A New Carthaginian Age: Trade, Politics, War and Treachery in the post-Roman World
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Chapter XII: The Collapse of the Coalition
Chapter XII: The Collapse of the Coalition
The coalition formed to combat the Barcids had been marvellously successful in its initial and main goal, combating and defeating the Barcids. Uniting the democrats and the conservative republicans against a single enemy, it had been able to not only oust the most powerful family in the Mediterranean from the city but defy their army and navy and maintain control, setting up an interim government with Hamilcar serving as suffet from the initial ousting of the Barcids in early 139 until their final defeat in April 138 with the intention being, it seemed, to allow him to serve on until proper elections could be held the following year. This would give Hamilcar time to reestablish the old republic of Carthage. But, with the defeat of the Barcids, the narrow alliance between the democratic lower class and the republican/oligarchic aristocrats proved shaky to say the least. This was a problem that stemmed initially from the very Barcid domination that the coalition had been formed to overthrow, for one the political repression under the Barcids as well as their influence in fostering the democratic movement abroad had created a politicised lower class, one that would no longer settle for a form of government that was dominated by an elite few. For another, the aristocratic class had been devastated over the last 40 years as the Barcids destroyed enemies, opened up the senate to others, thus weakening the genealogical source of prestige for the aristocracy, and many of those in the senate had been pro-Barcids who were purged in political and treason trials throughout 139 and 138 BCE. As such, Hamilcar found himself representing a drastically outnumbered aristocracy now besieged by an increasingly politicised lower class demanding democratic features in government along the lines of Rome.
From April through to June, this became a serious source of tension within the city as the aristocracy maintained the mercenaries that had been hired to combat the Barcids, ostensibly to defend the city and maintain law and order in the wake of a civil war. For Hamilcar, this seemed the only military protection the aristocracy had against the now-armed people rising up against them as well and instituting a radical form of democracy as existed in Rome. At the same time, however, the presence of mercenaries seemed eerily similar to many within the democratic movement who saw resemblances to the Barcid mercenaries and their abuses as well as to the political bodyguards of the last 40 years and may have, in the Hannonids, have seen a potential second Barcid family. Dialogue between the democratic movement's leaders and the Hannonid-led aristocrats grew ever more tense as Hamilcar continued to defend that the coup had been to restore the republic, not to institute a democracy along lines that had never before existed in Carthage whilst the democratic movement expressed the the peoples' demands for greater representation. This became all the more fierce as the political debate was surrounded by what amounted to two armies, one of mercenaries who, whilst better trained and equipped were certainly outnumbered, and one of a politically charged lower class populace. By June, the governance of the city had split in two, with the aristocrats forming their government in the wealthy Byrsa district and reestablishing the Carthaginian Senate and the democrats meeting in the forum to establish an assembly. The first real political clash between these two governments had been a running debate ever since the victory over the Barcids, the right to try political prisoners. The trials had been continuing since the initial ousting of the Barcids but, with the preoccupation with the war, had only really picked up in April 138. These were mostly corruption or treason charges, not just of pro-Barcid aristocrats but accomplices of all kinds from all across the city right down to corrupt tax and toll officials. The problem was that for the higher cases, the aristocrats believed that only the Senate should be allowed to try other major aristocrats and that the people at large should be exempt from such trials as they didn't possess the status to try such men. This had been mitigated by sheer practicality during the time of war, Hamilcar couldn't afford any breaches in his coalition and as such had established a joint body of both aristocrats and lower class democrats for any and all trials in the city. But, with the governments now split between the Senate and the Assembly, the right of jurisdiction was also split.
On one hand, the Senate defended that they alone should be allowed to try aristocrats but would compromise by allowing the Assembly to try lower officials whilst the democrats claimed that they should have equal jurisdiction but would accept a similar compromise as had been reached beforehand with a joint body to try any and all prisoners. This was worsened by suspicions amongst the democrats that the Senate might allow some aristocrats to go free so as to bolster their numbers and strengthen their political hand in the face of determined political opposition and by fears amongst the Senate that the people might turn and try to use the law courts to bring down their government by prosecuting their members as well. So too, this was also exacerbated by the well known fact that few of those who now sat in the Senate were by any means free of the blame of colluding with the Barcids, many of them were simply those who had joined the coalition at the right time. Should they allow the people a say in prosecuting high-level aristocrats, then that would set a precedent for those same people to prosecute them. In short, the Assembly saw the Senate as potentially corrupt whilst the Senate saw the Assembly as representing a palpable threat to their authority and legal rights. Things came to a head when a prisoner being escorted to the Byrsa to stand trial was set upon by armed forces working for the Assembly who tried to take him away to a trial in the forum, in the ensuing struggle multiple people were killed on both sides including the prisoner himself. Almost immediately dialogue broke down between the democrats and Hamilcar, both sides blaming one another for not respecting their right to try political prisoners in their own form of government. Determined to seize the prisoners for themselves, both sides fell to fighting all throughout the city, killing hundreds over the rest of the week as individual skirmishes broke out between the democrats and the oligarchs throughout much of the city. Realising the very real risks of this fighting devolving into another civil war, representatives from both the Senate and the Assembly met in late June in the forum to discuss a truce and general disarmament to prevent further outbreaks of violence pending an actual resolution to the difficulties between the two. On one hand, the aristocrats agreed to disband the mercenaries and remove them from the city whilst, on the other, the Assembly agreed to disarm the people and try certain individuals who had committed especially egregious acts of assault or murder. For the most part, the truce proved an important victory for both sides. For the first time in just over a week, the sense of a city under siege in many areas now dissipated and the fears of civil war that had built up began to dissipate. Aristocrats from the Byrsa were now able to reach the cothon once again and a modicum of trade, industry and business began to start up once more as the truce persisted.
But the truce failed in so far as the disputes between the Byrsa Senate and the Assembly went unsolved and the two governments remained separated. But, drastically outnumbered and unable to rely upon mercenaries any more, the aristocrats found their ability to impose their will upon the negotiations severely curtailed and in early July Hamilcar would make an important concession. Namely, this was to agree to a joint body for the trial of political prisoners of all kinds, from tax inspectors to senators, reinstating the Council of 104 to serve as the main court for such political trials for the time being. For its makeup, the Senate and Assembly would both nominate half its members to sit on the Council for the trials, thus, in theory, giving them equal weight in prosecutions of political prisoners. As normal business resumed, the trials were divided up amongst lower courts with the most important trials, those of high-ranking aristocrats, taking place in the Council and those of lower magistrates and officials in lower courts, almost all of which were staffed by magistrates from the Assembly as the Senate had neither the resources nor the manpower to staff these courts themselves. Thus, by the end of 138 BCE, most of the judicial system had come into the hands of the Assembly, all lower trials took place in courts staffed by people appointed by the Assembly and they held an equal weight in higher trials such as those in the Council which now took over the responsibility for almost all major trials as neither the Senate nor the Assembly would be acceptable. In return, the Assembly relented to dropping any charges against previous collaborators in the Senate government, thus allowing Hamilcar to retain his political strength which would have been destroyed had the Assembly been allowed to prosecute most of the Senate.
But this did nothing to solve the inherent and deepening dispute between the Assembly and the Senate, namely that of executive and legislative powers within the city. Traditionally, both had been wielded largely by the suffets elected by and with recourse to, the Senate who would vote on proposals put forward by the suffets. This was no longer acceptable to the Assembly, now the people wanted a greater say than simply resolving disputes between suffets or between suffets and the Senate, rather they now wanted the right to be prime in and of themselves in the executive and legislative spheres. Indeed, the Assembly coming to control much of the law courts in 138 only worsened the latter as it fell to members of the Assembly to actually enforce the workings of the law in many cases and thus a dispute between the Senate and the Assembly over legislation could lead to a very real divide between the Senate and the judiciary which could, in turn, jeopardise the workings of the law within the city. One of the biggest problems in this entire dispute was that the Senate and Assembly effectively had contrary aims and concerns, even on the same matters. For instance, the Assembly had been advocating for land redistribution in the vein of Rome or Kroton but the aristocrats saw that as a threat to themselves and sought to maintain their own control of the land. One particularly vicious dispute here was the nature of the lands confiscated from the Barcids or from pro-Barcid Senators and politicians during the trials. The Assembly believed it should be distributed to the people and feared that the aristocrats might end up distributing it amongst themselves, thereby increasing their own wealth whilst the poor citizenry continued to lack land and income. With control over most of the lower city, the Assembly had precluded this by issuing a document stating their intention to distribute the land amongst members of the landless poor which, in turn, was challenged by the Senate as presuming an authority which was not that of the Assembly's to wield. Rather, the Senate demanded that issues of land reform be dealt with in the Senate which, as with the treason trials, the Assembly would never accept. This was similar to disputes taking place all the time throughout the city, with the control of Carthage as a whole at stake. Should either side emerge triumphant, they would have the majority of executive and legislative powers but until one did, the two governments would remain in competition and division.
Throughout the city, people deferred to one or the other governments, often divided by wealth and class with the richest in society deferring to the Byrsa Senate and the poor masses deferring instead to the Assembly. Thus, Carthage was divided, street by street, area by area into groups of people supporting either the Assembly or the Senate as the rightful government. The main strength of the Assembly lay in their numbers, there were far more poor or disenfranchised citizens throughout the city than rich aristocrats in the Senate, whilst the Senate appealed to those who were the richer or more influential in society and those who served to lose a lot of political influence in a democratic system as well as basing much of their argument upon the dangers of mob rule and the political traditions of Carthage. The July concession made by Hamilcar had had much wider consequences than many had expected, now the Assembly could no longer be denied as a rightful force in the city at large and the Senate lost its chance to actually put down the Assembly and restore their own undisputed control because, either way, the Assembly now dominated the law courts and so any matters of legislation, if they were to ever be effectively put into action, would have to be referred to the Assembly anyway. By making the concession in July, Hamilcar had effectively sealed the fate of the Assembly, even if it did not now rise to become the main or sole government in the city, it would certainly become a much more influential part of the city's government, one that could not be denied. But the disputes continued, raging throughout the remainder of 138 BCE and continuing on into 137 which was kick started with another huge political issue when Hamilcar's time came to an end and he (and Hannibal, the other suffet who was far less notable than his counterpart) stepped down as suffet. Once again, the divides between the Senate and the Assembly became apparent. From 139 to the end of 138, Hamilcar and Hannibal had been accepted by both the Assembly and the Senate as the rightful suffets, in turn a huge bonus for the Senate who had the backing of an uncontested leader. At the very least, the democrats had had a hand in choosing the suffets so they couldn't contest that they were rightful suffets which, at the very least had provided a stabilising influence as the Assembly and Senate, whilst fighting one another, accepted that the chosen suffets were chosen correctly. It had been Hamilcar's influence, for instance, that had allowed the June truce and he had pushed the Senate to accepting the July concession as well. The problem was one of sustaining control in a city riven by turmoil, the Assembly simply wouldn't accept the overall authority of the Senate and vice versa, thus Hamilcar and Hannibal, whilst accepted as suffets had their authority greatly weakened as the Assembly and Senate would rarely, if ever, accept any decisions passed through or by their rival.
Now came the trouble of electing two new suffets and the time of an uncontested suffet in charge of Carthage had now passed, since both the Senate and the Assembly had had a hand in choosing Hamilcar and Hannibal as suffets, there was now no question of having the two new suffets be entirely chosen by the Senate and when they took it upon themselves to elect two new suffets in early 137 BCE, the Assembly was quick to reject their choices and elected two new suffets of their own, both from amongst the Assembly itself. This was abhorrent to the aristocratic Senators, allowing the Assembly to vote upon new suffets would undermine a vital privilege of theirs, the right to choose the suffets for the upcoming year to the Assembly. Not to mention, the suffets voted into power by the Assembly did not and, if they took power, would not consult the Senate but would continue to consult the Assembly itself. This served only to further exacerbate the divide between the two governments, whilst a joint judicial system had been worked out with the July concession, all other aspects of government had become divided between the Assembly and the Senate with two sets of competing suffets vying for power in the city. This, in turn, led to a dangerous divide in the law courts, the lower law courts followed without exemption the laws set down, not by the Senate, but by the Assembly but within the Council of 104, the entire system became divided with the Senatorial members refusing to accept legal matters instituted by the Assembly and vice versa, thus creating a dangerous split down the middle of the council. At the height of the problems, this made the Council almost completely frozen by divisions and completely unable to continue important trials, threatening to force a division into two further competing courts, one under the auspices of the Assembly and the other under the Senate, thus completely unravelling the July concession and completing the divide between the two governments. In effect, the Council became the last thread tying the two together and, should it snap, the governments would become entirely separate entities vying for control of the city and her government, in short it would be grounds for another civil war. The chief element preventing this was the terms of the June truce, under which neither the Senate nor the Assembly had an armed force at its disposal and both feared the ability of the other to raise an army against themselves. Within the law courts, the incapacitated Council found itself with little option but to defer more and more cases to lower and subsidiary courts at risk of being overwhelmed by cases as they began to drag out more and more, riven by divisions and chaos. Thus, over the course of 137, the rights and powers of the lower Assembly-run courts continued to grow as more and more important cases were deferred to them, giving them an increasing grip over the workings of the legal system.
This created a stalemate for the two governments, the Senate couldn't risk trying to oust the Assembly from the legal system for, if they failed, they would have broken the terms of the July concession and opened themselves up to being attacked and prosecuted by the Assembly which would cripple their power. At the same time, neither could the Assembly use the law courts to defeat the Senate without risking the very terms upon which their authority had been built. should the July concession break down then the Senate would likely establish a separate court and reject the rights of the Assembly to try important cases once again, thus returning to the very same problems they had had before the concession had been made. In turn, the dispute became one of recognition, whichever government was more widely recognised as the main government of Carthage would be the more widely powerful government as it would have more of the city following its decisions, its government and its suffets. With neither side willing to concede government, wide recognition as the rightful government became the prime determinant of power within the system. To this end, the Assembly had a huge step up under the July concession, as the Council became more impotent and the power of the lower courts grew, the legal decisions undertaken by the Assembly became more and more influential throughout the city. Thus, by the end of 137 BCE, the Assembly had de facto control over the legislative organ of the state as the Senate's ability to actually enforce their legal decisions declined. It was a game of numbers, the poorer elements of society who would gain from a more powerful Assembly outnumbered the rich aristocratic Senators. Those who were not rich or had not the lineage to serve in the Senate, that being a large portion of the population, gained from a more powerful Assembly whilst those who could serve and sit within the Senate gained from a more powerful Senate but their numbers had been devastated by the civil wars and purges under the Barcids. Under this current lay those who would be disenfranchised from either government, they were not native Carthaginian or they were women or children and thus would lack the same political rights. This made appealing to them for either government a lot more difficult and their acceptance of a government tended to be based not so much on ideology but on de facto control. Thus the writing was on the wall for the Senatorial government in the Byrsa, their actual control over the city was in steady decline through 137, they couldn't impose their laws whilst the law courts remained unified but they couldn't risk dividing them, thus under this system the Assembly became ever more powerful and their suffets much more widely accepted than their counterparts in the Byrsa.
This created a dilemma for the Senate, to them there seemed only a few ways out of their predicament, either to reach an accord with the Assembly in which they would undoubtedly lose a lot of their influence within the politics of the city and quite possibly have to accept the Assembly's right to at least influence the choice of suffets or even accept the legal decisions reached by the suffets of the Assembly, thus in part legitimising them. Another option was to break the July concession, establish a separate Senate-controlled system of law courts and reject those of the Assembly before trying to impose their own legal system across the city and a third, but very much extreme option advocated for by some in the Senate was to rearm, use their wealth to hire mercenaries and retake the city by force. All they would, in theory, need was to get a single messenger out of the city to round up a few thousand mercenaries with whom they could destroy the Assembly and reassert their control. To many, this third option was unthinkable, even if they should arrest and massacre the Assembly, they risked provoking a civil war, turning the democratic movement violent as had happened in Rome and, if they lost, they would face a very similar fate. The second option also caused problems, whilst strictly possible, trying to reassert their control over a city that was used to following the legal precedents of the Assembly would be an uphill battle for the Senate. Once again, as well, if they completely denounced the courts of the Assembly and their legal decisions, they risked splitting government completely which would make any accommodation harder in the future and also risked entrenching the loyalties of various groups. For instance, if they split the government entirely then the populace would remain divided between the Senate and the Assembly but the complete division might make loyalties to one or the other ever more fierce with violence yet again being a potential outcome. Neither side wanted civil war, if just because neither side was assured of a victory and both faced potentially brutal trials and executions for treason should they lose, this wasn't a war that would be fought by pitched armies in a field, it would be brutal, urban warfare and it would kill thousands and devastate the homes and livelihoods of people on both sides of the dispute, neither the leaders of the Assembly nor the Senate had any desire to create that situation for themselves.
As debates raged in both the Senate and the Assembly as to what their next move should be, the control of the Assembly over the law courts became more and more entrenched and normalised as time went by, thus the chances for the Senate to retake legal control grew ever slimmer and their options became less and less open to them. Without a universally recognised pair of suffets in charge, dialogue proved hard to maintain and frequently broke down into chaos and arguments between the two governments and legal trials in the Council became disputes between the Assembly and Senate with a number of trials being cancelled or deferred to lower courts as the Council became impotent, fighting amongst themselves as to whose law codes should be followed. Finally, a culmination was reached, in part due to Hamilcar's continued powerful influence in the Senate, dialogue was reopened in November 137 and a second concession made between the two governments. Sensing the risk of the July concession being broken, the Assembly and the Senate set about to agree upon a singular law code that both would abide by, such that not only the Council but the lower courts would follow as well, under this new concession, any changes to the law codes would go through both the Assembly and the Senate although either could propose a change. The July and November concessions would set the tone for the legal system in the post-Barcid Carthage, it set about the decline of the suffets as a legislative authority and moved the power to enact and change laws primarily to the Senate and the Assembly, either of which could now propose laws but both of which were needed for laws to pass. Furthermore, it effectively halted the splitting of the two governments at the seams, uniting the law courts along a singular law code agreed by both the Senate and the Assembly, whilst neither set of suffets was universally accepted, now neither the Senate nor the Assembly could deny the influence of the other in making legislation, thus empowering both at the expense of the suffets.
With this, the divides could now begin to heal. The Assembly continued to control the lower courts and the appointment of lower magistrates would remain a province of the Assembly whilst the Council of 104, now mostly a legal body as had occurred by necessity after the July concession, remained evenly split between Assembly and Senatorial members. This left the right to executive powers as the main divide between the two governments, inherently both saw themselves as the rightful government of Carthage and believed it was their prerogative to govern the city. But the decline of the suffets and the November concession now showed an obvious way forward, if the suffets were no longer such an important figure in the politics of the day, then the executive government could be split between the Assembly and the Senate. This came with a plethora of its own problems, for one if the power was evenly split between the two bodies then it opened the way for new disputes and an impotent government, one in which neither body could overrule the other but both bodies would be split by ideological or simply practical differences. An accommodation had been made easier but it was still far off, especially as forming a new executive body remained unacceptable to the Senate who, outnumbered, would lose the majority of their influence should one be formed. Simply put, the empowerment of the Assembly and the Senate meant that only one of them could really rule, the other would have to take a subsidiary role. This problem wouldn't be resolved until the next year with what had been known as, given the convention of the previous two agreements, the February concession. After another dispute in which both the Assembly and the Senate elected separate suffets, dialogue was once again opened between the two. The experience of the previous two negotiations had made this easier and both sides were now much more willing to make concessions, especially as both now held equal legislative power. Under the February concession, both the Assembly and the Senate agreed to recognise a single suffet from the other body. This, in turn, solved the problem of executive powers.
The July, November and February concessions, formed from 138 to 136 would become the basis of the new constitution of the post-Barcid Carthage. Not democratic in the same way as the Italian and Latin democracies, the Carthaginian government has been described as pseudo-democratic. The Assembly was a democratic body, open to any citizen whilst the Senate remained exclusive albeit more opened up after the Barcids and was entitled only to those of a certain wealth category and, to prevent abuses, one could only sit in either the Senate or the Assembly but not both. Thus, as the new constitution was formed over the next few years, the government became based around 3 separate entities. The Suffets were elected separately by the Assembly and the Senate and held the main executive powers in Carthage with the requirement that major decisions would go through both the Senate and the Assembly prior to being passed. Legislative powers were devolved, in turn, to the Assembly and the Senate, both of which could propose legislation but neither of which could enforce it without the other providing its consent. Within the law courts, the power largely resided within the Assembly who retained the power to appoint lower magistrates as well as 52 of the 104 Councillors in the highest Carthaginian court (the Council) whilst the appointment of various other magistrates (such as tax collectors) would also largely go to the Assembly. Meanwhile the appointment of many other higher positions such as generals as well as powers with foreign policy and diplomacy remained with the Senate as it had done before. Thus, in effect, most domestic affairs became the domain of the Assembly, from the majority of the law courts to other areas such as tax collection and even infrastructure developments whilst the Senate became the main power for foreign policy, electing generals and making the main decisions of diplomacy as well as largely retaining a powerful hand in state religion. In this environment, the power of the suffets would continue to decline. True, in name they held the executive authority in the city as per the February concession. But that proved more of a stop-gap, it couldn't reverse the slow decline of the suffets but it had allowed the Senate and the Assembly to invest a body acceptable to both with executive powers. In truth, both suffets had become more and more reliant on their respective bodies during the period of divided government as the tumultuous political environment had meant that their position had relied heavily upon continued support from their respective bodies. As such, it would have been unacceptable for the suffets to try to overrule either the Senate or the Assembly on any decision or to impose any real independent political will, thus their influence would continue to decline, their powers moving more and more to the two bodies of government.
This wasn't a constitution destined to last but it was a constitution that served its purpose. It reunified a divided city under one government and it provided the political base from which further changes would occur. Its biggest success was getting the people to accept and recognise a single government, even if it failed to entirely address the divisions between the Assembly and the Senate. The problems I mentioned before of two equally powerful bodies vying for dominance hadn't been solved, but it would no longer take place between two separate governments but between two organs of a unified government.
