A MAN ALONE... - a slightly different ww1

1916 – Italian Front


June


The Austrian offensive popularly know as ‘Strafexpedition’ or Battaglia degli Altipiani (Battle of the Plateau) for the Italians; caused not only immense military repercussion for Italy but also political with the fall of the Salandra government the 12 of June and the dismissal of General Luigi Cadorna from the role of Chief of Staff (1).


The Hapsburg assault, strongly desired and planned by the Austrian Chief of Staff Conrad, started 15 May and lasted more than a month. Even if in the end was stopped at a very high cost (for both side) and the positions lost later regained at the end of June, the offensive made very apparent the great problems of the Italian army. Morale was at all time low, general lack of proper equipment and supply plus an inadequate leaderships only exacerbate the situation, made much worse by the strictly disciplinarian attitude taken by Cadorna…added by his habit of cashier any officer that disagree with him (or that can take the blame of his mistakes).


Already at the beginning of the conflict, relationship between the civilian and military leaderships were very tense and after almost two years of war the situation was much worse with the two side barely talking to each other. In this climate, the president of the council of ministers Antonio Salandra, knowing his time in office was coming to an end decided to concentrate all his effort in an single issue, the dismissal of Cadorna from his post; as the soon former president (and one of the men most responsible of the Dow of Italy) was not intentioned to be the only one to pay for this debacle.
The 10 of June General Cadorna received the letter containing not only the news of his dismal from the role of Chief of Staff of the Army and his reassignment to the command of the troops in Libya, but also the name of his successor General Guglielmo Pecori Girardi. While very few tears were shed over the departure of Cadorna, the rest of the officer corps nervously readied itself to his new commander as great was the fear for the unknown.


General Girardi, a veteran of the African and Libyan campaign, was chosen by Salandra with supervision of the King and other generals and politicians (first among them Paolo Boselli, the chosen substitute of Salandra) for various reason, first among them his greater capacity to work alongside the civilian administration and a much less caustic character. That the man, unlike his predecessor, was also an experienced veteran, greatly respected by his soldiers and that he distinguished himself during the recent offensive in Trentino, were just some added bonus for the politicians.

In his work to rebuild the Italian Army Girardi was assisted by the Generals Badoglio and Diaz; the first was an up and coming officials greatly supported by the House Savoy itself, while the latter having worked with Cadorna at the Staff had decided that the front was a better place but was recalled in his previous position due to great number of recommendations.
Girardi and all his staff know that they need time, time to rebuild and retrain the army, time to establish a new trust between army and government and more importantly time to let the soldiers rest. For this reason and among the great protest of the allied governments, it was agreed that until the end of the year no new offensive would be launched against Austria-Hungary.


As an olive branch towards Paris and London, in august, it was also decided to send two reinforced division oversea, one in support of the allied effort in Palestine and another to augment the Italian expeditionary force in the Balkans, so fulfilling the previous numerous request of his allies.
While give the new necessary equipment and supply to the army, like steel helmet, camouflage uniform and anything capable of alleviate the hard life in the trench, was an almost herculean task, in both monetary and logistical sense, paled if compared with the other job of the new Staff…rebuild the morale of the army. Cadorna during his tenure, had effectively build a vast army with little time and even less material but to do this had used an iron hand in a steel glove; subjecting the soldiers to the most rigid discipline of the Entente (and probably also of the CP), cashiering anyone that disagree with him almost to a ludicrous point and forcing the army to keep an offensive rate double than the rest of the alliance.
Girardi and his aides know perfectly that things cannot continue in this manner as the entire army was almost to a breaking point as the recent Austrian offensive demonstrated, with a great number of troops simply surrender or officer incapable to react quickly or in autonomy as ‘accustomed’ to receive order (or better micromanaged to use a modern term) by the higher echelon. Immediately a great effort was done to ameliorate the life of the common soldiers, trying to give them better food, better pay and a more stable turn-over regarding staying in the trench. Emphasis was given to the propaganda both military, so to motivate the men, and to the civilian, many trench journals were founded and various poets (like D’Annunzio), speakers and journalist were enrolled to make tour on the various military bases to motivate the men. The discipline while not relaxed by much was at least made consistent and not hard but very erratic as before.


Naturally, not only the morale aspect was touched, Badoglio worked to make training more uniform and to create a better coordination between infantry and artillery; more autonomy was given to the local command and the greatest amount possible of material was delivered to the front.


This kind of approach created a great strain between Italy and the rest of the Entente, as all the allied request of launching some offensive to relieve the pressure over Russia and Romania fallen on deaf ears, even during or after the famed Brusilov Offensive that almost broke the Austrian back. Girardi, supported by both Badoglio and Diaz was adamant, the Regio Esercito was not ready for any offensive at this stage and he needed time to fix things. While Boselli and the rest of the government understood his situation and continued to support his decision, the pressure from the allies was quickly became too great and soon something needed to be done; naturally it was very openly implied that in case this plan had failed Italy will be in quickly need of a new Chief of Staff for the Army.


1916 – Macedonian Front


September


Greece, unofficially, was a divided country, almost on the verge of a civil war. The situation between the neutralist, led by King Constantine I and who has instead desired take part at the war on the Entente side lead by Prime Minister Venizelos was very tense and anything can lit the powder keg.


Regardless of this situation or the desire of the local population, war had come in Greece in any case when the Entente occupied Thessaloniki to use her to deploy and support an expeditionary force in the almost desperate effort to aid Serbia or at least save her army.


Soon the hodgepodge army composed by units of various nationality (Serbian, French, British, Russian and Italian) was fused, almost in an autonomous manner, in a united army with an single chain of command, the Allied Army of the Orient under General Maurice Sarrail. The overall strategic objective of this front was to alleviate pressure from Romania and force Bulgaria to sign an armistice; the first attempt to do that ended even before starting as the pre-empetive Bulgarian offensive, even if stopped , forced Sarrail to scrap that plan.

