A history of the second HMAS Australia

0100 1 March 1942, - Australia goes down
0100 1 March 1942, HMAS Australia, off Java

The five men from the last operational boiler room had scrambled to reach the main deck before the inexorable advance of the water trapped them inside. With the ship settling on its side, corridors that would lead them to freedom now might impede their path, so they had to exercise caution in moving about.

During their groping in the dark, they came to a cross alleyway which, because of the list, blocked their way. If they were to have any hope, the men had to leap across a 5-foot-wide gap to the other side of the alley, a dicey jump. The first man slipped as he jumped and fell screaming into the gap, the second hit the far wall, but short and fell without a sound. It was not a promising start, yet the others successfully landed on the other side.

John Avery's two companions squeezed through a manhole to the deck, but before Avery could do so, Australia turned almost completely upside down and lurched backwards, trapping him underwater. Yet, he remained calm. He thought that if he struggled to reach the surface, he would quickly expend the air in his lungs, plus he could be smacked into heavy objects and debris, even other men, in the water. Instead, he decided that as the ship headed downward, the rush of water leaving the doomed vessel might take him to the surface, so he moved near the hatch where there was air and lay still, trusting the sea would save him. It was only a 30 second later the water shot him out of the hatch.

Soon after, Avery, covered in oil, burst to the surface, gasping for air, the rest of the ship’s debris bobbed about him. He turned to watch Australia's propeller blades, only 50 yards distant, slip under the water. Grateful to be alive, he looked to the sky and uttered a prayer, certain he as the last an off the doomed ship. At 0104, Australia sank in Bantum Bay, all that was left her men and debris floating in the water.
 
0105, 1 March 1942, - Final ship, including Houston go down
0105, 1 March 1942, USS Houston, off Java

The two vessels being locked together arrested the list of USS Houston for some time, despite the fact that the crew, ordered to abandon ship at 0059, were no longer attempting to arrest the flooding. The weight disparity of the two vessels was to eventually cause their separating, Houston breaking free at 0105, rolling onto her side at 0108 and then capsizing at 0110. She was to sink at 0116. The separation caused an even greater gash in the rear hull of the small freighter. She was to follow Houston to the bottom some 12 minutes later.

The Japanese were enraged by the losses they incurred. During that night, many men heard the constant screaming from men near him and the sounds of Japanese machine guns as the enemy moved from group to group, shooting the Americans and Australians as they floated in the water. Yet many other men were picked up and taken prisoner. It seemed to depend on the captain of each IJN vessel. Hec Waller was one of those that fell into captivity. Although 182 of Australia's company died in captivity, the infamous Burma Railway project taking a toll, Waller was to survive the war.

Commander Rentz, Houston's chaplain, was on a raft with other survivors, but is began sinking under the weight of too many men. Saying nothing, he swam away from the raft, but a sailor brought him back. The chaplain looked at the younger men, saying, “You men are young with your lives ahead of you. I’m old and have had my fun.” Uttering a brief prayer, Rentz pulled off his life jacket and disappeared. All but one of the men on his raft survived, although 3 of the 11 died in captivity.

Captain Alfred Rooks, expecting to likely go down with Houston, was sucked down and then bobbed back up. He found himself in the water, remarkably almost alone. Although an older man, he was a strong swimmer. Swimming away from Houston, he was surprised to see land appear out of the murky blackness. Putting his head down, he crested the surf line in the calm sea and found himself on the tiny island of Palau Tarahan. By 0250, he had circumnavigated the 100 meter wide island and made the decision to swim to the Javanese shore line. By 0330, he was ashore. Luck can play so much a part in warfare. Just as dawn broke, he was to encounter a car with two Australia nurses of the 2/13th Australian General Hospital. Eventually reaching Sourabaya, he was on the last Dornier Do-24 out of the Dutch East Indies, arriving at Darwin Harbour on February the 11th March. He was to go on and become the first commander of the new battleship USS South Dakota.

Over the coming hours, various groups of exhausted men, Australian, British, American, and Japanese, reached Java’s shoreline. Among them was the commander of the West Java force, General Hitoshi Imamura of the 16th Army, on board the Ryujo Maru, when it sank. He was less than impressed when his aide, in an effort to cheer him up, congratulated him on his successful landing on Java.
 