The coalition formed to combat the Barcids had been marvellously successful in its initial and main goal, combating and defeating the Barcids. Uniting the democrats and the conservative republicans against a single enemy, it had been able to not only oust the most powerful family in the Mediterranean from the city but defy their army and navy and maintain control, setting up an interim government with Hamilcar serving as suffet from the initial ousting of the Barcids in early 139 until their final defeat in April 138 with the intention being, it seemed, to allow him to serve on until proper elections could be held the following year. This would give Hamilcar time to reestablish the old republic of Carthage. But, with the defeat of the Barcids, the narrow alliance between the democratic lower class and the republican/oligarchic aristocrats proved shaky to say the least. This was a problem that stemmed initially from the very Barcid domination that the coalition had been formed to overthrow, for one the political repression under the Barcids as well as their influence in fostering the democratic movement abroad had created a politicised lower class, one that would no longer settle for a form of government that was dominated by an elite few. For another, the aristocratic class had been devastated over the last 40 years as the Barcids destroyed enemies, opened up the senate to others, thus weakening the genealogical source of prestige for the aristocracy, and many of those in the senate had been pro-Barcids who were purged in political and treason trials throughout 139 and 138 BCE. As such, Hamilcar found himself representing a drastically outnumbered aristocracy now besieged by an increasingly politicised lower class demanding democratic features in government along the lines of Rome.
From April through to June, this became a serious source of tension within the city as the aristocracy maintained the mercenaries that had been hired to combat the Barcids, ostensibly to defend the city and maintain law and order in the wake of a civil war. For Hamilcar, this seemed the only military protection the aristocracy had against the now-armed people rising up against them as well and instituting a radical form of democracy as existed in Rome. At the same time, however, the presence of mercenaries seemed eerily similar to many within the democratic movement who saw resemblances to the Barcid mercenaries and their abuses as well as to the political bodyguards of the last 40 years and may have, in the Hannonids, have seen a potential second Barcid family. Dialogue between the democratic movement's leaders and the Hannonid-led aristocrats grew ever more tense as Hamilcar continued to defend that the coup had been to restore the republic, not to institute a democracy along lines that had never before existed in Carthage whilst the democratic movement expressed the the peoples' demands for greater representation. This became all the more fierce as the political debate was surrounded by what amounted to two armies, one of mercenaries who, whilst better trained and equipped were certainly outnumbered, and one of a politically charged lower class populace. By June, the governance of the city had split in two, with the aristocrats forming their government in the wealthy Byrsa district and reestablishing the Carthaginian Senate and the democrats meeting in the forum to establish an assembly. The first real political clash between these two governments had been a running debate ever since the victory over the Barcids, the right to try political prisoners. The trials had been continuing since the initial ousting of the Barcids but, with the preoccupation with the war, had only really picked up in April 138. These were mostly corruption or treason charges, not just of pro-Barcid aristocrats but accomplices of all kinds from all across the city right down to corrupt tax and toll officials. The problem was that for the higher cases, the aristocrats believed that only the Senate should be allowed to try other major aristocrats and that the people at large should be exempt from such trials as they didn't possess the status to try such men. This had been mitigated by sheer practicality during the time of war, Hamilcar couldn't afford any breaches in his coalition and as such had established a joint body of both aristocrats and lower class democrats for any and all trials in the city. But, with the governments now split between the Senate and the Assembly, the right of jurisdiction was also split.
On one hand, the Senate defended that they alone should be allowed to try aristocrats but would compromise by allowing the Assembly to try lower officials whilst the democrats claimed that they should have equal jurisdiction but would accept a similar compromise as had been reached beforehand with a joint body to try any and all prisoners. This was worsened by suspicions amongst the democrats that the Senate might allow some aristocrats to go free so as to bolster their numbers and strengthen their political hand in the face of determined political opposition and by fears amongst the Senate that the people might turn and try to use the law courts to bring down their government by prosecuting their members as well. So too, this was also exacerbated by the well known fact that few of those who now sat in the Senate were by any means free of the blame of colluding with the Barcids, many of them were simply those who had joined the coalition at the right time. Should they allow the people a say in prosecuting high-level aristocrats, then that would set a precedent for those same people to prosecute them. In short, the Assembly saw the Senate as potentially corrupt whilst the Senate saw the Assembly as representing a palpable threat to their authority and legal rights. Things came to a head when a prisoner being escorted to the Byrsa to stand trial was set upon by armed forces working for the Assembly who tried to take him away to a trial in the forum, in the ensuing struggle multiple people were killed on both sides including the prisoner himself. Almost immediately dialogue broke down between the democrats and Hamilcar, both sides blaming one another for not respecting their right to try political prisoners in their own form of government. Determined to seize the prisoners for themselves, both sides fell to fighting all throughout the city, killing hundreds over the rest of the week as individual skirmishes broke out between the democrats and the oligarchs throughout much of the city. Realising the very real risks of this fighting devolving into another civil war, representatives from both the Senate and the Assembly met in late June in the forum to discuss a truce and general disarmament to prevent further outbreaks of violence pending an actual resolution to the difficulties between the two. On one hand, the aristocrats agreed to disband the mercenaries and remove them from the city whilst, on the other, the Assembly agreed to disarm the people and try certain individuals who had committed especially egregious acts of assault or murder. For the most part, the truce proved an important victory for both sides. For the first time in just over a week, the sense of a city under siege in many areas now dissipated and the fears of civil war that had built up began to dissipate. Aristocrats from the Byrsa were now able to reach the cothon once again and a modicum of trade, industry and business began to start up once more as the truce persisted.
But the truce failed in so far as the disputes between the Byrsa Senate and the Assembly went unsolved and the two governments remained separated. But, drastically outnumbered and unable to rely upon mercenaries any more, the aristocrats found their ability to impose their will upon the negotiations severely curtailed and in early July Hamilcar would make an important concession. Namely, this was to agree to a joint body for the trial of political prisoners of all kinds, from tax inspectors to senators, reinstating the Council of 104 to serve as the main court for such political trials for the time being. For its makeup, the Senate and Assembly would both nominate half its members to sit on the Council for the trials, thus, in theory, giving them equal weight in prosecutions of political prisoners. As normal business resumed, the trials were divided up amongst lower courts with the most important trials, those of high-ranking aristocrats, taking place in the Council and those of lower magistrates and officials in lower courts, almost all of which were staffed by magistrates from the Assembly as the Senate had neither the resources nor the manpower to staff these courts themselves. Thus, by the end of 138 BCE, most of the judicial system had come into the hands of the Assembly, all lower trials took place in courts staffed by people appointed by the Assembly and they held an equal weight in higher trials such as those in the Council which now took over the responsibility for almost all major trials as neither the Senate nor the Assembly would be acceptable. In return, the Assembly relented to dropping any charges against previous collaborators in the Senate government, thus allowing Hamilcar to retain his political strength which would have been destroyed had the Assembly been allowed to prosecute most of the Senate.
But this did nothing to solve the inherent and deepening dispute between the Assembly and the Senate, namely that of executive and legislative powers within the city. Traditionally, both had been wielded largely by the suffets elected by and with recourse to, the Senate who would vote on proposals put forward by the suffets. This was no longer acceptable to the Assembly, now the people wanted a greater say than simply resolving disputes between suffets or between suffets and the Senate, rather they now wanted the right to be prime in and of themselves in the executive and legislative spheres. Indeed, the Assembly coming to control much of the law courts in 138 only worsened the latter as it fell to members of the Assembly to actually enforce the workings of the law in many cases and thus a dispute between the Senate and the Assembly over legislation could lead to a very real divide between the Senate and the judiciary which could, in turn, jeopardise the workings of the law within the city. One of the biggest problems in this entire dispute was that the Senate and Assembly effectively had contrary aims and concerns, even on the same matters. For instance, the Assembly had been advocating for land redistribution in the vein of Rome or Kroton but the aristocrats saw that as a threat to themselves and sought to maintain their own control of the land. One particularly vicious dispute here was the nature of the lands confiscated from the Barcids or from pro-Barcid Senators and politicians during the trials. The Assembly believed it should be distributed to the people and feared that the aristocrats might end up distributing it amongst themselves, thereby increasing their own wealth whilst the poor citizenry continued to lack land and income. With control over most of the lower city, the Assembly had precluded this by issuing a document stating their intention to distribute the land amongst members of the landless poor which, in turn, was challenged by the Senate as presuming an authority which was not that of the Assembly's to wield. Rather, the Senate demanded that issues of land reform be dealt with in the Senate which, as with the treason trials, the Assembly would never accept. This was similar to disputes taking place all the time throughout the city, with the control of Carthage as a whole at stake. Should either side emerge triumphant, they would have the majority of executive and legislative powers but until one did, the two governments would remain in competition and division.
Throughout the city, people deferred to one or the other governments, often divided by wealth and class with the richest in society deferring to the Byrsa Senate and the poor masses deferring instead to the Assembly. Thus, Carthage was divided, street by street, area by area into groups of people supporting either the Assembly or the Senate as the rightful government. The main strength of the Assembly lay in their numbers, there were far more poor or disenfranchised citizens throughout the city than rich aristocrats in the Senate, whilst the Senate appealed to those who were the richer or more influential in society and those who served to lose a lot of political influence in a democratic system as well as basing much of their argument upon the dangers of mob rule and the political traditions of Carthage. The July concession made by Hamilcar had had much wider consequences than many had expected, now the Assembly could no longer be denied as a rightful force in the city at large and the Senate lost its chance to actually put down the Assembly and restore their own undisputed control because, either way, the Assembly now dominated the law courts and so any matters of legislation, if they were to ever be effectively put into action, would have to be referred to the Assembly anyway. By making the concession in July, Hamilcar had effectively sealed the fate of the Assembly, even if it did not now rise to become the main or sole government in the city, it would certainly become a much more influential part of the city's government, one that could not be denied. But the disputes continued, raging throughout the remainder of 138 BCE and continuing on into 137 which was kick started with another huge political issue when Hamilcar's time came to an end and he (and Hannibal, the other suffet who was far less notable than his counterpart) stepped down as suffet. Once again, the divides between the Senate and the Assembly became apparent. From 139 to the end of 138, Hamilcar and Hannibal had been accepted by both the Assembly and the Senate as the rightful suffets, in turn a huge bonus for the Senate who had the backing of an uncontested leader. At the very least, the democrats had had a hand in choosing the suffets so they couldn't contest that they were rightful suffets which, at the very least had provided a stabilising influence as the Assembly and Senate, whilst fighting one another, accepted that the chosen suffets were chosen correctly. It had been Hamilcar's influence, for instance, that had allowed the June truce and he had pushed the Senate to accepting the July concession as well. The problem was one of sustaining control in a city riven by turmoil, the Assembly simply wouldn't accept the overall authority of the Senate and vice versa, thus Hamilcar and Hannibal, whilst accepted as suffets had their authority greatly weakened as the Assembly and Senate would rarely, if ever, accept any decisions passed through or by their rival.
Now came the trouble of electing two new suffets and the time of an uncontested suffet in charge of Carthage had now passed, since both the Senate and the Assembly had had a hand in choosing Hamilcar and Hannibal as suffets, there was now no question of having the two new suffets be entirely chosen by the Senate and when they took it upon themselves to elect two new suffets in early 137 BCE, the Assembly was quick to reject their choices and elected two new suffets of their own, both from amongst the Assembly itself. This was abhorrent to the aristocratic Senators, allowing the Assembly to vote upon new suffets would undermine a vital privilege of theirs, the right to choose the suffets for the upcoming year to the Assembly. Not to mention, the suffets voted into power by the Assembly did not and, if they took power, would not consult the Senate but would continue to consult the Assembly itself. This served only to further exacerbate the divide between the two governments, whilst a joint judicial system had been worked out with the July concession, all other aspects of government had become divided between the Assembly and the Senate with two sets of competing suffets vying for power in the city. This, in turn, led to a dangerous divide in the law courts, the lower law courts followed without exemption the laws set down, not by the Senate, but by the Assembly but within the Council of 104, the entire system became divided with the Senatorial members refusing to accept legal matters instituted by the Assembly and vice versa, thus creating a dangerous split down the middle of the council. At the height of the problems, this made the Council almost completely frozen by divisions and completely unable to continue important trials, threatening to force a division into two further competing courts, one under the auspices of the Assembly and the other under the Senate, thus completely unravelling the July concession and completing the divide between the two governments. In effect, the Council became the last thread tying the two together and, should it snap, the governments would become entirely separate entities vying for control of the city and her government, in short it would be grounds for another civil war. The chief element preventing this was the terms of the June truce, under which neither the Senate nor the Assembly had an armed force at its disposal and both feared the ability of the other to raise an army against themselves. Within the law courts, the incapacitated Council found itself with little option but to defer more and more cases to lower and subsidiary courts at risk of being overwhelmed by cases as they began to drag out more and more, riven by divisions and chaos. Thus, over the course of 137, the rights and powers of the lower Assembly-run courts continued to grow as more and more important cases were deferred to them, giving them an increasing grip over the workings of the legal system.
This created a stalemate for the two governments, the Senate couldn't risk trying to oust the Assembly from the legal system for, if they failed, they would have broken the terms of the July concession and opened themselves up to being attacked and prosecuted by the Assembly which would cripple their power. At the same time, neither could the Assembly use the law courts to defeat the Senate without risking the very terms upon which their authority had been built. should the July concession break down then the Senate would likely establish a separate court and reject the rights of the Assembly to try important cases once again, thus returning to the very same problems they had had before the concession had been made. In turn, the dispute became one of recognition, whichever government was more widely recognised as the main government of Carthage would be the more widely powerful government as it would have more of the city following its decisions, its government and its suffets. With neither side willing to concede government, wide recognition as the rightful government became the prime determinant of power within the system. To this end, the Assembly had a huge step up under the July concession, as the Council became more impotent and the power of the lower courts grew, the legal decisions undertaken by the Assembly became more and more influential throughout the city. Thus, by the end of 137 BCE, the Assembly had de facto control over the legislative organ of the state as the Senate's ability to actually enforce their legal decisions declined. It was a game of numbers, the poorer elements of society who would gain from a more powerful Assembly outnumbered the rich aristocratic Senators. Those who were not rich or had not the lineage to serve in the Senate, that being a large portion of the population, gained from a more powerful Assembly whilst those who could serve and sit within the Senate gained from a more powerful Senate but their numbers had been devastated by the civil wars and purges under the Barcids. Under this current lay those who would be disenfranchised from either government, they were not native Carthaginian or they were women or children and thus would lack the same political rights. This made appealing to them for either government a lot more difficult and their acceptance of a government tended to be based not so much on ideology but on de facto control. Thus the writing was on the wall for the Senatorial government in the Byrsa, their actual control over the city was in steady decline through 137, they couldn't impose their laws whilst the law courts remained unified but they couldn't risk dividing them, thus under this system the Assembly became ever more powerful and their suffets much more widely accepted than their counterparts in the Byrsa.
This created a dilemma for the Senate, to them there seemed only a few ways out of their predicament, either to reach an accord with the Assembly in which they would undoubtedly lose a lot of their influence within the politics of the city and quite possibly have to accept the Assembly's right to at least influence the choice of suffets or even accept the legal decisions reached by the suffets of the Assembly, thus in part legitimising them. Another option was to break the July concession, establish a separate Senate-controlled system of law courts and reject those of the Assembly before trying to impose their own legal system across the city and a third, but very much extreme option advocated for by some in the Senate was to rearm, use their wealth to hire mercenaries and retake the city by force. All they would, in theory, need was to get a single messenger out of the city to round up a few thousand mercenaries with whom they could destroy the Assembly and reassert their control. To many, this third option was unthinkable, even if they should arrest and massacre the Assembly, they risked provoking a civil war, turning the democratic movement violent as had happened in Rome and, if they lost, they would face a very similar fate. The second option also caused problems, whilst strictly possible, trying to reassert their control over a city that was used to following the legal precedents of the Assembly would be an uphill battle for the Senate. Once again, as well, if they completely denounced the courts of the Assembly and their legal decisions, they risked splitting government completely which would make any accommodation harder in the future and also risked entrenching the loyalties of various groups. For instance, if they split the government entirely then the populace would remain divided between the Senate and the Assembly but the complete division might make loyalties to one or the other ever more fierce with violence yet again being a potential outcome. Neither side wanted civil war, if just because neither side was assured of a victory and both faced potentially brutal trials and executions for treason should they lose, this wasn't a war that would be fought by pitched armies in a field, it would be brutal, urban warfare and it would kill thousands and devastate the homes and livelihoods of people on both sides of the dispute, neither the leaders of the Assembly nor the Senate had any desire to create that situation for themselves.
As debates raged in both the Senate and the Assembly as to what their next move should be, the control of the Assembly over the law courts became more and more entrenched and normalised as time went by, thus the chances for the Senate to retake legal control grew ever slimmer and their options became less and less open to them. Without a universally recognised pair of suffets in charge, dialogue proved hard to maintain and frequently broke down into chaos and arguments between the two governments and legal trials in the Council became disputes between the Assembly and Senate with a number of trials being cancelled or deferred to lower courts as the Council became impotent, fighting amongst themselves as to whose law codes should be followed. Finally, a culmination was reached, in part due to Hamilcar's continued powerful influence in the Senate, dialogue was reopened in November 137 and a second concession made between the two governments. Sensing the risk of the July concession being broken, the Assembly and the Senate set about to agree upon a singular law code that both would abide by, such that not only the Council but the lower courts would follow as well, under this new concession, any changes to the law codes would go through both the Assembly and the Senate although either could propose a change. The July and November concessions would set the tone for the legal system in the post-Barcid Carthage, it set about the decline of the suffets as a legislative authority and moved the power to enact and change laws primarily to the Senate and the Assembly, either of which could now propose laws but both of which were needed for laws to pass. Furthermore, it effectively halted the splitting of the two governments at the seams, uniting the law courts along a singular law code agreed by both the Senate and the Assembly, whilst neither set of suffets was universally accepted, now neither the Senate nor the Assembly could deny the influence of the other in making legislation, thus empowering both at the expense of the suffets.
With this, the divides could now begin to heal. The Assembly continued to control the lower courts and the appointment of lower magistrates would remain a province of the Assembly whilst the Council of 104, now mostly a legal body as had occurred by necessity after the July concession, remained evenly split between Assembly and Senatorial members. This left the right to executive powers as the main divide between the two governments, inherently both saw themselves as the rightful government of Carthage and believed it was their prerogative to govern the city. But the decline of the suffets and the November concession now showed an obvious way forward, if the suffets were no longer such an important figure in the politics of the day, then the executive government could be split between the Assembly and the Senate. This came with a plethora of its own problems, for one if the power was evenly split between the two bodies then it opened the way for new disputes and an impotent government, one in which neither body could overrule the other but both bodies would be split by ideological or simply practical differences. An accommodation had been made easier but it was still far off, especially as forming a new executive body remained unacceptable to the Senate who, outnumbered, would lose the majority of their influence should one be formed. Simply put, the empowerment of the Assembly and the Senate meant that only one of them could really rule, the other would have to take a subsidiary role. This problem wouldn't be resolved until the next year with what had been known as, given the convention of the previous two agreements, the February concession. After another dispute in which both the Assembly and the Senate elected separate suffets, dialogue was once again opened between the two. The experience of the previous two negotiations had made this easier and both sides were now much more willing to make concessions, especially as both now held equal legislative power. Under the February concession, both the Assembly and the Senate agreed to recognise a single suffet from the other body. This, in turn, solved the problem of executive powers.
The July, November and February concessions, formed from 138 to 136 would become the basis of the new constitution of the post-Barcid Carthage. Not democratic in the same way as the Italian and Latin democracies, the Carthaginian government has been described as pseudo-democratic. The Assembly was a democratic body, open to any citizen whilst the Senate remained exclusive albeit more opened up after the Barcids and was entitled only to those of a certain wealth category and, to prevent abuses, one could only sit in either the Senate or the Assembly but not both. Thus, as the new constitution was formed over the next few years, the government became based around 3 separate entities. The Suffets were elected separately by the Assembly and the Senate and held the main executive powers in Carthage with the requirement that major decisions would go through both the Senate and the Assembly prior to being passed. Legislative powers were devolved, in turn, to the Assembly and the Senate, both of which could propose legislation but neither of which could enforce it without the other providing its consent. Within the law courts, the power largely resided within the Assembly who retained the power to appoint lower magistrates as well as 52 of the 104 Councillors in the highest Carthaginian court (the Council) whilst the appointment of various other magistrates (such as tax collectors) would also largely go to the Assembly. Meanwhile the appointment of many other higher positions such as generals as well as powers with foreign policy and diplomacy remained with the Senate as it had done before. Thus, in effect, most domestic affairs became the domain of the Assembly, from the majority of the law courts to other areas such as tax collection and even infrastructure developments whilst the Senate became the main power for foreign policy, electing generals and making the main decisions of diplomacy as well as largely retaining a powerful hand in state religion. In this environment, the power of the suffets would continue to decline. True, in name they held the executive authority in the city as per the February concession. But that proved more of a stop-gap, it couldn't reverse the slow decline of the suffets but it had allowed the Senate and the Assembly to invest a body acceptable to both with executive powers. In truth, both suffets had become more and more reliant on their respective bodies during the period of divided government as the tumultuous political environment had meant that their position had relied heavily upon continued support from their respective bodies. As such, it would have been unacceptable for the suffets to try to overrule either the Senate or the Assembly on any decision or to impose any real independent political will, thus their influence would continue to decline, their powers moving more and more to the two bodies of government.
This wasn't a constitution destined to last but it was a constitution that served its purpose. It reunified a divided city under one government and it provided the political base from which further changes would occur. Its biggest success was getting the people to accept and recognise a single government, even if it failed to entirely address the divisions between the Assembly and the Senate. The problems I mentioned before of two equally powerful bodies vying for dominance hadn't been solved, but it would no longer take place between two separate governments but between two organs of a unified government.
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Not yet, sorry, might need to wait a bit. Though I can't say I know for sure myself whether Carthage is going to go radical democracy or oligarchic yet, either way the current balance of power won't hold forever.
markus meecham
Banned
Out of the many tls over here, there are rome victorious ones, carthage victorious ones, but i don't think there's any that features an alliance between them, just saying
Chapter XIII: An Uneasy Truce
Chapter XIII: An Uneasy Truce
There was one problem. The problem was that the differences between the Assembly and the Senate had become almost irreconcilable. On one hand, the democratic Assembly saw the inherently oligarchic Senate as needing replaced by a much more radically democratic system whilst the Senate saw the Assembly as a threat to their authority that needed to be put down at risk of their power and authority being eroded by radical democracy. To this end, the revolution in Rome had proven a huge problem all across the Mediterranean. No longer could the democratic movement be seen as simply a nuisance political movement, one that could be compromised or worked with where necessary, now it was a potentially violent and devastating threat. To the oligarchic or monarchical systems of the 2nd Century BCE, the democratic movement had become a spectre to be feared and hated, crushed where possible whilst the people saw their potential power and influence more and more in terms of their ability to rise up. True, there had been concessions and compromises in a number of cities, but there had also been revolutions, rebellions and coups and the worry of these only served to create constant frictions between the two sides in cities from Italy to Iberia. This was heightened after 138, the rapid collapse of the Barcids meant that political regimes that had been propped up by the family now began to totter, their opponents became bolder and struck out more. Coalitions such as had been formed in Carthage rose and fell just as quickly. All across the Mediterranean, former governors of pro-Barcid dictators or even republics now became unsteady as the vital lifeline of wealth and military power vanished. The political unrest that followed would tear across the Mediterranean. Tyrants rose and fell, in many cities, desperate governors seized power through force, repressing dissent in a desperate attempt to ensure their own survival. In other cities, especially in Sicily, there were waves of democratic sentiment culminating in revolutions and coups all across the island in both Greek and Phoenician states (despite the later stereotype of the democratic Eastern half and the tyrannical Western half of Sicily). Demographically, the effect was dramatic. In Sicily, it is estimated that as many as 200,000 might have died in the ensuing civil wars and interstate conflicts from 138 through to 125 alone. Civil wars often gave way to larger inter-state wars as claimants or rival parties turned to other states for help against their enemies, thus escalating internal conflicts beyond their original bounds. Within a few years, the collapse of the Barcids would bring chaos to Southern Italy as the Italian Alliance collapsed in on itself, dragging the Latin League down with it.