A new attempt was scheduled for mid-September, with a combined push by all the various contingent.
The attack started on September 11 with a three day long bombardment of the enemy trench, followed by the infantry assault the 13th and by the next day and after a series of hard fought attack and counter-attack, the Bulgarian were forced to retreat towards Florina (or Lerin for the Bulgarian and Serbs) a Greeks town near the Serbian border. Crucial to this operation, at least for the Serbian part were the motorized transport units lent to them by the British, this allowed a quick transport of supply and men to the front, greatly helping the Serbian effort. While an important victory come the 18th of September with the conquest of Kamjmakcalan from the exhausted Bulgarian, there also movement behind the CP line, with some change in the overall command of the army, the shifting of troops from a zone to another to close some gap and the arrival on the front of General Otto von Bulow.


The 4th October in conjunction with the Romanian-Russian offensive against the third Bulgarian Army (that ironically was halted the day before due to bad weather and a too strong resistance), Sarrail launched an offensive towards the Monastir-Cherna Loop Line with the purpose of knock out Bulgaria out of the war. Despite the Entente numerical advantage the first series of assaults were repelled by the Bulgarians and soon the situation devolved in a series of attack and counterattack that slowly and costly grinded the CP positions, thanks to the continuous and generous use of artillery by the allies and despite Germans and Bulgarian redeployment of troops.
By the end of October Kenali was abandoned by CP troops, allowing Serbian, French and Russian troops to finally conquer the city…but the morale boosting effect lasted a very short time as the enemy new defensive line just a few miles north resisted any attempt of breakthrough.

It was during this initial probing attack that the Italian troops were firstly used en masse, more precisely the 35th infantry division (instead the newly created 36th division was kept on reserve).
During this period however general von Below had decided to also abandon Monastir and on 18 November, while the heavy fighting was still going on, General der Infanterie Winckler ordered the Eleventh Army to retreat to new positions to the north of Monastir. The Bulgarian commander in chief General Nikola Zhekov protested this decision but in the end, he could not stop its execution. On 19 of November, French and Russian soldiers entered the beleaguered town for the final time. The Bulgarians established a new position on the Chervena Stena - height 1248 - height 1050 - Makovo - Gradešnica defensive line, helped by a new German division (arrived from the Somme) and Bulgarians troops from Droubja. Almost immediately it came under attack but this time the new position held firm, because the Allies were exhausted, having reached almost the breaking point of their logistical capacity. Thus, all the initial French and Serbian attempts to break through the line were defeated; with the internal situation in Greece worsening, Serrail decided to attempt one last time to break the CP line, throwing all reserve on the fray. So 29 November the final attack was launched, with abundant use of artillery and after three days of heavy combat in a mud-covered terrain, finally succeed smiled to the Entente, at least a little (2).
The immediate allied objective was the town of Resna, an important depot of supply and communication node, just north-west of Monastir. Luckily the enemy was still in disarray and the troops protecting the depot put only a mild fight before an hastily retreat; this also allowed at the Italian and French troops to capture a good amount of food, ammunition and other important materials.


Naturally all luck run out and a few miles out of the city a new defensive line was created by von Bulow, and this time with the entire army exhausted and the first sign of winter starting to appear, it was decided to stop any further attack for the time being. Even because a new genre of problem recently was added to the multitude that plagued the Allied Army of Orient; in Athens armed fighting had started between supporter of the two side of the ‘National Schism’ and there were fear of some possible Greeks attack to the Entente line of communication.


For the duration of the offensive, the Allies suffered around 50,000 battle casualties, the bulk of those were Serbians. In addition, some 80,000 allied troops died or had to be evacuated due to sickness and disease. This brought the total casualties to as high as 130,000 men or just a little less than a third of all Entente forces in the theater.
The Bulgarians and German casualties totaled around 64,000 men and the fact that Monastir and Resna had to be abandoned (with the precious supplies) was an huge hit for their morale, even if the new positions a few kilometers from the city provided excellent conditions for defense; still many take pride in having resisted the Entente attack, suffering less than an half of their causalities.


Overall, the allied offensive had been a Tactical success but a Strategic failure as Bulgaria was still on the war and very little pressure had been relieved from the Romanian


1 – OTL the government fall quickier and there were a reluctance to change the man in command of the army at this junction. Here Salandra let his pettiness override this fear.
2 – OTL the lack of reinforcement was an important factor in the defeat of the attack, here the supplemental Italian division is the straw that broke the camel.
 
1916 – Italian Front


October


An eerie tranquility, relatively speaking naturally, reigned along the Isonzo for at least 5 months with Girardi stubbornly refusing to even entertaining the idea of a new offensive until he felt that the army was ready, so limiting his effort to launching a series of limited probing attack. Neither the ‘Brusilov offensive’ or the plea to help Romania after her entering the war moved his position of an inch; still the allied political pressure was becoming too much to bear for anyone and even the King and the Presidente del Consiglio Boselli, behind the scene and in private, had started to press him for an attack.


The date chosen was the middle of October, in practice the last window of opportunity for an offensive before the winter made impossible such type of effort.
The plan, ironically, was one originally devised by Cadorna and continued the philosophy of the first five battles; this meant launching an all-out attack towards Gorizia and secure the heights around her, so to have road free to invade Trieste and Lubjiana.

The offensive was initially planned for February but the so-called Strafexpedition, derailed such idea, as too many assets had to be diverted in Trentino to face it.


The task of lead the new offensive was given to the Third Army commanded by Emanuele Filiberto Duke of Savoia, cousin of the King himself. The plan was divided in three phases, the first against the line Oslavia-Sabotino, so to secure a bridgehead to Gorizia and strategically control the area. The second phase it would have been an attack towards the S.Michele-S.Martino front and finally open the Fatji so to allow attacking Trieste.


