A New Beginning - Our 1992 Russian Federation
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Thanks! Its the best solution having separate lore updates, while normal chapters focus on single events.
I would like to point out how well we did in Georgia, it was our weak link in the Caucasus and we completely closed it. On one side we have our troops there and puppet government, but on other side we also federalized the country making it so that even without puppet government no Georgian government can really exit our sphere of influence as those groups see Russia as a guarantee for their autonomy.
Geopolitically this is a major win, we got another safe link to Armenia (Azerbaijan is another, but there are tensions) and more importantly we stopped Turkish ambitions in the region. Armenia has history with Türkiye and with Georgia in our sphere we basically cut of Azerbaijan from Türkiye, only other option being Iran who is regional rival to Türkiye which means that due to us resolving Georgia we also resolved Azerbaijan as well and consolidated our sphere in Caucasus as Azerbaijan cannot really play us against Türkiye. Only weak link left is Ukraine.
On second hand it's interesting to me that Russia imposed itself as a guarantee for Post Soviet order in regards to former Soviets minorities... As we basically secured the rights for various minorities in former ASSRs like in Azerbaijan and in Georgia.
In regards to Georgia, new government will probably be allowed significant autonomy to give it appearance of independence but what's important is that we resolved geopolitical tensions with Georgia and will bind it to us economically.
In regards to Oligarchs update am i correct to assume that we are still practicing Capital controls and most of these investments that our Oligarchs are doing are with state approval and guidance to aquire necessary technologies for Russia etc.?
Geopolitically this is a major win, we got another safe link to Armenia (Azerbaijan is another, but there are tensions) and more importantly we stopped Turkish ambitions in the region. Armenia has history with Türkiye and with Georgia in our sphere we basically cut of Azerbaijan from Türkiye, only other option being Iran who is regional rival to Türkiye which means that due to us resolving Georgia we also resolved Azerbaijan as well and consolidated our sphere in Caucasus as Azerbaijan cannot really play us against Türkiye. Only weak link left is Ukraine.
On second hand it's interesting to me that Russia imposed itself as a guarantee for Post Soviet order in regards to former Soviets minorities... As we basically secured the rights for various minorities in former ASSRs like in Azerbaijan and in Georgia.
In regards to Georgia, new government will probably be allowed significant autonomy to give it appearance of independence but what's important is that we resolved geopolitical tensions with Georgia and will bind it to us economically.
In regards to Oligarchs update am i correct to assume that we are still practicing Capital controls and most of these investments that our Oligarchs are doing are with state approval and guidance to aquire necessary technologies for Russia etc.?
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Also, I've decided to start a Red China TL starting from 1949, though it will be probably a semi-collaborative game, meaning that there will be no votes on particular issue, instead players will be able to post their initiatives. I want to try a new format, but we will see how it will go.
Even one sentence would be enough for me. I will work on what the reader will give me.
Chapter Twenty Three: Scramble for Arctic and rise of the tech giants (April 2004 - March 2005)
(FSB Spetznaz operator in Central Asia during Russia's campaign against Al-Qaeda in the region)
In response to a recent string of terrorist attacks organized by Al-Qaeda on the orders of Osama bin Laden, the Russian government initiated a multifaceted approach to enhance its counter-terrorism efforts. Firstly, recognizing the need for an immediate and robust response, the government increased and improved the services responsible for combating terrorism. This involved expanding the number of positions within the security forces dedicated to counter-terrorism operations. Lethal force was authorized when necessary, though the preference remained capturing suspects alive for an exemplary trial. Additionally, stringent penalties were imposed for the manufacture, possession, and transportation of explosives and military-grade weapons without the required permits. Secondly, to streamline and intensify efforts against terrorist organizations, the government established a specialized branch within its secret services focused solely on combating terrorism. Recognizing the global nature of the threat, Russia sought collaboration with allied nations, urging them to join forces in the fight against terrorism. This included requesting their collaboration and adherence to the new specialized branch's initiatives. In a diplomatic move, the Russian government took a proactive approach by reaching out to Western European countries individually. Informal talks were initiated, offering a collaborative framework where Russia would share valuable information in exchange for intelligence from its Western counterparts. These discussions aimed to foster cooperation in the fight against terrorism while maintaining a low profile to avoid alarming NATO.