The
Yes, it was a strange business. Can't really see why they were removed TBH.

It was an issue all war for the IJN and if a Solomons campaign occurs, those shortages will only be worse.

Thank you.
American cruiser classes, Northamptons as well as Pensacolas and Portlands had their torpedo tunes removed because of weight issues, when the 5" /25s had gunshields added, and the decision made to mount 1.1 " AAA aft on the cruisers, as well as radar on the mainmasts. There was both weight as well as rolling issues. Something had to go and torpedo had to go.
 
Rooks surviving and escaping is a big deal since it means the USN has someone who knows just how good the Japanese are at night fighting and is senior enough to get people to listen to him
 
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0105, 1 March 1942, USS Houston, off Java

The two vessels being locked together arrested the list of USS Houston for some time, despite the fact that the crew, ordered to abandon ship at 0059, were no longer attempting to arrest the flooding. The weight disparity of the two vessels was to eventually cause their separating, Houston breaking free at 0105, rolling onto her side at 0108 and then capsizing at 0110. She was to sink at 0116. The separation caused an even greater gash in the rear hull of the small freighter. She was to follow Houston to the bottom some 12 minutes later.

The Japanese were enraged by the losses they incurred. During that night, many men heard the constant screaming from men near him and the sounds of Japanese machine guns as the enemy moved from group to group, shooting the Americans and Australians as they floated in the water. Yet many other men were picked up and taken prisoner. It seemed to depend on the captain of each IJN vessel. Hec Waller was one of those that fell into captivity. Although 182 of Australia's company died in captivity, the infamous Burma Railway project taking a toll, Waller was to survive the war.

Commander Rentz, Houston's chaplain, was on a raft with other survivors, but is began sinking under the weight of too many men. Saying nothing, he swam away from the raft, but a sailor brought him back. The chaplain looked at the younger men, saying, “You men are young with your lives ahead of you. I’m old and have had my fun.” Uttering a brief prayer, Rentz pulled off his life jacket and disappeared. All but one of the men on his raft survived, although 3 of the 11 died in captivity.

Captain Alfred Rooks, expecting to likely go down with Houston, was sucked down and then bobbed back up. He found himself in the water, remarkably almost alone. Although an older man, he was a strong swimmer. Swimming away from Houston, he was surprised to see land appear out of the murky blackness. Putting his head down, he crested the surf line in the calm sea and found himself on the tiny island of Palau Tarahan. By 0250, he had circumnavigated the 100 meter wide island and made the decision to swim to the Javanese shore line. By 0330, he was ashore. Luck can play so much a part in warfare. Just as dawn broke, he was to encounter a car with two Australia nurses of the 2/13th Australian General Hospital. Eventually reaching Sourabaya, he was on the last Dornier Do-24 out of the Dutch East Indies, arriving at Darwin Harbour on February the 11th March. He was to go on and become the first commander of the new battleship USS South Dakota.

Over the coming hours, various groups of exhausted men, Australian, British, American, and Japanese, reached Java’s shoreline. Among them was the commander of the West Java force, General Hitoshi Imamura of the 16th Army, on board the Ryujo Maru, when it sank. He was less than impressed when his aide, in an effort to cheer him up, congratulated him on his successful landing on Java.
Well done on Captain Rooks surviving. I could see an alternate to your Savo Island story. You have newly minted Rear Admiral Rooks as 2nd in Command to Admiral Crutchley, commanding the Division of Quincy, Astoria,and Vincinnes, and the ships ready for a fight, and with Rooks surviving the Allies have a better appreationof the Type 93 Torpedo.
 
0141 1 March 1942, - Turning South into the Sudra Strait
0141, 1 March 1942, HMAS Perth, near Sumatra

Captain Emile Dechaineux had swung her onto course 180, cutting directly South into the Sudra Strait. He felt that if he passed through the Strait, his two ships should be in the clear, at least until dawn. It was after dawn that he was worried about. The two ships had very limited capacity to defend themselves, not only from air attack, but from surface attack as well.

They had been delayed on leaving Batavia by Evertsen's issues, now they had lost two hours more from their transit by the last disastrous battle. Their original objective of
Tjilatjap was too far away. Instead, they would make for Pelabuhan Ratu Bay, which they should be just able to reach before dawn, lay up and then go to Tjilatjap the following day, before hopefully refuelling and making for Australia.
 