Many changes happened or were undergoing in the Italian Army, the artillery now was in a much better shape in both numerical terms and in training; the number of forward observers was increased and were better employed. New equipment like steel helmets and field telephones were distributed in greater quantity and the training on both soldiers and officers were increased. More importantly, the officers in the field had no more the cumbersome presence of the Chief of Staff and his envoys to micromanage their effort, having more operational freedom. (1)


From the end of September, the Army Staff begun the transfer of men and material from the front in Trentino to the Isonzo to prepare the offensive. This was done the more secretly possible, giving at the various units their destination only when already in transit and try everything to mask their departure and the same was done for the various work to create a better and deeper system of trench.
On the other hand, while the AU never catch the Italian moves, they at least suspected that an attempt before the end of the year and the coming of the winter will have been done so total it was impossible obtain a total surprise at both strategic and local level.


Facing the Italian there was the fortification system of the region composed by the fort of Gorizia and the other fortified position on Mt.Sabotino, Mt. San Michele, Mt. Santo and others around the city. The greatest disadvantage of the Austrian position was that unlike the Italian, they had only a railway to use and this was forced to pass around the mountains lengthening the journey time.


The attack started the morning of the 15 October at the 6 of the morning with an intense barrage of artillery, the biggest ever seen on the Italian front until now. Thanks to the series of tunnel previously excavated, during the first day of the attack Mt.Sabotino was conquered as great part of the line of the Oslavia, instead, the position on Podgora still resisted and even counterattacked but the Italians at heavy cost repelled them. The morning after, with the Austrian having received some reinforcements the battle started again but in the end their attempts failed.
With their line faltering and hammered by the intense bombardment the 16 night the Austrian command ordered to abandon Gorizia; during the same night and in part during the morning the Austrian army retreated from the fight, while the k.u.k sappers succeed in destroy the various bridges and parts of railways so to slow the Italian movements.


The dawn of 16 October 1916, Gorizia was officially in Italian hand, as the strategic position of Mt. San Michelino.


The 18, the Austro-Hungarian troops on the Carso retreated on a defensive line east of the city of Doberdò sul Lago, as the loss of the previous position in Gorizia left them in a weak position. They were followed by elements of the XI, XIII and VI army corps and at noon of the 19, a new battle started when the two forces made contact. After two days of fight, with a seemingly infinite series of attack and counterattack made even more difficult by the bad weather, the Italian army, with great losses, succeeded in break the Austrian defensive line around Monte Lupo, Novavilla, Colle Grande and Pecinca.


At the feeble light of the dawn on the 20 October, with a massive artillery preparation General Luigi Capello (commander of the II Army Corps) launched an assault to secure the mountain position around Gorizia so to secure the city once for all; but after 5 days of fierce fighting and limited gain it was decided to call off the offensive.
The contemporary attack towards the Mt. Trsteji through quote 432 in direction of Trieste also had a very limited success, with the conquest of some trench and part of the city of Merna.


By the 25th the Army Staff decided to stop the operation as the troops were exhausted and the resistance too stiff; while the conquest of Gorizia was a huge morale booster for the Italians, military and civilian alike, it had come at a huge cost, around 50.000 causalities for the Regio Esercito and little more than 60.000 for the Austrian. (2)



For the remaining of the year no other great scale attack happened along the Italian front, except a limited Austrian counterattack with the objective of retaking some of the position lost on the Sabotino and Mt. Lupo, but even if initially successful the reaction of the Italians allowed them to reconquers all the territory lost.



(1) - many of this change, except naturally the longer leash for the officers in the field, happened even OTL, here there is more time for prepare and the morale aspect it's not denied.
(2) - a little more better than OTL, not a breakthrought but a more secure position but at a very high cost.
 
Interesting approach - hope this will continue - and I am curious where it will lead (OK, I know Italys future will be brighter - a bit at least)

Ehy naturally it will be a little brighter:D, still it will not be an huge Italowank...more a series of nation that will be in a better shape.
Frankly my idea, is how a little thing, a move done out of despise and pettyness can create some long term change...plus the italian front it's usually forgotten.
 
1916 – Palestinian Front


August


With the new Italian top brass unwilling, making clear from the beginning that launching an offensive on the Isonzo was not on the immediate plan, the British and French were capable to extract some other concession from their ally. In particular sending troops in other front, specifically in Macedonia and Sinai; while the first was a request that both London and Paris had already done several times, the latter was a mild surprise for everyone involved, as except some little probing from the British government to the Italian ambassador in London nothing of official has been demanded to Rome.


Girardi and Boselli simply tried to pre-empt the request of their allies and fulfill on their terms.
The plan for the newly baptized Corpo di spedizione Italiano nel Sinai (Italian expeditionary force in Sinai) was to create a force of 6000 men fully equipped to send against the Ottoman army in the Middle East. These troops will have to a mix of newly recruits and more seasoned men coming from Eritrea and Libya; the decision to divert soldiers from the colonies was not one taken lightly, even due to the dramatic situation in Tripolitania where the entire colony was on rebellion and the Regio Esercito still hold only the big coast cities. Still in the end it was decided that retaken the lost position was much less costly of a prolonged war or a single ill-fated offensive against the Austrian.


The first contingent, destined to form the initial core of the expeditionary force, arrived the 6 of July in Port Said, formed by 700 bersaglieri, quickly nicknamed ‘soldati gallina’ (chicken soldiers) due to the typical headgear, and 200 carabinieri. The contingent don’t have heavy weapons, only 12 horse and 60 mule had be assigned to it, there is little on food and medicine and the ammunition level for rifle and gun it’s low; the supply situation forced the British to step in and to give at the new arrival some help in the form of food, horses, water and medical assistance.