In the face of the American expanded military presence in Central and Eastern Europe, coupled with the deployment of a complex missile defense system, the Russian government adopted a strategic and diplomatic stance to address the evolving geopolitical landscape. To express its concerns, Russia raised a symbolic protest against the increased presence of U.S. troops in Europe. The government asserted that the Union's intervention was in response to the request of a member state of the CSTO, emphasizing that it did not harbor imperialistic intentions or seek conflict with NATO. This diplomatic maneuver aimed to convey a message of responsible intervention driven by regional security considerations rather than aggressive posturing. Simultaneously, the Russian government denounced the installation of the missile defense system, labeling it a serious disruption to the balance in Europe. By highlighting the potential destabilizing impact of the missile defense system, Russia sought to draw attention to the broader implications of such deployments on regional security. Furthermore, in response to the increased U.S. military presence, Russia considered a strategic redeployment of its own forces. While maintaining a diplomatic tone, the government acknowledged the necessity of reinforcing its borders with Baltic States and Poland, as well as in the Balkans, to counterbalance NATO military deployments. This approach aimed to underscore Russia's commitment to regional security while avoiding unnecessary escalation with the United States.
In a resounding verdict, the Russian authorities opted to let Mikhail Khodorkovsky languish in the harsh confines of Siberia for the next 25 years. The decision to condemn him to an extended period of imprisonment in one of the world's most formidable and unforgiving terrains underscored the severity of the charges leveled against the once-mighty oligarch. The symbolic act served as a stark reminder of the consequences of challenging the established order in Russia. Khodorkovsky's fate was sealed, with the harsh Siberian landscape chosen as the backdrop for his prolonged incarceration. The decision was not merely punitive; it carried a profound message to others who might contemplate dissent or resistance to the prevailing political and economic structures. The remote and inhospitable Siberian environment became a metaphorical prison, encapsulating the isolation and adversity awaiting those who dared to challenge the authority of the Russian government. As Khodorkovsky faced the prospect of spending a quarter of a century in Siberian exile, the move was laden with political symbolism. The Russian government, under President Lukashenko's firm grip, demonstrated that dissent would not be tolerated, and those who sought to disrupt the status quo would face severe consequences. The decision to consign Khodorkovsky to Siberia was a calculated maneuver, sending a chilling message that echoed through the echelons of power in Russia. In the broader context, the extended sentence served as a powerful deterrent, dissuading other oligarchs and individuals from contemplating actions that could be construed as a challenge to the government's authority. The symbolism of Siberia, with its harsh climate and vast expanses, resonated with the historical narrative of punishment and exile in Russian political history.
(Aftermath of terrorist attacks in Egypt)
The 2004 Sinai bombings were three bomb attacks targeting tourist hotels in the Sinai Peninsula, Egypt, on 7 October 2004. The attacks left 34 people dead and 171 injured. The explosions occurred on the night of 7 October, against the Hilton Taba and campsites used by Israelis in Ras al-Shitan (see in Hebrew). In the Taba attack, a truck drove into the lobby of the Taba Hilton and exploded, killing 31 people and wounding some 159 others. Ten floors of the hotel collapsed following the blast. Some 50 kilometers (31 mi) south, at campsites at Ras al-Shitan, near Nuweiba, two more sites were targeted. A car parked in front of a restaurant at the Moon Island resort exploded, killing two Israelis and a Bedouin. Twelve were wounded. Another blast happened moments later, targeting the Baddiyah tourist camp, but no one was hurt, apparently because the bomber had been scared off by a guard and did not enter the crowded resort. Of the 34 who were killed, 18 were Egyptians, 12 were from Israel, two from Italy, one from Russia, and one was an Israeli-American. According to the Egyptian government, the bombers were Palestinians who had tried to enter Israel to carry out attacks there but were unsuccessful. They claimed that the mastermind, Iyad Saleh, recruited Egyptians and Bedouins to find explosives to be used in the attacks. Beginning in March 2004, the bombers used washing machine timers, mobile phones and modified gas cylinders to build the bombs. They used TNT and old explosives found in the Sinai (as it was many times a war zone), which were purchased from Bedouins, to complete the bombs. Egypt has said that Saleh and one of his aides, Suleiman Ahmed Saleh Flayfil, died in the Hilton blast, apparently because their bomb timer had run out too fast.
Three Egyptians, Younes Mohammed Mahmoud, Osama al-Nakhlawi, and Mohammed Jaez Sabbah were sentenced to death in November 2006 for their roles in the blast. Egypt arrested up to 2,400 people following the attacks. The initial investigations by the Israeli and Egyptian governments centered on al-Qaeda, with Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom saying "The type, the planning, the scope, the simultaneous attacks in a number of places, all this points to al-Qaeda". However, Egyptian Presidential Spokesman Majid `Abd al-Fatah later stated that there was no evidence linking the organisation to the attack, instead claiming it was the work of a lone wolf driven by "injustice, aggression and despair" over the Israeli-Palestine conflict. Israel had warned in September 2004 that there were planned bombings in the Sinai, but most Israelis did not heed those warnings and went on vacation there instead. Many Israelis left the Sinai after the bombings, along with some foreign tourists, but the effects on the country's tourism were not too severe. Militants struck again in Cairo at tourists in April 2005, killing three and wounding several. Similar attacks took place in resorts in Sharm el-Sheikh in July 2005 and in Dahab in 2006. On 9 May 2006, Egyptian security forces shot dead Nasser Khamis el-Mallahi, leader of the militant group. The shootout took place in Al-Arish, where el-Mallahi and Abu Jarair are native.
