Part One: Nemesis
AGOD
Part One: Nemesis
"Napoleon on the Sands at Boulogne, France" by Andrew Carrick Gow
What is the whole history of England, but a continued scene of rapine and desolation, with now and then a few solitary intervals of repose?
~ William Sherwin, radical journalist and Napoleon sympathizer
Great Britain was a titan of all that France wasn't. Napoleon Bonaparte, now Napoleon I, had spent a decade of his wartime career hopelessly fighting Britain's mastery over the oceans, trade, finance, and international diplomacy. In 1793, Bonaparte had tried to command a naval assault on Sardinia, only to be overwhelmed by obstacles. Later that same year he had besieged Toulon, forced to face the Royal Navy as it supplied a whole city not even under their control. The Royal Navy had always troubled him, enriching France's enemies with British loans. It was to the point that Bonaparte's hero and icon, Pasquale Paoli, was transformed into a British client. When Bonaparte attempted a conquest of Egypt, the Royal Navy followed and ultimately destroyed his naval force, the Armée d'Orient's fleet, at the Battle of the Nile, dooming Bonaparte's expedition to a slow death by isolation and plague. Even now, a decade since the beginning of his conflicts with Britain, Bonaparte felt inflamed over Britain's break with the Treaty of Amiens and their seizure of Franco-Dutch ships without warning. It was 1805 (Nivȏse of year XIII on the French Republican Calendar), and the world was revolving around the English Channel.
Napoleon's words, "Let us be masters of the Channel for six hours and we are masters of the world." would christen the coming naval campaign, a campaign which Bonaparte envisioned as a final, decisive strike against France's arch-nemesis. The entire plan and coming operation was a longshot, not aided by Bonaparte's micromanagement and inexperience with naval warfare, but it wasn't an impossibility. In their current positions, France's fleets and that of it's ally, Spain, were broken up in portions in port-cities all throughout their respective nations. If these fleets were fully combined it would allow them to temporarily challenge British naval dominion, and possibly even guarantee Bonaparte his "six hours" to transport his armies across the Channel. Bonaparte hoped to rely on a snowball effect, essentially a first fleet would break out from its blockade in Toulon and move to Spain's port-cities, dispersing their smaller blockades and combining with the Spanish fleets. The now-combined Franco-Spanish fleet would then move across the Atlantic and into the Caribbean, with the intent of drawing away the Royal Navy from European waters. After combining with the other major French fleet, which would escape its blockade at Brest, the stage would be set for the final act: seizure of the English Channel.
The foundations of the plan were unstable. There existed a wide, wide ravine in talent, experience, and organization between the French and British navies. Becoming a great seaman required years of practice and devotion onboard a seafaring vessel. Britain had a long and prestigious seafaring tradition, and was constantly training new generations of officers and sailors. France's navy, while by no means weak (it was possibly second only to Britain's), was atrophied after constant defeats against Britain which continued to kill off or capitulate whatever talent France cultivated. The French Revolution itself had purged the French navy of its most capable men, and unlike in the army, the void of these officers could not be replenished without either time or victories. The French navy was also not prioritized, it was given less attention and less resources than the army, and had fallen far behind its British counterpart in bureaucratic efficiency. The only true way with which the French navy could outmatch the British navy was through pure numerical advantage, which is exactly what Bonaparte's plan was attempting to do.
Concerning the Caribbean, there existed the French colony of Saint-Domingue. Following a long, complex series of rebellions and civil conflicts between racial and economic groups on the colony, a specific group of pro-French ex-slaves under Toussaint Louverture had won absolute control. Bonaparte long agonized over the destiny of Saint-Domingue, and specifically, whether or not to overthrow Louverture with French military power. French ministers were under heavy pressure from the exiled (and extremely wealthy) planter elite of the colony, who manufactured constant propaganda of white citizens being massacred by blacks, to restore the old order in Saint-Domingue. Bonaparte himself was receptive to this propaganda, though after closer examination (as was usual for a micromanager like himself), restoring the "old order" seemed more and more impossible. Besides Louverture having already concentrated absolute power on the colony, both the Spanish and British had earlier attempted invasions of Saint-Domingue to no success. The British especially had mounted a previously unthinkable expedition of 30,000 soldiers and the full force of the Royal Navy, only to be trapped within Saint-Domingue's cities and decimated by yellow fever. Bonaparte resigned himself to the death of France's New World empire, and accepted Louverture's rule under a host of pro-French conditions. Louverture, as it would turn out, had never stopped considering himself a French citizen and Roman Catholic, even as Bonaparte contemplated his death.
Entering 1805, preparations were already well under-way for the English Channel campaign. In command of Toulon's fleet and of the entire operation was one Louis-René Levassor de Latouche Tréville, a beacon of talent and competence in the French navy. He was a pre-revolution naval commander, a rare breed, and one of a few men who had bested Horatio Nelson in open battle (something for which Nelson considered him his nemesis). As France's fleets remained in place, lazing around their port-cities, Bonaparte instituted a training regimen for the sailors under Tréville's guidance. "Active training" itself was a new, revolutionary practice, which was happening concurrently with the training of the Grande Armée off the English Channel coast at Boulogne. Bonaparte attempted to maintain total secrecy around both the future English Channel campaign and the invasion of England. It was hoped that if Britain's invasion fever was quelled, their government would be more willing to divert naval attention to the Caribbean once the time had come. Ultimately, total secrecy was impossible, though British public awareness of French plans remained too uncertain for mass calls to action on the part of the government. It would soon matter little though, as come March, the time was ready for the French navy to embody Destiny and set sail towards the unknown.