It was not only bad news for the Italians, at the end of the month a contingent of 5 aircraft model SAML S.2 for recognition duty finally arrived and the local subsidiary of the Banco di Roma (Bank of Rome) gave to the Italian contingent one of her magazines to stock their supply. In addition, the Italian embassy was active, in a rare example of initiative, started to search recruit in the Italian community in Egypt, the moment the news of the coming of the expeditionary corps arrived, obtaining immediately almost 300 volunteers. (1)


At the command of this brigade (in reality now just a battalion) there was Brigadier General Ottavio Zoppi, a veteran of both the war in Libya and of the Isonzo Front. While Zoppi was an experienced and capable officer, language problem between him (and the rest of the Italian staff) and the staff of General Murray, the commander of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force at whom the Italians were attached, plagued the relationship during the initial period as the official translators were still in Italy. Not helping the whole situation was the fact that both man seemed really dislike each other.



Battle of Romani


The German commander on the area General Kress von Kressenstein, advocated for long for another attack at the Suez canal and by July not only received permission to launch it but the proposed date in autumn was discarded so to try an attack on the beginning of August due to the collapse of Serbia and the sudden influx of German reinforcements.
Kressenstein plan was simple, with his force, composed by the third Anatolian division and Pasha I, a German force with 5 machine gun companies, 2 trench mortar companies plus heavy and AA artillery, for a total of 16.000 men, the objective was to establish a base on artillery range near the Suez Canal and start shelling the passing ships, effectively closing the route.
The attack forces was spotted by aerial survey the 19th July and their direction and objective quickly deducted; the allied command immediately started to prepare his position while mounted troops continued to follow the enemy force and started to harass it with hit and run delaying tactics.



The battle started the night between the third and 4 August, when the forward position in Romani, held by the first light horse brigade, was attacked by a mixed Ottoman/German force of about 8.000 men. The CP forces were kept at bay until almost the 4.00 by the mounted troops, at least until the sheer number overwhelm their defense and forced a retreat…still Kressenstein troops were unable to press the attack, even if numerous attempt were made, due to the intense shelling and machine gun fire.


By noon of the fourth, the allied troops even if forced to retreat from many position, had for any purpose and heavy cost, stopped the enemy advance on all front. Now both Pasha I and the Anatolian division were facing the hot and harsh day without being able to replenish their water reserve and at the same time being subjected to a hash artillery bombardment.


In the meantime, the Entente reinforcements (including the Corpo di Spedizione Itlaliano), called by the local British Commander Major General H. Lawrence, had started to arrive and take position for a counterattack. A general mounted attack at the enemy main position in Katia, preceded by a series of skirmish by patrol in recognition duty, started at the 14.30 when the New Zealand Mounted Rifles and the 1st and 2nd light horse brigade galloping in a long line and with fixed bayonets, advanced against the enemy positions.



Holding an advantage in artillery the CP forces hold their ground until sunset, forcing Lawrence direct and flank attack to a standstill, but it was clear that a prolonged resistance was not possible due, not only to the loss but also to the shortage of supply (especially water) and the exhaustion of the remaining troops.


In this moment one of the most controversial and ambiguous episodes in that theatre of war happened. During the night of the fourth, the remaining enemy force begun to retreat, leaving Katia in direction of Oghratina were defensive position were already prepared. These movements were helped not only by the cover of the night and by the exhaustion of the ANZAC troops but by the order of Lawrence, that told at the 52nd Lowland Division Commander to operate in direction south but be ready to advance in direction east. A difficult order to execute for an unit without much training for desert warfare and navigation.


This opening was allowing to Von Kressenstein troops to, not only leave the Katia, but even to take with them almost all the heavy equipment. Just before dawn, the enemy movements were spotted by a couple of Italian mounted patrols; Zoppi was alerted of this development as soon as possible.


From here, there are different version of what happened; the survivors of the Italian command swear that they had send at Lawrence HQ the report of the German/Ottoman movements and the request to launch an attack to stop or at least slow this. On the British side, until this day, there is the declaration that no message as ever arrived from the Italian contingent.


While it’s very difficult to really ascertain the truth and the final answer will probably be never know; it’s important to stress the tense relationships between Zoppi and Lawrence, by many described as ‘Hate at first sight’, the great language barrier as the translators were few in numbers for the Italians (many were still in Italy and about to start their trip to Egypt) and finally the little faith on the military capacity of the Italian force.


The Regio Esercito official version was that Zoppi, not receiving any news from the HQ, decided in autonomy to launch a delaying attack against the enemy, trying to cut them off from their escape route. Unfortunely due to the use of old maps (or more probable a navigational error), what was intended as an attack to the enemy right flank instead become a full frontal assault.
Despite the situation, the Italian force begun a desperate charge against the enemy, trying to reach their position as quick as possible. While this foolhardy attack alone was destined to fail, stopping only for a relatively brief period the enemy’s retreat, the battle allowed the rest of the ANZAC forces not only to notice their attempted flight but also give them the time to muster enough force to attack them in masse.


By noon it was clear that any type of retreat was impossible and any exit route was closed, so General Von Kesserstein, with heavy heart, surrendered with all his forces.
The Battle of Romani was the first big Entente victory against the Ottoman Empire and come after the capitulation of the British Army at Kut el-Amara in Mesopotamia a couple of months before and for this reason was a great booster for the morale of the entire alliance. This victory also marked the end of the German and Ottoman campaign against the Sinai Peninsula that from this moment was effectively secured.