(Alexander Nevsky literary prize was a funded to promote Russian culture and literature at home and abroad)
The Alexander Nevsky prize is a Russian national annual historical-literary competition, established in 2004, named after saint prince of Russia Alexander Nevsky. Russian National historical-literary prize "Alexander Nevsky" includes two awards: literature and historical writing & museum memorial projects. The Russian National historical-literary prize "Alexander Nevsky" was established by JSC "Taleon" (General director – Alexander Ebralidze) and Russian Union of Writers (Chairman – Valery Ganichev) in 2004. The main aim of the founders is to revive the interest in Russian history among Russian and international community, and popularization of historical literature and memorial museums. This initiative is widely supported by outstanding public figures, famous historical scientists, heads of major publishing houses and directors of the leading Russian museums. Thus, the commission of awarding of the prize "Alexander Nevskiy" and advisory board include such outstanding cultural and literature officials as Nikolay Skatov – corresponding member and advisor of Russian Academy of Sciences, Vladimir Tolstoy – director of The memorial estate of Leo Tolstoy "Yasnaya Polyana" and president of the Russian committee of International Council of Museums, Alexander Sokolov – director of the Russian State Historical Archive, Konstantin Chechenev – president of the Russian Book Publishers Alliance, Georgy Velinbakhov – head of the Russian Heraldic Presidential Council and deputy director of The State Hermitage Museum.
Dozens of talented writers, historical scientists, members of major museums and enthusiasts from school and national museums have been honored with the prize. Among them outstanding writers, literati, historians, cultural workers, statesmen, public and cultural figures became the laureates of Russian National historical-literary prize “Alexander Nevsky”: Anastasia Shirinskaya – legendary woman, who managed to save heritage of the last moorage of the Imperial Black sea Fleet in Bizerte (Tunisia), Vladimir Karpov, Pyotr Stegniy – Russian Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Israel, Boris Tarasov – rector of Maxim Gorky Literature Institute, Aza Takho-Godi – professor, doctor of philological Science, widow of famous Russian philosopher Alexey Losev, Ilya Glazunov – famous painter, member of Russian Academy of Arts, founder and rector of Russian Fine Arts Academy, Andrey Sakharov – director of Institute of Russian History of Russian Academy of Science. Museum workers award list includes both major museums and reservations: “Kizhi”, “Pavlovsk”, “Khmelita”, “Borodinskoye pole” and small ones: house-museum of Ioann Kronshtadsky, museums of Far-Eastern Technological University (Vladivostok), Museum of Russian script of O.N.Trubachev (Volgograd).
January 15, 2005 sieges were two raids of the Russian security forces on a militant Islamist group's safehouses in Daghestan. At least four Russian commandos and six rebels died in the clashes, while one was captured. The group, called Shariat Jamaat, previously killed 29 members of the Daghestani department for fighting extremism and criminal terrorism, including its chief Akhberdilav Akilov. In the first incident in Makhachkala, the government forces surrounded a group of five rebel fighters in a two-story house on the outskirts of Makhachkala, capital of Dagestan. For 17 hours, the rebels battled Russian special forces supported by armoured vehicles and a helicopter, killing one of elite Alpha Group commandos and wounding another. In the end a tank belonging to the Russian Marines smashed the remains of the burned and gutted house. The authorities claimed that among the five bodies recovered from the ruins was the Jennet leader Rasul Makasharipov, but it turned out to be incorrect when Makasharipov resurfaced four days later. In a separate clash in Kaspiysk this day, special police task force stormed another house in Dagestan's port of Kaspiysk to arrest a separate group of militants. Three SOBR officers were killed in the attempt, including group commander Colonel Arzulum Ilyasov. One rebel was killed (50-year-old commander Magomedzagir Akayev) and one wounded and captured, while the third one escaped (according to some reports two were captured).
(Prime Minister Erdogan being welcomed in Moscow by Deputy Prime Minister Medvedev)
On the crisp winter day of January 29, 2005, a pivotal diplomatic encounter unfolded in Moscow as Prime Minister of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, engaged in high-stakes negotiations with President Lukashenko. The meeting, set against the backdrop of Moscow's grandeur, symbolized the emerging dynamics of international relations and the shared interest in fostering economic cooperation between Turkey and a resurgent Russia. As the two leaders convened, their discussions delved into the realms of economic collaboration, reflecting the recognition of Russia's remarkable resurgence across various sectors. The burgeoning Russian economy, industry, and trade presented a lucrative opportunity for Turkey, and Prime Minister Erdoğan sought to navigate the intricate landscape of diplomatic dialogue to solidify a mutually beneficial partnership.