Even as trade survived to some degree (notably along the Carthage-Pisa route), it collapsed elsewhere as pirates stalked the seas around Iberia and Africa and the political power to protect trade routes collapsed in civil war and dissent. The problem was that the Barcids hadn't left with agreements or treaties, their empire simply vanished over a few years and the governments that had relied upon them went with them. There was a power vacuum and nobody strong enough to even contemplate filling it, the inevitable result being violence. Back in Carthage, this only worsened tensions. There was no grand enemy to unite the two feuding political bodies nor the people as a whole whilst the coups and revolutions abroad meant that both the Assembly and the Senate saw one another as a major threat and potentially on the verge of attempting to slaughter one another. That Carthage avoided another civil war in the first few years after the Barcids is actually rather remarkable, neither body trusted the other and the government after 136 proved incredibly vulnerable to splits right down the middle that would undo the concessions upon which it was built. What ultimately saved it was, as I mentioned before, the effect the Barcids and the previous civil wars had had. The Senate had been hugely weakened by purges and political bloodshed, they had no choice but to accept the Assembly because they lacked the ability to enforce their will, they were too badly outnumbered by the politically engaged and active Assembly. What largely prevented them from becoming a footnote at this point was their continued control of the treasury (the position of treasurer was still appointed from the Senate) and their single suffet. Should they lose either, the Assembly would have the political power to effectively sideline the Senate and establish themselves as the dominant body in the state. As it was, the constitutional agreement protected the Senate from violence whilst they rebuilt their strength, it bought them time and ensured their control over foreign policy, religious functions and the treasury as well as one suffet. Meanwhile, the Assembly was legitimised in its now expanded position by the acceptance of the agreement by the Senate, who could now no longer refuse to grant any legitimacy to their rivals.
Thus, from 136 onward, Carthage was faced with two major problems. The first was that the government was at near constant risk of being split down the middle by any serious dispute between the two governing bodies of state. The second, simply, was that Carthage was bankrupt. She had been relying primarily upon whatever had been in the treasury and the money that had been seized from the Barcids three years previously but the civil war had put a severe drain on that money whilst the years of government division had effectively frozen the organs of state and of the economy, preventing any serious economic development or even activity as the city ground to a halt in the midst of serious political divisions. Similarly, there had been no political ability to provide any form of foreign policy to set up trade deals or rebuild the shattered economy of the state, a situation only worsened by the fact that the casualties amongst the populace from the civil war which had meant the deaths of numerous skilled workers. With virtually no money left in her treasuries, the administration and state of Carthage became effectively unworkable. Ships rotted in the harbour, devoid of funds to keep them maintained, the city guard was made up of conscripted locals, often organised into groups based on local districts and prone to corruption and abuses whilst armed with improved or salvaged weapons, temple ceremonies were reduced in scale and large swathes of devastated city were left unattended. Perhaps more dangerously still, the payment of magistrates and the working of courts also proved expensive and many of the offices of state found their areas of jurisdiction effectively unworkable without the funds to keep them going. In short, the economy lay devastated and trade had slowed to a crawl by the time the government was reunified. This was a situation heightened by the fact that the treasury became one of the first battlegrounds in the new political divide. The problem was that many of the responsibilities of the two bodies were far from exactly defined under the new constitution, in theory the Assembly dealt with domestic affairs and the Senate with foreign affairs but in practice this was a muddy area. Questions very quickly arose, was the treasury and economy a domestic or foreign affair given that it was affected by both and could impact both areas. Similarly, was the money that came in to the treasury better suited for domestic or foreign affairs? On one hand the Senate advocated for the money to be spent improving their navy (of which they held a rump Barcid fleet) in order to establish a stronger position in the western Mediterranean whilst the Assembly believed it was much better used to rebuild the areas of the city that had been devastated during the war. What about religion? In name, that was an area of responsibility for the Senate but surely that was a domestic and not a foreign affair and should then come under the jurisdiction of the Assembly. Not to mention, the still very contentious issue of who should deal with land redistribution. Questions such as these were what endangered the political union and they very quickly began to spiral out of control.
That said, there were some key developments would take place over the next few years. Where the Assembly and the Senate could work with relatively little controversy, they worked generally effectively. Domestically, the Assembly's first job was to turn to the districts of the city. Administration and, especially, taxation was difficult as many of the old districts had been destroyed and new, ad hoc districts had risen in their place, constructed by the populace themselves rather than on any definitive plan. One historian writes:
This system proved itself a mixed success. On one hand, the local knowledge and ties of the magistrates meant that they were much better able to challenge local crime but they proved difficult for the Assembly to control. Despite there being no outward rebellions from the Magistrates, they were prone to corruption and what amounted in many cases to mob justice with one famous case of a nobleman thought to have raped a woman being dismembered in the street. But without the funds to do any better, there were no moves taken to challenge this corruption (especially as theoretically anyone eligible could sit with the Assembly and would take actions against their own punishment). Another weakness in the system was that it effectively threatened to create two private armies, one held by the Senate and one by the Assembly. In a period in which aristocratic-democratic relations were strained to put it mildly, this could be especially dangerous, allowing an angry populace access to weapons and putting them in positions of authority, a situation that could easily lead to bloodshed, violence and a quick escalation to civil war.
Now the Assembly turned its attention outside the city itself. The question of who should decide land redistribution had yet to be adequately resolved and it was proving especially contentious, especially as the un-worked land became more and more overgrown as the years passed with nobody having taken any legal ownership of it. At the same time, a process had been taking place of people simply leaving the city and farming the land without any legal ownership, nor oversight or taxation and, as such, a number of unofficial, informal farming estates had sprung up outside the city and their numbers continued to grow. However, the Senate continued to refuse to acknowledge the legality of any of these new farms nor to accept the Assembly's role in distributing the land seized from the Barcids. Under other circumstances, the state itself might have hired people to administer the land until the issue could be resolved but, given the lack of money, the lands that hadn't been taken simply fell into disrepair. This was proving a huge problem for the economy of the city, until the Senate agreed to land redistribution the lands couldn't be taxed or administered. Part pf the problem was that it wasn't just the landless poor guilty of taking unclaimed land, many in the Senate had done the same and acknowledging the Assembly's jurisdiction would have either led to their lands being cut back to what they nominally were or simply higher taxation as the state revalued their lands. Things came to a head in early 133 BCE. One February night, the Assembly met in secret and held a vote to draw up a distribution plan of the lands outside the city. Passing by a huge margin, the Assembly went to work in secret, drawing up dozens of new estates for many of the landless poor and their families and drawing up agreements to acknowledge the ownership of the lands of those who had moved out the city on the condition they accept their lands being evaluated, taxed and drawn into the administration of the state. Before dawn a few days later, hundreds of men armed with clubs and improvised weapons spread out amongst the outlying farms and countryside occupying farms and homesteads. As the Senate awoke, those not caught in the occupation, they found the Assembly's control a fait accompli, the countryside was occupied and they lacked the power to actually contest that occupation. With many of them having families now held in custody by the Assembly, an agreement was quickly reached between them. Under its terms, the Assembly was given jurisdiction to administer, tax and distribute farmlands outside the city with the Senate agreeing, once again and in writing, that any property disputes would come before magistrates in the lower courts, those controlled by the Assembly.
Over the next few months, the difference was astonishing. Any land not formally recognised in documents preceding Barcid rule (taken at about 180 BCE) was seized by the state and redistributed with dozens of new estates and farms being created from 133 through to 132. Meanwhile, many informal tenants were confirmed in their positions by the Assembly on the condition that they, as mentioned, accept taxation and administration (tax could be paid either in kind or in money). The right to tax land and to value land outside the city of Carthage would soon become a cornerstone of the Assembly's power within the city, it kept a check on the power of individual Senators who were now unable to buy up land at the same rate as they had before and, faced with the generally unfavourable Assembly-run courts, usually unable to push land claims in court. Crucially, it also provided the Assembly with a strong supporter base beyond the city itself as well as a richer, land-owning support base that could, if necessary, form a military or economic backbone for the Assembly against the Senate.
That said, the Senate had by no means been resting. Both in Carthaginian politics and abroad, the Senate had been pursuing a policy of consolidation and expansion. As elsewhere, a major problem facing Carthage in the early 130s was that much of her land had been stripped away by neighbouring states. In particular, areas in the South and East had often come under the jurisdiction of the former magistrates (now often turned kings) of cities such as Utica or come under the rule of the other African kingdoms which had been steadily moving on and into formerly Carthaginian land. This was particularly prominent as much of the land had been previously worked by Berber workmen, many of whom had left Carthage during or after the civil war with many setting up Berber communities elsewhere in the countryside, either under their own rulers or under the nominal rule of other African kings. Down South, the formerly Carthaginian territory of Libya had largely come under the sway of either Phoenician settlements or of similar communities and small kingdoms, many of which had, in turn, come under the influence of the powerful Garamantian kingdom in the region. Elsewhere, many of the former trade agreements signed under the Barcids were repudiated by various Mediterranean states and many of their former trade partners were beginning to collapse, such as the Italian Alliance. As such, Carthage had lost two significant sources of revenue, both taxable land and trade income from abroad. Politically, the Senate advocated for a strengthening of their military power (primarily hiring mercenaries but also possibly raising a citizen force), so as to seize back the countryside and put down the upstart kings in the formerly Carthaginian cities of North Africa, possibly with a long-term move in to Libya. There's no doubt that this was just as much political as it was economic or to do with foreign policy, many of the rich senators had formerly held land in regions such as Libya or even in the outskirts of Carthage that was now lost to them, most of the Berber communities were made up of former workers on their estates and those self-styled 'Kings' were to them jumped up foreigners who needed putting down. Similarly, should they expand the land available to Carthage, it would give excuses to send out colonisation parties of primarily lower class Assembly-supporting citizens, thus weakening the population disparity in politics and strengthening their own hand, especially as more land for themselves would increase their own economic and military base. Yet, such a move would in theory bring more taxable land under Carthaginian rule and allow them to expand their trade networks. In particular, a rebuilt army would allow them to reestablish Carthaginian rule in North-Africa and a strong navy, especially as they held the, now rotting, rump of the Barcid fleet, would allow them to intervene in Sicilian and Italian affairs to their own benefit. In particular, the shock of the fall of the Barcids seemed to provide an ideal opportunity for Carthage to carve out a new place in the Mediterranean and a strong military would be crucial to protecting her against ambitious rivals doing the same.
Almost immediately, the proposals for a rebuilt army and navy became infeasible. The Assembly categorically refused to even discuss the proposals and when the Senate attempted to invoke their powers over foreign policy to go ahead without them, the Assembly threatened to storm the harbour and prevent ships from being built. Carthage didn't even have the money for a serious rise in the military forces available to her, especially not a navy but even if she did, the Assembly had two huge problems with this proposal. First and foremost, there was the obvious argument that money was needed much more in rebuilding Carthage and the running of the state than building up a military force and, secondly, the worries that the Senate would simply bring the military under their own control, using it to take control of the city and sideline the Assembly. As such, any strengthened military became an abhorrent idea to the Assembly who now began to move ahead with a greater demand, not only that the plans for a naval expansion be scrapped but that the existing ships be either sold or destroyed, claiming they were an unnecessary drain on Carthage's resources. Fearing that the Assembly might move to destroy the ships themselves should action not be taken, the Senate moved first. One night in early 134 BCE, men boarded the ships and spirited them away to a harbour just down the coast where they were safely stowed and where work might commence to repair the ships in secret. The debate, however, had opened up a huge crack in the centre of the state. For one, it had exposed the rampant distrust between the two bodies of government. This was already proving itself a problem as the disputes over the system of guards became more heated, neither side trusting the other entirely to run the system of guards, especially in important areas. But for another, it had brought to light the important question of funds. In 133 BCE, the Senate signed a commercial treaty with Pisa, officially establishing the Carthage-Pisa trade route that would remain right up until the fall of Pisa. Merchants from both cities were granted reduced taxes and trade duties in one another with both Carthage and Pisa promising to use their 'joint naval power' to protect commercial interests in the Mediterranean. There was an obvious problem. On paper, Carthage had no naval power, they had the remainder of the Barcid fleet (now reduced to about 40 ships, many of which were barely seaworthy) but they couldn't go about making serious repairs of displays of naval power whilst the Assembly continued to oppose any naval expansion.
But here the problem of funds came into its own. With the return of taxable land due to the Assembly's land reform and trade deals signed by the Senate (more were signed with Sicilian and Sardinian states between 133 and 127 BCE), funds began to trickle back into Carthage's coffers from 126 BCE onward as their income slowly but steadily picked up. Corruption and poverty remained rampant but Carthage now at last had some funds to do something about it. Here the naval debate picked up once again. Now that Carthage had funds coming back into her coffers, the Senate once again began advocating for an expansion to the Carthaginian navy and a push to intervene in the civil and interstate wars in Sicily, also claiming that the Pisan treaty bound them to strengthen their navy to help fight piracy and defend their commercial interests. The Assembly refused adamantly, instead they claimed the Senate was neglecting its religious duties by advocating for a larger navy when a number of shrines remained damaged or in ruins, going on to defend that vast areas of the city needed rebuilt and improved. But the Senate had learnt from its failures in both the guard debate and the land reform affair. With their fortunes once again growing with the new commercial opportunities opened up from 133 BCE, the Senate had set up trade links to much of Pisa's trade network including Rome and, importantly, Corsica and Sardinia. Pisa and Carthage had both gained immensely from this treaty, Carthaginian goods (some of which had become popular amongst some Italian peoples) and agricultural products (important in Italy given the population issues) now entered almost solely through Pisa who made a small fortune exporting them to the rest of the Etruscan League and to the Italian and Po peoples as well as the Latin League and Italian Alliance. In return Carthage became a similar link between Pisa and Africa, whilst also gaining access to vital goods from Italy, Sardinia and Corsica. Many Senators had also made a fortune off exporting agricultural products to Sicily where they were in high demand due to the wars ravaging the island. In turn, the Senate itself had moved undercover of the Pisan treaty, importing timber and metal and repairing the ships available to them, often with the help of expert and often formerly Barcid naval officers. Finally, in early 125 BCE, the Senate made their move as a fresh fleet of now 60 Senatorial ships sailed into the Carthaginian harbour. Whilst there were no mercenaries, merely a light crew on board the ships, the arrival of 60 ships had changed the entire game.
From 133 through to 126, the Senate had seemed almost under siege. Save for the treasury, the harbour and the Byrsa, the rest of the city was now patrolled by Assembly-appointed guards, much of the land held by the Senatorial class had been forcibly redistributed and now the Assembly had built a strong economic and military power base that could be used against them. The stage seemed to have been set for the Assembly moving to sideline the Senate and seize power for themselves. Now, with 60 ships at their command, the Senate had reinforced its position immeasurably. Not only was the harbour itself greatly reinforced and fortified by the ships but they provided an effective access for the Senate to foreign mercenaries and displayed for all to see that their economic and military strength had been restored, hinting that with it would come a rejuvenated political strength. In effect, it was a statement that the Senate was putting itself back in the game. The Assembly was outraged. In theory, there was nothing stopping the Senate from doing this, they held authority for foreign policy and the treasury as well, most of the money had been private to boot. But, to the Assembly this conveyed a dangerous and seriously threatening use of military force in Carthaginian politics, not to mention it represented a serious infringement on their authority as the Senate seemed to completely disregard the rights of the Assembly in pursuing their own agenda for the state. Fearing that the use of military force was imminent, the Assembly reacted just as quickly. Within only a week of the arrival of the Senatorial fleet, the Assembly established what was termed a 'temporary domestic treasury', diverting taxation funds from the main treasury to this new, secondary treasury under their own control. Almost immediately, the Assembly began importing arms from local African kingdoms and other Phoenician cities such as Utica, under the guise of improving the equipment of the guards throughout the city and soon distributed them to the various guard magistrates throughout the city. In the districts closest to the harbour and the Byrsa, new guard magistrates were appointed.
For a second time, the city had been divided. In theory, the government remained united, the suffets remained in contact and the Assembly and Senate in name continued contact and discussion, but it was a city now de facto split between the Senate-controlled Byrsa, harbour and treasury and the rest of the city held by the Assembly. At these tension-filled heights, rumours began to spread that the Senate had been canvassing for mercenary support abroad in preparation for an armed seizure of the city, particularly in Pisa and Sicily where the democratic movement was especially unpopular in many states. Distrust was rampant between the Assembly and Senate and very quickly began to boil over, arguments and discussions in the Assembly accused the Senate of moving against them whilst the Senate, alarmed by the militaristic moves made by the Assembly began to descend into its own internal debates and disputes. Gradually, distrust began to prevail. The division and opposition from before hadn't been healed, rather the Assembly and Senate had been brought under one system and gradually opposed to one another within it. The events of 125 had proven that that the constitution had become unworkable, one body either had to be terminally weakened or actually removed before the state could ever hope to move on, there was simply too much distrust and dissent. Finally, the political chaos reached its second height in November 125 when the Assembly voted to end communication with the Senate until such a time at which the fleet were disbanded. In turn, the Senate retorted by demanding that the Assembly stand down a number of guards divisions throughout the city and hand over a series of upper class districts to the Senatorial guards. Neither the Assembly nor the Senate would back down on either, to do so would have been to significantly weaken their hand and, as the time passed on into 124 BCE, the city reached a second stalemate.
The difference this time was that the city was now nominally unified, it just had a government that was split into two halves refusing to deal with one another. At first, links continued in the forms of the suffets but this ended after February 124 BCE and the government fell silent. The Senate had to move quickly, if the standoff continued long enough then they would simply be besieged into submission, unable to reliably communicate between the Byrsa, the harbour and the treasury nor to reliably bring customs dues from the harbour over to the treasury. If mercenaries were indeed coming, then they needed to arrive quickly to take the Assembly off guard as much as was possible. The Senate would hold the advantage of better trained soldiers and the backing of the navy, allowing greater mobility and ensuring control of the harbour. If they moved quickly, then they could fight through and capture the Forum, effectively taking control of the economic and political heart of the city and relieving the Byrsa. But the Senate couldn't stay there, nor could they risk keeping the treasury down in the forum where it had been. In January 124 BCE, the Senate voted to move its seat of government temporarily to the harbour as well as its treasury. The procession was slow moving, the Senators went ahead, many on horses and surrounded by guards, followed in the back by dozens of wagons loaded with gold and silver from the treasury, recently emptied of both guards and its funds. They were surrounded on every side, in the cool winter air stood thousands of people, staring and watching as the Senators and their families evacuated the Byrsa. On every side stood guards, dozens of them, well over 50 at one point. As the escort trailed its way down the city, the crowds continued to grow, their contempt palpable as the vast train passed by on its way down to the harbour.
As the procession moved, so too did the Assembly. News had reached them days before that the Senate was planning to move and at dawn that day they had stationed hundreds of guards in the forum and near to the Byrsa so that, as the Senate left, the Assembly moved in. Nominally, they reunited the two treasuries, moving their funds back into the old treasury in the forum and occupying the Byrsa. By midday, the main holdouts of the Senate were under Assembly occupation and as the sun fell into evening, the Assembly held huge religious rites up on the Byrsa. The procession itself had moved with relatively little actual opposition, there had been few acts of violence or assault but up on the Byrsa things were different. As night fell, the people turned to looting, sacking the empty houses, attacking the few aristocrats who had refused to leave and starting a number of fires, one of which soon blazed out of control and flattened much of the Byrsa. Carthage was days away from a potential civil war and everyone knew it. The city had become riven, not just by political differences but by an actual palpable sense of hatred. Many of those living in the new districts resented the apathy and political detachment of the aristocrats whilst they lived in cramped, starved conditions. The Assembly seemed, in comparison, much more representative and, as a democratic body, had played a significant role in helping alleviate the conditions of those involved despite its sometimes penchant for corruption and mob rule. Meanwhile, the Senate had grown to fear the Assembly and as they had made concessions, they had seen their hand weaken more and more which only made them fear the democrats ever more.
Finally, the straw that broke the camel's back. It was early on a cold April morning, three months after the move to the harbour, when a young guard came rushing into his father's house. We can imagine the cries of 'mercenaries' that must have escaped his lips, the stories of thousands of Italians marching down from the ships in the dead of night, the images he conveyed of Senators and commanders and secret meetings in the Senatorial harbour government. His father, a man known to posterity as Abimilki rushed out the house, supposedly calling for 'anyone' to give him a horse that he might warn the Assembly. The story goes that for hours he rode back and forth through the city, going to each house in person and spreading the message on, telling them to tell anyone they could, to rouse the Assembly and call a war meeting. Whatever the truth, an emergency meeting of the Assembly was indeed called that April morning and one Abimilki is recorded as having spoken at it, so the story is one we have no reason to doubt as such. The mercenaries numbered between 8-10,000, a mixture of Italian, Sicilian and Sardinian mercenaries, likely hired out through contacts in Pisa, possibly in return for favourable trade agreements should they take the city. One way or another, Carthage was now on track for a third devastating civil war.
