Germanic peoples created a sort of wave effect, stories and acts of brutality such as the sacking or razing of towns and villages driving the Etruscans to flee South towards the seeming safety of Southern Italy. Entire towns and even smaller cities were abandoned and after the defeat in the Apennines in 107 BCE as many as 20,000 people are said to have left Pisae and fled South. For these peoples, there were two main routes, termed the 'Etruscan Refugee Roads'. The first passed South through Etruria and Latium into Campania and often went from there down to Sicily or the South. The second route passed to the East through the Apennines into Samnium and South from there often in South-East Italy towards Kroton and the democratic states of the region.

In effect, the movement of the Germanic peoples had created a refugee crisis. In the South, the influx of Etruscan peoples worsened the existing population pressures as well over a couple of hundred thousand Etruscan people fled through Latium to the South, driven forward as the Cimbri continued to move South. Within months of the defeat in the Apennines, the city of Florentia had been sacked and largely razed to the ground and the Cimbri had raided as far as Pisae itself with one source reporting that two thousand Cimbri had been spotted only two miles from Pisae.

But with the defeat in the Apennines the cork in the bottle had been removed and the migrating peoples flooded into Etruria proper. Even if, militarily, the Pisans could defeat the Cimbri in battle, there were simply far too many people seeking to settle to actually stop now. Indeed from 107 until the end of 106, the Pisans fought a brave last stand against the Cimbri but the settlement of the migrating peoples couldn’t be prevented now.

The final days of the Cimbrian War would come, at last, in November 106 BCE. After two major defeats near Pisae and a siege lasting four months, the glittering jewel of Northern Italy finally fell to Boiorix and the city was plundered for five days straight before a fire broke out in the royal quarters and much of the once beautiful city was destroyed.

By that point much of Pisae was almost empty. As many as 30,000 people may have fled by then including the royal family of the city itself with the king of Pisae living the rest of his life in exile in Campania. Along with them they had taken whatever they could but even still the plunder taken by the Cimbri was said to have been an incredible fortune.

‘Spices and silks and fine cloths they took in vast quantities, gold and silver and thousands of slaves’-
Democritus ‘The History of the Italian Peoples’


And just like that the last great trading city of the Mediterranean passed away, burnt in fire and bloodshed. Some have described what followed as a cultural, political and economic dark age as the city statesman of the Mediterranean continued to vie for dominance in a world abandoned by the Barcid and Pisan hegemonies. In the North of Italy, the Etruscan League found a new successor in a patchwork of settled Germanic, Gallic and Po culture peoples. Now masters of the rich lands they had initially sought, the Cimbri migration began to splinter. The Cimbri and Teutones themselves settled right where they had just won, occupying a broad strip of land along the Arno River. To the South lay a series of dozens of smaller tribes and peoples and even thousands of Etruscan refugees who occupied what had once been Southern Etruria and Northern Latium.

In comparison to the primarily Germanic Southern and Central Etruria, the North as far as Bononia and Mutina was actually more Gallic in settlement with the Po peoples (with their Latin-Etruscan-Gallic cultural hybrid) occupying the Po Valley itself. The reasons for this were simple, the Po peoples had sought more to reclaim their own former homes whilst the conflict with the Etruscans and the desire for wealth and land along with the wealth of the Pisae had drawn the Cimbri and Teutones further South into the central and Southern regions of Etruria itself.

 
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Interesting update seems the end of the Etruscan league as a power in Italy and while the rest are weakened and with their resources strained with the refugee waves besides of the clashes that this influx would provoke a truth turmoil (at first and a greater degree) in the central and south Italy and Sicily.

  • But a doubt... the Cimbri had siege machines and had learnt to use it or had allies because seems that at least some of the well fortified (that must guess given their constant warfare with each other) cities I think that should be able to resist the assault attempts by barbarian... Of course still would fall to a prolonged siege (or direct capitulation if their rulers flee or lost the will to resist) if they were cut from their supply means and when will be consumed their supply stores.
I guess that the events unchained by the invasion and settling of the barbarians in Italy and the destruction of the Pissae hegemony would provoke a repetition of the 'sea people' (refugee waves around the mediterranean seeking a new home).