The negotiations, conducted with diplomatic finesse, encompassed a spectrum of economic domains. Trade agreements were meticulously discussed, exploring avenues for increased bilateral trade that would harness the strengths of both nations. The resurgence of Russia's industrial sector became a focal point, with deliberations on potential joint ventures, investments, and collaborative projects that could propel economic growth for both countries. Energy cooperation emerged as a cornerstone of the discussions, with considerations for joint ventures in the energy sector, including the exploration of natural resources and the development of energy infrastructure. The strategic geographical proximity of Turkey and the expanding energy capacities of Russia laid the groundwork for substantial collaborations that could redefine the energy landscape in the region.
Amidst the negotiations, the leaders recognized the need for diplomatic synergy to address regional and global challenges. Shared concerns and aspirations underscored the importance of fostering a strategic partnership that extended beyond mere economic interests. Joint efforts in areas of security, regional stability, and diplomatic coordination were explored, reflecting the nuanced nature of contemporary geopolitical relationships. The meeting between Prime Minister Erdoğan and President Lukashenko, encapsulated in the gilded halls of Moscow, symbolized not only a strategic alignment of economic interests but also the potential for a lasting diplomatic alliance. The negotiations reflected the evolving geopolitical landscape, where nations sought to leverage each other's strengths for mutual progress in an era of resurgent powers. The outcome of this diplomatic rendezvous held the promise of a new chapter in the intricate tapestry of Turkish-Russian relations, echoing the changing dynamics of global politics and economic cooperation.
(Ahmet Davutoğlu - architect of Turkish foreing policy)
Turkish foreign policy under the AKP administration was associated with the name of Ahmet Davutoğlu. Davutoğlu served as the chief foreign policy advisor of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan before being appointed foreign minister in 2009. As an academic, he outlined his foreign policy doctrine in several writings, with his book "Strategic Depth" being the most significant. The implementation of Davutoğlu's foreign policy doctrine contributed to a transformation of Turkish foreign policy and the elevated importance of Turkey's diplomatic role, especially in the Middle East. While his doctrine was often dubbed as neo-Ottomanism, the use of this term was rather misleading. Ottomanism was a nineteenth-century liberal political movement aiming for the formation of a civic Ottoman national identity that transcended ethnic, linguistic, and religious identities. The term was briefly reinstated as "neo-Ottomanism" to characterize the foreign policy overtures of Turgut Özal in the late 1980s. However, these overtures involved increased interest in the Middle East but shared little of the conceptual content of Davutoğlu's vision.
Davutoğlu, influenced by Greek geopolitician Dimitri Kitsikis, supplemented geopolitics with liberal elements, including soft power, conflict resolution, and the promotion of "win-win" solutions. In his book "Strategic Depth," published in 2001, Davutoğlu elaborated on his strategic vision for Turkey. He argued that Turkey possessed "strategic depth" due to its history and geographic position, listing Turkey among a small group of countries he called "central powers." Turkey, according to Davutoğlu, should not be content with a regional role but aspire to play a leading role in several regions, which could award it global strategic significance. In Davutoğlu's view, Turkey was a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf, and Black Sea country, capable of simultaneously exercising influence in all these regions to claim a global strategic role. He rejected the perception of Turkey as a bridge between Islam and the West, as this would relegate Turkey to an instrument for the promotion of the strategic interests of other countries. Davutoğlu identified two conditions for Turkey to succeed in its global strategic ambitions. The first referred to its domestic politics, while the second to its relations with neighbors. On the domestic front, Turkey needed to resolve its own Kurdish question and bridge the growing rift between the Islamist and secularist elements of Turkish society. Davutoğlu advocated resolving both conflicts on the basis of liberal principles. Turkey's strategic potential, he argued, would be released if a fair and lasting solution for the Kurdish issue was reached, guaranteeing Kurdish minority rights within Turkey, and a liberal consensus was achieved on the question of secularism between different segments of Turkish society.
On the international front, Davutoğlu argued that Turkey needed to resolve all the bilateral disputes that had hampered its relations with its neighbors. Coined as the "zero problem policy with neighbors," he stated that in recent decades, Turkey had wasted crucial efforts and time in conflicts with its neighbors. For Turkey to become a regional leader and play a global strategic role, it needed to overcome phobic syndromes and establish cordial relations with all its neighbors. Its foreign policy should aim to resolve all the pending disputes that Turkey's diplomatic inertia had accumulated in the past so that it could seek its own global strategic role. Developing close relations with all rising global powers, including China, India, Russia, and Brazil, would be a key part of that process. Seeking a leading role in intercivilizational and interreligious dialogue would become one of Turkey's leading priorities, as Turkey could capitalize on its historical and cultural legacy.