The overall loss for the Entente were almost 2000 causalities (600 of them Italians, meaning the practical end of the Italian expeditionary force as a combat worthy force, until reinforcement arrive from Italy), against the total loss of the CP force of 16.000 (2100 dead, the rest taken prisoner) and all their equipment captured. (2)



While for the duration of the conflict both the political and military higher up of the entire entente decided to keep quiet over how this degree of victory has been achieved, so to quell any public animosity between allies.
[FONT=&quot]After the war the debate over the sacrifice of the Italian troops and what was considered in Italy a cold blooded sacrifice for the British Empire and an act of insubordination that had given some good result by sheer luck as it’s seen in the United Kingdom, exploded, with many intellectuals, politicians and demagogue from both side taking part in

1) - all OTL...except a yearl early and a little soused up in term of troops
2) - OTL the CP troops succeed in their escape plan, taking with them almost all their heavy ecquipment.
[/FONT]
 
Some nice twists from WW1. I look forward to seeing how you take things.

It will gradual, things will not greatly change for a while both for the sheer size of the conflict and for the PoD itself as it involve theathres regarded as secondaries.
Still things in general ITTL are a little better for the Entente and a little worse for the CP
 
1916 – Romanian Front

December

The month of December see the fall of the capital of the Kingdom of Romania; as the 10th German troops entered Bucharest, a day before the Romanian troops in the southern part of the nation surrendered (1). Almost 300.000 casualties were suffered by the Rumanians, of that more than 140.000 were prisoners, while the CP suffered about 62.000 casualties.
The only thing that saved Romania army from an even more terrible defeat was the bad weather that allowed them to retreat on Moldova where the reconstruction of the armed forces begin almost immediately. The reason for the bad performance of Romania, that had entered in the war just 4 months earlier, was due to a combination of factors; from obsolete equipment and lack of modern training for both officers and soldiers, to having to fight on two front (as Bulgaria was not knocked up by the Entente offensive as expected) and finally thanks to a bad or non-existent coordination with the Russian contingent sent as reinforcement.

1917 – Italian Front

May

The seventh battle of the Isonzo was fought between 15 May and 10 June 1917. The Italian objectives were to finally obtain a breakthrough and launch their attack against Trieste.
Despite the Italians greatly outnumbered the Austro-Hungarian in both men and artillery, the nature of the front and the good defensive position of the latter, forced the Regio Esercito to pay a great price in blood for their advance.
After an extreme cold winter, the coming of the fair weather allowed the Italian staff to plan a new offensive. During the previous month, General Girardi, with the support of the government, asked at allies, at least 10 division to launch an offensive strong enough to finally break the impasse on the front but the only result obtained was a firm refusal.
For this reason, it was decided to create a new force, called Comando Zona Gorizia, with the unification of three Army Corps and lead by General Luigi Capello, now a national hero thanks to his conquest of the city of Gorizia.

The plan was divided in three phases:

1) – a massive bombardment along all the front, from the mountain in Tolmino to the sea, so to block Austrian attempt to shift the reserve from one zone to another and give to the Italians local superiority.
2) – an attack of Comando Zona Gorizia towards various mountain pass along the Isonzo, to help this endeavor, a diversionary attack on the Loga zone was in program.
3) – Finally, after all that, troops from X Army Corps will have launched an offensive to, not only, consolidate the gains and obtain a more secure perimeter but prepare the terrain for a follow up attack.

The artillery barrage begun at the dawn of the 15th and lasted three days, at the early light of the 18th the Italian troops started their advance in the Plava and Gorizia sector. The offensive during the first day was very promising, with the conquest of various position near Gorizia and the demolition of the Austrian fortification in Zagora and Zagomilla by the Brigade Firenze and Campobasso.
The diversionary attack by the 47th division even with heavy losses was successful in forcing the Isonzo near Loga and starting the building of the bridgehead.

During the first week of the offensive a series of fierce counterattack supported by a very efficient artillery fire, allowed to the Austro-Hungarian to temporary retake various position and to stim the Italian advance, but not stop it.

Between the 23 and 28th, the principal line of the Italian offensive seemed to lose much of his steam, between the increased enemy resistance and the natural exaustation of the troops, with the advance stopped near the city of Mendazza and at river Timavo, but still succeeded in conquering and held the strategically important town of Castagnevinezza and Jamiano.
During this time, what started as a simple diversionary effort was quickly become the real important part of the overall battle, as the bridgehead in Loga and the other obtained in the following days along were extremely promising to the effort of breaking the Austrian line, along the Isonzo and finally attack Trieste and the rest of Istria.
While Girardi, Diaz and Capello were quick enough to divert all available reserve to this operational zone, the construction of the bridgehead was very difficult, due to the terrain and for the continuous attempt of the enemy to stop their work.

To stop that attempt, forcing the Italian Army staff to shift enough troops to contain the offensive and so abandon the bridgehead, it was decided to launch a counterattack against the enemy position near the fortification of Mt. Ermada. A success there, will have accomplished even an important secondary objective, as many K.u.K generals feared that once that forts had fallen, the road for Trieste would quickly become open. For this operation, it was decided to use a couple of infantry division composed by elite troops under the command of General Von Bojna, supported by expressly created artillery groups.
The Austrian attacked the morning of the seventh, with a diversionary assault against Dosso Faiti, even taking the position for a brief time before being evicted by the Italian counterattack. Even the other attacks along the line were successfully repelled or contained, giving a false sense of security to the Italian army.

The dawn of the eight see, the full Austrian counteroffensive, opening with a massive artillery salvo against the Italians, while the barrage lasted less than an hour, it caused an incredible amount of damage, severing almost all communications line and blocking much of the optic observations thanks to the fume produced. This was caused by the scarce defense preparation by the troops of the VII army corps, as it was thought that very soon a new attack would be launched against Mt. Ermada. After the barrage, infiltration troops (Stosstruppen), penetrated the Italian lines, searching for any possible weak point, so to not waste men in futile attempts.
This is considered one of the principal reason for the great success of this operation, as the full attack was directed against the point of conjunction between two divisions, defended by green troops, so a relatively scarce numbers of soldiers, succeed in capture a high number of prisoner and important strategic position like quote 135 and 145. For the entire rest of the day, the Austrian continued their attack, causing a general fall back of the Italian and capturing a sizeable number of prisoners, especially after succeeding in pin down two entire regiments on their own galleries.