There was one problem. The problem was that the differences between the Assembly and the Senate had become almost irreconcilable. On one hand, the democratic Assembly saw the inherently oligarchic Senate as needing replaced by a much more radically democratic system whilst the Senate saw the Assembly as a threat to their authority that needed to be put down at risk of their power and authority being eroded by radical democracy. To this end, the revolution in Rome had proven a huge problem all across the Mediterranean. No longer could the democratic movement be seen as simply a nuisance political movement, one that could be compromised or worked with where necessary, now it was a potentially violent and devastating threat. To the oligarchic or monarchical systems of the 2nd Century BCE, the democratic movement had become a spectre to be feared and hated, crushed where possible whilst the people saw their potential power and influence more and more in terms of their ability to rise up. True, there had been concessions and compromises in a number of cities, but there had also been revolutions, rebellions and coups and the worry of these only served to create constant frictions between the two sides in cities from Italy to Iberia. This was heightened after 138, the rapid collapse of the Barcids meant that political regimes that had been propped up by the family now began to totter, their opponents became bolder and struck out more. Coalitions such as had been formed in Carthage rose and fell just as quickly. All across the Mediterranean, former governors of pro-Barcid dictators or even republics now became unsteady as the vital lifeline of wealth and military power vanished. The political unrest that followed would tear across the Mediterranean. Tyrants rose and fell, in many cities, desperate governors seized power through force, repressing dissent in a desperate attempt to ensure their own survival. In other cities, especially in Sicily, there were waves of democratic sentiment culminating in revolutions and coups all across the island in both Greek and Phoenician states (despite the later stereotype of the democratic Eastern half and the tyrannical Western half of Sicily). Demographically, the effect was dramatic. In Sicily, it is estimated that as many as 200,000 might have died in the ensuing civil wars and interstate conflicts from 138 through to 125 alone. Civil wars often gave way to larger inter-state wars as claimants or rival parties turned to other states for help against their enemies, thus escalating internal conflicts beyond their original bounds. Within a few years, the collapse of the Barcids would bring chaos to Southern Italy as the Italian Alliance collapsed in on itself, dragging the Latin League down with it.
Even as trade survived to some degree (notably along the Carthage-Pisa route), it collapsed elsewhere as pirates stalked the seas around Iberia and Africa and the political power to protect trade routes collapsed in civil war and dissent. The problem was that the Barcids hadn't left with agreements or treaties, their empire simply vanished over a few years and the governments that had relied upon them went with them. There was a power vacuum and nobody strong enough to even contemplate filling it, the inevitable result being violence. Back in Carthage, this only worsened tensions. There was no grand enemy to unite the two feuding political bodies nor the people as a whole whilst the coups and revolutions abroad meant that both the Assembly and the Senate saw one another as a major threat and potentially on the verge of attempting to slaughter one another. That Carthage avoided another civil war in the first few years after the Barcids is actually rather remarkable, neither body trusted the other and the government after 136 proved incredibly vulnerable to splits right down the middle that would undo the concessions upon which it was built. What ultimately saved it was, as I mentioned before, the effect the Barcids and the previous civil wars had had. The Senate had been hugely weakened by purges and political bloodshed, they had no choice but to accept the Assembly because they lacked the ability to enforce their will, they were too badly outnumbered by the politically engaged and active Assembly. What largely prevented them from becoming a footnote at this point was their continued control of the treasury (the position of treasurer was still appointed from the Senate) and their single suffet. Should they lose either, the Assembly would have the political power to effectively sideline the Senate and establish themselves as the dominant body in the state. As it was, the constitutional agreement protected the Senate from violence whilst they rebuilt their strength, it bought them time and ensured their control over foreign policy, religious functions and the treasury as well as one suffet. Meanwhile, the Assembly was legitimised in its now expanded position by the acceptance of the agreement by the Senate, who could now no longer refuse to grant any legitimacy to their rivals.
Thus, from 136 onward, Carthage was faced with two major problems. The first was that the government was at near constant risk of being split down the middle by any serious dispute between the two governing bodies of state. The second, simply, was that Carthage was bankrupt. She had been relying primarily upon whatever had been in the treasury and the money that had been seized from the Barcids three years previously but the civil war had put a severe drain on that money whilst the years of government division had effectively frozen the organs of state and of the economy, preventing any serious economic development or even activity as the city ground to a halt in the midst of serious political divisions. Similarly, there had been no political ability to provide any form of foreign policy to set up trade deals or rebuild the shattered economy of the state, a situation only worsened by the fact that the casualties amongst the populace from the civil war which had meant the deaths of numerous skilled workers. With virtually no money left in her treasuries, the administration and state of Carthage became effectively unworkable. Ships rotted in the harbour, devoid of funds to keep them maintained, the city guard was made up of conscripted locals, often organised into groups based on local districts and prone to corruption and abuses whilst armed with improved or salvaged weapons, temple ceremonies were reduced in scale and large swathes of devastated city were left unattended. Perhaps more dangerously still, the payment of magistrates and the working of courts also proved expensive and many of the offices of state found their areas of jurisdiction effectively unworkable without the funds to keep them going. In short, the economy lay devastated and trade had slowed to a crawl by the time the government was reunified. This was a situation heightened by the fact that the treasury became one of the first battlegrounds in the new political divide. The problem was that many of the responsibilities of the two bodies were far from exactly defined under the new constitution, in theory the Assembly dealt with domestic affairs and the Senate with foreign affairs but in practice this was a muddy area. Questions very quickly arose, was the treasury and economy a domestic or foreign affair given that it was affected by both and could impact both areas. Similarly, was the money that came in to the treasury better suited for domestic or foreign affairs? On one hand the Senate advocated for the money to be spent improving their navy (of which they held a rump Barcid fleet) in order to establish a stronger position in the western Mediterranean whilst the Assembly believed it was much better used to rebuild the areas of the city that had been devastated during the war. What about religion? In name, that was an area of responsibility for the Senate but surely that was a domestic and not a foreign affair and should then come under the jurisdiction of the Assembly. Not to mention, the still very contentious issue of who should deal with land redistribution. Questions such as these were what endangered the political union and they very quickly began to spiral out of control.
That said, there were some key developments would take place over the next few years. Where the Assembly and the Senate could work with relatively little controversy, they worked generally effectively. Domestically, the Assembly's first job was to turn to the districts of the city. Administration and, especially, taxation was difficult as many of the old districts had been destroyed and new, ad hoc districts had risen in their place, constructed by the populace themselves rather than on any definitive plan. One historian writes:
'Much of the city had been made into slums, people were crammed in together in huge numbers, living in houses made of anything they could find. Some were even said to be recycled from rotting ships'
The danger was evident and from 139 through to 130 there were a number of small but significant outbreaks of disease and plague within the slums, the most notable coming only a year after the constitutional settlement and killing an estimated 8-10,000 people. The cramped, dangerous conditions only further turned the people against the aristocracy who held the relatively untouched Byrsa to themselves and had been more able to use personal fortunes to rebuild their own districts. At the same time, the outbreaks of plague hit the populace ever harder, putting yet further strain on the bankrupt economy of Carthage. Without the money to rebuild the slums, nor to establish any proper policing, the Assembly set about reforming the administration of the city. The districts were redrawn, at least in the poorer regions, and the new 'districts' that had sprung up were effectively legitimised and adopted into the workings of the Assembly. Starting in 134, the Assembly took upon itself to appoint district magistrates annually who would set about 'recruiting' teams of guards and equipping them in whatever ways possible to police their districts, larger districts or those with more people would often have two or three of such magistrates appointed. At first, this was only accepted by the Senate in the poorer reaches of the city. Fearing the influence it might give to the Assembly should they allow the richest areas, particularly the Byrsa, to be patrolled by guards under the leadership of a magistrate appointed by the Assembly, they refused to comply, instead insisting that they must appoint their own magistrates for a list of districts, the Byrsa included. Things almost turned to violence in November 134 BCE when the Senate refused to accept the Assembly-appointed magistrates for these regions (especially the Byrsa as none in the Assembly came from the Byrsa, all those living there being wealthy enough for the Senate, and as such had appointed an outsider) and appointed a series of their own, leading to stand-offs and conflicts throughout much of the city. A concession came only a few days later, however, when the Assembly agreed to retract its candidate for the Byrsa and allow the Senate to appoint and arm their own guards for the district on the condition that they relent a series of other districts throughout the city. Shortly afterwards, an agreement was reached. In return for handing back control of the rest of the city itself, the Senate was given the right to appoint its own magistrates and guards to important regions considered their jurisdiction. They already held the Byrsa but were now given control of the harbour and the treasury itself (although the rest of the forum remained in the hands of the Assembly). As such, the city now became divided between two sets of armed guards, the Senatorial guards in the Byrsa, treasury and harbour and the Assembly guards elsewhere.
This system proved itself a mixed success. On one hand, the local knowledge and ties of the magistrates meant that they were much better able to challenge local crime but they proved difficult for the Assembly to control. Despite there being no outward rebellions from the Magistrates, they were prone to corruption and what amounted in many cases to mob justice with one famous case of a nobleman thought to have raped a woman being dismembered in the street. But without the funds to do any better, there were no moves taken to challenge this corruption (especially as theoretically anyone eligible could sit with the Assembly and would take actions against their own punishment). Another weakness in the system was that it effectively threatened to create two private armies, one held by the Senate and one by the Assembly. In a period in which aristocratic-democratic relations were strained to put it mildly, this could be especially dangerous, allowing an angry populace access to weapons and putting them in positions of authority, a situation that could easily lead to bloodshed, violence and a quick escalation to civil war.
Now the Assembly turned its attention outside the city itself. The question of who should decide land redistribution had yet to be adequately resolved and it was proving especially contentious, especially as the un-worked land became more and more overgrown as the years passed with nobody having taken any legal ownership of it. At the same time, a process had been taking place of people simply leaving the city and farming the land without any legal ownership, nor oversight or taxation and, as such, a number of unofficial, informal farming estates had sprung up outside the city and their numbers continued to grow. However, the Senate continued to refuse to acknowledge the legality of any of these new farms nor to accept the Assembly's role in distributing the land seized from the Barcids. Under other circumstances, the state itself might have hired people to administer the land until the issue could be resolved but, given the lack of money, the lands that hadn't been taken simply fell into disrepair. This was proving a huge problem for the economy of the city, until the Senate agreed to land redistribution the lands couldn't be taxed or administered. Part pf the problem was that it wasn't just the landless poor guilty of taking unclaimed land, many in the Senate had done the same and acknowledging the Assembly's jurisdiction would have either led to their lands being cut back to what they nominally were or simply higher taxation as the state revalued their lands. Things came to a head in early 133 BCE. One February night, the Assembly met in secret and held a vote to draw up a distribution plan of the lands outside the city. Passing by a huge margin, the Assembly went to work in secret, drawing up dozens of new estates for many of the landless poor and their families and drawing up agreements to acknowledge the ownership of the lands of those who had moved out the city on the condition they accept their lands being evaluated, taxed and drawn into the administration of the state. Before dawn a few days later, hundreds of men armed with clubs and improvised weapons spread out amongst the outlying farms and countryside occupying farms and homesteads. As the Senate awoke, those not caught in the occupation, they found the Assembly's control a fait accompli, the countryside was occupied and they lacked the power to actually contest that occupation. With many of them having families now held in custody by the Assembly, an agreement was quickly reached between them. Under its terms, the Assembly was given jurisdiction to administer, tax and distribute farmlands outside the city with the Senate agreeing, once again and in writing, that any property disputes would come before magistrates in the lower courts, those controlled by the Assembly.
Over the next few months, the difference was astonishing. Any land not formally recognised in documents preceding Barcid rule (taken at about 180 BCE) was seized by the state and redistributed with dozens of new estates and farms being created from 133 through to 132. Meanwhile, many informal tenants were confirmed in their positions by the Assembly on the condition that they, as mentioned, accept taxation and administration (tax could be paid either in kind or in money). The right to tax land and to value land outside the city of Carthage would soon become a cornerstone of the Assembly's power within the city, it kept a check on the power of individual Senators who were now unable to buy up land at the same rate as they had before and, faced with the generally unfavourable Assembly-run courts, usually unable to push land claims in court. Crucially, it also provided the Assembly with a strong supporter base beyond the city itself as well as a richer, land-owning support base that could, if necessary, form a military or economic backbone for the Assembly against the Senate.
That said, the Senate had by no means been resting. Both in Carthaginian politics and abroad, the Senate had been pursuing a policy of consolidation and expansion. As elsewhere, a major problem facing Carthage in the early 130s was that much of her land had been stripped away by neighbouring states. In particular, areas in the South and East had often come under the jurisdiction of the former magistrates (now often turned kings) of cities such as Utica or come under the rule of the other African kingdoms which had been steadily moving on and into formerly Carthaginian land. This was particularly prominent as much of the land had been previously worked by Berber workmen, many of whom had left Carthage during or after the civil war with many setting up Berber communities elsewhere in the countryside, either under their own rulers or under the nominal rule of other African kings. Down South, the formerly Carthaginian territory of Libya had largely come under the sway of either Phoenician settlements or of similar communities and small kingdoms, many of which had, in turn, come under the influence of the powerful Garamantian kingdom in the region. Elsewhere, many of the former trade agreements signed under the Barcids were repudiated by various Mediterranean states and many of their former trade partners were beginning to collapse, such as the Italian Alliance. As such, Carthage had lost two significant sources of revenue, both taxable land and trade income from abroad. Politically, the Senate advocated for a strengthening of their military power (primarily hiring mercenaries but also possibly raising a citizen force), so as to seize back the countryside and put down the upstart kings in the formerly Carthaginian cities of North Africa, possibly with a long-term move in to Libya. There's no doubt that this was just as much political as it was economic or to do with foreign policy, many of the rich senators had formerly held land in regions such as Libya or even in the outskirts of Carthage that was now lost to them, most of the Berber communities were made up of former workers on their estates and those self-styled 'Kings' were to them jumped up foreigners who needed putting down. Similarly, should they expand the land available to Carthage, it would give excuses to send out colonisation parties of primarily lower class Assembly-supporting citizens, thus weakening the population disparity in politics and strengthening their own hand, especially as more land for themselves would increase their own economic and military base. Yet, such a move would in theory bring more taxable land under Carthaginian rule and allow them to expand their trade networks. In particular, a rebuilt army would allow them to reestablish Carthaginian rule in North-Africa and a strong navy, especially as they held the, now rotting, rump of the Barcid fleet, would allow them to intervene in Sicilian and Italian affairs to their own benefit. In particular, the shock of the fall of the Barcids seemed to provide an ideal opportunity for Carthage to carve out a new place in the Mediterranean and a strong military would be crucial to protecting her against ambitious rivals doing the same.
Almost immediately, the proposals for a rebuilt army and navy became infeasible. The Assembly categorically refused to even discuss the proposals and when the Senate attempted to invoke their powers over foreign policy to go ahead without them, the Assembly threatened to storm the harbour and prevent ships from being built. Carthage didn't even have the money for a serious rise in the military forces available to her, especially not a navy but even if she did, the Assembly had two huge problems with this proposal. First and foremost, there was the obvious argument that money was needed much more in rebuilding Carthage and the running of the state than building up a military force and, secondly, the worries that the Senate would simply bring the military under their own control, using it to take control of the city and sideline the Assembly. As such, any strengthened military became an abhorrent idea to the Assembly who now began to move ahead with a greater demand, not only that the plans for a naval expansion be scrapped but that the existing ships be either sold or destroyed, claiming they were an unnecessary drain on Carthage's resources. Fearing that the Assembly might move to destroy the ships themselves should action not be taken, the Senate moved first. One night in early 134 BCE, men boarded the ships and spirited them away to a harbour just down the coast where they were safely stowed and where work might commence to repair the ships in secret. The debate, however, had opened up a huge crack in the centre of the state. For one, it had exposed the rampant distrust between the two bodies of government. This was already proving itself a problem as the disputes over the system of guards became more heated, neither side trusting the other entirely to run the system of guards, especially in important areas. But for another, it had brought to light the important question of funds. In 133 BCE, the Senate signed a commercial treaty with Pisa, officially establishing the Carthage-Pisa trade route that would remain right up until the fall of Pisa. Merchants from both cities were granted reduced taxes and trade duties in one another with both Carthage and Pisa promising to use their 'joint naval power' to protect commercial interests in the Mediterranean. There was an obvious problem. On paper, Carthage had no naval power, they had the remainder of the Barcid fleet (now reduced to about 40 ships, many of which were barely seaworthy) but they couldn't go about making serious repairs of displays of naval power whilst the Assembly continued to oppose any naval expansion.
But here the problem of funds came into its own. With the return of taxable land due to the Assembly's land reform and trade deals signed by the Senate (more were signed with Sicilian and Sardinian states between 133 and 127 BCE), funds began to trickle back into Carthage's coffers from 126 BCE onward as their income slowly but steadily picked up. Corruption and poverty remained rampant but Carthage now at last had some funds to do something about it. Here the naval debate picked up once again. Now that Carthage had funds coming back into her coffers, the Senate once again began advocating for an expansion to the Carthaginian navy and a push to intervene in the civil and interstate wars in Sicily, also claiming that the Pisan treaty bound them to strengthen their navy to help fight piracy and defend their commercial interests. The Assembly refused adamantly, instead they claimed the Senate was neglecting its religious duties by advocating for a larger navy when a number of shrines remained damaged or in ruins, going on to defend that vast areas of the city needed rebuilt and improved. But the Senate had learnt from its failures in both the guard debate and the land reform affair. With their fortunes once again growing with the new commercial opportunities opened up from 133 BCE, the Senate had set up trade links to much of Pisa's trade network including Rome and, importantly, Corsica and Sardinia. Pisa and Carthage had both gained immensely from this treaty, Carthaginian goods (some of which had become popular amongst some Italian peoples) and agricultural products (important in Italy given the population issues) now entered almost solely through Pisa who made a small fortune exporting them to the rest of the Etruscan League and to the Italian and Po peoples as well as the Latin League and Italian Alliance. In return Carthage became a similar link between Pisa and Africa, whilst also gaining access to vital goods from Italy, Sardinia and Corsica. Many Senators had also made a fortune off exporting agricultural products to Sicily where they were in high demand due to the wars ravaging the island. In turn, the Senate itself had moved undercover of the Pisan treaty, importing timber and metal and repairing the ships available to them, often with the help of expert and often formerly Barcid naval officers. Finally, in early 125 BCE, the Senate made their move as a fresh fleet of now 60 Senatorial ships sailed into the Carthaginian harbour. Whilst there were no mercenaries, merely a light crew on board the ships, the arrival of 60 ships had changed the entire game.
From 133 through to 126, the Senate had seemed almost under siege. Save for the treasury, the harbour and the Byrsa, the rest of the city was now patrolled by Assembly-appointed guards, much of the land held by the Senatorial class had been forcibly redistributed and now the Assembly had built a strong economic and military power base that could be used against them. The stage seemed to have been set for the Assembly moving to sideline the Senate and seize power for themselves. Now, with 60 ships at their command, the Senate had reinforced its position immeasurably. Not only was the harbour itself greatly reinforced and fortified by the ships but they provided an effective access for the Senate to foreign mercenaries and displayed for all to see that their economic and military strength had been restored, hinting that with it would come a rejuvenated political strength. In effect, it was a statement that the Senate was putting itself back in the game. The Assembly was outraged. In theory, there was nothing stopping the Senate from doing this, they held authority for foreign policy and the treasury as well, most of the money had been private to boot. But, to the Assembly this conveyed a dangerous and seriously threatening use of military force in Carthaginian politics, not to mention it represented a serious infringement on their authority as the Senate seemed to completely disregard the rights of the Assembly in pursuing their own agenda for the state. Fearing that the use of military force was imminent, the Assembly reacted just as quickly. Within only a week of the arrival of the Senatorial fleet, the Assembly established what was termed a 'temporary domestic treasury', diverting taxation funds from the main treasury to this new, secondary treasury under their own control. Almost immediately, the Assembly began importing arms from local African kingdoms and other Phoenician cities such as Utica, under the guise of improving the equipment of the guards throughout the city and soon distributed them to the various guard magistrates throughout the city. In the districts closest to the harbour and the Byrsa, new guard magistrates were appointed.
For a second time, the city had been divided. In theory, the government remained united, the suffets remained in contact and the Assembly and Senate in name continued contact and discussion, but it was a city now de facto split between the Senate-controlled Byrsa, harbour and treasury and the rest of the city held by the Assembly. At these tension-filled heights, rumours began to spread that the Senate had been canvassing for mercenary support abroad in preparation for an armed seizure of the city, particularly in Pisa and Sicily where the democratic movement was especially unpopular in many states. Distrust was rampant between the Assembly and Senate and very quickly began to boil over, arguments and discussions in the Assembly accused the Senate of moving against them whilst the Senate, alarmed by the militaristic moves made by the Assembly began to descend into its own internal debates and disputes. Gradually, distrust began to prevail. The division and opposition from before hadn't been healed, rather the Assembly and Senate had been brought under one system and gradually opposed to one another within it. The events of 125 had proven that that the constitution had become unworkable, one body either had to be terminally weakened or actually removed before the state could ever hope to move on, there was simply too much distrust and dissent. Finally, the political chaos reached its second height in November 125 when the Assembly voted to end communication with the Senate until such a time at which the fleet were disbanded. In turn, the Senate retorted by demanding that the Assembly stand down a number of guards divisions throughout the city and hand over a series of upper class districts to the Senatorial guards. Neither the Assembly nor the Senate would back down on either, to do so would have been to significantly weaken their hand and, as the time passed on into 124 BCE, the city reached a second stalemate.
The difference this time was that the city was now nominally unified, it just had a government that was split into two halves refusing to deal with one another. At first, links continued in the forms of the suffets but this ended after February 124 BCE and the government fell silent. The Senate had to move quickly, if the standoff continued long enough then they would simply be besieged into submission, unable to reliably communicate between the Byrsa, the harbour and the treasury nor to reliably bring customs dues from the harbour over to the treasury. If mercenaries were indeed coming, then they needed to arrive quickly to take the Assembly off guard as much as was possible. The Senate would hold the advantage of better trained soldiers and the backing of the navy, allowing greater mobility and ensuring control of the harbour. If they moved quickly, then they could fight through and capture the Forum, effectively taking control of the economic and political heart of the city and relieving the Byrsa. But the Senate couldn't stay there, nor could they risk keeping the treasury down in the forum where it had been. In January 124 BCE, the Senate voted to move its seat of government temporarily to the harbour as well as its treasury. The procession was slow moving, the Senators went ahead, many on horses and surrounded by guards, followed in the back by dozens of wagons loaded with gold and silver from the treasury, recently emptied of both guards and its funds. They were surrounded on every side, in the cool winter air stood thousands of people, staring and watching as the Senators and their families evacuated the Byrsa. On every side stood guards, dozens of them, well over 50 at one point. As the escort trailed its way down the city, the crowds continued to grow, their contempt palpable as the vast train passed by on its way down to the harbour.