The attempted Tulip Revolution of 2005 in Kyrgyzstan unfolded against the backdrop of a resurgent Russia, led by President Alexander Lukashenko, and showcased the intricate interplay between domestic discontent, regional dynamics, and the assertive influence of the Russian government. Seeds of discontent were sown within Kyrgyzstan due to political corruption, economic challenges, and a growing demand for democratic reforms. Disputed parliamentary elections in February 2005, marred by allegations of fraud, intensified public dissatisfaction, leading to widespread protests, particularly in Bishkek. However, the geopolitical landscape would prove to be a determining factor in the course of events. President Lukashenko, viewing Kyrgyzstan as a strategically important ally, recognized the potential for regional instability and the necessity of protecting Russian interests. In a coordinated effort, Russian military forces, under Lukashenko's leadership, swiftly intervened to quell the protests. The intervention was framed as a measure to prevent chaos and maintain stability in the region, effectively thwarting the revolutionary aspirations. The use of Russian military support showcased the complexity of geopolitical dynamics, with Lukashenko wielding influence to safeguard regional stability and quash a potentially destabilizing revolution. The failure of the Tulip Revolution in the Kyrgyzstan underscored the strategic calculations made by a resurgent Russia, as embodied by President Lukashenko, and its impact on shaping Kyrgyzstan's political trajectory. The West, observing these events, notably recalled Russia's intervention in Georgia in 2003 to quash protests. The reaction from Western nations mirrored their concerns about Russia's assertive influence in the region, raising questions about the dynamics of regional stability and the balance of power. This geopolitical maneuvering highlighted the competing interests of major powers and the consequences for nations caught in the crossfire of strategic calculations, as Kyrgyzstan found itself aligning with the assertive and resurgent Russia led by President Lukashenko.
(President Lukashenko delivering a speech about securing interests of Russia in the North Pole, which sparked the Scramble for Arctic)
In the wake of the unsuccessful uprisings in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, regions traditionally within Russia's sphere of influence, the Russian leadership under President Lukashenko intensified its conviction that the United States was actively engaged in a campaign to destabilize what they deemed Russia's soft underbelly—the Caucasus and Central Asia. The events in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan were construed by the Russian leadership as integral components of a broader U.S. strategy to erode Russia's influence in strategically significant areas. President Lukashenko, along with other Russian officials, voiced strong apprehensions that the U.S. was exploiting political discontent and orchestrating unrest in regions historically aligned with Russia's geopolitical interests. The failed revolutions heightened suspicions within the Russian government, fostering the belief that the U.S. was deliberately sowing instability in the Caucasus and Central Asia—regions in close proximity to Russia. This interpretation fueled a sense of urgency among Russian authorities to counteract what they perceived as external meddling in their established sphere of influence. President Lukashenko, known for his assertive defense of Russian interests, played a pivotal role in shaping the narrative that positioned the United States as a destabilizing force in the region. The unsuccessful revolts served as a rallying cry for the Russian government, reinforcing their commitment to protecting what they considered their soft underbelly against external interventions.
This shift in perception marked a significant evolution in Russia's foreign policy, prompting a more assertive approach to counter perceived external threats to their influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The failed revolutions acted as a catalyst for a renewed emphasis on strategic interests, regional stability, and a resolute determination to resist what Russia perceived as attempts to undermine its geopolitical standing in these crucial regions. As a consequence, Russian foreign policy underwent adjustments, focusing on reinforcing its presence and influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The failed revolutions became a pivotal factor in shaping Russia's strategic outlook and fostering a proactive stance to safeguard its geopolitical interests against perceived external encroachments. In the aftermath of the failed revolutions in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, both considered within Russia's sphere of influence, President Lukashenko and the Russian leadership perceived a strategic threat orchestrated by the United States to destabilize Russia's soft underbelly in the Caucasus and Central Asia. This interpretation of Western interference fueled a growing sense of paranoia and a desire among Russian leaders to regain the strategic initiative against the perceived adversary, the United States. In response to these perceived threats, President Lukashenko delivered a confrontational speech in the Russian parliament, asserting Russia's dominance over the Arctic. The timing of this declaration was not arbitrary; it was a calculated move influenced by a confluence of geopolitical, economic, and strategic imperatives.