A second minor attack was launched in an attempt to close any retreat route, but even if greatly weakened the defenders hold the line in Flondar long enough allowing at a great numbers of men (and their equipment) to reach the safety.
The Italian commanders were very nervous, as they feared a full offensive and a general route, with many rumors of mass surrender and great advance spreading like flame. During this crucial moment, it was the cool and rational mind of General Capello and of the Duke of Aosta to keep the situation from degenerate.
Immediately every available reserve and even the troops from the bridgehead were recalled to stop the Austrian attack and prop up the already tired and fatigued men; in an enormous feat of will and logistic, all possible means were used to speed up the process: mules, horses, trucks, and feet.

The nine and 10 June seen the Italian army held the new line near Dosso Faiti and the Comarie, even if at the price of great loss, while at the same time the first reinforcement arrived.
In an all-out assault, Capello ordered to all the available force, even the already exhausted brigade Siena, Arezzo e Murge, to engage the enemy in the first afternoon of the nine, after a brief but powerful artillery strike. While by the end of the next day, they were successful in retake almost all the lost position, the loss were staggering and the Austrian defense near the Ermada too strong so the offensive was called off.
In the end, the K.u.K. counterattack was only partially successful as while the bridgehead along the Isonzo were dismantled, the forts on Mt.Ermada were still on peril.

In all the seventh of the series of Battle on the Isonzo cost to the Italians almost 200.000 casualties (of them more than 40.000 deaths) and 150.000 causalities (25.000 deaths) for the Austrian; more importantly had teached to the Italian general staff how dangerous were the new infiltration techniques and that countermeasures were vital for the continuation of the war.
The huge number of deaths, wounded and prisoners, was a severe hit for both the army and the population morale and the voice against the war started to increase, even with the government heavy censorships and propaganda.

(1) – OTL Bucharest and all South Romania fall happened the sixth, here they resist a little more due to few troops available to the Bulgarians and the Ottomans thanks to a slightly worse situation in other fronts.
 
Thanks for a plausible development (and not depicting the Austrians as incompetent as done too often here ;))

Well it's not the either the italians are always pictured as vey competent;).
Joke aside, both side had his strenght and weakness, and frankly even if the Regio Esercito had been forced to 'evolve' earlier ITTL, the terrain, the nature of the war itself...and the fact that neither the Austro-Hungarian are a bunch of bubbling idiot make a quick solution impossible.
 
1917 – Macedonian Front


May


The extremely rigid Balkan winter, blocked any operation for the months of January and February; forcing the soldiers of both side to remain in the dubious safety and security of their trench; as only and handful of probing raid were authorized.



During this period, the greatest enemies were cold and famine, plus naturally the continuing worrying about the political situation of Greece and what will happen to them if or, as many thought, when the civil war start.
During the lull in the fight, the Bulgarians, under the supervision of then colonel Vladimir Varzov, greatly improved the defensive work on their position; as the various Allied scout parties and probing attack grimly discovered.


The British commanders, decided to concentrate their effort in breaking the Bulgarian line on Lake Doiran, using at least three division, for a total of 43.000 men, almost 500 machine gun and 300 piece of artillery; this force was planned to be augmented by two French division moved from their position on Resna and Monastir. The day of the offensive was set for the 22 April, and the general objective remained that of knocking out Bulgaria from the war, so greatly ease up the now perilous situation of Romania.


Unfortunely the French position quickly come under a heavy German-Bulgarian attack the 20 April, supported by a very generous use of artillery. While after more than 4 days of fight, they were repelled at high cost and with the enemy having gain only some minor position around Resna, the sudden CP move greatly worried the French commander, making him cancel the order to move the troop in support of the British assault, for fear of a renewed offensive.


The British offensive was postponed for at least 10 days, as a new plan were formulated and the absence of meaningful support taken in account; while this happened the commander of the British and Franco-Serb contingent shout at each other’s regarding the supposed ‘lack of cooperation’ between the various component of the Army of Orient.
A new attack was planned for 2 May, roughly following the original plan and objectives. All begun with a 4 days-long artillery barrage against the Bulgarian position, with the British spending more than 100.000 shells in trying to break the enemy defenses; but obtaining only meager results for all that effort. Instead the strength of the Bulgarian own artillery strikes was a complete surprise for the Entente; Varzov successfully hidden numerous batteries along the mountainous. Quickly a rain of fire descended over the attacking troops, breaking their formation and causing an enormous number of causalities.


For three days the British continued to relentlessly attack the Bulgarian position, every time being repelled with high causalities, as the artillery and fortification proven to be too strong to be easily defeated, and every time the British conquered a valuable position, the quick Bulgarian counterattack dislodged them before they had prepared the necessary defenses.


Even if artillery duel and raid continued until the 10, by the end of the six the full offensive was stopped due to the increasing death toll and the seemingly impossible to break fortification in what was now called ‘The Valley of Death’. The overall cost for the Royal Army was of more of 12.000 causalities, against the little more of 2.000 of the Bulgarians. Once again the hope to bring out Bulgaria from the war and give some relief to Romania were smashed by the harsh reality, the enemy preparation and the hostile terrain proved to be a too strong combination to overwhelm. On the bright side, by the end of the month the situation on Greece finally become more stable, with Prime Minister Venizelos finally take full control of the nation and immediately declare war against the CP; from now on the Army of Orient had finished to always look worried at his back.