As the procession moved, so too did the Assembly. News had reached them days before that the Senate was planning to move and at dawn that day they had stationed hundreds of guards in the forum and near to the Byrsa so that, as the Senate left, the Assembly moved in. Nominally, they reunited the two treasuries, moving their funds back into the old treasury in the forum and occupying the Byrsa. By midday, the main holdouts of the Senate were under Assembly occupation and as the sun fell into evening, the Assembly held huge religious rites up on the Byrsa. The procession itself had moved with relatively little actual opposition, there had been few acts of violence or assault but up on the Byrsa things were different. As night fell, the people turned to looting, sacking the empty houses, attacking the few aristocrats who had refused to leave and starting a number of fires, one of which soon blazed out of control and flattened much of the Byrsa. Carthage was days away from a potential civil war and everyone knew it. The city had become riven, not just by political differences but by an actual palpable sense of hatred. Many of those living in the new districts resented the apathy and political detachment of the aristocrats whilst they lived in cramped, starved conditions. The Assembly seemed, in comparison, much more representative and, as a democratic body, had played a significant role in helping alleviate the conditions of those involved despite its sometimes penchant for corruption and mob rule. Meanwhile, the Senate had grown to fear the Assembly and as they had made concessions, they had seen their hand weaken more and more which only made them fear the democrats ever more.
Finally, the straw that broke the camel's back. It was early on a cold April morning, three months after the move to the harbour, when a young guard came rushing into his father's house. We can imagine the cries of 'mercenaries' that must have escaped his lips, the stories of thousands of Italians marching down from the ships in the dead of night, the images he conveyed of Senators and commanders and secret meetings in the Senatorial harbour government. His father, a man known to posterity as Abimilki rushed out the house, supposedly calling for 'anyone' to give him a horse that he might warn the Assembly. The story goes that for hours he rode back and forth through the city, going to each house in person and spreading the message on, telling them to tell anyone they could, to rouse the Assembly and call a war meeting. Whatever the truth, an emergency meeting of the Assembly was indeed called that April morning and one Abimilki is recorded as having spoken at it, so the story is one we have no reason to doubt as such. The mercenaries numbered between 8-10,000, a mixture of Italian, Sicilian and Sardinian mercenaries, likely hired out through contacts in Pisa, possibly in return for favourable trade agreements should they take the city. One way or another, Carthage was now on track for a third devastating civil war.
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It would be possible that after this crisis ,the Carthaginian navy would pass through and become (how the Athenian navy) in the main support of the new regime or in the Carthaginian case, of the Assembly.
markus meecham
Banned
Now we have a foundational myth for this experiment, it seems, so let freedom ring!
A democratic carthage would be comparable to athens in it's impact, in my humble and ill informed opinion.
Not only that, but if cultural differences can be at least partially ignored in favor of a democratic ideal, whatevee that may be, we might see a grand democratic alliance with Rome and Kroton (and any other cities around that might be adopting the system around) that would be something with very, very interesting ramifications.
A democratic carthage would be comparable to athens in it's impact, in my humble and ill informed opinion.
Not only that, but if cultural differences can be at least partially ignored in favor of a democratic ideal, whatevee that may be, we might see a grand democratic alliance with Rome and Kroton (and any other cities around that might be adopting the system around) that would be something with very, very interesting ramifications.
Chapter XIV: The Dam Breaks
Chapter XIV: The Dam Breaks
The Assembly hadn’t been idle whilst the Senate built their army. Just as Senatorial ships had been leaving the harbour to canvass for mercenary support abroad, the Assembly had been in fervent negotiations with other local rulers and African mercenaries. Having amassed funds from taxation within their own treasury, the Assembly had set about bringing together a mixed force of African, Libyan and Phoenician mercenaries, signing treaties with the Berber communities in the South, recognising them and their kings in return for military support. At the same time, they had been importing arms, even manufacturing some in city workshops to improve the equipment available to the guards and even arm part of the population. As such, as about 10,000 mercenaries arrived in the city harbour, the Assembly jumped into action, sending missives to their mercenary and foreign allies in the countryside and calling them to arms.
For their part, the Senatorial army was a mixture of Sardinian, Italian and Sicilian mercenaries. The core of this army lay in 4000 Italian heavy infantry supplied by Pisa with support of Sicilian infantry and the lighter Sardinian skirmishers, both approximately 2-3000 strong. Added to this were maybe 1-1500 marines manning the 60 ships available to the Senate, backed up in turn by about 20 ships hired from mercenaries or supplied by Pisa (depending on the sources we use). In comparison, the Assembly had at most 4000 armed guards in the city and maybe 2000 armed citizens, neither of them particularly well trained but decently enough armed. In support, there were possibly as many as 10,000 mercenaries and foreign troops beyond the city. This division was the crux of the problem, fighting would move quickly and the mercenaries were at least a days’ march from Carthage. Should their more undisciplined citizen troops break before they could arrive, then Carthage would fall and the mercenaries would simply be cut to pieces at the walls. Outnumbered and outclassed, the citizen forces would have to hold their ground at least until the mercenaries arrived.
As the sun rose, the Senatorial mercenaries made their move, sweeping out from the harbour and advancing into the city. The Assembly had mobilised all their forces here at the entrance to the harbour, hoping to contain the mercenaries there until their allies arrived and an assault could be attempted. The fighting was brutal and decisively one sided. The citizen army was desperately outclassed by their mercenary opponents and the Senate’s control of the seas proved crucial in turning defensive position after defensive position as detachments of mercenary soldiers were landed in the flanks of the Assembly’s forces. Realising their position was untenable and the risks of being trapped against the walls whilst the rest of the city was taken, the Assembly began to pull their forces back, district by district towards the forum. At the head of the Senatorial army came the heavy infantry, driving all before them whilst their lighter support troops went by side streets, catching the Assembly’s army in the flanks, trapping and annihilating isolated soldiers and picking off the democratic forces as they were worn down. By midday, the battle seemed won when a fresh 2000 mercenaries in the pay of the Senate landed in the harbour and began marching to join their allies in the fighting which, by this point, was approaching the forum rapidly. Realising their position had become untenable, the Assembly voted plans to abandon the city and rendezvous with their allies in the hope of defeating the Senate in a field battle. The Senate, however, had absolutely no intention of letting them do so as a force of 1000 Sicilian mercenaries went on ahead of their main army to close off any paths towards the walls and trap the democrats in the Assembly.
Thus, the noose was closed and began to tighten. To the West, the streets were cut off by the Senate’s Sicilian troops whilst the East saw the rapid approach of the main Senatorial army, by now at least 10,000 strong with maybe as many as 12,000. In comparison, one source tells us that the Assembly was left with as few as 2-3000 soldiers under their command. There was only one place left for them to go. Evacuating what funds they could from the treasury, the democrats began to retreat upwards, climbing up towards the Byrsa acropolis and fortifying themselves in there, blocking whatever roads they could, turning houses into military bases and temples into granaries.
Enter Bomilcar. For such a crucial figure in democratic Carthaginian history, we actually know very little about the famous Bomilcar. Save for that he was a farmer who had sat in the Assembly, supposedly from a wealthy but not Senatorial family who had fought against the Barcids in 139 BCE, Bomilcar as a figure seems to just appear in our record at the very nadir of democratic fortunes. Just as startlingly, for such a notable figure, he makes very few appearances afterwards. His name is attached to a few reforms and policies instituted in the years after the civil war and appears on a few stelae but he remains a largely mysterious figure in our historical record. That said, the sources seem to agree that this mysterious ‘Bomilcar’ took the lead in the final days of the civil war, emerging at the very nadir of democratic fortunes and turning the tide against the Senatorial forces.
As night fell, the Assembly found itself now besieged on the Byrsa, surrounded on every front by Senatorial forces, its on forces as well as any who had thought to abandon the rest of the city now crammed up in the abandoned homes and temples high above the city. It is at this point that Bomilcar emerges in our sources. Over the next two days, with no sign of the Assembly’s allies approaching, Bomilcar led a spirited defence up on the Byrsa. As the Senatorial mercenaries approached, they were greeted with hails of stone, wood and metal, anything that could be scavenged. With the sun beating down on the democrats and food soon running low, Bomilcar ordered rites to be performed in the temples day and night to raise morale. Without anywhere to run, fearing that they would likely be slaughtered to a man and their wives and children raped and killed should they break, the democrats fought for their lives, desperately throwing everything they had at the mercenaries for hours on end. As their numbers wore thin, armour and weapons were scavenged by anyone healthy enough to fight. By the time the fifth day dawned, women were taking up arms to hold the lines, slowly being pushed back, children would pelt the mercenaries with whatever they could find. At some point, 500 Sicilians scaled the Byrsa and almost broke the defending lines with a surprise attack, only to be driven back and slaughtered to a man, but only after inflicting heavy casualties. Probably at this point, Bomilcar had the idea for which he would become in many ways famous. Still known in some regions as Bomilcarian Warfare, he sent messengers scaling down the same rocky outcrop one night with a simple task, to raise the people in revolt behind the ranks of the Senate. Sneaking through the besiegers’ lines, they spread out through the city, meeting with disgruntled and poor citizens, calling upon them to take knives, daggers, whatever they could and to strike out at the mercenaries occupying their city.
The result was phenomenal. For many, the Assembly was their government. If they themselves hadn’t taken part in it then it was normally the government most of them referred to, it governed their daily lives in the city, it had built connections with its citizens’ magistrates, it governed the courts in which their laws were upheld. To many of the citizens, the foreign policy government of the Senate was nothing more than an intruder, displacing a government that had de facto governed them for over a decade. To many it was as simple as foreign, invading mercenaries fighting loyal Carthaginian citizens. There was no contest, the Senate was to many nothing more than an invading, barely Carthaginian government and they were now being called on to overthrow it. The attacks began almost immediately, hit and run attacks in the tight streets of the slums, small groups of mercenaries stabbed to death at night or in the day, their attackers melting back into the crowds, disappearing into houses and homes. Worrying about a general insurrection, more and more soldiers began to be deployed to the city to keep order. Gradually the pressure began to be relieved on Bomilcar’s beleaguered forces as the Senate siphoned off more and more men to deal with the insurrection in their rear. Finally, after more than a weak of warfare the tide turned. Late one night a shrill sound echoed through the air, followed by another and another. From up on the Byrsa, the democrats could only watch in amazement as their allies poured out of the surrounding hills and descended on the city. Now faced with enemies on three fronts, the Senate ordered as many men as it could spare to the walls, desperate to hold them and sending out messengers for reinforcements.
But the tide had already turned, the penchant for brutality and the foreign nature of the mercenaries had only solidified in the minds of many that they were merely foreign invaders. Riots broke out all across the city and by evening, as the assault on the walls stopped for the night, the riots broke out into rebellion. Outnumbered and often surrounded, the mercenaries were quickly overwhelmed in much of the city, seized by the angry mob and beaten to death, torn to pieces and brutally killed. Elsewhere, the mercenaries held out only barely in the forum as waves of people launched assault after assault against their lines, using whatever weapons they could. Bomilcar saw his opportunity almost immediately, amassing his men he swept down on the besiegers, now terminally weakened in numbers and fighting on multiple fronts. As his desperate wave of men swept forward, their line shattered, men turning to flee in any direction to escape the carnage. Finally, what remained of Bomilcar’s force could rendezvous with the rebels down near the forum. As the night continued, the fighting fell to a lull, both sides too tired to continue until morning. Realising they were being divided and risked being wiped out, the Senate began to pull their forces back to the forum, intending to fight their way en masse to the harbour where they might escaoe by ship and regroup before making another attempt to take the city. As dawn broke, they swept down on Bomilcar’s forces, taking them by surprise and cutting a bloody swathe through them as they pushed on towards the harbour. Bomilcar, reeling from the attack rallied his men and set off in pursuit. In a bloody repetition of the procession of the Senate, the mercenaries desperately fought their way down towards the harbour, pelted and attacked on all fronts by the citizenry as they continued on their way. Rocks, wood and metal came flying from rooftops, from alleyways and nearby streets, bands of men would attack them, cutting down a few of their number before retreating or being driven back. Blood ran in the streets as dozens met their deaths on both sides. Marching in full armour, weapons constantly at the ready, fighting almost all the time and having to hold position under a near constant barrage, the mercenaries stumbled onwards, their numbers falling all the time, exhausted and worn out. Bomilcar was a step ahead of them, though. Rushing back to the walls, he let his allies in and mobilised them to rush down towards the harbour. With the Senatorial forces slowed to a crawl by the constant fighting, Bomilcar quickly outpaced them, marching by back alleyways where his allies could only move one abreast and sweeping down into the harbour.
Not all of the Senatorial fleet had been out at sea, much of it had remained in the harbour as both a blockade and to provide support when needed or even carry messages back to Sicily or Italy, indeed ships had already been sent out with this purpose. Having received news that the Senate was retreating to the harbour, much of the fleet (possibly 50-60 ships) had been waiting for them and, as such, when Bomilcar arrived with his own force it took them too long to realise it wasn’t who they had been expecting. Sweeping down into the harbour, Bomilcar and his men took the ships by surprise, seizing most of them and killing the marines on board, sparing the rowers themselves on the condition they work for them instead. A few ships, however, managed to escape and swept out into the sea to warn their compatriots. As the exhausted Senatorial army approached the harbour, they found Bomilcar waiting for them, his forces lined up in formation before the harbour walls, their light support troops stood above and behind them on the walls themselves. Surrounded, exhausted and worn down, there was little could be done to stop the mercenaries defecting. Almost as one, they seized the Senators and executed them en masse, handing their heads over to Bomilcar in return for their lives. Probably fearing the potential disloyalty and treachery of his own allies, Bomilcar paid a sizeable indemnity to them as a ‘gift’ (additional to their pay) on the condition they leave Carthage which they, seemingly, promptly did. Only two days later, a democracy was proclaimed by the Assembly in the forum and the Senate (and the position of suffet) was declared disbanded. Over the next two weeks, the remainder of the Senatorial fleet was either hunted down and captured or destroyed or fled into the Mediterranean, never again to appear.
Obviously, this is a troubling historical narrative, although one often repeated by the Carthaginian democrats in decades to come. For one, Hamilcar Hannonid is conspicuous by his absence, though probably elderly by now, he never once appears in the record of the democratic revolution of 124 BCE. Many of the Senators are named by our sources, Gisgo, Hannibal, Hasdrubal and so on but Hamilcar never once appears though his son is identified as being killed in the slaughter at the end of the siege. In all likelihood, Hamilcar was still alive but probably retired as he would have been elderly by this point and we do have records showing that the Hannonids survived after the revolution with at least two of them being active in the democracy as late as 40 BCE. What confuses us about Hamilcar is that he is named and identified almost right up to the revolution (his last appearance is about 127) and appears once or twice afterwards so we can presume he was alive, but never makes a single appearance in the record of the revolution itself. Secondly, we have the questions about Bomilcar, not to mention exactly where the allies got to for days on end while the democrats starved to death on the Byrsa. At the same time, the chronology can be difficult for us at times, we don’t know when Bomilcar’s insurrection began nor whether the rebellion itself broke out when the allies arrived or before that as some sources claim (though the former is more likely). Some events are presented in some sources as occurring simultaneously and some aren’t mentioned in others.
In truth, the civil war (known, with the 139 BCE Civil War, as a revolution against tyranny by later democratic tradition) is a murky period of history at best. We don’t know the exact layout or chronology of what happened but we do know the basic events and, importantly, the outcome. Later, pro-democratic histories would identify the 124 BCE Civil War as a glorious uprising against tyranny, they would cast Hamilcar Hannonid as a traitor to freedom and democracy who helped fight the Barcids then created a new Senatorial tyranny, sometimes as a man who secretly envied the Barcids and wanted their power for himself. In truth, Hamilcar and the other Senators were certainly self-serving, they were prone to corruption and used intimidation, violence and political wrangling to achieve their own ends. But so too did the Assembly at many points. Their guard system was full of abuses, they too turned to violence against the Senate at the end and forcibly seized the countryside to force the Senate to accept their land reform. In the end, the Assembly had emerged triumphant. After decades of the democratic movement existing in Carthage, after a decade and a half of struggles with the Senate, Carthage had followed in the footsteps of her once hated enemy Rome and switched to democracy.
The Assembly hadn’t been idle whilst the Senate built their army. Just as Senatorial ships had been leaving the harbour to canvass for mercenary support abroad, the Assembly had been in fervent negotiations with other local rulers and African mercenaries. Having amassed funds from taxation within their own treasury, the Assembly had set about bringing together a mixed force of African, Libyan and Phoenician mercenaries, signing treaties with the Berber communities in the South, recognising them and their kings in return for military support. At the same time, they had been importing arms, even manufacturing some in city workshops to improve the equipment available to the guards and even arm part of the population. As such, as about 10,000 mercenaries arrived in the city harbour, the Assembly jumped into action, sending missives to their mercenary and foreign allies in the countryside and calling them to arms.
For their part, the Senatorial army was a mixture of Sardinian, Italian and Sicilian mercenaries. The core of this army lay in 4000 Italian heavy infantry supplied by Pisa with support of Sicilian infantry and the lighter Sardinian skirmishers, both approximately 2-3000 strong. Added to this were maybe 1-1500 marines manning the 60 ships available to the Senate, backed up in turn by about 20 ships hired from mercenaries or supplied by Pisa (depending on the sources we use). In comparison, the Assembly had at most 4000 armed guards in the city and maybe 2000 armed citizens, neither of them particularly well trained but decently enough armed. In support, there were possibly as many as 10,000 mercenaries and foreign troops beyond the city. This division was the crux of the problem, fighting would move quickly and the mercenaries were at least a days’ march from Carthage. Should their more undisciplined citizen troops break before they could arrive, then Carthage would fall and the mercenaries would simply be cut to pieces at the walls. Outnumbered and outclassed, the citizen forces would have to hold their ground at least until the mercenaries arrived.
As the sun rose, the Senatorial mercenaries made their move, sweeping out from the harbour and advancing into the city. The Assembly had mobilised all their forces here at the entrance to the harbour, hoping to contain the mercenaries there until their allies arrived and an assault could be attempted. The fighting was brutal and decisively one sided. The citizen army was desperately outclassed by their mercenary opponents and the Senate’s control of the seas proved crucial in turning defensive position after defensive position as detachments of mercenary soldiers were landed in the flanks of the Assembly’s forces. Realising their position was untenable and the risks of being trapped against the walls whilst the rest of the city was taken, the Assembly began to pull their forces back, district by district towards the forum. At the head of the Senatorial army came the heavy infantry, driving all before them whilst their lighter support troops went by side streets, catching the Assembly’s army in the flanks, trapping and annihilating isolated soldiers and picking off the democratic forces as they were worn down. By midday, the battle seemed won when a fresh 2000 mercenaries in the pay of the Senate landed in the harbour and began marching to join their allies in the fighting which, by this point, was approaching the forum rapidly. Realising their position had become untenable, the Assembly voted plans to abandon the city and rendezvous with their allies in the hope of defeating the Senate in a field battle. The Senate, however, had absolutely no intention of letting them do so as a force of 1000 Sicilian mercenaries went on ahead of their main army to close off any paths towards the walls and trap the democrats in the Assembly.
Thus, the noose was closed and began to tighten. To the West, the streets were cut off by the Senate’s Sicilian troops whilst the East saw the rapid approach of the main Senatorial army, by now at least 10,000 strong with maybe as many as 12,000. In comparison, one source tells us that the Assembly was left with as few as 2-3000 soldiers under their command. There was only one place left for them to go. Evacuating what funds they could from the treasury, the democrats began to retreat upwards, climbing up towards the Byrsa acropolis and fortifying themselves in there, blocking whatever roads they could, turning houses into military bases and temples into granaries.
Enter Bomilcar. For such a crucial figure in democratic Carthaginian history, we actually know very little about the famous Bomilcar. Save for that he was a farmer who had sat in the Assembly, supposedly from a wealthy but not Senatorial family who had fought against the Barcids in 139 BCE, Bomilcar as a figure seems to just appear in our record at the very nadir of democratic fortunes. Just as startlingly, for such a notable figure, he makes very few appearances afterwards. His name is attached to a few reforms and policies instituted in the years after the civil war and appears on a few stelae but he remains a largely mysterious figure in our historical record. That said, the sources seem to agree that this mysterious ‘Bomilcar’ took the lead in the final days of the civil war, emerging at the very nadir of democratic fortunes and turning the tide against the Senatorial forces.
As night fell, the Assembly found itself now besieged on the Byrsa, surrounded on every front by Senatorial forces, its on forces as well as any who had thought to abandon the rest of the city now crammed up in the abandoned homes and temples high above the city. It is at this point that Bomilcar emerges in our sources. Over the next two days, with no sign of the Assembly’s allies approaching, Bomilcar led a spirited defence up on the Byrsa. As the Senatorial mercenaries approached, they were greeted with hails of stone, wood and metal, anything that could be scavenged. With the sun beating down on the democrats and food soon running low, Bomilcar ordered rites to be performed in the temples day and night to raise morale. Without anywhere to run, fearing that they would likely be slaughtered to a man and their wives and children raped and killed should they break, the democrats fought for their lives, desperately throwing everything they had at the mercenaries for hours on end. As their numbers wore thin, armour and weapons were scavenged by anyone healthy enough to fight. By the time the fifth day dawned, women were taking up arms to hold the lines, slowly being pushed back, children would pelt the mercenaries with whatever they could find. At some point, 500 Sicilians scaled the Byrsa and almost broke the defending lines with a surprise attack, only to be driven back and slaughtered to a man, but only after inflicting heavy casualties. Probably at this point, Bomilcar had the idea for which he would become in many ways famous. Still known in some regions as Bomilcarian Warfare, he sent messengers scaling down the same rocky outcrop one night with a simple task, to raise the people in revolt behind the ranks of the Senate. Sneaking through the besiegers’ lines, they spread out through the city, meeting with disgruntled and poor citizens, calling upon them to take knives, daggers, whatever they could and to strike out at the mercenaries occupying their city.
The result was phenomenal. For many, the Assembly was their government. If they themselves hadn’t taken part in it then it was normally the government most of them referred to, it governed their daily lives in the city, it had built connections with its citizens’ magistrates, it governed the courts in which their laws were upheld. To many of the citizens, the foreign policy government of the Senate was nothing more than an intruder, displacing a government that had de facto governed them for over a decade. To many it was as simple as foreign, invading mercenaries fighting loyal Carthaginian citizens. There was no contest, the Senate was to many nothing more than an invading, barely Carthaginian government and they were now being called on to overthrow it. The attacks began almost immediately, hit and run attacks in the tight streets of the slums, small groups of mercenaries stabbed to death at night or in the day, their attackers melting back into the crowds, disappearing into houses and homes. Worrying about a general insurrection, more and more soldiers began to be deployed to the city to keep order. Gradually the pressure began to be relieved on Bomilcar’s beleaguered forces as the Senate siphoned off more and more men to deal with the insurrection in their rear. Finally, after more than a weak of warfare the tide turned. Late one night a shrill sound echoed through the air, followed by another and another. From up on the Byrsa, the democrats could only watch in amazement as their allies poured out of the surrounding hills and descended on the city. Now faced with enemies on three fronts, the Senate ordered as many men as it could spare to the walls, desperate to hold them and sending out messengers for reinforcements.