The perceived encroachment of the West in neighboring regions, as evidenced by the failed revolutions, played a pivotal role in shaping Russia's assertive stance in the Arctic. The Arctic, with its vast untapped resources and strategic significance, became the focal point of Russia's response to what it considered a Western offensive. Lukashenko's speech served as a stern warning that Russia would resist any attempt to infringe upon its strategic sphere, signaling a shift from cooperative international relations to a more competitive and defensive posture. Economically, the Arctic's resource riches became a key factor driving Russia's assertiveness. Lukashenko's speech was a rallying cry to prioritize the extraction and exploitation of Arctic resources, positioning Russia as a dominant player in the global energy market. This economic motivation intertwined with the perceived national security threats posed by potential Western interference. Nationalist sentiment within Russia was harnessed as Lukashenko emphasized historical ties to the Arctic, framing the region as an integral part of Russian identity. This nationalist fervor provided the domestic support necessary for an ambitious Arctic agenda, aligning public sentiment with the government's confrontational stance. Strategically, concerns about security in the Arctic, given the opening of new maritime routes and military possibilities, justified Russia's militarization efforts. Lukashenko's speech served as a justification for establishing a robust military presence to safeguard Russian interests in the region, echoing a defensive posture against potential adversaries.
Lastly, the speech was a demonstration of Russia's global power projection. As the country sought to reestablish itself as a formidable global player, asserting dominance in the Arctic became a symbolic move. By challenging the status quo, Russia signaled to the international community that it was ready to expand its sphere of influence and confront perceived adversaries on the world stage. In essence, President Lukashenko's confrontational speech on the Arctic encapsulated Russia's response to perceived external threats, blending economic interests, nationalist sentiments, and security concerns into a strategic vision that positioned the Arctic as a focal point in Russia's resurgent geopolitical ambitions.
(Mark Zuckerberg's Facebook would transform not only the tech industry, but also the very societies around the world)
In the mid-2000s, a technological revolution reshaped the digital landscape, giving rise to iconic tech giants that would redefine the way individuals connect, share information, and conduct business. Among the trailblazers were Facebook, YouTube, and Amazon, each contributing uniquely to the evolving dynamics of the tech industry. Facebook, founded by Mark Zuckerberg in 2004, initially catered to Harvard University students before rapidly expanding its user base. The platform's success lay in its simplicity and innovative approach to social networking. Facebook transformed how people communicated, fostering connections, and creating a virtual social sphere that transcended geographical boundaries. YouTube, launched in 2005 by former PayPal employees, revolutionized the way people consumed and shared video content online. Offering an open platform for users to upload, share, and discover videos, YouTube democratized content creation. It became a breeding ground for creators, from vloggers to musicians, shaping the era of user-generated content. Amazon, while founded in 1994, solidified its status as a tech giant in the mid-2000s. Under the visionary leadership of Jeff Bezos, Amazon evolved from an online bookstore into a global e-commerce powerhouse. Its expansion included diverse product offerings, digital services, and the groundbreaking Amazon Web Services (AWS), which redefined cloud computing.
Google, another influential player during this period, had already established itself as a dominant force in search technology. In the mid-2000s, Google expanded its footprint with the acquisition of YouTube in 2006, further enhancing its influence in the digital realm. The company's suite of services, including Google Search, Gmail, and Google Maps, became integral parts of daily life. Apple marked its resurgence under the leadership of Steve Jobs. The introduction of iconic products like the iPod, iPhone, and MacBook solidified Apple's position as a technology trendsetter. The App Store, launched in 2008, revolutionized software distribution, empowering developers and sparking the mobile app revolution. Microsoft, although an established player, underwent significant transformations in the mid-2000s. The launch of Windows 7 in 2009 marked a pivotal moment, offering a more user-friendly interface and improved performance. Microsoft's strategic moves, including the introduction of Azure cloud services, positioned the company for a new era of technological innovation. These tech giants of the mid-2000s shared common traits – visionary leadership, innovative technologies, and a deep understanding of evolving consumer needs. Their collective impact not only transformed the tech industry but also laid the groundwork for the interconnected, digital age.
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1. Please write down, how should the Russian government handle the Scramble for Arctic?
2. Please write down, how should the Russian government promote Russian culture and literature abroad?
3. Please write down, how should digitalization be introduced in Russia? What initiatives should be supported by the government to support the rise of tech giants like Facebook, Google or Amazon in the United States?
4. Please write down, in which areas could Russia and Turkey cooperate together?
2. Please write down, how should the Russian government promote Russian culture and literature abroad?
3. Please write down, how should digitalization be introduced in Russia? What initiatives should be supported by the government to support the rise of tech giants like Facebook, Google or Amazon in the United States?