Finally, I guess that in two generations the barbarian would be mostly assimilated to their subjects and from the tribes hegemonies new states/kingdoms would to be created, but the city state model would be perished and perhaps would be discredited by their inability to survive.
 
Interesting update seems the end of the Etruscan league as a power in Italy and while the rest are weakened and with their resources strained with the refugee waves besides of the clashes that this influx would provoke a truth turmoil (at first and a greater degree) in the central and south Italy and Sicily.

  • But a doubt... the Cimbri had siege machines and had learnt to use it or had allies because seems that at least some of the well fortified (that must guess given their constant warfare with each other) cities I think that should be able to resist the assault attempts by barbarian... Of course still would fall to a prolonged siege (or direct capitulation if their rulers flee or lost the will to resist) if they were cut from their supply means and when will be consumed their supply stores.
I guess that the events unchained by the invasion and settling of the barbarians in Italy and the destruction of the Pissae hegemony would provoke a repetition of the 'sea people' (refugee waves around the mediterranean seeking a new home).

Finally, I guess that in two generations the barbarian would be mostly assimilated to their subjects and from the tribes hegemonies new states/kingdoms would to be created, but the city state model would be perished and perhaps would be discredited by their inability to survive.

Despite what I might have made it appear like, not all the Etruscan cities or settlements are gone. There are still a number of Etruscan hold-outs in the South as well as city states and communities dotted around much of the rest of what was once the Etruscan League. But the league has been disbanded and Bononia, Florentia and Pisae all sacked by the Cimbri (OTL the Cimbri were able to defeat the Romans a few times and showed themselves to be very skilled and cunning warriors, luring at least one Roman army into an ambush in Noricum and annihilating around 120,000 Romans at Arausio). As a result, I felt that a militarily exhausted, distracted and politically divided Etruria would also be a plausible enemy for the Cimbri (given that OTL estimated put their total number including civilians at 300-500,000) to defeat.

Aside from that, there are going to be some interesting social and cultural developments as a result of this. For one, Rome and the Samnites are now right on the front lines against the barbarian peoples now inhabiting Northern Italy and these people are now going to mix and change culturally on a huge scale. We might in fact see some interesting cultural mixing- eg. Etruscan-Germanic culture or even a Latin-Gallic-Germanic mixture around where the Po cultures have already developed.

Looks like the Samnites will be much more scarier than otl.

Historians will probably see "Samnitization" alongside "Romanization" as a term. And iirc, the foreshadowing of the Samnites winning above everyone else from the 3 leagues wars says to me that they'll definitely get their time in the sun.

Oh yeah we definitely have the golden age of the Samnites on its way. They've become a lot more unified lately, pushed together by outside threats encroaching on their territory and now they're using that unity to push back against the now disunited Italian peoples elsewhere. Just look at Latium, rich lands almost free for the taking with the Roman and other populations devastated by the war of the Three Leagues. Campania is divided and rejecting Kroton's rule and the Etruscan League and the formerly powerful Pisans have been annihilated. Not to mention, the Samnites have been playing their own political role in the power struggles in Rome and now have a huge influx of manpower and even very skilled workmen coming from the former Etruscan League to the North. Central Italy is right within their grasp if they can take it. That said, there is also a new kid on the block with the Cimbri and Teutones settling in Etruria and whilst the smaller Germanic/Gallic peoples in Southern Etruria might make a potential playground for a talented Samnite king, it could also be a region divided enough for Boiorix and pals to control as well.

Add on to this the growing refugee crisis that is about to hit Southern Italy and the same political problems they've been facing might be about to get a lot worse.
 
So I know how irregular my posts have been for a while now, I just want to give an explanation. I started a new job back in October and things have been a bit hectic and I kinda lost the will to write a lot for a while, I'm trying to get at least one or two posts a month out so you aren't all left completely in the dark but I just want to apologise for the irregularity and long gaps. Hopefully soon I'll be back into the swing of things and more regular updates will be coming but at the moment I'm a tiny bit burnt out and just trying to take it easy until I am ready to write. Thank you all again for the continued support and don't worry, this timeline isn't dead and an update IS coming.
 
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