1917 – Western Front


May


This was not a very good time for the Entente; in the east, the mighty Russian Empire was no more, the Tsar deposed by an angry and resentful population due to the mishaps in conducting the war. In his place stood a Republic, led by a shaky provisional government with Aleksandr Kerensky as Chairman.


Few in London and Paris had much hope about the stability of this new government, as it was a ramshackle coalition besieged by extremist on every side, not even considering how sick and tired were the general Russian population of the war. The concrete possibility that the Russian seek a separate armistice was one of the factor that prompted for launching the ill fated and worse planned ‘Nivelle Offensive’. The other important factor was that even in the west there were agitation and protest regarding the war and many see the situation quickly coming to a boiling point, so when famed General Robert Nivelle proposed a daring assault on the German line that if successful will have end the war in 48 hours, he found a very eager and desperate public for his proposal, even if many high ranking military personnel made clear theirs doubt over the operation.


The offensive divided in 3 phases, started the 16 April 1917 and involved 1.200.000 men and more than 7000 artillery gun and numerous tank. The first phase was an attack of three army corps against Arras, the second was the conquest of Chemin des Dames and the final third expect the reunion of British (included the Dominion) and French troops after the breakthrough of the German line.


Unfortunately reality was much different from the optimistic expectation of the Entente leaderships; in two week the offensive succeeded only in advance few kilometers but at the staggering cost of almost 200.000 causalities (even if only 100.000 were admitted) and the destructions of almost all their tanks. Many were the reason for this debacle, from the almost total absence of operational security regarding the offensive (the Germans were perfectly aware of the Anglo-French intention), to a strange and false sense of sure victory that had allowed to set unreal objectives for the offensive and at the same time greatly underestimate the causalities number and do not prepare enough medical units.


The huge number of deaths and wounded for negligible results, added to the crushed hope for a quick victory, were the triggers for mutinies that plagued the French Army in that period. This debacle, added to the failure in July of the last Russian offensive and the following descent in chaos of that nation represented the Nadir of the Entente war effort, the lowest point they reached during the conflict, with only the Declaration of War of the United States against Germany in April still giving hope for a succesfull resolution of the conflict
 
1917 – Italian Front


August


The general mood of the Italian population was not very cheerful, the war seemed that will last for long and the daily struggle for merely survive was taking his tool on the civilians and military alike. The last offensive, while being not a total failure as some important objectives had been reached, had not obtained the much hoped and promised breakthrough and the price paid for that results was astronomical…the only bright spot was that also the Austro-Hungarians had sustained massive loss.


While the morale situation in both the frontlines and the Homefront was dire, at least it was not critical as for now it looked that there were no perils of a revolution like Russia or massive mutinies like France…but Girardi and his staff, the King and the government know that they were not in the position to push their luck and that another costly offensive like the May one will change the all situation. Other considerations, this time of military matters, worried the Italian leaderships; Russia the once mighty giant now crippled by revolutions and defeatism had exit the war, accepting the very humiliating condition of the Treaty of Brest-Litovosk as price…a clear sign of the Bolsheviks cowardice and treachery as King Vittorio Emanuele III declared in public.



Everyone in Rome knows were all the freed Austrian troops from the east, probably with some Teutonic reinforcements, will be directed and for what scope; for this reason the front on Trentino was quietly siphoned of men and materials that were shifted on the Isonzo front, where the generals rightly believed that the war in Italy would be decided.


In this climate, it is easy to understand how a reckless and dangerous proposal like the Carzano operation was accepted (1).
The night of the 12 July 1917 a sergeant of the Austrian Army surrender itself to an Italian patrol near Strigno, the man, later identified as Sergeant Mleinek and revealed as a Czech nationalist, bring with him a message of some of his compatriots ready to help the Italian war effort.
With him, there were a message from an informer that the S.I.M (Servizio Informazioni Militari – Military Intelligence Service) had named Paolino or Paulin.

Once the missive was decrypted, many officers were taken aback by his content. Right in front of them there was the defense plan of the front in Valsugana, with troops position and strength, and more, even a an offer to help any military endeavor. To communicate the agreement to his proposal, in any of the following day at exactly noon, two grenades had to shoot against the bel tower of Carzano.

The military situation in Trentino for the Austrian was very precarious, rightly believing that any serious military breakthrough will have happened in the Isonzo and in anticipation of the future offensive, that part of the front was stripped of almost all the best troops and materials so to reinforce the army in Friuli.

To hold the line there were two 'ghost division', called in this manner due to the fact that they were furnished of only the minimum armament possible and composed by troops normally too old or too young for frontline duty, even the ethnic composition of the troops were not homogeneous, with many disparate nationalities forming the two division.

The night of the 15 July, finally Paolino aka Ljudevit Pivko, an officer of the Austrian Army born in Slovenia and member of the nationalistic movement 'Sokol' meet an Italian representative, in this case Major Cesare Pettorelli Lalatta, to explain in full his proposal.
The man stated that he and his group (composed by more or less 50 men), were capable of shut off the electric of the barbwire and isolate the various command blocking the telephonic and telegraphic communications, communicate to the Italian the various security protocols. In case of an offensive, if supplied of opiates, they boasted to be capable to neutralize much of their troops and to able to give to the Italians guides and materials to pass safely the lines.


Immediately the intelligence officers tried to make contact with Girardi and the army staff, but due to both burocratic red tape and an inborn lack of faith of the army high officers for the so-called 'cloak and dagger types', the meeting happened only the 12 August


In any case, both Girardi and his assistants find the proposal both risky but also very tempting; sure there was the strong possibility that all was a trap, but the intelligence officers assured that Paolino had been a faithful source of information for a long time and it was a too good occasion to waste. While there were a general agreement for the last affirmation, it was not an easy decision to take, and for almost an agonizing week, no news come from the top. Finally the 18 September, after another meeting with Lalatta, this time enlarged to comprehend more high-ranking officers, the staff come to a decision, the operation was approved.