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0630 1 March 1942, - It's a disaster
0630, 1 March 1942, IJN Natori, off Java

Rear Admiral Kenzaburo Hata reflected on what was a disaster, really. It could be spun as a success, he supposed. Sunrise had arrived not half an hours ago, revealing a scene of devastation. One ship capsized, the sea dotted with oil, men, corpses and debris. They had sunk the enemy capital ship, the old HMS Princess Royal, then HMAS Australia. He had not known such a ship was back in commission. They had also sunk an American cruiser, the USS Houston. Plus an American destroyer and a British destroyer. Was that all, or had they sunk other ships as well. Surely four ships could not do so much damage. Lookout had reported seeing five ships, but, in action, these sorts of reports were often unreliable. The loss of a battleship, even an older one, was yet another prestige blow for the allied fores. For all that, the toll had been a heavy one. The navy's, indeed his own, main task had been to protect the transports. In that, there had been a complete failure.

The enemy Task Force had steamed straight into the transports, whether by accident or design it mattered little. Losses were large, consisting of:

7,100 ton assault ship Ryujo Maru, assault force flagship, sunk by gunfire and torpedo from HMAS Australia, with the loss of 688 men, 101 horses, 40 vehicles and 500 tons of weapons, ammunition and provisions
700 ton transport Aso Maru sunk by gunfire from USS Houston and torpedoes from USS Pillsbury, with the loss of 78 men
9,246 ton AA ship Sakura Maru, sunk by gunfire from USS Houston, HMAS Perth and HMS Encounter, with the loss of 233 men and 800 tons of supplies
600 ton minesweeper W3, sunk by gunfire from USS Houston, with the loss of 39 men
6,122 ton transport Junko Maru, torpedoed by mistake by IJN Mikuma, with the loss of 902 men
9,162 ton transport Horai Maru, torpedoed by mistake by IJN Mikuma, with the loss of 347 men
6,960 ton transport Tasuno Maru, torpedoed by mistake by IJN Mogami, with the loss of 166 men
3,120 ton transport Kiko Maru, torpedoed by mistake by IJN Mogami and Mikuma, with the loss of 934 men
600 ton minesweeper W2, torpedoed by mistake by IJN Mikuma, with the loss of 40 men
2,120 ton transport Wirakazi Maru, torpedoed by mistake by IJN Shirayuki, with the loss of 412 men
600 minesweeper W1, sunk by gunfire from HMAS Australia, with the loss of 62 men
3,800 ton ammunition ship Soya, sunk by gunfire from HMNS Evertsen, with the loss of 90 men and 1,080 tons of supplies
13,260 ton heavy cruiser Mogami, sunk by gunfire from HMAS Australia, with the loss of 303 men
600 ton minesweeper W4, sunk by friendly gunfire from IJN Natori, Murakumo and Shirakumo, with the loss of 28 men
5,440 ton Alaska Maru, sunk by gunfire from USS Houston and torpedoed by mistake by IJN Suzaya, with the loss of 888 men
1,300 ton Katsura Maru, sunk after being rammed by USS Houston, with the loss of 61 men

In addition, the destroyers Shirayuki was damaged with three dead, the Harukaze suffered hits to her bridge, engine room and rudder, killing nine, the Murakomo had taken two hits and had 12 dead. The Fubuki had been hit the worst, with 22 dead. The heavy cruiser Mikuma had taken a number of 6 and 4 inch hits and had 17 dead. Four other transports were damaged with 66 dead aboard them. In all, over 5,000 dead, 16 ships sunk and thousands of tons of supplies lost. It all brought him back to his original point. It was a disaster.
 
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0632, 1 March 1942, - Perth anchors up
0632 1 March 1942, HMAS Perth, Pelabuhan Ratu Bay, off Java

The two ships had run the gauntlet through the Strait, passing only a small junk. Dawn had seen then near the entrance of Pelabuhan Ratu Bay. Now the bulk of Perth nudged up to the jetty. His main worry was that the bay itself was on the potential flight path of any Japanese naval aircraft that may be launched from carriers to the South of Java. Yet for all that, his crew needed a rest and inshore the ship could be anchored and camouflaged using the sheets prepared at Surabaya prior to departure. At sea, two warships in company were only more likely to be identified. Plus, it was more likely that the Japanese, if they were looking at all, would be looking at sea, where they would expect to make straight for Australia, being unaware of their precarious fuel situation.
 