But the tide had already turned, the penchant for brutality and the foreign nature of the mercenaries had only solidified in the minds of many that they were merely foreign invaders. Riots broke out all across the city and by evening, as the assault on the walls stopped for the night, the riots broke out into rebellion. Outnumbered and often surrounded, the mercenaries were quickly overwhelmed in much of the city, seized by the angry mob and beaten to death, torn to pieces and brutally killed. Elsewhere, the mercenaries held out only barely in the forum as waves of people launched assault after assault against their lines, using whatever weapons they could. Bomilcar saw his opportunity almost immediately, amassing his men he swept down on the besiegers, now terminally weakened in numbers and fighting on multiple fronts. As his desperate wave of men swept forward, their line shattered, men turning to flee in any direction to escape the carnage. Finally, what remained of Bomilcar’s force could rendezvous with the rebels down near the forum. As the night continued, the fighting fell to a lull, both sides too tired to continue until morning. Realising they were being divided and risked being wiped out, the Senate began to pull their forces back to the forum, intending to fight their way en masse to the harbour where they might escaoe by ship and regroup before making another attempt to take the city. As dawn broke, they swept down on Bomilcar’s forces, taking them by surprise and cutting a bloody swathe through them as they pushed on towards the harbour. Bomilcar, reeling from the attack rallied his men and set off in pursuit. In a bloody repetition of the procession of the Senate, the mercenaries desperately fought their way down towards the harbour, pelted and attacked on all fronts by the citizenry as they continued on their way. Rocks, wood and metal came flying from rooftops, from alleyways and nearby streets, bands of men would attack them, cutting down a few of their number before retreating or being driven back. Blood ran in the streets as dozens met their deaths on both sides. Marching in full armour, weapons constantly at the ready, fighting almost all the time and having to hold position under a near constant barrage, the mercenaries stumbled onwards, their numbers falling all the time, exhausted and worn out. Bomilcar was a step ahead of them, though. Rushing back to the walls, he let his allies in and mobilised them to rush down towards the harbour. With the Senatorial forces slowed to a crawl by the constant fighting, Bomilcar quickly outpaced them, marching by back alleyways where his allies could only move one abreast and sweeping down into the harbour.
Not all of the Senatorial fleet had been out at sea, much of it had remained in the harbour as both a blockade and to provide support when needed or even carry messages back to Sicily or Italy, indeed ships had already been sent out with this purpose. Having received news that the Senate was retreating to the harbour, much of the fleet (possibly 50-60 ships) had been waiting for them and, as such, when Bomilcar arrived with his own force it took them too long to realise it wasn’t who they had been expecting. Sweeping down into the harbour, Bomilcar and his men took the ships by surprise, seizing most of them and killing the marines on board, sparing the rowers themselves on the condition they work for them instead. A few ships, however, managed to escape and swept out into the sea to warn their compatriots. As the exhausted Senatorial army approached the harbour, they found Bomilcar waiting for them, his forces lined up in formation before the harbour walls, their light support troops stood above and behind them on the walls themselves. Surrounded, exhausted and worn down, there was little could be done to stop the mercenaries defecting. Almost as one, they seized the Senators and executed them en masse, handing their heads over to Bomilcar in return for their lives. Probably fearing the potential disloyalty and treachery of his own allies, Bomilcar paid a sizeable indemnity to them as a ‘gift’ (additional to their pay) on the condition they leave Carthage which they, seemingly, promptly did. Only two days later, a democracy was proclaimed by the Assembly in the forum and the Senate (and the position of suffet) was declared disbanded. Over the next two weeks, the remainder of the Senatorial fleet was either hunted down and captured or destroyed or fled into the Mediterranean, never again to appear.
Obviously, this is a troubling historical narrative, although one often repeated by the Carthaginian democrats in decades to come. For one, Hamilcar Hannonid is conspicuous by his absence, though probably elderly by now, he never once appears in the record of the democratic revolution of 124 BCE. Many of the Senators are named by our sources, Gisgo, Hannibal, Hasdrubal and so on but Hamilcar never once appears though his son is identified as being killed in the slaughter at the end of the siege. In all likelihood, Hamilcar was still alive but probably retired as he would have been elderly by this point and we do have records showing that the Hannonids survived after the revolution with at least two of them being active in the democracy as late as 40 BCE. What confuses us about Hamilcar is that he is named and identified almost right up to the revolution (his last appearance is about 127) and appears once or twice afterwards so we can presume he was alive, but never makes a single appearance in the record of the revolution itself. Secondly, we have the questions about Bomilcar, not to mention exactly where the allies got to for days on end while the democrats starved to death on the Byrsa. At the same time, the chronology can be difficult for us at times, we don’t know when Bomilcar’s insurrection began nor whether the rebellion itself broke out when the allies arrived or before that as some sources claim (though the former is more likely). Some events are presented in some sources as occurring simultaneously and some aren’t mentioned in others.
In truth, the civil war (known, with the 139 BCE Civil War, as a revolution against tyranny by later democratic tradition) is a murky period of history at best. We don’t know the exact layout or chronology of what happened but we do know the basic events and, importantly, the outcome. Later, pro-democratic histories would identify the 124 BCE Civil War as a glorious uprising against tyranny, they would cast Hamilcar Hannonid as a traitor to freedom and democracy who helped fight the Barcids then created a new Senatorial tyranny, sometimes as a man who secretly envied the Barcids and wanted their power for himself. In truth, Hamilcar and the other Senators were certainly self-serving, they were prone to corruption and used intimidation, violence and political wrangling to achieve their own ends. But so too did the Assembly at many points. Their guard system was full of abuses, they too turned to violence against the Senate at the end and forcibly seized the countryside to force the Senate to accept their land reform. In the end, the Assembly had emerged triumphant. After decades of the democratic movement existing in Carthage, after a decade and a half of struggles with the Senate, Carthage had followed in the footsteps of her once hated enemy Rome and switched to democracy.
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It's an interesting point actually, in Athens' case the navy was very much tied in many ways to the democracy because, according to Thucydides and Xenophon at least, it made the people rich from pay. The more wars they were in, the more they were called to the navy and the more pay they got. The same or similar could happen in Carthage. That said, Carthage is in the unique position of the democracy having made a whole new class of landowners, families which will likely also be very loyal to the democracy and having a government forged by the people during a civil war, thus strengthening them as an institution for the people as a whole.
As a general aside, I was wanting to ask if people wanted to see an update on the workings of the Carthaginian democracy, as I did with the Roman democracy and the Carthaginian republic. I understand my last three updates have been very Carthage-centric so if people want me to focus instead elsewhere that is absolutely fine.
While, would be interesting more about the Carthaginian just born democracy, but, at least I, think that would be very interesting to know the parallel developments that would be happen besides of Italy in Makedon, Greece and perhaps in the Middle East.
But more in specific I want to ask, if you have, considered that Carthage would be become or at least, seems to have the potential, in a land and naval power... perhaps would go through a military reform similar to the OTL Marius reform in the Roman legion. Because with their new landowner class wouldn't need to be dependant of foreign mercenaries, than OTL, or at least wouldn't the main part of the TTL Carthaginian army.
But more in specific I want to ask, if you have, considered that Carthage would be become or at least, seems to have the potential, in a land and naval power... perhaps would go through a military reform similar to the OTL Marius reform in the Roman legion. Because with their new landowner class wouldn't need to be dependant of foreign mercenaries, than OTL, or at least wouldn't the main part of the TTL Carthaginian army.
Okay so the current plan is to do a few updates covering developments in the Eastern Mediterranean, specifically I want to do one covering Egypt, one covering the Seleucids and one covering Greece and Macedonia to bring us up to date in this region as a whole. Then, I'm going to return to the Western Med to cover developments in Italy up to around 110 (there's a big change coming), circle round with an update covering post-Barcid Iberia and come back to Carthage to bring everyone up to around 110 BCE, thus bringing us to the end of our first century of timeline.
Chapter XV: Pharaohs and Kings
Chapter XV: Pharaohs and Kings
For the Ptolemies, the 2nd Century BCE was one of almost perpetual decline, culminating in their defeat and destruction by the Seleucids in the 130s, it was also a period in which their foreign policy would bring them ever more into the clutches of the Barcid family as time went on. It was a period marked by internal strife, by political dissent and chaos, rebellion and a cultural and political movement that not even the Seleucids would be able to entirely suppress once they came to power in Egypt. It was also a period in which the demographic and trade makeup of Egypt as a whole would change quite significantly as the Barcids edged ever closer to almost total domination of the weak kings of Ptolemaic Egypt as the century moved onward. In effect, the historical processes pushing the Ptolemies towards their eventual destruction had started at around the same time our story started, about a year before Hannibal's victory at Cannae in 217 BCE. For our historical record, this year is important for one event in particular. Under the leadership of Antiochus III 'the Great', the Seleucids launched an invasion of Coele-Syria and Judaea in 217 BCE, taking advantage of the weakness of the young Ptolemy IV of Egypt. To say Ptolemy was weak is actually an understatement, his rule was characterised by the almost total domination of the powerful ministers of state, men (and sometimes women of the royal family) who played on his indulgences and vices to control the young king and steer the throne from behind the scenes. In name, he was Pharaoh and ruled over all Egypt but that position merely masked a treacherous game of politics being played out between powerful advisers and ministers, each fighting to control and maintain control of the throne. It might have been expected that this weakness would have effectively doomed Ptolemaic Egypt and, indeed, it came close. What saved it in the end was little more than self-interest, determined to protect their position as effective rulers of Egypt, the ministers behind Ptolemy banded together and raised an army of as many as 75,000 men, the core of which was largely Egyptian rather than Greek, to make up for a lack of Greek manpower to form a proper phalanx. As a result, 30,000 Egyptians had been drafted to form much of the infantry core of the army and, in turn, had distinguished themselves impressively against their Seleucid foes, the Egyptian army ultimately prevailing and driving Antiochus' forces from the field, inflicting over 14,000 casualties.
Raphia is a key moment in our timeline because of this Egyptian phalanx. Unlike previous armies which had had a large Greek contingent at their core, the Ptolemaic army of Raphia had had to rely upon a large basis of Egyptian soldiers with a corresponding growth in self-confidence, especially as it had required the arming of a large portion of the Egyptian population. Resenting Greek domination, the Egyptians rose in revolt in the South (Upper Egypt) under a native Pharaoh by the name of Hugronaphor in 207 BCE, three years before the death of Ptolemy IV. At the same time, the Ptolemaic government and even culture began to change also with a growing Egyptian influence as more and more native Egyptians began finding places in Ptolemaic government and influencing the governance and culture of Egypt as a whole over time. Thirdly, the war with the Seleucid Empire brought to the fore another problem, that of money. For the next 80 years Egypt would be plagued by financial difficulties, worsened by occasional conflicts with the Seleucids and by native revolts such as that of Hugronaphor. As such, by the time Ptolemy IV died in 204 BCE and was succeeded by his 5-year old son Ptolemy V, the stage was already set for political and financial chaos. Surrounding Ptolemy were both the royal family and his Greek ministers, below whom were the rising class of Egyptian ministers. Beyond the confines of Alexandria, the Egyptian revolt seemed to grow ever more as time went on, even after the death of Hugronaphor in 199 BCE and the accession of Ankhmakis to the throne of the revolt. Within two years, Ankhmakis had reached Lykopolis and at the height of the revolt may have held as much as 80% of Egypt. Whilst Antiochus remained distracted with internal problems, Ptolemy was safe from the North but by the mid to late 190s, the days of the Ptolemies seemed increasingly doomed. Enter the Barcids. Now, in truth, the revolt was probably put down more by Ptolemaic than Barcid money and soldiers but it is important to note that by 188 BCE, at least, there was some Barcid involvement in Egyptian affairs. Our records only tell us of funds sent to the Ptolemaic government and a later record mentions 1000 Sicilians fighting at the Battle of Thebes and so the help was probably quite small, the Barcid trade and political network had yet to reach its height in 188 BCE and this was still before the First Carthaginian Civil War (182-180). Nevertheless, the point still stands. By 185 BCE, the revolt had been crushed and Ankhmakis captured and executed. But the trends that had been started couldn't be reversed and the rebellion had only worsened the financial difficulties Ptolemaic Egypt was in by the 180s.
Behind the throne, the political battles continued. Fearing for their position, the predominantly Greek ministers found themselves besieged on two fronts, by Cleopatra I (the daughter of Antiochus) whom they distrusted as potentially helping Antiochus influence Ptolemy and the Egyptian ministers rising through the ranks who now sought ever higher positions and whom they felt might displace them. Not to mention, the memory of Ankhmakis' revolt still loomed large and the Greek ministers now found themselves increasingly at odds with the Egyptians, distrusting and fearing them as potential rebels or simply replacements. As the 190s and 180s continued, the battles over Ptolemy V grew ever fiercer, as Cleopatra, the Greek ministers and the Egyptian ministers all sought to influence Ptolemy to their own ends, largely for selfish reasons such as rising through the ranks. The mutual fear provided some solidarity amongst the groups of ministers but their self-interest made things worse, threatening to pit them against one another as each sought to advance his own ends against those of his rivals. Inevitably, these political battles taking place behind the throne only grew more heated when Ptolemy died in 181 BCE leaving his 3 year old son Ptolemy VI to another regency. The kingdom was paralysed, no foreign nor domestic policy could take place whatsoever whilst ministers battled amongst themselves, in what might be seen as only too similar to the divided government that would plague the 130s and 120s in Carthage and had culminated in a civil war. At the same time, the borders of Egypt were pushed ever further to the brink, in the 190s Antiochus retook much of Syria and Judaea and pushed on into Ptolemaic territories overseas in Anatolia and even Cyprus whilst Philip V of Macedon moved against Ptolemaic islands and territories back in mainland Greece. Throughout the 180s, Antiochus fought elsewhere mostly, securing his position in Asia Minor and elsewhere in his empire but by the end of the decade had pushed his borders to the edge of the Sinai Desert and even launched raids against Egyptian towns and cities in the peninsula, sending ships along the Red Sea to attack Ptolemaic settlements along the coast.
Now in his 60s, Antiochus resolved to launch one final attempt to Egypt in the early 170s and led a huge army through the Sinai Desert against the Delta. At this point, it must have seemed like Egypt was doomed. Faced with civil unrest, paralysed internally by divisions and faced with a divided regency for a young Ptolemy VI, Antiochus seemed only to need to actually take the country. Once again, however, motivated by self-interest and pointing to the invasion as a threat both to native Egyptians (who would never be able to fend off the Seleucids themselves) and the Greek ministers, the regents came together, exorcising Cleopatra from the government and spiriting Ptolemy away to their own control and raising an army. Facing a critical financial problem, the Ptolemies turned to the Barcids, offering them favourable trading rights in return for financial and military assistance. In turn, the Barcids were only too willing to help and sent a massive sum of gold as well as 10,000 mercenaries and 40 ships to help the Ptolemies against the Seleucids. With Barcid help, the Ptolemies found themselves yet again able to drive off Antiochus, defeating him at the Battle of the Sinai and repelling him back into Gaza. In turn, however, a counterattack fell apart as soon as it was proposed, neither the Greeks nor the Egyptians wanting to leave Egypt for fear of being undermined by their rivals back home as soon as they left and refusing to make the hard trip across the desert to attack the Seleucids. Instead, the regency now sent emissaries, offering to pay tribute to Antiochus and confirm him in his rule of everything North of the Sinai including the Anatolian territories he had seized previously. As an added incentive, Ptolemy would marry Antiochus' granddaughter Nysa (the daughter of Antiochus' son and heir Antiochus). Only three years later, in 174 BCE, Antochus III died at the age of 67 after a reign of 48 years and left the throne to his 47 year old son Antiochus IV.
Back in Egypt, the Battle of the Sinai reverberated through Egyptian politics, as the fragile union fell apart in internal matters, Cleopatra sought to return to favour and restore her own control over the young Ptolemy VI, in turn removing the Greek ministers who sought to edge her out of politics. From her 'retirement' in the Faiyum Oasis, she sent messengers to the Barcids, offering them greater trade rights in Alexandria as well as other areas of Egypt in return for assistance in reestablishing her control over the court. Knowing that the Barcids had the funds and military power to ensure she could take control, Cleopatra's choice to involve the Barcids in internal politics would prove itself a dangerous precedent for future Ptolemaic kings and their regents over the last few decades of Ptolemaic history. Nevertheless, the scheme worked marvellously. Backed up by 8000 Iberian mercenaries, Cleopatra stormed back into Alexandria, seized Ptolemy and had the 11 year old king proclaim her rightful regent, then using her authority to have a number of powerful ministers arrested on charges of treason. Cleopatra would in turn remain regent for the final four years of Ptolemy's regency until he took the throne in his own right in 170 BCE. However, his reign in turn would be both short and dominated mostly by his mother coming to a bloody and sudden end in 162 BCE when his younger brother, now taking the name Ptolemy VII sided with the surviving Greek ministers and, using Barcid soldiers once again, took the throne for himself. Ptolemy VII, only 20 when he took the throne, was determined to be a step apart from his predecessor and to asser his authority in his own right. To this end, he saw two major threats to his position, on one side were the Greek ministers who now sought to impose their own control over Ptolemy and on the other the now deposed Cleopatra and Ptolemy VI as well as the Barcids who, under Cleopatra, had formed a powerful and wealthy Carthaginian trading community on the outskirts of Alexandria and had already made themselves known in Ptolemaic politics twice whilst accruing a number of privileges such as reduced tolls on shipping and goods as well as the right to trade throughout certain regions of Egypt in their own right. At the same time, by the late 160s, the Seleucid Empire (now under the rule of the 20 year old Seleucus IV, Antiochus IV's son born in 181 BCE) now had its eyes set once more upon Egypt. Internally as well, the Battle of the Sinai had created another wave of dissent amongst native Egyptians and periodic revolts had broken out across the country over the last 14 years.
Deprived of both manpower and sustainable finances and facing the Seleucid Empire at its height, Ptolemy turned to the only source of both finances and manpower he had available to strengthen his armies and, however reluctantly, struck up yet another deal with the Barcids. The problem was that the Barcids couldn't be avoided, they were too valuable a source of soldiers and money for the Ptolemies and until various external and internal threats had been dealt with, Ptolemy had no recourse to oppose them. Announcing his intention to march against the Seleucids himself (possibly in an attempt to free himself from the clutches of his ministers), Ptolemy raised an army of 50,000 including a core of an astonishing 20,000 Barcid mercenaries and swept out against Seleucus. Ptolemy VII was, in many ways, the last chance of the dynasty to save itself. A skilled general and a wily politician, he was a league apart from his predecessors in both his ability and will to turn the tide in favour of Egypt. Leading a gruelling march across the Sinai, he launched a surprise attack on Seleucus' cities and territories in Judaea, ravaging his way North and meeting the Seleucids at the Battle of Tyre where he won a famous victory over Seleucus, forcing the king to repay vast amounts of money in war indemnities and return a series of Judaean cities to the Ptolemies in return for peace. With this money, Ptolemy turned back to his internal issues, paying off the debt his state had owned to the Barcids ever since the treaty signed under his predecessor had forced the Ptolemies to take out loans from the Barcids to pay for both the war and the indemnities they had owed to the Seleucids. Returning to Egypt, Ptolemy began his campaigns against internal dissent, marching South and brutally crushing a revolt in Upper Egypt before returning to Alexandria in glory. Only two weeks later, the young Ptolemy was dead, poisoned at a banquet with the culprits never found. Realising that a strong king might pose a threat to their own position and authority in Egypt, it makes sense that Barcids were likely involved in the assassination of Ptolemy but the other culprits have gone entirely unidentified, whether or not they were dissenting Greek ministers realising their control was fading or even agents on behalf of Cleopatra.
Within weeks, however, Cleopatra was back, helped, once again, by the same Barcid mercenaries she had used before and who had helped depose her in turn. The reinstatement of Ptolemy VI after the death of his brother marked the point at which the Ptolemies lost any real hope of a restoration of their fortunes. Now the Barcids gained in Egypt by leaps and bounds. from 159 BCE (when Cleopatra retook Egypt) through to 155 BCE, the Barcids became ever more involved in internal politics, acting as power brokers between various feuding ministers and providing their military forces for Cleopatra in return for greater political and financial rights. The turning point came in 154 BCE when Cleopatra died at the age of 58 in Alexandria and the young Ptolemy was left to be fought over by the feuding ministers. Suddenly, there was a way forward for the Barcids. Rather than propping up Cleopatra as a puppet, they would take the position of the puppet masters themselves, using a Greek minister by the name of Andronicus as their own front and through him manipulating Ptolemy who had sunk further into vice and ignorance under Cleopatra's domination. By 152 BCE, Seleucus was ready to try again and led an invasion down the coast of Palestine, defeating a Barcid-Egyptian army near Meggido and invading Gaza and Sinai. At the same time, the Ptolemies were being pressed, too, by their erstwhile allies the Barcids in the West. Over the course of the 150s, the Barcids had built up trading communities as existed at Alexandria in many of the Libyan cities under Ptolemaic domination (including Cyrene) which culminated in 154 BCE with a series of coups resulting in the accession of a series of puppet governments, thus bringing the coast of Libya directly under Barcid control. Thus it might be said that the Barcids, at their height, had an empire covering not just Iberia, Africa and Sicily but influenced much more beyond that including most of Italy and even Egypt.