4. Please write down, in which areas could Russia and Turkey cooperate together?
GDP Ranking (2005)
1. United States - $14,239,200M
2. Japan - $5,731,470M
3. China - $4,490,020M
4. Germany - $4,004,440M
5. Union State - $3,088,717M
6. United Kingdom - $3,087,670M
7. France - $2,618,160M
8. Italy - $2,259,240M
9. Canada - $1,373,510M
10. Spain - $1,354,350M
11. South Korea - $1,199,720M
12. India - $1,134,217M
13. Brazil - $1,001,633M
14. Mexico - $957,130M
15. Australia -$935,936M
16. Netherlands - $905,727M
17. Ukraine - $770,815M
18. Turkey - $626,186M
19. Switzerland - $598,050M
20. Sweden - $552,219M
2. Japan - $5,731,470M
3. China - $4,490,020M
4. Germany - $4,004,440M
5. Union State - $3,088,717M
6. United Kingdom - $3,087,670M
7. France - $2,618,160M
8. Italy - $2,259,240M
9. Canada - $1,373,510M
10. Spain - $1,354,350M
11. South Korea - $1,199,720M
12. India - $1,134,217M
13. Brazil - $1,001,633M
14. Mexico - $957,130M
15. Australia -$935,936M
16. Netherlands - $905,727M
17. Ukraine - $770,815M
18. Turkey - $626,186M
19. Switzerland - $598,050M
20. Sweden - $552,219M
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Invest heavily into the Arctic with a major push for economic development and resource extraction. Try to keep military expansion to a minimum as at this point the US holds most of the Arctic under their influence due to their allies. Trying to militarize the situation would only lead the US to gain more influence than us in the region.
Trying to simply promote Russian historical literature based on our culture and history is going to fail as its not really what the average person wants and it will have to deal with a saturated market as is. Otherwise we will end up like China with most of our cultural output being seen as bland, inoffensive, and in some cases seen as propaganda.
Promote the adoption of our own pop-culture like Japan. Promote R-Pop as a Russian cultural product and increasingly allow the genre greater penetration to Russian pop-culture networks. Considering how Hollywood and later K-Pop are/were any controversial nature will be washed away from the marketing and greater presence in the cultural sphere. Promote cross promotion/cooperation with J-pop/K-Pop.
Use Hudson Soft/NEC and their video game console to gain a beach head in Japan in terms of video game presence. Promote the anime and manga fandom to create their own content to create our own graphic novels and anime to further penetrate the global market.
Try to bring Russian characters especially mythological characters as an influence into said anime, manga, and games. Actually bring in Chinese and Japanese cultural mythology as well by taking advantage of our immigration community. Simply promoting Russian culture will both limit ourselves and make us seem as overly xenophobic to both the world and our own people. Plus this way we can better penetrate the Chinese, Japanese and international market.
Further more push our animation studios as support studios for anime as a way to gain more experience for our own animators and to further the demand of our animation studios. Further push our voice talent into Anime and advertisements in Japan and globally to build connections with the greater entertainment network.
Push for the translation of our pop-culture to bring more attention to it globally.
Use the previously talked about Digital Silk Road and promote the creation of our own media and social media and further expand its digital infrastructure. Try to promote or avoid hurting Russian pornographic websites as an alternative to western output to gain a larger global digital footprint. Try to create our own digital payment method to take advantage of the rise of the digital market place. In general allow a lot of freedom for people to deal with the internet as any major attempts at creating our own government mandated option is likely going to be worse than any commercial version and will be seen as lame and unpopular.
Try to avoid catering to hard to the Chinese as their demands for cultural policing is going to hurt our cultural output especially in terms of digital content/production. Overall try to avoid any major policing of the internet outside of actual illegal and harmful content as at this point Facebook, YouTube, and the western internet has the major advantage in terms of internet freedom, and any attempts to police will likely lead to people to chose them instead.
Promote payed content over free content as doing otherwise will lead us to fall into the same trap most tech-giants fell to OTL.
We should cooperate in economic terms but try to not get to friendly as we might scare Greece and Balkans from further cooperation with us.
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Thinking further in terms of pop-culture we should outright competition as we will be competing with Japan, America, Europe and Latin America which all have greater global outreach when compared to us. Trying to actually compete will likely fail as we would be entering an over-saturated market. We should rather try to act as a support network for Japan and the US as a way to gain access to the entertainment industry and copy them although mostly Japan since trying to fight Hollywood is a death sentence since every other institution has tried only to become a part of Hollywood. Animation is at least cheap and something we can actually do so we should try and copy Japan by becoming their premier animation support network while we undercut South Korea for the market share. This applies to video games as well.
Outside of that we could become like China in the sense that our video games are heavily anime inspired but make a massive amount of money. More importantly we will not have to contend with censorship furthering something we have over the Chinese.
Actually I was thinking a Russian company could buy Fallout and Westwood from EA/interplay and make it our own since our people would be a major player base for said games. Promoting our own RPGs and strategy games are a must.
Finally promoting our women would work as well. Saying our women as the most beautiful in the world would allow us a greater penetration of the modeling scene, cosmetics, and underwear as well.