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Pangur

Donor
0630, 1 March 1942, IJN Natori, off Java

Rear Admiral Kenzaburo Hata reflected on what was a disaster, really. It could be spun as a success, he supposed. Sunset had arrived not half an hours ago, revealing a scene of devastation. One ship capsized, the sea dotted with oil, men, corpses and debris. They had sunk the enemy capital ship, the old HMS Princess Royal, then HMAS Australia. He had not known such a ship was back in commission. They had also sunk an American cruiser, the USS Houston. Plus an American destroyer and a British destroyer. Was that all, or had they sunk other ships as well. Surely four ships could not do so much damage. Lookout had reported seeing five ships, but, in action, these sorts of reports were often unreliable. The loss of a battleship, even an older one, was yet another prestige blow for the allied fores. For all that, the toll had been a heavy one. The navy's, indeed his own, main task had been to protect the transports. In that, there had been a complete failure.

The enemy Task Force had steamed straight into the transports, whether by accident or design it mattered little. Losses were large, consisting of:

7,100 ton assault ship Ryujo Maru, assault force flagship, sunk by gunfire and torpedo from HMAS Australia, with the loss of 688 men, 101 horses, 40 vehicles and 500 tons of weapons, ammunition and provisions
700 ton transport Aso Maru sunk by gunfire from USS Houston and torpedoes from USS Pillsbury, with the loss of 78 men
9,246 ton AA ship Sakura Maru, sunk by gunfire from USS Houston, HMAS Perth and HMS Encounter, with the loss of 233 men and 800 tons of supplies
600 ton minesweeper W3, sunk by gunfire from USS Houston, with the loss of 39 men
6,122 ton transport Junko Maru, torpedoed by mistake by IJN Mikuma, with the loss of 902 men
9,162 ton transport Horai Maru, torpedoed by mistake by IJN Mikuma, with the loss of 347 men
6,960 ton transport Tasuno Maru, torpedoed by mistake by IJN Mogami, with the loss of 166 men
3,120 ton transport Kiko Maru, torpedoed by mistake by IJN Mogami and Mikuma, with the loss of 934 men
600 ton minesweeper W2, torpedoed by mistake by IJN Mikuma, with the loss of 40 men
2,120 ton transport Wirakazi Maru, torpedoed by mistake by IJN Shirayuki, with the loss of 412 men
600 minesweeper W1, sunk by gunfire from HMAS Australia, with the loss of 62 men
3,800 ton ammunition ship Soya, sunk by gunfire from HMNS Evertsen, with the loss of 90 men and 1,080 tons of supplies
13,260 ton heavy cruiser Mogami, sunk by gunfire from HMAS Australia, with the loss of 303 men
600 ton minesweeper W4, sunk by friendly gunfire from IJN Natori, Murakumo and Shirakumo, with the loss of 28 men
5,440 ton Alaska Maru, sunk by gunfire from USS Houston and torpedoed by mistake by IJN Suzaya, with the loss of 888 men
1,300 ton Katsura Maru, sunk after being rammed by USS Houston, with the loss of 61 men

In addition, the destroyers Shirayuki was damaged with three dead, the Harukaze suffered hits to her bridge, engine room and rudder, killing nine, the Murakomo had taken two hits and had 12 dead. The heavy cruiser Mikuma had taken a number of 6 and 4 inch hits and had 17 dead. Four other transports were damaged with 66 dead aboard them. In all, over 5,000 dead, 16 ships sunk and thousands of tons of supplies lost. It all brought him back to his original point. It was a disaster.
I think you mean sunrise
 
Nearly 5,000 dead and a Heavy Cruiser not to mention the Naval Auxillaries and the large transports that Japan had a lack of throughout the war. bloodbath.
 