Through Andronicus, the Barcids effectively controlled the Egyptian government. This, in turn, created a whole plethora of new problems. A dependent Ptolemaic Egypt was both a financial and an administrative drain, bolstered only by their financial gains made in the country through favourable trade and agreements elsewhere. Not only did the Barcids have to deal with rival ministers, but also internal dissent and foreign invasion and Andronicus himself was by no means strong enough to deal with them directly. Within two years, Andronicus had been overthrown by a palace coup as the Greek and Egyptian ministers joined forces to remove Barcid control of central government. After the Barcids mobilised no fewer than 8000 soldiers and threatened to storm the city, the ministers finally came to the negotiating table. Egypt was a step too far and the last two years had shown that, the administrative and financial resources needed to maintain any direct control were too much for even the Barcids and so they agreed to step down from direct involvement in the rule of the kingdom in return for a confirmation of their trading privileges as well as the right to maintain a permanent military garrison in their trading town (known to some locals at the time as Barcopolis), in turn, their Egyptian magistrate would be allowed to consult directly with the central government. As such, the Barcids maintained an arm in the game of Egyptian politics whilst not involving themselves too directly to have to fully get involved. Trade wise, by the end of the 150s, the Barcids had become a dominant force in Egyptian finances. They imported vast amounts of goods from the rest of their empire, gold, silver, tin and luxury items as well, in return buying up grain and wheat and selling it for a profit elsewhere. Increasingly, they also came to play an important part in the spice trade and Barcid ships were already known to be sailing the Red Sea as early as 163 BCE. Importing spices from India and the East, the Barcids would transport them by land across Egypt towards Barcopolis or Alexandria from which they would sail them to Carthage for distribution and sale across the rest of the Western Mediterranean. However, this was soon joined by other routes through the Eastern Mediterranean to Cyprus, Anatolia, Greece and even up into the Black Sea.
With huge trading privileges and a deal of political influence, the Barcids began flaunting their immense wealth openly in Egypt, knocking others out the competition and coming to dominate more and more trade throughout the country. By the end of the 140s, there were Carthaginian merchant caravans crisscrossing Egypt, buying up goods and selling them on at a profit elsewhere. For many, this was a step too far. Not the fact that they gained trade privileges, but that they so easily knocked others out the competition, bankrupting them with lower prices or simply being able to export such larger quantities that few could keep up. As with the Senatorial troops of the Third Civil War, the Barcids were seen as foreign invaders, controlling Ptolemaic government, dominating their trade routes and economy and slowly taking over the country for their own ends whilst impoverishing natives. Thus, throughout the 150s and 140s, there were a series of native revolts in Egypt against both the Barcids and the Ptolemies, seeking to restore native pharaohs to the country and remove the foreign oppressors. More and more, the Barcids invested in Egypt. It was a gold mine of sorts, making them a fortune from spice and luxury goods as well as their own imports in to the country of wine, metals and their own luxury goods. But the costs continued to mount. Seleucus seemed to be funding native revolts from abroad, funnelling weapons and encroaching on Egyptian territory. Ironically, the more the Ptolemies became dependent on the Barcids, the more the Ptolemies cost the Barcids. As with elsewhere, this wasn't an issue so long as they maintained their control over the economy and continued making a fortune, but as soon as their economic and political control failed, it could be disastrous.
At last, in 145 BCE, the beginning of the end. Seleucus launched a large invasion of the Sinai, defeating a joint Barcid-Egyptian army and advancing into the Nile Valley, ravaging the Delta and meeting up with his native allies down near Memphis before finally being forced to pull back as his supply lines threatened to be cut by the Barcid navy. He retreated but held on to the Sinai Peninsula. The economy of the Ptolemaic kingdom was devastated as the state began to descend into revolt. Now under the rule of Ptolemy VIII (at least in name), the Ptolemaic Kingdom began to spiral out of control. The native revolt spread, encouraged by Seleucus (a wily diplomat at the best of times) and by 142 BCE had taken everything South of the Delta. Despite this, a series of small victories would maintain the rump Ptolemaic state for another three years until the collapse of the Barcids in 139 BCE. With the loss of Carthage that year, the Barcids seemed weaker than ever and their enemies moved like lightning. Needing whatever forces they could martial, the Barcids pulled out almost all of their Egyptian army, leaving only 4500 soldiers there to join up with the Ptolemies to maintain their position. No longer threatened by the Barcid fleet, Seleucus swept in to the North, advancing on Memphis and taking the city after a short siege before sweeping up towards Alexandria and capturing the city, defeating what remained of the Barcid force with their Egyptian allies at Barcopolis in a last stand. Ptolemy VIII would actually survive the ordeal, being forcibly retired to an estate near Antioch. The Barcid magistrate was not so lucky, nor were the mercenaries. Seleucus had all of them executed only a week after the Battle of Barcopolis, marking the end of the Ptolemaic Kingdom as an independent entity.
With the destruction of the Ptolemies in 139 BCE, the question arose of what exactly should be done with Egypt. Seleucus wanted to restore Greek control, that isn't in doubt, but the mismanagement of the Ptolemies in the last 6 decades and the memory of the Barcids as foreign oppressors as well as the presence of an armed and dangerous revolt controlling much of the country seemed to make that impossible. Instead, a different political arrangement had to be reached in the region. Realising direct rule was not an option by any means at the moment, Seleucus instead opted for a more indirect domination of the newly founded Egyptian state. As such, an agreement drawn up in early 138 BCE recognised this. Seleucus would maintain rule over Sinai and everything North or East of that, he would also maintain control over Alexandria and portions of the Delta, his territory being recognised by Egypt to include Libya as far as Cyrene. The rest of Upper and Lower Egypt would, in turn, belong to the new native state, existing de facto as pretty much a vassal state of the Seleucids, following them in foreign policy and often paying what amounted to a tribute to Seleucus. Determined to mark a new glorious start in the name of the previous kingdoms of Egypt, the new Pharaoh took Thebes for his capital in the South and the name Ahmose III, comparing himself to the founder of the famous 18th Dynasty, thought by many to have been the golden age of Egypt.
For the Ptolemies, the 2nd Century BCE was one of almost perpetual decline, culminating in their defeat and destruction by the Seleucids in the 130s, it was also a period in which their foreign policy would bring them ever more into the clutches of the Barcid family as time went on. It was a period marked by internal strife, by political dissent and chaos, rebellion and a cultural and political movement that not even the Seleucids would be able to entirely suppress once they came to power in Egypt. It was also a period in which the demographic and trade makeup of Egypt as a whole would change quite significantly as the Barcids edged ever closer to almost total domination of the weak kings of Ptolemaic Egypt as the century moved onward. In effect, the historical processes pushing the Ptolemies towards their eventual destruction had started at around the same time our story started, about a year before Hannibal's victory at Cannae in 217 BCE. For our historical record, this year is important for one event in particular. Under the leadership of Antiochus III 'the Great', the Seleucids launched an invasion of Coele-Syria and Judaea in 217 BCE, taking advantage of the weakness of the young Ptolemy IV of Egypt. To say Ptolemy was weak is actually an understatement, his rule was characterised by the almost total domination of the powerful ministers of state, men (and sometimes women of the royal family) who played on his indulgences and vices to control the young king and steer the throne from behind the scenes. In name, he was Pharaoh and ruled over all Egypt but that position merely masked a treacherous game of politics being played out between powerful advisers and ministers, each fighting to control and maintain control of the throne. It might have been expected that this weakness would have effectively doomed Ptolemaic Egypt and, indeed, it came close. What saved it in the end was little more than self-interest, determined to protect their position as effective rulers of Egypt, the ministers behind Ptolemy banded together and raised an army of as many as 75,000 men, the core of which was largely Egyptian rather than Greek, to make up for a lack of Greek manpower to form a proper phalanx. As a result, 30,000 Egyptians had been drafted to form much of the infantry core of the army and, in turn, had distinguished themselves impressively against their Seleucid foes, the Egyptian army ultimately prevailing and driving Antiochus' forces from the field, inflicting over 14,000 casualties.
Raphia is a key moment in our timeline because of this Egyptian phalanx. Unlike previous armies which had had a large Greek contingent at their core, the Ptolemaic army of Raphia had had to rely upon a large basis of Egyptian soldiers with a corresponding growth in self-confidence, especially as it had required the arming of a large portion of the Egyptian population. Resenting Greek domination, the Egyptians rose in revolt in the South (Upper Egypt) under a native Pharaoh by the name of Hugronaphor in 207 BCE, three years before the death of Ptolemy IV. At the same time, the Ptolemaic government and even culture began to change also with a growing Egyptian influence as more and more native Egyptians began finding places in Ptolemaic government and influencing the governance and culture of Egypt as a whole over time. Thirdly, the war with the Seleucid Empire brought to the fore another problem, that of money. For the next 80 years Egypt would be plagued by financial difficulties, worsened by occasional conflicts with the Seleucids and by native revolts such as that of Hugronaphor. As such, by the time Ptolemy IV died in 204 BCE and was succeeded by his 5-year old son Ptolemy V, the stage was already set for political and financial chaos. Surrounding Ptolemy were both the royal family and his Greek ministers, below whom were the rising class of Egyptian ministers. Beyond the confines of Alexandria, the Egyptian revolt seemed to grow ever more as time went on, even after the death of Hugronaphor in 199 BCE and the accession of Ankhmakis to the throne of the revolt. Within two years, Ankhmakis had reached Lykopolis and at the height of the revolt may have held as much as 80% of Egypt. Whilst Antiochus remained distracted with internal problems, Ptolemy was safe from the North but by the mid to late 190s, the days of the Ptolemies seemed increasingly doomed. Enter the Barcids. Now, in truth, the revolt was probably put down more by Ptolemaic than Barcid money and soldiers but it is important to note that by 188 BCE, at least, there was some Barcid involvement in Egyptian affairs. Our records only tell us of funds sent to the Ptolemaic government and a later record mentions 1000 Sicilians fighting at the Battle of Thebes and so the help was probably quite small, the Barcid trade and political network had yet to reach its height in 188 BCE and this was still before the First Carthaginian Civil War (182-180). Nevertheless, the point still stands. By 185 BCE, the revolt had been crushed and Ankhmakis captured and executed. But the trends that had been started couldn't be reversed and the rebellion had only worsened the financial difficulties Ptolemaic Egypt was in by the 180s.
Behind the throne, the political battles continued. Fearing for their position, the predominantly Greek ministers found themselves besieged on two fronts, by Cleopatra I (the daughter of Antiochus) whom they distrusted as potentially helping Antiochus influence Ptolemy and the Egyptian ministers rising through the ranks who now sought ever higher positions and whom they felt might displace them. Not to mention, the memory of Ankhmakis' revolt still loomed large and the Greek ministers now found themselves increasingly at odds with the Egyptians, distrusting and fearing them as potential rebels or simply replacements. As the 190s and 180s continued, the battles over Ptolemy V grew ever fiercer, as Cleopatra, the Greek ministers and the Egyptian ministers all sought to influence Ptolemy to their own ends, largely for selfish reasons such as rising through the ranks. The mutual fear provided some solidarity amongst the groups of ministers but their self-interest made things worse, threatening to pit them against one another as each sought to advance his own ends against those of his rivals. Inevitably, these political battles taking place behind the throne only grew more heated when Ptolemy died in 181 BCE leaving his 3 year old son Ptolemy VI to another regency. The kingdom was paralysed, no foreign nor domestic policy could take place whatsoever whilst ministers battled amongst themselves, in what might be seen as only too similar to the divided government that would plague the 130s and 120s in Carthage and had culminated in a civil war. At the same time, the borders of Egypt were pushed ever further to the brink, in the 190s Antiochus retook much of Syria and Judaea and pushed on into Ptolemaic territories overseas in Anatolia and even Cyprus whilst Philip V of Macedon moved against Ptolemaic islands and territories back in mainland Greece. Throughout the 180s, Antiochus fought elsewhere mostly, securing his position in Asia Minor and elsewhere in his empire but by the end of the decade had pushed his borders to the edge of the Sinai Desert and even launched raids against Egyptian towns and cities in the peninsula, sending ships along the Red Sea to attack Ptolemaic settlements along the coast.
Now in his 60s, Antiochus resolved to launch one final attempt to Egypt in the early 170s and led a huge army through the Sinai Desert against the Delta. At this point, it must have seemed like Egypt was doomed. Faced with civil unrest, paralysed internally by divisions and faced with a divided regency for a young Ptolemy VI, Antiochus seemed only to need to actually take the country. Once again, however, motivated by self-interest and pointing to the invasion as a threat both to native Egyptians (who would never be able to fend off the Seleucids themselves) and the Greek ministers, the regents came together, exorcising Cleopatra from the government and spiriting Ptolemy away to their own control and raising an army. Facing a critical financial problem, the Ptolemies turned to the Barcids, offering them favourable trading rights in return for financial and military assistance. In turn, the Barcids were only too willing to help and sent a massive sum of gold as well as 10,000 mercenaries and 40 ships to help the Ptolemies against the Seleucids. With Barcid help, the Ptolemies found themselves yet again able to drive off Antiochus, defeating him at the Battle of the Sinai and repelling him back into Gaza. In turn, however, a counterattack fell apart as soon as it was proposed, neither the Greeks nor the Egyptians wanting to leave Egypt for fear of being undermined by their rivals back home as soon as they left and refusing to make the hard trip across the desert to attack the Seleucids. Instead, the regency now sent emissaries, offering to pay tribute to Antiochus and confirm him in his rule of everything North of the Sinai including the Anatolian territories he had seized previously. As an added incentive, Ptolemy would marry Antiochus' granddaughter Nysa (the daughter of Antiochus' son and heir Antiochus). Only three years later, in 174 BCE, Antochus III died at the age of 67 after a reign of 48 years and left the throne to his 47 year old son Antiochus IV.
Back in Egypt, the Battle of the Sinai reverberated through Egyptian politics, as the fragile union fell apart in internal matters, Cleopatra sought to return to favour and restore her own control over the young Ptolemy VI, in turn removing the Greek ministers who sought to edge her out of politics. From her 'retirement' in the Faiyum Oasis, she sent messengers to the Barcids, offering them greater trade rights in Alexandria as well as other areas of Egypt in return for assistance in reestablishing her control over the court. Knowing that the Barcids had the funds and military power to ensure she could take control, Cleopatra's choice to involve the Barcids in internal politics would prove itself a dangerous precedent for future Ptolemaic kings and their regents over the last few decades of Ptolemaic history. Nevertheless, the scheme worked marvellously. Backed up by 8000 Iberian mercenaries, Cleopatra stormed back into Alexandria, seized Ptolemy and had the 11 year old king proclaim her rightful regent, then using her authority to have a number of powerful ministers arrested on charges of treason. Cleopatra would in turn remain regent for the final four years of Ptolemy's regency until he took the throne in his own right in 170 BCE. However, his reign in turn would be both short and dominated mostly by his mother coming to a bloody and sudden end in 162 BCE when his younger brother, now taking the name Ptolemy VII sided with the surviving Greek ministers and, using Barcid soldiers once again, took the throne for himself. Ptolemy VII, only 20 when he took the throne, was determined to be a step apart from his predecessor and to asser his authority in his own right. To this end, he saw two major threats to his position, on one side were the Greek ministers who now sought to impose their own control over Ptolemy and on the other the now deposed Cleopatra and Ptolemy VI as well as the Barcids who, under Cleopatra, had formed a powerful and wealthy Carthaginian trading community on the outskirts of Alexandria and had already made themselves known in Ptolemaic politics twice whilst accruing a number of privileges such as reduced tolls on shipping and goods as well as the right to trade throughout certain regions of Egypt in their own right. At the same time, by the late 160s, the Seleucid Empire (now under the rule of the 20 year old Seleucus IV, Antiochus IV's son born in 181 BCE) now had its eyes set once more upon Egypt. Internally as well, the Battle of the Sinai had created another wave of dissent amongst native Egyptians and periodic revolts had broken out across the country over the last 14 years.
Deprived of both manpower and sustainable finances and facing the Seleucid Empire at its height, Ptolemy turned to the only source of both finances and manpower he had available to strengthen his armies and, however reluctantly, struck up yet another deal with the Barcids. The problem was that the Barcids couldn't be avoided, they were too valuable a source of soldiers and money for the Ptolemies and until various external and internal threats had been dealt with, Ptolemy had no recourse to oppose them. Announcing his intention to march against the Seleucids himself (possibly in an attempt to free himself from the clutches of his ministers), Ptolemy raised an army of 50,000 including a core of an astonishing 20,000 Barcid mercenaries and swept out against Seleucus. Ptolemy VII was, in many ways, the last chance of the dynasty to save itself. A skilled general and a wily politician, he was a league apart from his predecessors in both his ability and will to turn the tide in favour of Egypt. Leading a gruelling march across the Sinai, he launched a surprise attack on Seleucus' cities and territories in Judaea, ravaging his way North and meeting the Seleucids at the Battle of Tyre where he won a famous victory over Seleucus, forcing the king to repay vast amounts of money in war indemnities and return a series of Judaean cities to the Ptolemies in return for peace. With this money, Ptolemy turned back to his internal issues, paying off the debt his state had owned to the Barcids ever since the treaty signed under his predecessor had forced the Ptolemies to take out loans from the Barcids to pay for both the war and the indemnities they had owed to the Seleucids. Returning to Egypt, Ptolemy began his campaigns against internal dissent, marching South and brutally crushing a revolt in Upper Egypt before returning to Alexandria in glory. Only two weeks later, the young Ptolemy was dead, poisoned at a banquet with the culprits never found. Realising that a strong king might pose a threat to their own position and authority in Egypt, it makes sense that Barcids were likely involved in the assassination of Ptolemy but the other culprits have gone entirely unidentified, whether or not they were dissenting Greek ministers realising their control was fading or even agents on behalf of Cleopatra.
Within weeks, however, Cleopatra was back, helped, once again, by the same Barcid mercenaries she had used before and who had helped depose her in turn. The reinstatement of Ptolemy VI after the death of his brother marked the point at which the Ptolemies lost any real hope of a restoration of their fortunes. Now the Barcids gained in Egypt by leaps and bounds. from 159 BCE (when Cleopatra retook Egypt) through to 155 BCE, the Barcids became ever more involved in internal politics, acting as power brokers between various feuding ministers and providing their military forces for Cleopatra in return for greater political and financial rights. The turning point came in 154 BCE when Cleopatra died at the age of 58 in Alexandria and the young Ptolemy was left to be fought over by the feuding ministers. Suddenly, there was a way forward for the Barcids. Rather than propping up Cleopatra as a puppet, they would take the position of the puppet masters themselves, using a Greek minister by the name of Andronicus as their own front and through him manipulating Ptolemy who had sunk further into vice and ignorance under Cleopatra's domination. By 152 BCE, Seleucus was ready to try again and led an invasion down the coast of Palestine, defeating a Barcid-Egyptian army near Meggido and invading Gaza and Sinai. At the same time, the Ptolemies were being pressed, too, by their erstwhile allies the Barcids in the West. Over the course of the 150s, the Barcids had built up trading communities as existed at Alexandria in many of the Libyan cities under Ptolemaic domination (including Cyrene) which culminated in 154 BCE with a series of coups resulting in the accession of a series of puppet governments, thus bringing the coast of Libya directly under Barcid control. Thus it might be said that the Barcids, at their height, had an empire covering not just Iberia, Africa and Sicily but influenced much more beyond that including most of Italy and even Egypt.
Through Andronicus, the Barcids effectively controlled the Egyptian government. This, in turn, created a whole plethora of new problems. A dependent Ptolemaic Egypt was both a financial and an administrative drain, bolstered only by their financial gains made in the country through favourable trade and agreements elsewhere. Not only did the Barcids have to deal with rival ministers, but also internal dissent and foreign invasion and Andronicus himself was by no means strong enough to deal with them directly. Within two years, Andronicus had been overthrown by a palace coup as the Greek and Egyptian ministers joined forces to remove Barcid control of central government. After the Barcids mobilised no fewer than 8000 soldiers and threatened to storm the city, the ministers finally came to the negotiating table. Egypt was a step too far and the last two years had shown that, the administrative and financial resources needed to maintain any direct control were too much for even the Barcids and so they agreed to step down from direct involvement in the rule of the kingdom in return for a confirmation of their trading privileges as well as the right to maintain a permanent military garrison in their trading town (known to some locals at the time as Barcopolis), in turn, their Egyptian magistrate would be allowed to consult directly with the central government. As such, the Barcids maintained an arm in the game of Egyptian politics whilst not involving themselves too directly to have to fully get involved. Trade wise, by the end of the 150s, the Barcids had become a dominant force in Egyptian finances. They imported vast amounts of goods from the rest of their empire, gold, silver, tin and luxury items as well, in return buying up grain and wheat and selling it for a profit elsewhere. Increasingly, they also came to play an important part in the spice trade and Barcid ships were already known to be sailing the Red Sea as early as 163 BCE. Importing spices from India and the East, the Barcids would transport them by land across Egypt towards Barcopolis or Alexandria from which they would sail them to Carthage for distribution and sale across the rest of the Western Mediterranean. However, this was soon joined by other routes through the Eastern Mediterranean to Cyprus, Anatolia, Greece and even up into the Black Sea.
With huge trading privileges and a deal of political influence, the Barcids began flaunting their immense wealth openly in Egypt, knocking others out the competition and coming to dominate more and more trade throughout the country. By the end of the 140s, there were Carthaginian merchant caravans crisscrossing Egypt, buying up goods and selling them on at a profit elsewhere. For many, this was a step too far. Not the fact that they gained trade privileges, but that they so easily knocked others out the competition, bankrupting them with lower prices or simply being able to export such larger quantities that few could keep up. As with the Senatorial troops of the Third Civil War, the Barcids were seen as foreign invaders, controlling Ptolemaic government, dominating their trade routes and economy and slowly taking over the country for their own ends whilst impoverishing natives. Thus, throughout the 150s and 140s, there were a series of native revolts in Egypt against both the Barcids and the Ptolemies, seeking to restore native pharaohs to the country and remove the foreign oppressors. More and more, the Barcids invested in Egypt. It was a gold mine of sorts, making them a fortune from spice and luxury goods as well as their own imports in to the country of wine, metals and their own luxury goods. But the costs continued to mount. Seleucus seemed to be funding native revolts from abroad, funnelling weapons and encroaching on Egyptian territory. Ironically, the more the Ptolemies became dependent on the Barcids, the more the Ptolemies cost the Barcids. As with elsewhere, this wasn't an issue so long as they maintained their control over the economy and continued making a fortune, but as soon as their economic and political control failed, it could be disastrous.
At last, in 145 BCE, the beginning of the end. Seleucus launched a large invasion of the Sinai, defeating a joint Barcid-Egyptian army and advancing into the Nile Valley, ravaging the Delta and meeting up with his native allies down near Memphis before finally being forced to pull back as his supply lines threatened to be cut by the Barcid navy. He retreated but held on to the Sinai Peninsula. The economy of the Ptolemaic kingdom was devastated as the state began to descend into revolt. Now under the rule of Ptolemy VIII (at least in name), the Ptolemaic Kingdom began to spiral out of control. The native revolt spread, encouraged by Seleucus (a wily diplomat at the best of times) and by 142 BCE had taken everything South of the Delta. Despite this, a series of small victories would maintain the rump Ptolemaic state for another three years until the collapse of the Barcids in 139 BCE. With the loss of Carthage that year, the Barcids seemed weaker than ever and their enemies moved like lightning. Needing whatever forces they could martial, the Barcids pulled out almost all of their Egyptian army, leaving only 4500 soldiers there to join up with the Ptolemies to maintain their position. No longer threatened by the Barcid fleet, Seleucus swept in to the North, advancing on Memphis and taking the city after a short siege before sweeping up towards Alexandria and capturing the city, defeating what remained of the Barcid force with their Egyptian allies at Barcopolis in a last stand. Ptolemy VIII would actually survive the ordeal, being forcibly retired to an estate near Antioch. The Barcid magistrate was not so lucky, nor were the mercenaries. Seleucus had all of them executed only a week after the Battle of Barcopolis, marking the end of the Ptolemaic Kingdom as an independent entity.