AGOD
Part One: Invidia
Part One: Nemesis
"Napoleon on the Sands at Boulogne, France" by Andrew Carrick Gow
What is the whole history of England, but a continued scene of rapine and desolation, with now and then a few solitary intervals of repose?
~ William Sherwin, radical journalist and Napoleon sympathizer
Great Britain was a titan of all that France wasn't. Napoleon Bonaparte, now Napoleon I, had spent a decade of his wartime career hopelessly fighting Britain's mastery over the oceans, trade, finance, and international diplomacy. In 1793, Bonaparte had tried to command a naval assault on Sardinia, only to be overwhelmed by obstacles. Later that same year he had besieged Toulon, forced to face the Royal Navy as it supplied a whole city not even under their control. The Royal Navy had always troubled him, enriching France's enemies with British loans. It was to the point that Bonaparte's hero and icon, Pasquale Paoli, was transformed into a British client. When Bonaparte attempted a conquest of Egypt, the Royal Navy followed and ultimately destroyed his naval force, the Armée d'Orient's fleet, at the Battle of the Nile, dooming Bonaparte's expedition to a slow death by isolation and plague. Even now, a decade since the beginning of his conflicts with Britain, Bonaparte felt inflamed over Britain's break with the Treaty of Amiens and their seizure of Franco-Dutch ships without warning. It was 1805 (Nivȏse of year XIII on the French Republican Calendar), and the world was revolving around the English Channel.
Napoleon's words, "Let us be masters of the Channel for six hours and we are masters of the world." would christen the coming naval campaign, a campaign which Bonaparte envisioned as a final, decisive strike against France's arch-nemesis. The entire plan and coming operation was a longshot, not aided by Bonaparte's micromanagement and inexperience with naval warfare, but it wasn't an impossibility. In their current positions, France's fleets and that of it's ally, Spain, were broken up in portions in port-cities all throughout their respective nations. If these fleets were fully combined it would allow them to temporarily challenge British naval dominion, and possibly even guarantee Bonaparte his "six hours" to transport his armies across the Channel. Bonaparte hoped to rely on a snowball effect, essentially a first fleet would break out from its blockade in Toulon and move to Spain's port-cities, dispersing their smaller blockades and combining with the Spanish fleets. The now-combined Franco-Spanish fleet would then move across the Atlantic and into the Caribbean, with the intent of drawing away the Royal Navy from European waters. After combining with the other major French fleet, which would escape its blockade at Brest, the stage would be set for the final act: seizure of the English Channel.
The foundations of the plan were unstable. There existed a wide, wide ravine in talent, experience, and organization between the French and British navies. Becoming a great seaman required years of practice and devotion onboard a seafaring vessel. Britain had a long and prestigious seafaring tradition, and was constantly training new generations of officers and sailors. France's navy, while by no means weak (it was possibly second only to Britain's), was atrophied after constant defeats against Britain which continued to kill off or capitulate whatever talent France cultivated. The French Revolution itself had purged the French navy of its most capable men, and unlike in the army, the void of these officers could not be replenished without either time or victories. The French navy was also not prioritized, it was given less attention and less resources than the army, and had fallen far behind its British counterpart in bureaucratic efficiency. The only true way with which the French navy could outmatch the British navy was through pure numerical advantage, which is exactly what Bonaparte's plan was attempting to do.
Concerning the Caribbean, there existed the French colony of Saint-Domingue. Following a long, complex series of rebellions and civil conflicts between racial and economic groups on the colony, a specific group of pro-French ex-slaves under Toussaint Louverture had won absolute control. Bonaparte long agonized over the destiny of Saint-Domingue, and specifically, whether or not to overthrow Louverture with French military power. French ministers were under heavy pressure from the exiled (and extremely wealthy) planter elite of the colony, who manufactured constant propaganda of white citizens being massacred by blacks, to restore the old order in Saint-Domingue. Bonaparte himself was receptive to this propaganda, though after closer examination (as was usual for a micromanager like himself), restoring the "old order" seemed more and more impossible. Besides Louverture having already concentrated absolute power on the colony, both the Spanish and British had earlier attempted invasions of Saint-Domingue to no success. The British especially had mounted a previously unthinkable expedition of 30,000 soldiers and the full force of the Royal Navy, only to be trapped within Saint-Domingue's cities and decimated by yellow fever. Bonaparte resigned himself to the death of France's New World empire, and accepted Louverture's rule under a host of pro-French conditions. Louverture, as it would turn out, had never stopped considering himself a French citizen and Roman Catholic, even as Bonaparte contemplated his death.
Entering 1805, preparations were already well under-way for the English Channel campaign. In command of Toulon's fleet and of the entire operation was one Louis-René Levassor de Latouche Tréville, a beacon of talent and competence in the French navy. He was a pre-revolution naval commander, a rare breed, and one of a few men who had bested Horatio Nelson in open battle (something for which Nelson considered him his nemesis). As France's fleets remained in place, lazing around their port-cities, Bonaparte instituted a training regimen for the sailors under Tréville's guidance. "Active training" itself was a new, revolutionary practice, which was happening concurrently with the training of the Grande Armée off the English Channel coast at Boulogne. Bonaparte attempted to maintain total secrecy around both the future English Channel campaign and the invasion of England. It was hoped that if Britain's invasion fever was quelled, their government would be more willing to divert naval attention to the Caribbean once the time had come. Ultimately, total secrecy was impossible, though British public awareness of French plans remained too uncertain for mass calls to action on the part of the government. It would soon matter little though, as come March, the time was ready for the French navy to embody Destiny and set sail towards the unknown.
AGOD
Part One: Invidia
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