Outside of that we could become like China in the sense that our video games are heavily anime inspired but make a massive amount of money. More importantly we will not have to contend with censorship furthering something we have over the Chinese.
Actually I was thinking a Russian company could buy Fallout and Westwood from EA/interplay and make it our own since our people would be a major player base for said games. Promoting our own RPGs and strategy games are a must.
Finally promoting our women would work as well. Saying our women as the most beautiful in the world would allow us a greater penetration of the modeling scene, cosmetics, and underwear as well.
In general we should try to develop our own animation as we should avoid becoming like Canada in that our work is everywhere but its not considered Canadian. Avoid giving grants as that is just going to help promote subpar work and ideological driven works. Maybe we could make is so networks have to have a Russian produced and developed show but we should make it so that studios can chose what to put up since if we force the issue we would get subpar work since only those looking to make an easy paycheck would decide to join the program.
Rally not sure what would be the best option since most will just see opportunistic people take advantage of the situation and make subpar work making Russian animation seem like kidy shit or just bad in general. Either way we should try to not censor submissions since doing so will just get us kid shows and we should at least get people to leave the animation ghetto as getting stuck there will make it harder to market and profit from our shows.
Rally not sure what would be the best option since most will just see opportunistic people take advantage of the situation and make subpar work making Russian animation seem like kidy shit or just bad in general. Either way we should try to not censor submissions since doing so will just get us kid shows and we should at least get people to leave the animation ghetto as getting stuck there will make it harder to market and profit from our shows.
- Our conquest of Artic can truly begin through technological advancement. Invest into Artic vehicles like Kharkovchanka with a goal to create a new and more improved model of transportation.
- Invest into research on how to best exploit untaped Artic resources.
- Invest into ecological research in Artic.
- See about possibility of Promotion of Artic tourism in Russian Artic.
- In regards to military, found a Northern fleet Strategic command.
- train troops and army unit's especially dedicated to Artic warfare
- reactivate Soviet bases in Artic.
Generally measures similar to otl in regards to military. We shouldn't be unprepared militarily in Artic and honestly USA is unlikely to react any differently from otl.
Generally same as @Fratsup but i want to focus domestically on our own culture opposed to copying and complimenting other cultures. We have good literally base, we just need to put that in animation.
Basically goal is to invest in and promote our Pop-culture, invest in our own animation and encourage younger fanbase to synchronize Western Animation with the Japanese so we may create our own brand of animation.
This can be done by organizing regional competitions for domestic animators with popular vote to decide the winner, as well as encouraging animated adds , marketing etc to start the business and make it popular.
Encourage animation in school clubs together with comic clubs via ministry of education and culture. Give them more funding for necessary equipment.
Actually create online site for Russian animation, maybe that way we will be able to create our YouTube equivalent (other forgein animations are also welcome).
But besides that promote authentic Russian movies for domestic and Euroasian and European market. Use traditional Russian Songs in movies, cartoons etc.
- Russia isn't short of its own domestic Tech giants like VKontakte, use the fact that these have a base in Russian speakers and promote them across Russia and Russian sphere of influence,
- Encourage entrepreneur's to ventutre into e- commerce by giving them generous loans and facilitate cooperation with various domestic companies to have their products be delivered and sold by these companies
-Facilitate a cooperation between various Tech companies to create New services etc.
- Support creation our own digital payment methods .
Build up Russian Digital infrastructure to the fullest , create a comprehensive 5 to 8 year plan to achieve full digitalization of schools by making sure that most (at least Uraban Schools) have a computer ( favorably from domestic producers), -- Encourage formation of E-Cafés
- Subsidize companies in their efforts to digitalize
-Encourage formation of domestic Apps, storages etc.
- Most importantly cooperate in economic field, encourage investment in Turkey and investment from Turkey in Russia. Invest in their infrastructure etc...
- Encourage export of our industrial products in Turkey (cars, computers etc.) Facilitate a trade deal between Turkey and CIS/EEU.
- Strike an energy cooperation and see weather we can supply Turkey with the energy
- Encourage tourism between two countries.
- Facilitate export of some military hardware to Turkey...
- On geopolitical front strike a cooperation with Turkey in middle east.
- Cooperate against terrorism with Turkey and arrange for sharing of inteligence with them.
Honestly im all for full cooperation with Turkey, most of our Balkan allies have no direct conflict with Turkey, expect Greece which is a NATO/EU problem, not our and thus shouldn't stand in way of our relations.
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Not sure about this. We should at least limit it so they will not use it against us in the future.
We should be careful with encouraging Turkish influence in the Balkans. If the Balkan states see us do this we might lose influence from them due to helping a historical rival. Plus giving Turkey more influence in Albania just seems like a way to create their own power block which might hurt us in the future. Not counting what they might do in Kosovo.