The date for the beginning of the attack was decided for the 28 August, 10 days from now. The command of the operation was given to General Antonino Di Giorgio, a man that had fight in Trentino from the start of the war and know perfectly the zone. For the assaults Di Giorgio not only received 2 division composed by experienced troops but also massive logistical aide, trucks enough to transport an entire division, armored cars-and half of the entire force of the Bersaglieri on bicycles.
Despite all that, Lalatta at end of the meeting was not in a festive mood, as it was stated that the entire attack was just a diversion in grand scale. The final objective was so divert the greater possible number of Austrian troops to a secondary front at the expense of the principal, instead of the war-ending breakthrough that he and his contact had envisioned.


The night of the attack things initially goes even better than planned, Di Giorgio advanced troops reached Carzano at the scheduled time through the road agreed with the conspirators without any glitch. There they quickly noticed that many obstacles has been removed and the sentinels were incapacitated or members of Paolino group; this scenes repeated themselves along the entire front in Valsugana, with Bersaglieri and infantrymen find an open road to their advance. The initial concentration of Austrian troops were isolated and quickly overwhelmed, with any stronger resistance eliminated thanks to a strong artillery fire; all these actions were helped by the great difficulties that now the Austrian had to communicate to their command due to the sabotage of the telegraph and telephonic lines.



The greatest success, at least in term of morale and symbol was the capture of Posten Vezzena (of Forte Vezzena) a strategically positioned fortification that till that moment had resisted any Italian attempt to conquer it. Now thanks to the Pivko men, the surprise and the fact that many sentinels has been incapacitated, a quick action by the Bersaglieri allowed the Italians to capture the fort basically untouched and with minimal loss due to the total surprise achieved.


Naturally, no battle plan resist the contact with the enemy, and this was not exception, even with all the promises and preparation possible, the affirmation by the Slovenian of what he and his companions were capable was a bit exaggerated. In various occasion the attempt to block the communication line or incapacitate the sentinels failed and only for luck or more prosaically lack of coordination and initiative the Italian infiltration spread unchecked until was too late. Still the most important part of the contribution of Pivko’s group, the guides for the passage of the Italians through the Austrian defense, had gone perfectly.


By noon all the initial objective were achieved, thanks more to the disorganization of the Austrian army, caught totally unware of the attack and with the chain of command in disarray, even due to the general lack of weapons and the low morale of the stationed troops, than to the Italian prowess, even because the logistical difficulties has been greatly underestimated. The relatively great numbers of k.u.k. prisoner and deserters (even if many of them later quietly returned on their line to continue the war) charaterizated this phase of the offensive.


In mere three days the entire Valsugana was, for all practical purpose, in Italian hand and only a veil of soldiers stand between the Regio esercito. Di Giorgio pushed his men to the physical and mental limit, not giving at the enemy a single moment of pause for fear to lose the momentum; with a pincer maneuver, the 1 October completed the encirclement of the remaining Austro-Hungarian troops in Valsugana, cutting them off from any escape route and forcing their surrender the day after. The three October Trento was evacuated as deemed indefensible at the moment and a general retreat to the new line of defense north of Trento (the line Adamello – Lavis – Cavalese) begun. Unlike any optimistic Italian expectation, it wasn’t a route but an ordered retreat, as after the initial panic of the first attack and infiltration, the local commanders quickly (even if with some difficulties) regained control of the troops and started a more organized resistance.


For their part, the Italians were extremely tired and their logistical chain were very close to the collapse, not counting the fact that the Austrian severely damaged road and bridge to hamper the Italian advance. Therefore, there was no pursuing of the retreating enemy, but a continuation of the sporadic skirmish that characterized the earlier days, this decision was very controversial and Di Giorgio received many critics for that…luckily for everyone involved these voices were muted by the cheers for the conquest of Trento (2).


The consequence of this Italian victory were many and not comprehended immediately.


1 – The front, at least in Trentino, has become shorter, relieving partially the efforts of the Italians.
2 – The Austrian-Hungarian Army was forced to shift troops from the Isonzo to Tyrol to protect the new line of defense and block any possible Italian advance; weakening in this manner any possible future offensive.
3- A boost in the Italian morale, both for the army and the civilians (this was less than expected) and an hit at the Austrian morale, already sorely tried by the previous enormous human loss.
4- An unexpected development was a series of purge and arrest of supposed traitors in the Austro – Hungarian armed forces. The great support given by the nationalist cabal to the enemy offensive, greatly scared Vienna e Budapest, causing them to overreact (at least in the eyes of many contemporary) and try to dispose of any supposed ‘bad apple’. This moves greatly sapped the morale of the army, creating a serious tension that hampered the Austrian performances.
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[FONT=&quot] (1)[/FONT]– I do not make up anything, OTL a plan like this was attempted, the only difference here is that the people in charge are not the same and they plan this operation better and assign more experienced men to execute her…unlike OTL.



(2) – ITTL after the war, a nasty series of accusation fallen on Di Giorgio for the wasted occasion, forcing him to resign to the army; after a stint back in the senate and later as Minister of the Colonial Affair, he decided to leave the political career and retire to private life, continuing his historical studies and writing.
 
Thanks for the new update and background. Nice to see Italy gain some success from the campaign. I will wonder how many of the AH who aided the Italians survived the purges?
 
Thanks for the new update and background. Nice to see Italy gain some success from the campaign. I will wonder how many of the AH who aided the Italians survived the purges?

historically, many of them, including the ringleader, survived attaching themself to the italian troops and fully defect...later forming (with other prisoners) a sort of italian foreign legion.
 
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