With the destruction of the Ptolemies in 139 BCE, the question arose of what exactly should be done with Egypt. Seleucus wanted to restore Greek control, that isn't in doubt, but the mismanagement of the Ptolemies in the last 6 decades and the memory of the Barcids as foreign oppressors as well as the presence of an armed and dangerous revolt controlling much of the country seemed to make that impossible. Instead, a different political arrangement had to be reached in the region. Realising direct rule was not an option by any means at the moment, Seleucus instead opted for a more indirect domination of the newly founded Egyptian state. As such, an agreement drawn up in early 138 BCE recognised this. Seleucus would maintain rule over Sinai and everything North or East of that, he would also maintain control over Alexandria and portions of the Delta, his territory being recognised by Egypt to include Libya as far as Cyrene. The rest of Upper and Lower Egypt would, in turn, belong to the new native state, existing de facto as pretty much a vassal state of the Seleucids, following them in foreign policy and often paying what amounted to a tribute to Seleucus. Determined to mark a new glorious start in the name of the previous kingdoms of Egypt, the new Pharaoh took Thebes for his capital in the South and the name Ahmose III, comparing himself to the founder of the famous 18th Dynasty, thought by many to have been the golden age of Egypt.
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Interesting update... Egypt has the first native dynasty since the Persian conquest that was succeeded by the Macedonian/Ptolemaic, even if they must submit to the Seleucid hegemony, this it's a great achievement.
But, I think that the native cultural and political reaction would be limited to the above mentioned political situation and because the Hellenic culture would keep its influence throughout the Greek minority and the Hellenized native Egyptian.
Beside that the political freedom of action of the new Pharaoh, surely would be quite limited.
Because, I guess that, he would be pressed by the more radical native factions (that probably would be pushing for more and deeper reforms and/or action against the Ptolemaic regime remnants or the Hellenistic culture) On the other hand by his needy to not antagonizing to the Seleucid in order to maintain their rule and the continued independence of Egypt.
Of course, this will be a supervised independence under the Seleucid tutelage, but rather better than the back to a full foreign rule and for the new Pharaoh and his successors would remain a last hope that if the Seleucid would be weakened and/or defeated by some enemy then Egypt would be able to finally, freed from the foreign rule.
But, I think that the native cultural and political reaction would be limited to the above mentioned political situation and because the Hellenic culture would keep its influence throughout the Greek minority and the Hellenized native Egyptian.
Beside that the political freedom of action of the new Pharaoh, surely would be quite limited.
Because, I guess that, he would be pressed by the more radical native factions (that probably would be pushing for more and deeper reforms and/or action against the Ptolemaic regime remnants or the Hellenistic culture) On the other hand by his needy to not antagonizing to the Seleucid in order to maintain their rule and the continued independence of Egypt.
Of course, this will be a supervised independence under the Seleucid tutelage, but rather better than the back to a full foreign rule and for the new Pharaoh and his successors would remain a last hope that if the Seleucid would be weakened and/or defeated by some enemy then Egypt would be able to finally, freed from the foreign rule.
The thing is, under both the Persians and the Greeks and even the Romans there were a number of native Egyptian revolts so, given the mismanagement and the arrival of what the Egyptians see as foreign oppressors in the form of the economically taxing Barcids, I feel that Egypt is too angry at the moment to be really governable for the Seleucids. The way I see it, there are going to be some interesting demographic changes from this. For one, Alexandria is a Greek safe zone under Seleucid rule so any attempts at retribution by the Egyptians may drive them North to Alexandria or into Gaza and Syria especially with, as you say, more radical nativist factions. Ahmose has a big job, he needs to unite the native state and protect its independence as best he can and for the moment he has to rely upon the Seleucids for that, though it isn't going to be popular. He does have one major advantage though, some very valuable trade routes pass through his lands, trade routes both the Barcids and Seleucids have been utilising so he is going to have some huge economic benefits from those.
Chapter XVI: Spices and Silks
Chapter XVI: Spices and Silks
Just as it had under the Barcids in the west, trade flourished during the 2nd Century BCE in the Eastern Mediterranean. From olive oil to gold and spices, vast amounts of goods flowed through these waters and over land every year, spreading wealth on a massive scale as the century went on and even outlasting the prosperity of the Western Mediterranean by a good while. For the Barcids, the centrepiece of this trade was actually not in the East but the West. Any trade going by sea to the Western Mediterranean had to pass through either the Straits of Messana or between Lilybaeum and Carthage and the dominance of Sicily during this period played a huge role in that. Primarily was the Carthage-Alexandria trade route, a good contender for being the single most prosperous trade route of the Barcid empire (rivalled only by the route from Qart Hadasht to Carthage). Along this trade route flowed everything, iron, mercenaries, luxuries, gold and silver from the west and, crucially, spices and silks from the East, as well as vast amounts of grain. Carthage itself became easily the biggest spice market in the Western Mediterranean under the Barcids and huge amounts of spices were exported to Italy, Spain, Africa and Gaul all the time, imported through Egypt in the East. To this end, the Barcid trade privileges were crucial, allowing them to import spices and silks at a significantly lower price and sell them on for a fortune. By the time the Barcids left Egypt, there were Carthaginian merchants sailing along the Red Sea and even an expedition sent in 145 BCE to explore the sea and what lay beyond it organised by the Barcids. Spice flowed in through the Egyptian red sea ports and was taken overland to Alexandria where huge quantities were taken by ship to Carthage. To this end, the Barcids were in communication with the Sabeans and Muscat people of Southern Arabia, often paying their kings to use their fleets to help protect shipments of spice and silk to Egypt. Indeed, the Red Sea and the spice routes became a vital economic battleground between the Barcids and the Seleucids, mostly diplomatic and economic rather than military. At varying points, both states would send ships through the Red Sea to protect their own shipments and make local allies to attack or delay the shipments of their rivals. Indeed, the Seleucids seemed to have their eyes set on exporting spices and silks out of Antioch or other Mediterranean ports and sidelining the Carthaginian-dominated Alexandria. Given their position on the silk road in the North and their greater access to India, the Seleucids proved very successful in the latter, benefiting especially from their access to the Tyrian sources of purple dye and selling silks across the Eastern Mediterranean to Greece, the Black Sea and further West to Italy and Sicily.
Faced with competition in the West, the Seleucids used their position to their advantage, importing spices through the Persian Gulf straight into Mesopotamia rather than bothering with the Red Sea and then taking them overland to Antioch where they could be sold on to the rest of the Mediterranean. At this stage, however, the Seleucids lacked the same access beyond the Eastern Mediterranean where the Barcids had an effectively captive market, one they could control access to at will. Hence why, whilst Seleucid exports went on to Eastern Italy and Sicily, they themselves could never sell silk beyond in the Western Mediterranean whilst the Barcids held out. Instead, the Barcids often increased duties on these goods for anyone but their own merchants beyond these ports, using Syracuse to buy Seleucid silk and selling them on at a profit themselves in Iberia and Africa. With the defeat of the Ptolemies in the early 130s, everything changed, however. Suddenly, the biggest rival of the Seleucids was no more and the spice trade fell almost entirely into their grasp. Under Seleucus IV, a fleet was sent down the Red Sea to circumnavigate Arabia and return up the Persian Gulf towards the end of the 130s. In effect, this was nothing more than a political propaganda mission but it achieved its purpose. The huge display of Seleucid power left no one in any doubt, the Seleucids were the new power here. Now spices flowed into the empire from two points, up the Persian Gulf into Mesopotamia or along the Red Sea and through Ahmose's kingdom. This was where the real disadvantages of the agreement with Seleucus became apparent. Whilst Ahmose made a small fortune selling spice on to Greek communities in the North, he himself couldn't export much beyond that, especially not into the Mediterranean where he only held a relatively short strip of coastline between Alexandria in the West and Pelousion in the East. Yet again, it was Alexandria that benefited. Throughout the rest of the century, Alexandria would compete with Antioch for the main export site for spices in the empire, even as Antioch steadily outstripped the latter for silk exports. In turn, Alexandria quickly became Ahmose's main market for any and all goods. Vast amounts of grain grown along the Nile passed over into Alexandria, flowing through the city into Libya as well in order to help feed the city and the region beyond, even as spice flowed in as well. Soon enough, however, it became apparent that Ahmose had other benefits in his position. For one, the Seleucids' main theatre of operations and interests, despite the fleet of the 130s, remained the Mediterranean Sea, not the Indian Ocean. In turn, Ahmose effectively became the Seleucids' watchdog for the Red Sea towards the end of the 2nd Century BCE, protecting spice routes up the Red Sea and rivalling the Sabeans and Muscat people of Arabia. Even as Ahmose was expected to follow Seleucus' diplomacy elsewhere, he formed his own foreign policy in the Red Sea, one that would be followed by Egyptian rulers even afterwards. Under the pretence of protecting spice routes, Ahmose expanded Egypt's fleet and army, building defensive fortifications along his Southern border and using his fleet to police traffic along the coastlines. This, naturally, led to political conflict with both Saba and Muscat in Arabia and the Kushites and Axumites of Ethiopia.
With a highly militarised populace following the rebellion and political enemies on a number of fronts, Ahmose would launch raids into Nubia and Wawat throughout the 120s and 110s, expanding his access to the gold reserves of Nubia up until his death in 113 BCE and the accession of his son, Ahmose IV. This political and economic success belies a troubled political and demographic situation boiling under the surface of Egypt during the period, something we will return to in later chapters and something that would continue to create frictions between the Seleucids and the Egyptians as time went on. By the end of the century, however, Egypt had become a vital part of the Seleucid trade network, importing vast amounts of spice that passed through to Alexandria along with grain and, just as importantly, gold. In turn, the Seleucids gained immensely, often taking a portion of Ahmose' gold reserves as tribute (owed to them as part of their agreement signed in the 130s) and, in turn, using that gold for their own political ends. Just as it had with the Barcids, the trade position of the Seleucids translated directly in political and military success across the board. But spice and silk weren't the only important resources available to the Seleucids. As mentioned, Tyre produced the famous Tyrian purple dye that was hugely popular amongst Mediterranean rulers and was exported all across the Mediterranean to only the richest rulers and became an almost universal sign of prestige, owing in part to the Barcids who coveted it just as much as anyone. By the end of the century, Tyrian purple was known in Iberia and Gaul just as much as in the Mediterranean world, owing to its association with the power of the Barcids at their height. On a level that was just as important, the Seleucids had access to many of the same resources as their Barcid counterparts and now took a huge step in becoming the most influential trade power in many of these goods, from salt (produced along many of the coastlines of the empire) and grain (produced all across the empire but most notably in Mesopotamia and the regions of the Nile Valley they held), iron, gold, copper (from Cyprus). With the collapse of the Barcids, the Western Mediterranean opened up in a way it hadn't before to the Seleucids and vast amounts of goods were exported, often docking in Carthage before being exported across the rest of the Western Mediterranean (a new Antioch-Carthage route matching the Alexandria-Carthage route).
In turn, the movement of wealth and gold changed its course in the West. Under the Barcids, it had concentrated in Carthage or Qart Hadasht before being distributed through political favours, bribes, armies and mercenaries and a number of other avenues. Primarily, however, the gold had been distributed by the Barcids through their own territories in one way or another. Most commonly was through provisioning. They had to feed their armies, for example, and so used their wealth to buy grain from their own territories, the same for iron and salt, for weapons and armour. The tendency for mercenaries to end up settling down near the Barcids had had a similar effect, concentrating the wealth they paid to the mercenaries near to them. Thus Carthage and Qart Hadasht had grown wealthy whilst gold and silver flowed out of the rest of the Mediterranean, only occasionally coming back in to cities and states elsewhere. In turn, this had actually fuelled the democratic movement somewhat, with people growing angry at the bankrupting of their states as money flowed to the Barcids. Now the trend moved the other way, gold and wealth flowed East primarily towards the Seleucids but in a much more indirect way. Carthage and Qart Hadasht remained important centres of trade with Syracuse and Lilybaeum taking significant roles in Sicily whilst Kroton (which had become an important centre of trade for the Seleucids whilst they couldn't access the Western reaches of Italy) used its now developed trade routes to Capua and the rest of Italy to grow rich off the trade flowing from the East. Now wealth concentrated around local trade centres, Carthage, Qart Hadasht, Syracuse etc. as it always did and always had done with an overall trend of wealth moving East as people and cities bought Seleucid trade goods. It shouldn't be mistake, however, that the Seleucids ever displaced local sources as such. Rome retained its important position in the salt trade as did the Spanish salt mines, Qart Hadasht remained an important source of silver, gold and iron from Iberia. But for rarer goods (and in areas closer to the Seleucids), the gold and silver went East. That said, much the same happened to some degree within the empire itself. As they bought spices and silk to sell on elsewhere, they sent gold and silver in turn East into India. But their dominating position on the nexus of the Silk Road the spice trade paid huge financial dividends for the Seleucids who, as the Barcids waned and collapsed, began to reach the apex of their own power and glory and found themselves within spitting distance of reuniting what Alexander had built, once and for all.
Just as it had under the Barcids in the west, trade flourished during the 2nd Century BCE in the Eastern Mediterranean. From olive oil to gold and spices, vast amounts of goods flowed through these waters and over land every year, spreading wealth on a massive scale as the century went on and even outlasting the prosperity of the Western Mediterranean by a good while. For the Barcids, the centrepiece of this trade was actually not in the East but the West. Any trade going by sea to the Western Mediterranean had to pass through either the Straits of Messana or between Lilybaeum and Carthage and the dominance of Sicily during this period played a huge role in that. Primarily was the Carthage-Alexandria trade route, a good contender for being the single most prosperous trade route of the Barcid empire (rivalled only by the route from Qart Hadasht to Carthage). Along this trade route flowed everything, iron, mercenaries, luxuries, gold and silver from the west and, crucially, spices and silks from the East, as well as vast amounts of grain. Carthage itself became easily the biggest spice market in the Western Mediterranean under the Barcids and huge amounts of spices were exported to Italy, Spain, Africa and Gaul all the time, imported through Egypt in the East. To this end, the Barcid trade privileges were crucial, allowing them to import spices and silks at a significantly lower price and sell them on for a fortune. By the time the Barcids left Egypt, there were Carthaginian merchants sailing along the Red Sea and even an expedition sent in 145 BCE to explore the sea and what lay beyond it organised by the Barcids. Spice flowed in through the Egyptian red sea ports and was taken overland to Alexandria where huge quantities were taken by ship to Carthage. To this end, the Barcids were in communication with the Sabeans and Muscat people of Southern Arabia, often paying their kings to use their fleets to help protect shipments of spice and silk to Egypt. Indeed, the Red Sea and the spice routes became a vital economic battleground between the Barcids and the Seleucids, mostly diplomatic and economic rather than military. At varying points, both states would send ships through the Red Sea to protect their own shipments and make local allies to attack or delay the shipments of their rivals. Indeed, the Seleucids seemed to have their eyes set on exporting spices and silks out of Antioch or other Mediterranean ports and sidelining the Carthaginian-dominated Alexandria. Given their position on the silk road in the North and their greater access to India, the Seleucids proved very successful in the latter, benefiting especially from their access to the Tyrian sources of purple dye and selling silks across the Eastern Mediterranean to Greece, the Black Sea and further West to Italy and Sicily.
Faced with competition in the West, the Seleucids used their position to their advantage, importing spices through the Persian Gulf straight into Mesopotamia rather than bothering with the Red Sea and then taking them overland to Antioch where they could be sold on to the rest of the Mediterranean. At this stage, however, the Seleucids lacked the same access beyond the Eastern Mediterranean where the Barcids had an effectively captive market, one they could control access to at will. Hence why, whilst Seleucid exports went on to Eastern Italy and Sicily, they themselves could never sell silk beyond in the Western Mediterranean whilst the Barcids held out. Instead, the Barcids often increased duties on these goods for anyone but their own merchants beyond these ports, using Syracuse to buy Seleucid silk and selling them on at a profit themselves in Iberia and Africa. With the defeat of the Ptolemies in the early 130s, everything changed, however. Suddenly, the biggest rival of the Seleucids was no more and the spice trade fell almost entirely into their grasp. Under Seleucus IV, a fleet was sent down the Red Sea to circumnavigate Arabia and return up the Persian Gulf towards the end of the 130s. In effect, this was nothing more than a political propaganda mission but it achieved its purpose. The huge display of Seleucid power left no one in any doubt, the Seleucids were the new power here. Now spices flowed into the empire from two points, up the Persian Gulf into Mesopotamia or along the Red Sea and through Ahmose's kingdom. This was where the real disadvantages of the agreement with Seleucus became apparent. Whilst Ahmose made a small fortune selling spice on to Greek communities in the North, he himself couldn't export much beyond that, especially not into the Mediterranean where he only held a relatively short strip of coastline between Alexandria in the West and Pelousion in the East. Yet again, it was Alexandria that benefited. Throughout the rest of the century, Alexandria would compete with Antioch for the main export site for spices in the empire, even as Antioch steadily outstripped the latter for silk exports. In turn, Alexandria quickly became Ahmose's main market for any and all goods. Vast amounts of grain grown along the Nile passed over into Alexandria, flowing through the city into Libya as well in order to help feed the city and the region beyond, even as spice flowed in as well. Soon enough, however, it became apparent that Ahmose had other benefits in his position. For one, the Seleucids' main theatre of operations and interests, despite the fleet of the 130s, remained the Mediterranean Sea, not the Indian Ocean. In turn, Ahmose effectively became the Seleucids' watchdog for the Red Sea towards the end of the 2nd Century BCE, protecting spice routes up the Red Sea and rivalling the Sabeans and Muscat people of Arabia. Even as Ahmose was expected to follow Seleucus' diplomacy elsewhere, he formed his own foreign policy in the Red Sea, one that would be followed by Egyptian rulers even afterwards. Under the pretence of protecting spice routes, Ahmose expanded Egypt's fleet and army, building defensive fortifications along his Southern border and using his fleet to police traffic along the coastlines. This, naturally, led to political conflict with both Saba and Muscat in Arabia and the Kushites and Axumites of Ethiopia.
With a highly militarised populace following the rebellion and political enemies on a number of fronts, Ahmose would launch raids into Nubia and Wawat throughout the 120s and 110s, expanding his access to the gold reserves of Nubia up until his death in 113 BCE and the accession of his son, Ahmose IV. This political and economic success belies a troubled political and demographic situation boiling under the surface of Egypt during the period, something we will return to in later chapters and something that would continue to create frictions between the Seleucids and the Egyptians as time went on. By the end of the century, however, Egypt had become a vital part of the Seleucid trade network, importing vast amounts of spice that passed through to Alexandria along with grain and, just as importantly, gold. In turn, the Seleucids gained immensely, often taking a portion of Ahmose' gold reserves as tribute (owed to them as part of their agreement signed in the 130s) and, in turn, using that gold for their own political ends. Just as it had with the Barcids, the trade position of the Seleucids translated directly in political and military success across the board. But spice and silk weren't the only important resources available to the Seleucids. As mentioned, Tyre produced the famous Tyrian purple dye that was hugely popular amongst Mediterranean rulers and was exported all across the Mediterranean to only the richest rulers and became an almost universal sign of prestige, owing in part to the Barcids who coveted it just as much as anyone. By the end of the century, Tyrian purple was known in Iberia and Gaul just as much as in the Mediterranean world, owing to its association with the power of the Barcids at their height. On a level that was just as important, the Seleucids had access to many of the same resources as their Barcid counterparts and now took a huge step in becoming the most influential trade power in many of these goods, from salt (produced along many of the coastlines of the empire) and grain (produced all across the empire but most notably in Mesopotamia and the regions of the Nile Valley they held), iron, gold, copper (from Cyprus). With the collapse of the Barcids, the Western Mediterranean opened up in a way it hadn't before to the Seleucids and vast amounts of goods were exported, often docking in Carthage before being exported across the rest of the Western Mediterranean (a new Antioch-Carthage route matching the Alexandria-Carthage route).
In turn, the movement of wealth and gold changed its course in the West. Under the Barcids, it had concentrated in Carthage or Qart Hadasht before being distributed through political favours, bribes, armies and mercenaries and a number of other avenues. Primarily, however, the gold had been distributed by the Barcids through their own territories in one way or another. Most commonly was through provisioning. They had to feed their armies, for example, and so used their wealth to buy grain from their own territories, the same for iron and salt, for weapons and armour. The tendency for mercenaries to end up settling down near the Barcids had had a similar effect, concentrating the wealth they paid to the mercenaries near to them. Thus Carthage and Qart Hadasht had grown wealthy whilst gold and silver flowed out of the rest of the Mediterranean, only occasionally coming back in to cities and states elsewhere. In turn, this had actually fuelled the democratic movement somewhat, with people growing angry at the bankrupting of their states as money flowed to the Barcids. Now the trend moved the other way, gold and wealth flowed East primarily towards the Seleucids but in a much more indirect way. Carthage and Qart Hadasht remained important centres of trade with Syracuse and Lilybaeum taking significant roles in Sicily whilst Kroton (which had become an important centre of trade for the Seleucids whilst they couldn't access the Western reaches of Italy) used its now developed trade routes to Capua and the rest of Italy to grow rich off the trade flowing from the East. Now wealth concentrated around local trade centres, Carthage, Qart Hadasht, Syracuse etc. as it always did and always had done with an overall trend of wealth moving East as people and cities bought Seleucid trade goods. It shouldn't be mistake, however, that the Seleucids ever displaced local sources as such. Rome retained its important position in the salt trade as did the Spanish salt mines, Qart Hadasht remained an important source of silver, gold and iron from Iberia. But for rarer goods (and in areas closer to the Seleucids), the gold and silver went East. That said, much the same happened to some degree within the empire itself. As they bought spices and silk to sell on elsewhere, they sent gold and silver in turn East into India. But their dominating position on the nexus of the Silk Road the spice trade paid huge financial dividends for the Seleucids who, as the Barcids waned and collapsed, began to reach the apex of their own power and glory and found themselves within spitting distance of reuniting what Alexander had built, once and for all.
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