1916 1 March 1942, Nagumo has some success, but not to the North
1916, 1 March 1942, IJN Akagi, off Southern Java

It had been a long day for the Kido Butai commander. Requests to search for escaped allied ship from Hara, who was not even sure that such ships, had, indeed, escaped. It was yet another day of low, scudding clouds, especially around Western Java. None the less, he had complied with such a request, launching four float-planes to search the area. He would launched more as well, if it were not for the fact that a search plane from Tone, launched toward Christmas Island, had sighted a ship just over the horizon. This merchant ship, the Modjokerto, was engaged by gunfire from the screen at 1125 and sunk. Soon after, the same aircraft spotted a "possible aircraft carrier" heading due south. This trumped all other considerations and at 1200 Nagumo ordered a strike to sink it. In fact, it was the tanker USS Pecos. The mistake is corrected when the first 26 plane strike has just launched. However, the tanker proves a difficult customer to sink, so at 1513 another launch is made. Pecos goes down at 1711. Almost immediately after, at 1720, the destroyer USS Edsall stumbles onto the main Kido Butai formation from astern, having come down from northeast in response to the tanker's distress calls. Kongo, Haruna and, CruDiv 4's Atago, Maya and Takao, combined with yet another air strike the destroyer at 1900.

Nagumo has had a busy day. His search planes to the North find nothing through the gaps in the cloud. Tomorrow he plans to swing and hit Christmas Island. Any escaping allied ships could have gone there. Then he will follow with a strike on Tjilatjap the following day, weather permitting, for the forecast is a continuation of the current poor weather until late on the 4th.
 
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1950, 1 March 1942, - They make their escape
1950, 1 March 1942, HMAS Perth, off Southern Java

The two ships have cleared Pelabuhan Ratu Bay and turn East towards Tjilatjap, making a more sedate 22 knots, the night is to pass uneventfully, the ships arriving at Tjilatjap 0425 on the 2nd of March. Emile Dechaineux finds what he is looking for, fuel and both ships are able to almost fill their bunkers. No ammunition is available, however. They both departed at 1844 that night.

By dawn at 0610 on the 3rd of March, the two ships are more than 300 nautical miles Southeast of Tjilatjap, Dechaineux having moved their course to due South, making for Exmouth. They eventually make the port at 1022 on the 4th of March. Fremantle is eventually reached on the 5th. Something had survived of ABDA.
 
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1215 12 March 1942, - The bunglings of the navy
1215, 12 March 1942, Town Hall, Batavia, Dutch East Indies

Lieutenant General Hitoshi Imamura reflected. The navy's bungling had caused his men to suffer dearly, not only the losses suffered at sea, but also on land. This quite apart from his own unplanned swim. The original plan called for the Fukushima and Sato detachments to advance on Batavia, whilst the Nasu detachment was to capture Buitenzorg, cutting the escape route to Bandoeng, and, eventually, Tjilatjap. With the losses incurred at sea, he had been forced to downgrade the Nasu detachment to a virtual blocking force, with instructions to halt in the face of superior odds. This they had done, failing to capture Buitenzorg. He had no doubt that this had resulted in allied troops escaping that may otherwise have been captured.

The navy had raided Tjilatjap on the 5th, sinking 17 ships, so that had been something, but he was certain others had escaped. He was correct. Not only Perth and Eversen had left on the 3rd. So had the Australian Minesweeping Flotilla based at Tjilatjap. The town did not fall until the 9th, but between the 5th and the 9th, over 1,000 made their escape from the port. More would have gone, but for the lack of ships.

The Australian 2/2nd Pioneer and 2/3rd Machine Gun Battalions were positioned along a riverbank at Leuwiliang and put up a vigorous defense during the Battle of Leuwiliang . Highly accurate volleys from "D" Battery, U.S. 2/131st Field Artillery, destroyed many Japanese tanks and trucks and halted Nasu detachment. Fukushima and Sato detachments were held for almost three days at Balaradja, Dutch Marmon-Herrington light tanks having to be destroyed only by the courage of his infantry men. All the Japanese tanks earmarked had been lost at sea, as had some of his artillery. Even these inadequate Dutch tanks were hard to bypass. It had all cost more of his own men's lives than it should, as well as ruining his plans to capture Tjilatjap before the East Java force.

It was typical of the bungling of the navy, which were more interested in sinking ships than capturing ground.
 
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Just one update to go, which will project a bit of the rest of 1942. Hard to go past that time, when projecting ahead gets a bit hard. I will probably have that up tomorrow, I reckon.
 
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